the said ports every vessel will be required to
have a clearance from the collector of the cus
toms according to law, showing that there has
been no violation of the conditions of the license.
Any violation of the said conditions will involve
the forfeiture and condemnation of the vessel and
cargo, and the exclusion of all parties concerned
from any further privilege of entering the United
States during the war for any purpose whatever.
Second. To vessels of the United States clear
ing coastwise for the ports aforesaid license can
only be obtained from the Treasury Department.
Third. In all other respects the existing block
ade remains in full force and effect, as hitherto
established and maintained ; nor is it relaxed by
the proclamation, except in regard to the ports
to which the relaxation is by that instrument ex
pressly applied. S. P. CHASE,
Secretary of the Treasury.
Doc. 15.
RETREAT OF GENERAL BANKS.
GENERAL BANKS S REPORT.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY SHENANDOAH, June, 1862.
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War :
INFORMATION was received on the evening of
May twenty-third that the enemy in very large
force had descended on the guard at Front Royal,
Col. Kenly, First Maryland regiment, command
ing, burning* the bridges and driving our troops
toward Strasburgh with great loss. Owing to
what was deemed an extravagant statement of
the enemy s strength, these reports were received
with some distrust ; but a regiment of infantry,
with a strong detachment of cavalry and a section
of artillery, were immediately sent to reeriforce
Col. Kenly. Later in the evening, despatches from
fugitives who had escaped to Winchester informed
us that Col. Kenly s force had been destroyed,
with but few exceptions, and the enemy, fifteen
or twenty thousand strong, were advancing by
lapid marches on Winchester.
Orders were immediately given to halt the re-
enforcements sent to Front Royal, which had
moved by different routes, and detachments of
troops under experienced officers were sent in
every direction to explore the roads leading from
Front Royal to Strasburgh, Middletown, New-
town, and Winchester, and ascertain the force,
position, and purpose of this sudden movement
of the enemy. It was soon found that his pickets
were in possession of every road, and rumors
from every quarter represented him in movement,
in rear of his pickets, in the direction of our
camp.
The extraordinary force of the enemy could no
longer be doubted. It was apparent, also, that
they had a more extended purpose than the cap
ture of the brave little band at Front Royal.
This purpose could be nothing less than the
defeat of my own command, or its possible cap
ture by occupying Winchester, and by this move
ment intercepting supplies or reinforcements, and
cutting off all possibility of retreat.
It was also apparent from the reports of fugi
tives, prisoners, Union men, and our own recon
noitring parties, that all the three divisions of the
enemy s troops known to be in the valley, and
embracing at least twenty-five thousand men,
were united and close upon us, in some enter
prise not yet developed.
The suggestion that, had their object been a
surprise, they would have given notice of their
approach by an attack on Front Royal, was an
swered by the fact that on the only remaining
point of attack the Staunton road our outposts
were five miles in advance, and daily reconnois-
sances made for a distance of twelve miles to
ward Woodstock.
Under this interpretation of the enemy s plans,
our position demanded instant decision and ac
tion. Three courses were open to us : first, a
retreat across Little North Mountain to the Po
tomac River on the West ; second, an attack
upon the enemy s flank on the Front Royal road;
third, a rapid movement direct upon Winchester,
with a view to anticipate his occupation of the
town by seizing it ourselves thus placing my
command in communication with its original base
of operations, in the line of reinforcements by
Harper s Ferry and Martinsburgh, and securing a,
safe retreat in case of disaster. To remain at
Strasburgh was to be surrounded ; to move over
the mountains was to abandon our train at the
outset, and to subject my command to flank at
tacks without possibility of succor; and to at
tack, the enemy being in such overwhelming
force, could only result in certain destruction.
It was therefore determined to enter the lists
with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should
choose, for the possession of Winchester, the key
of the valley, and for us the position of safety.
. At three o clock A.M., the twenty-fourth inst.,
the reinforcements infantry, artillery, and cav
alry sent to Col. Kenly were recalled ; the ad
vance-guard, Col. Donnelly s brigade, were or
dered to return to Strasburgh ; several hundred
disabled men left in our charge by Shields s di
vision were put upon the march, and our wagon-
train ordered forward to Winchester, under es-
DOCUMENTS.
