importance to the Government, and made every
effort to save it.

On Monday night, reinforcements, under com
mand of Colonel Owen, Sixtieth Indiana, were
received from Lebanon Junction, consisting of
a part of the Sixtieth Indiana, (four hundred
and twenty men,) including one company of the
Twenty-eighth Kentucky, Lieutenant Conaway,
which had been attached to it for duty ; a part
of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, Colonel King, (five
hundred and seventy men,) and a battery of six
pieces, Captain Conkle in command.

On Tuesday, the sixteenth instant, about half-
past nine A.M. the advance of the enemy attack
ed our pickets on the south of our works, and
from the direction of Cave City. His advance
was sternly resisted by companies A, B, and H,
Fiftieth Indiana, and part of company K, Seventy-
eighth Indiana, under Major Wells, who, as well
as the officers and men under him, in this little



skirmish, displayed great coolness and courage.
They held the enemy s advancing column at bay
for over an hour, and were only pressed back by
overwhelming numbers. The object evidently
was to avoid the field-work on our left, known
as Fort Craig, from which he had been so fatally
repulsed on Sunday, and, under the cover of the
woods, to approach and carry by storm the
breastworks of our right. But the promptness
and energy with which he was met seemed to
deter him from the attempt. Before eleven A.M.
the engagement had become general along our
south line, the heavy pressure being upon the
west or right. The men were cool and eager for
the expected assault. The fire was rapid and
continuous on the part of the enemy, who kept
himself under cover of the woods.

Between two and three it slackened, and by
three it had almost ceased, and, supposing the
enemy had withdrawn from the woods which
fronted our entire south line, and, being anxious
to occupy the farther edge of it that I might be
advised of, and check a renewed attack, company
A, Fiftieth Indiana, Captain Barrell, was thrown
out as skirmishers, to feel through it. They
soon became hotly engaged with the enemy, who
attempted to turn their left flank. I immediate
ly ordered Captain Carothers, with company G,
of the same regiment, to his support. The order
was promptly obeyed and the company gallantly
deployed under a galling fire. This was a bril
liant little affair. In it Lieutenant Burton, of
company G, fell severely wounded, nobly doing
his duty.* Finding that the enemy still occu
pied the woods in force, our men were with
drawn under a fire from the works. I should
also mention that company A, Sixtieth Indiana,
was thrown out as skirmishers upon the left
early in the engagement, and there remained for
some time, doing excellent service with a loss of
one man wounded. By half-past four the firing
on both sides had nearly ceased, there being only
an occasional shot from our guns as opportunity
offered to prevent the planting of batteries by
the enemy. Between five and six o clock a flag
of truce from the enemy was seen approaching.
I sent Colonel Wilder to receive it. It covered
a note from General Bragg, commanding the
enemy s forces, asserting that we were surround
ed by an overwhelming force, all hopes of reen-
forcernents cut off, and demanding a surrender
to save the loss of human life which must result
from carrying the works by storm. I promptly
and peremptorily declined, but when Colonel
Wilder returned, after the delivery of my reply,
and informed me that so far as he had been able
to observe, the force against us was truly over
whelming, and especially in artillery, and situa
tion critical, and being a senior officer of equal
rank with several others in the works, some of
whom had had greater experience, I, at his sug
gestion, deemed it my duty to call a council of
war of those officers. I desired .also to gain time
in hopes of relief from this place or from Bowling
Green. I, therefore, sent a note to Gen. Bragg,
Since dead.



DOCUMENTS.



453



asking a further suspension of hostilities to give
me time for consultation. He consented to such
suspension until nine o clock P.M. This was a
point gained, as by that time it would be too late
for further attack except by assault, which I felt
able to repel.