5?.
cort of cavalry and infantry. Gen. Hatch, with
nearly our whole force of cavalry and six pieces
of artillery, was charged with the protection of
the rear of the column and the destruction of
army stores for which transportation was not
provided, with instructions to remain in front of
the town as long as possible, and hold the enemy
in check, our expectations of attack being in that
direction. All these orders were executed with
incredible alacrity, and soon after nine o clock
the column was on the march, Col. Donnelly in
front, Col. Gordon in the centre, and Gen. Hatch
in the rear.
The column had passed Cedar Creek, about
three miles from Strasburgh, with the exception
of the rear-guard, still in front of Strasburgh,
when information was received from the front
that the enemy had attacked the train, and was
in full possession of the road at Middletown. This
report was confirmed by the return of fugitives,
refugees, and wagons, which came tumbling to
the rear in fearful confusion.
It being apparent now that our immediate dan
ger was in front, the troops were ordered to the
head of the column and the train to the rear; and
in view of a possible necessity for our return to
Strasburgh, Capt. James W. Abert, Topographi
cal corps who associated with him the Zouaves
d Afrique, Capt. Collis was ordered to prepare
Cedar Creek bridge for the flames, in order to
prevent a pursuit in that direction by the enemy.
In the execution of this order Capt. Abert and
the Zouaves were cut off from the column, which
they joined at Williamsport. They had at Stras
burgh a very sharp conflict with the enemy, in
which his cavalry suffered severely. An inter
esting report of this affair will be found in the
reports of Capt. Abert and Capt. Collis.
The head of the reorganized column, Col. Don
nelly commanding, encountered the enemy in
force at Middletown, about thirteen miles from
Winchester. Three hundred troops had been
seen in town, but it soon appeared that larger
forces were in the rear. The brigade halted, and
the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, Col. Knipe, was
ordered to peneti .ite the woods on the right and
dislodge the enemy s skirmishers. They were
supported by a section of Cothran s New-York
battery. Five companies of the enemy s cavalry
were discovered in an open field in the rear of the
woods, and our artillery, masked at first by the
infantry, opened fire upon them. They stood fire
for a while, but at length retreated, pursued by
our skirmishers. The Twenty- eighth New- York,
Lieut. -Col. Brown, was now brought up, and un
der a heavy fire of infantry and artillery, the en
emy were driven back more than two miles from
the pike. Col. Donnelly, being informed at that
point, by a citizen in great alarm, that four thou
sand men were in the woods beyond, the men
were anxious to continue the fight ; but as this
would have defeated our object by the loss of
valuable time, with the exception of a small
guard, they were ordered to resume the march.
This affair occurred under my own observa
tion. ai?d I have great pleasure in vouching for
the admirable conduct of the officers and men.
We lost one man killed and some wounded.
This episode, with the change of front, occu
pied nearly an hour, but it saved our column.
Had the enemy vigorously attacked our train
while at the head of the column, it would have
been thrown into such dire confusion as to have
made a successful continuation of our march im
possible. Pending this contest, Col. Brodhead,
of the First Michigan cavalry, was ordered to
advance, and, if possible, to cut his way through
and occupy Winchester. It was the report of
this energetic officer that gave us the first assur
ance that our course was yet clear, and he was
the first of our column to enter the town.
When it was first reported that the enemy had
pushed between us and Winchester, Gen. Hatch
was ordered to advance with all his available
cavalry from Strasburgh, leaving Col. De Forrest
to cover the rear and destroy stores not provided
with transportation. Major Vought, Fifth New-
York cavalry, had been previously ordered to re
connoitre the Front Royal road, to ascertain the
position of the enemy, whom he encountered in
force near Middletown, and was compelled to fall
back, immediately followed by the enemy s cav
alry, infantry and artillery. In this affair five of
our men were killed and several wounded. The
enemy s loss is not known.
After repeated attempts to force a passage
through the lines of the enemy, now advanced to
the pike, Gen. Hatch, satisfied that this result
could not be accomplished without great loss,
and supposing our army to have proceeded but
a short distance, turned to the left and moved
upon a parallel road, made several ineffectual at
tempts to effect a junction with the main column.
At Newtown, however, he found Col. Gordon
holding the enemy in check, and joined his bri
gade. Major Collins, with three companies of cav
alry, mistaking the point where the main body
of the cavalry left the road, dashed upon the ene
my until stopped by the barricade of wagons and
the tempestuous fire of infantry and artillery.
His loss must have been very severe.
Six companies of the Fifth New- York, Col.
De Forrest, and six companies of the First Ver
mont cavalry, Col. Tompkins, after repeated and
desperate efforts to form a junction with the
main body the road now being filled with in
fantry, artillery and cavalry fell back to Stras
burgh, where they found the Zouaves d Afrique.
The Fifth New- York, foiling to effect a junction
at Winchester, and also at Martinsburgh, came
in at Clear Spring, with a train of thirty-two
wagons and many stragglers. The First Ver
mont, Col. Tompkins, joined us at Winchester
with six pieces of artillery, and participated in
the fight of the next morning. Nothing could
surpass the celerity and spirit with which the
various companies of cavalry executed their
movements, or their intrepid charges upon the
enemy.
Gen. Hatch deserves great credit for the man
ner in which he discharged his duties as chief of
cavalry in this part of our march, as well as at
REBELLION RECORD. 1862.
the fight at Winchester, and in covering the rear
of our column to the river ; but especially for the
spirit infused into his troops during the brief pe
riod of his command, which, by confession of
friend and foe, had been been equal, if not supe
rior, to the best of the enemy s long- trained
mounted troops.
From this point the protection of the rear of
the column devolved upon the forces under Col.
Gordon
The guard having been separated from the col
umn, and the rear of the train having been at
tacked by an increased force near the bridge
between Newtown and Kernstown, Col. Gordon
was directed to send back the Second Massachu
setts, Lieut. -Colonel Andrews commanding, the
Twenty-seventh Indiana, Col. Colgrove, and the
Twenty-eighth New-York, Lieut. -Col. Brown, to
rescue the rear of the train and hold the enemy
in check. They found him at Newtown with a
strong force of infantry, artillery and cavalry.
The Second Massachusetts was deployed in the
field, supported by the Twenty-eighth New- York
and the Twenty-seventh Indiana, and ordered to
drive the enemy from the town ; and the battery
was at the same time so placed as to silence the
guns of the enemy.
Both these objects were quickly accomplished.
They found it impossible to reach Middletown,
so as to enable the cavalry under Gen. Hatch to
join the column, or to cover entirely the rear of
the train. Large bodies of the enemy s cavalry
passed upon our right and left, and the increased
vigor of his movements demonstrated the rapid
advance of the main body. A cavalry charge
made upon our troops was received in squares
on the right and on the road, and in the line of
the left, which repelled his assault and gained
time to reform the train, to cover its rear and to
burn the disabled wagons. This affair occupied
several hours the regiments having been moved
to the rear about six o clock, and not reaching
the town until after twelve.
A full report by Col. Gordon, who commanded
in person, is inclosed herewith. The principal
loss of the Second Massachusetts occurred in this
action.
The strength and purpose of the enemy were
to us unknown when we reached AVinchcster, ex
cept upon surmise and vague rumors from Front
lloyal. These rumors were strengthened by the
vigor with which the enemy had pressed our main
column, and defeated at every point the efforts of
detachments to effect a junction with the main
column.
At Winchester, however, all suspicion was re
lieved on that subject. All classes secessionists,
Unionists, refugees, fugitives and prisoners
argued that the enemy s force at or near Win
chester was overwhelming, ranging from twenty-
five thousand to thirty thousand. Rebel officers,
who came into our camp with entire unconcern,
supposing that their own troops occupied the
town as a matter of course, and were captured,
confirmed these statements, and added that an
attack would be made upon us at daybreak. I
determined to test the substance and strength of
the enemy by actual collision, and measures
were promptly taken to prepare our troops to
meet them. They had taken up their positions
on entering the town after dark, without expect
ations of a battle, and Avere at disadvantage as
compared with the enemy.
The rattling of musketry was heard during
the latter part of the night, and before the break
of day a sharp engagement occurred at the out
posts. Soon after four o clock the artillery opened
its fire, which was continued without cessation
till the close of the engagement.
The right of our line was occupied by the
Third brigade, Col. Geo. II. Gordon commanding.
The regiments were strongly posted, and near
the centre covered by stone walls from the fire of
the enemy.
Their infantry opened on the right, and soon
both lines were under heavy fire.