By this time I had got telegraphic communica
tion with Louisville, and immediately telegraph
ed General Gilbert in substance that we had held
the enemy, said to be Bragg s and Folk s whole
arm} , at bay all day ; that evidently fresh columns
were being moved against us, and whether we
should be able to continue to hold our posi
tion without assistance remained to be seen ;
that we should do the best we could. I received
an answer ordering me to turn the command
over to Colonel Wilder. I replied that under the
circumstances I regarded the order as unjust,
but should obey it. In the mean time the coun
cil had been convened, consisting of Colonels
Owen, Wilder, King, Emerson, and Murray, Cap
tain Conkle, and myself. The unanimous con
clusion was, that if they had the force claimed,
namely, over twenty-five thousand men and sixty
pieces of artillery besides cavalry, it would be a
useless sacrifice of human life to resist, and
especially as by their artillery they could in
spite of us occupy the heights north of the river,
which completely covered our works. But it
was also unanimously resolved that we should
be permitted by some competent officer or offi
cers to have actual observation of their strength
or that we should demonstrate it by actual trial
of arms. At the conclusion of the council I
formally relinquished the command to Colonel
Wilder who has reported the further proceed
ings. I at once telegraphed Brigadier-General
Gilbert in substance that I had so relinquished
the command, and that I should take my mus
ket and go into the trenches, that as a senior un
der the circumstances I would not as an officer-
fight under a junior.

I was immediately ordered by him to report to
Colonel Wilder under arrest, which I did. It is
but just that I should add that I did not object
to serving under Colonel Wilder. Between him
and myself had existed, and yet exist, the most
friendly and cordial relations. We had in all
things agreed, and no praise from me would add
to his reputation as an officer. The proper au
thorities must judge from subsequent events
whether my telegram to General Gilbert was
such evidence of weakness as justified my re
moval from command, or whether it was simply
evidence that I saw our peril and was not afraid
to look it in the face. To that authority I shall i
also appeal for the justness of my arrest. Of the
coolness and determined bravery of the men I
cannot speak too highly. Of officers, when all
did their duty well, especial praise seems almost
out of place ; yet some, of course, had better op
portunities than others to display tact, coolness,
and courage.

Justice requires me to acknowledge my obli
gations to Lieutenant-Colonel Edward A. King,
of the Nineteenth regulars, but now Colonel of



the Sixty-eighth Indiana volunteers. He had
position about midway of the south line of the
works west of the railroad.

Six companies of his regiment were held as a
support in a hollow near by, the assault being
anticipated in that direction, His experience,
coolness, and close observation, even when shell
and musket-balls flew thick and fast, were inval
uable, and cannot be too favorably mentioned.

Colonel Owen was in command of the field-
works on the left, (Fort Craig,) with discretion
ary authority. I need scarcely say that it was a
trust worthily confided.

I should also mention the excellent conduct of
Adjutant John R. Simpson, of the Fiftieth In
diana, and Lieutenant Pompella, of the Sixteenth
Kentucky, who acted as my aids. On Sunday
they boldly reconnoitred the woods along our
march to guard us against surprise. On Tues
day they did their duty with a quiet fearlessness
that deserves favorable notice.

Our loss was one officer, Lieutenant Burton,
and six privates wounded ; one private mortally,
and Lieutenant Burton dangerously, a musket-
ball passing through both legs, and shattering
the bone of one. The enemy s Joss was over
one hundred said to be one hundred and five.

The forces under my command during this
affair were those men named by Colonel Wilder
in his report, and the reinforcements thereto
hereinbefore noticed.

I am, respectfully,

0. L. DUNHAM,

Colonel Commanding United States Forces at Greer H?"*r

N. B. It is probably but just both to Major-
General Gilbert and myself to add that, since my
arrival in this city, he has informed me that, with
in a few moments after issuing the order direct
ing me to report to Colonel Wilder under arrest,
he sent a despatch not only releasing me froro
arrest but restoring me to the command, but
telegraphic communication being in the .cear
time cut off, it did not reach me.

Respectfully, C. L. -.,

Colonel Cominandinsj United States Forces at Green Rivet
MAJOR-GENERAL JONES S REPORT.

To General S. Cooper, Adjutant- General C. S. .

A courier from General Bragg s headquarters,
eight miles west of Munfordville, on the night of
the eighteenth instant, confirms the report that
Bragg captured about five thousand men at Mun
fordville on the seventeenth instant. Our loss
was about fifty killed and wounded.

The same courier reports that up to the twelfth
instant about twenty-three thousand Kentuckians
had joined Gen. Smith, and they were still com
ing. The home guard was delivering up their guns
as rapidly as they could be received.

SAMUEL JONES,

Major-Geueral.

GENERAL BRAGG S REPORT.

To General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-
General :
The garrison at this place surrendered ,ast



454



REBELLION RECORD, 1862.



night without our firing a gun. We got four
thousand (4000) prisoners, four thousand (4000)
small arms, pieces of artillery and munitions in
large quantities. BRAXTON BRAGG.