The left was occupied by the Third brigade,
Col. Dudley Donnelly commanding.
The line was weak, compared with that of the
enemy, but the troops were posted, and patiently
awaited, as they nobly improved, their coming
opportunity. The earliest movements of the ene
my were on our left, two regiments being seen to
move as with the purpose of occupying a posi
tion in flank or rear. Gen. Hatch sent a detach
ment of cavalry to intercept this movement, when
it was apparently abandoned. The enemy suf
fered very serious loss from the fire of our infant
ry on the left. One regiment is represented by
persons present during the action, and after the
field was evacuated, as nearly destroyed.
The main body of the enemy was "hidden dur
ing the early part of the action by the crest of
the hill and the woods in the rear.
Their force was massed apparently upon our
right, and their manoeuvres indicated a purpose
to turn us upon the Berryville road, where, it ap
peared subsequently, they had placed a consider
able force, with a view of preventing reenforcc-
ments from Harper s Ferry. But the steady fire
of our lines held them in check until a small por
tion of the troops on the right of our line made a
movement to the rear. It is but just to add,
that this was done under the erroneous impres
sion that an order to withdraw had been given.
No sooner was this observed by the enemy, than
its regiments swarmed upon the crest of the hill,
advancing from the woods upon our right, which,
still continuing its fire steadily, advanced toward
the town.
The overwhelming force of the enemy now sud
denly showing itself, making further resistance
unwise, orders were sent to the left by Capt. Do
Hauteville to withdraw, which was done reluct
antly but in order, the enemy having greatly
suffered in that wing. A portion of the troops
passed through the town in some confusion ; but
the column was soon reformed and continued its
march in order.
This engagement held the enemy in check for
five hours.
The forces engaged were greatly unequal In-
DOCUMENTS.
disposed to accept the early rumors concerning
the enemy s strength, I reported to the Depart
ment that it was about fifteen thousand. It is
now conclusively shown that not less than twen
ty-five thousand men were in position, and could
have been brought into action. On the right and
left their great superiority of numbers was plain
ly felt and seen, and the signal officers, from ele
vated positions, were enabled to count the regi
mental standards, indicating a strength equal to
that I have stated.
My own command consisted of two brigades of
less than four thousand men, all told, with nine
hundred cavalry, ten Parrott guns, and one bat
tery of six-pounders, smooth-bore cannon. To
this should be added the Tenth Maine regiment
of infantry, and five companies of Maryland cav
alry, stationed at Winchester, which were engag
ed in the action. The loss of the enemy was
treble that of ours in killed and wounded. In
prisoners ours greatly exceeds theirs.
Officers, whose words I cannot doubt, have
stated, as the result of their own observations,
that our men were fired upon from private dwell-
.ngs in passing through Winchester ; but I am
credibly informed, and gladly believe, that the
atrocities said to have been perpetrated upon our
wounded soldiers by the rebels, are greatly exag
gerated or entirely untrue.
Our march was turned in the direction of Mar-
tinsburgh, hoping there to meet with reenforce-
ments the troops moving in three parallel col
umns, each protected by an efficient rear-guard.
Pursuit by the enemy was prompt and vigorous,
but our movements were rapid and without
loss.
A few miles from Winchester, the sound of the
steam-whistle, heard in the direction of Martins-
burgh, strengthened the* hope of reinforcements,
and stirred the blood of the men like a trumpet.
Soon after, two squadrons of cavalry came dash
ing down the road, with wild hurrahs. They
were thought to be the advance of the anticipated
support, and received with deafening cheers.
Every man felt like turning back upon the enemy.
It proved to be the First Maryland cavalry, Lieut. -
Col. Wetschky, sent out in the morning as a
train-guard. Hearing the guns, they had return
ed to participate in the fight. Advantage was
taken of this stirring incident to reorganize our
column, and the march was continued with re
newed spirit and ardor. At Martinsburgh, the
column halted two and a half hours, the rear
guard remaining until seven in the evening in
rear of the town and arrived at the river at sun
down, forty-eight hours after the first news of the
attack on Front Royal. It was a march of fifty-
three miles, thirty -five of which were performed
in one day. The scene of the river, when the
rear-guard arrived, was of the most animating
and exciting description. A thousand camp-fires
were burning on the hillside, a thousand car
riages of every description were crowded upon
the banks, and the broad river between the ex
hausted troops and their coveted rest.