Doc. 122.
BATTLE OF ANTIETAM, MD.*

DESPATCH FROM GENERAL HOOKER.

CENTREVILLB, MD., Wednesday, September 17.

A GREAT battle has been fought and we are
victorious. I had the honor to open it yesterday
afternoon, and it continued until ten o clock this
morning, when I was wounded, and compelled to
quit the field.

The battle was fought with great violence on
Loth sides. The carnage has been awful.

I only regret that I was not permitted to take
part in the operations until they were concluded,
for I had counted on either capturing their army
or driving them into the Potomac.

My wound has been painful, but it is not one
that will be likely to lay me up. I was shot
through the foot. J. HOOKKK,

Brigadier-General.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL COX S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH ARMY CORPS, ^
MOUTH OF ANTIETAM, September 23, 1S62. )

Lieutenant- Colonel L. Richmond, A. A. G., Head
quarters Right Wing, Major- General Burnside
Commanding :

SIR : I have the honor to submit the following
report of the movements of the Ninth army corps
on the sixteenth instant, and their parts in the
battle of Sharpsburgh on the seventeenth.

Un tne evening of the fifteenth instant the
Ninth army corps having been ordered away
from the remainder of the right wing, was en
camped in the rear of the extreme left of the
whole line of the army of the Potomac, close to
the hills on the south-east side of the valley of
the Antietam, and on the left of the road from
Kohersville to Sharpsburgh.

In the afternoon of the sixteenth the whole
corps, except Wilcox s division, was moved for
ward, and to the left and front, by command of
Major-Gen. Burnside, in three columns, and took
up a new position upon the rear slopes of the
ridges on the left bank of the Antietam, the cen
tre of the corps being nearly opposite the stone
bridge over the stream on the above-mentioned
road.

The positions assigned the divisions of the
command were as follows : The right front to be
occupied by Crook s brigade of the Kanawha di
vision, supported in rear by Sturgis s division ; a
commanding knoll in the centre to be occupied
by battery E, Second United States artillery,
First Lieutenant Samuel N. Benjamin command
ing, consisting of twenty-pounder Parrott guns ;
the left front to be occupied by Rodman s divi
sion, supported in rear by E wing s brigade of the

* Further reports of this battl<* will be found in the Supple
ment.



Kanawha division, (the whole of the latter div:
sion being under command of Col. E. P. Scam
rnon.) The columns were conducted to their
new position by staff-officers of the personal stall
of Gen. Burnside. The artillery of the command,
except Benjamin s battery, was held in reserve.

Shortly after daybreak on the seventeenth, the
enemy s batteries opened upon the batteries of
our line, and a brisk artillery fight began, in
which Benjamin s battery and Durell s battery
(the latter sent forward a little to the right of on.
position, under charge of Capt. Rawalle, by Gen.
Sturgis) took an active part, cooperating with
batteries of other corps on our right. Two of the
enemy s caissons were exploded, arid many of
their guns silenced. The shot and shelf fell
thickly in our bivouac, but little damage was
done us.

About seven o clock orders were received from
Gen. Burnside to move forward the corps to the
ridge nearest the Antietam and hold it in readi
ness to cross the stream, carrying the bridge and
the heights above it by assault. The command
was moved forward in columns as it had been
formed the previous night, and promptly took
position as directed, and the light artillery was
advanced to cover the movement ; McMullin s,
Durell s, Clark s, Muhlenberg s and Cook s bat
teries being placed on the heights to right and
left, and somewhat to the front of Benjamin s
battery, to which a section of twenty-pounders
from Simmons s battery was also temporarily
attached. Wilcox s division was also brought
up and held as a reserve.

About nine o clock the order was received to
cross the stream. Immediately the Eleventh
Connecticut infantry, Col. Kingsbury command
ing, was detailed from Hodman s division to de
ploy as skirmishers, and drive the enemy from
the head of the bridge. The column on the right
(Crook s brigade of the Kanawha division, sup
ported by Sturgis s division) was ordered to
inarch under cover of the Eleventh Connecticut,
and attempt to carry the bridge by assault, de
ploying to right and left as soon as the bridge
should be carried, and taking the heights above
it. The column on the left (Rodman s division,
supported by Ewing s brigade of the Kanawha
division) was ordered to cross, if possible, by a
ford about one third of a mile below the bridge,
take the heights above it, and join the column
crossing by the bridge.

The bridge itself is a stone structure of three
arches, with stone parapet above, this parapet to
some extent flanking the approach to the bridge
at either end.

The valley in which the stream runs is quite
narrow, the steep slope on the right bank ap
proaching to the water s edge. In this slope the
roadway is scarped, running both ways from the
bridge and passing to the higher land above by
ascending through ravines, above and below the
other ravine being some six hundred yards above
the bridge, the town about half that distance
below. On the hill-side immediately above the
bridge w r as a strong stone fence running parallel



DOCUMENTS.



455



to the stream, the turns of the roadway were
covered by rifle-pits and breastworks made of
rails and stone, all of which defences, as well as
the woods which covered the slope, were filled
with the enemy s infantry and sharp-shooters.
Beside the infantry defences, batteries were
placed to enfilade the bridge and all its ap
proaches. The crest of the first hill above the
bridge is curved toward the steam, forming a sort
of natural tcte de pont. The next ridge beyond
rises somewhat higher, though with less regular
ity, the depression between the two being but
slight, and the distance varying in places from
three to seven hundred yards.

In accordance with the order mentioned above,
the Eleventh Connecticut advanced to the stream
und warmly engaged the enemy across it. Crook s
brigade in moving forward was brought under so
lively an infantry fire as well as that of artillery,
that it was forced to halt and open fire in return,
and Sturgis s. division passing by the rear came
first to the bridge and was ordered to cross,
under protection of the artillery-fire. General
Sturgis ordered forward the Second Maryland
and Sixth New-Hampshire, which charged at
double-quick, with fixed bayonets ; but the con
centrated fire upon the bridge forced them to fall
back. After repeated brave efforts these regi
ments were withdrawn and the Fifty-first New-
York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania, from the same
division, were ordered up. About the same time
Col. Crook of the Second brigade, Kanawha di
vision, succeeded in getting a section of Sim
mons s battery, supported by the Twenty-eighth
Ohio infantry, in position to bear directly upon
the enemy s position at the farthest end of the
bridge, and, aided with these guns, the fresh
troops charged with great enthusiasm, bearing-
down all opposition, and at one o clock planted
their banner on the opposite bank. In this des
perate light in the Valley, Col. Kirigsbury, of the
Eleventh Connecticut, fell, cheering his men on
to their duty.

Gen. Sturgis s division immediately marched
over, deploying one brigade to the right and the
other to the left of the bridge, and advanced up
the slope, driving the enemy before them. This
division was followed by Col. Crook s brigade, of
the Kanawha division, which took position 011 the
right.

Meanwhile, Gen. Rodman s division and the
First brigade of the Kanawha division, under Col.
Scarnmon, had succeeded in crossing at the ford
below, after a sharp engagement and under a
heavy musketry and artillery-fire, and success
fully took the position assigned, at the left of the
line, of the crest above the bridge. The three
divisions of the corps, at this time on the right
bank of the Antietam, occupied the exact posi
tions assigned them before the commencement of
the movement, except that on the right wing the
division of Sturgis was in front, and Crook s bri
gade in support of it the order being reversed
by the causes before stated.

The bitterly contested fight at the bridge hav
ing about exhausted the ammunition and greatly



fatigued the troops engaged, I sent a request to
Gen. Burnside that Wilcox s division, which had
been held in reserve on the left bank, might be
sent over and take its place on the right front,
putting Sturgis s division in reserve at the head
of the bridge. This was immediately ordered by
Gen. Burnside, and Gen. Wilcox came promptly
forward with his command. During the interval
the^enemy kept up an incessant cannonade, and
having the exact range of the valley and the ra
vines, his shells came in very fast, annoying us a
good deal, causing numerous casualties, notwith
standing the men were kept lying on the ground
near the crests of the hill, whilst the changes in
the line and the partially new formation after the
arrival of Wilcox s division were being made.