The ford was too deep for the teams to cross
in regular succession. Only the strongest horses,
after a few experiments, were allowed to essay
the passage of the river before morning.
The single ferry was occupied by the ammuni
tion trains, the ford by the wagons.
The cavalry was secure in its form of crossing.
The troops only had no transportation. Fortu
nately, the train we had so sedulously guarded
served us in turn. Several boats belonging to the
pontoon-train, which we had brought from Stras-
burgh, were launched and devoted exclusively to
their service. It is seldom that a river-cross
ing of such magnitude is achieved with greater
success. There never were more grateful hearts
in the same number of men, than when, at mid
day on the twenty-sixth, we stood on the oppo
site shore.
My command had not suffered an attack and
rout, but accomplished a premeditated march of
near sixty miles, in the face of the enemy, de
feating his plans and giving him battle wherever
he was found.
Our loss is stated in detail, with the names of
the killed, wounded and missing, in the full re
port of Brig. -Gen. A. S. Williams, commanding
division, to which reference is made.
The whole number of killed is thirty-eight ;
wounded, one hundred and fifty-five ; missing,
seven hundred and eleven. Total loss, nine hun
dred and five.
It is undoubtedly true that many of the miss
ing will yet return, and the entire loss may be
assumed as not exceeding seven hundred. It is
also probable that the number of killed and
wounded may be larger than that above stated,
but the aggregate loss will not be changed thereby.
All our guns were saved.
Our wagon-train consisted of nearly five hun
dred wagons. Of this number fifty-five were
lost. They were not, with but few exceptions,
abandoned to the enemy ; but were burned upon
the road. Nearly all of our supplies were thus
saved. The stores at Front Royal, of which I
had no knowledge until my visit to that post on
the twenty-first instant, and those at Winchester,
of which a considerable portion was destroyed
by our troops, are not embraced in this state
ment.
The number of sick men in the hospital at
Strasburgh, belonging to Gen. Williams s division,
was one hundred and eighty-nine, one hundred
and twenty-five of whom were left in hospital at
Winchester, under charge of Surgeon Lincoln R.
Stone, Second Massachusetts ; sixty-four were
left in hospital at Strasburgh, including attend
ants, under charge of Surgeon Gillispie, Seventh
Indiana, and Assistant-Surgeon Porter, United
States army.
Eight of the surgeons of this division volunta
rily surrendered themselves to the enemy in the
hospitals and on the field for the care of the sick
and wounded placed under their "charge. They
include, in addition to those above named, Bri
gade-Surgeon Peale, at Winchester J Surgeon
REBELLION RECORD, 1862.
Mitchell, First Maryland, at Front Royal ; Sur
geon Adolphus, Best s battery, United States
army ; Surgeon Johnson, Sixteenth Indiana, anc
Surgeon Francis Leland, Second Massachusetts
on the field.
It is seldom that men are called upon to mak
a greater sacrifice of comfort, health and liberty
for the benefit of those entrusted to their charge,
Services and sacrifices like these ought to entitl(
them to some more important recognition of their
devotion to public duty than the mere historica
record of the fact. The report of the Medical Di
rector, Surgeon W. S. King, exhibits the disposi
tion of nearly one thousand sick and disabled men
left at Strasburgh, of Shields division, upon its
removal to the Rappahannock Valley.
My warmest thanks are due to the officers and
men of my command, for their unflinching cour
age and unyielding spirit exhibited on the march
and its attendant combats, especially to Brig.-
Gen. A. S. Williams, commanding the division ;
Gen. George S. Greene and Gen. L. W. Crawford,
who had reported for duty, but were yet unas
signed to separate commands. They accompa
nied the column throughout the march, and ren
dered me most valuable assistance.
My thanks are also due to the gentlemen of my
staff Major D. 1). Perkins, Chief of Staff ; Capt.
James TV. Abert, of the Topographical Engineers ;
Capt. William Shcffler, Capt. Frederick Munthur,
and Capt. Frederick De Hautenville, for their ar
duous labors.
It gives me pleasure, also, to commend the con
duct of Col. Donnelly and Col. Gordon, com
manding the two brigades. I would also respect
fully ask the attention of the Department to the
reports of the several officers commanding de
tachments separate from the main column, and