At about three o clock, the necessary changes
in the line having been completed, the order to
advance was received from Gen. Burnside, and
the whole force, except Sturgis s division, was put
in motion. Gen. Wilcox on the right his whole
division in line and supported by Col. Crook
was ordered to move on Sharpsburgh, which lay
about a mile distant to the right of our front.
Gen. Rodman, supported by Col. Scammon, was
ordered to move in the same direction, first dis
lodging the enemy from his front, and then chang
ing direction to his right, bringing his command
in echelon on the left of Gen. Wilcox. The ad
vance was partly covered by Simmons s, Muhlen-
berg s, Clark s and Cook s batteries, the other
batteries of the corps being in part out of ammu
nition, and part being kept necessarily in position
on the commanding ground on the left bank of
the stream.

The troops moved forward in perfect order, and
with great enthusiasm. On the right, Gen. Wil
cox and Col. Crook quickly repulsed the enemy
and drove back their artillery, pushing victori
ously forward nearly to the village. On the left,
General Rodman and Col. Scammon likewise ad
vanced rapidly, driving the rebels before them.
The enemy, however, were manifestly in much
greater force than ours, and massed their troops
heavily on the extreme left. This necessarily
made the line of march of our left wing diverge
from the course intended, and open a gap between
it and the right, which it was necessary to fill by
the troops of the second line. Batteries were ac
cumulated against us upon the semi-circular ridge
in advance, and the advancing line was subject
to a most trying and destructive cross-fire of ar
tillery.

The enemy now brought up more fresh forces
upon the left, and whilst Gen. Rodman was mak
ing disposition to meet them by a change of front
of part of his command, he fell desperately wound
ed by a ball through his chest. The loss of their
Commander at a critical period caused confusion
in part of the division on the extreme left. The
Second brigade of his division, Col. Harlan com
manding, was forced to retire after an obstinate
contest in which they suffered terribly. Colonel
Scammon, of the Kanawha division, being ordered
to make disposition of the brigade with him to
oppose the rebel force on the left, caused the



456



REBELLION RECORD, 1862.



Twelfth and Twenty-third Ohio regiments to exe
cute a perpendicular change of front, which Avas
done with precision and success, the other regi
ment of the brigade, (Thirtieth Ohio) maintaining
its proper front.

The whole line was now engaged, the supports
being brought to the front, except the reserve
division of Gen. Sturgis at the bridge. This was
now ordered up, and came promptly, though much
exhausted and weakened by its previous exertions
during the day. The mass of the enemy on the
left still continued to increase, new batteries were
constantly opening upon us, and it was manifest
the corps would, Avithout reinforcements, be un
able to reach the village of Sharpsburgh, since the
movement could not be made to the right, whilst
the enemy exhibited such force in front of the ex
treme left, and the attack both to the right and
left at once Avould necessarily separate the Avings
to- such an extent as to imperil the whole move
ment unwarrantably.

The attack having already had the effect of a
most powerful diversion in favor of the centre
and right of the army, Avhich, by this means, had
been able to make decided and successful ad
vances, and no supports being at the time avail
able for our exhausted corps, I ordered the troops
withdrawn from the exposed ground in front to the
cover of the curved hill above the bridge Avhich
had been taken from the enemy earlier in the
afternoon. This movement Avas effected shortly
before dark, in perfect order and with admirable
coolness and precision on the part of both offi
cers and men. The line as then constituted Avas
formed by Sturgis s division in front, on the left,
supported by Fairchild s brigade of Rodman s
division, the KanaAA ha division under Col. Scam-
mon in the centre, and Wilcox s division on the
right. The enemy did not venture an attack upon
the position, but kept up a brisk art ill cry -fire until
nightfall.

The braA er} and soldierly conduct of the men
Avas most striking, and becomes still more notice
able Avhcn it is considered that for several days
they had been marching and fighting, with scarce
ly any rest by night or day, and the rapidity of
the movement had prevented their having any
regular supplies of food, the supply train being
detained at the rear by the advance of other
troops.

The batteries on the left bank of the Antietam
Avere not only to assist in the movement of the
corps, but Avere most efficiently turned upon the
enemy in his attack upon the centre and right of
the army. The} r Avere all very Avell served, and
the twenty-pounder battery and Lieut. Benjamin s
Avere especially efficient. In their reports (Avhich
are transmitted hereAvith) the commandants of
divisions and separate brigades speak in the high
est terms of their troops, and make special men
tion of numbers of officers and men Avho distin
guished themselves. These are too numerous to
be named in this report, but the Avhole list will
very shortly be published in a special order from
these headquarters.