Class U- i u . •

Bnnk . IB 6 ^,



COPmiCHT DEPOSm'^'"'



"1^



THE WAR OF THE FUTURE



' THE
WAR OF THE FUTURE

IN TPIE LIGHT OF THE
LESSONS OF THE WORLD WAR



" BY
GENERAL von BERNHARDI ^

AUTHOR OF "GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR," ETC.




% TRANSLATED BY

F. A. HOLT, O.B.E.



'd. appleton and company

NEW YORK MCMXXI



CoWbp









COPYRIGHT, 1921, BY

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY



PBINTED IN THB CNITED BTATXS OF AMERICA



^



FEB 10 1921
'g)CLA60S302



PREFACE

The following pages were written either dur-
ing the late war itself or shortly after it ended.
The conclusions which they contain are entirely
the product of the war. The immediate pur-
pose of the book was to give to all officers who
were not in a position to see the war from a
central point a survey of the nature of modem
war: to present them with a frame into which
they could fit their special knowledge. Fur-
ther I intended to suggest the principles on
which the future development of the Army
should be based.

That purpose has now become utterly vain.

A large proportion of our magnificent Corps
of Officers lies on the battlefields ; another part
has been compelled to give up the splendid pro-
fession by wounds or disease ; the rest has been
dissolved side by side with the Army and is
trying to pick up a precarious livelihood in
other walks of life. Thus the number of my
readers in that circle can be but small.

But that is not all. There is no longer a Ger-
man Army, for the few men we are allowed to



vi PREFACE

keep after the Peace Treaty cannot be consid-
ered as such. Our colonies are a thing of the
past. Our fleet is at the bottom of the sea. It
would be sheer madness to think of preparing
for war now, even if only in theory; for it is
utterly impossible for us to make war. It
would be a crime to hanker after war now when
peace has just been concluded and it is the duty
of us all to work for the economic recovery of
our people. Moreover, our present Govern-
ment is doing everything to elhninate war from
international intercourse, and there can be no
doubt that the success of this attempt will be
very welcome so long as the interests and
honor of the German nation can thereby be
preserved. Whether this ambition will actually
succeed is another question. I do not think so
unless Germany submits blindly to the will of
the hostile states around her, or human nature
entirely changes. But no obstacles should be
placed in the way of this effort ; it should pro-
ceed in the most favorable conditions possible,
and in these circumstances it would be a mis-
take to hint at a coming war.

If in spite of all this I am publishing my
work and have found a publisher willing to take
on the thankless task of printing it for the
benefit of the public, I am pursuing a twofold



PREFACE vii

aim. In the first place I shall hope to show how
a war — that is a war on modern lines — is ut-
terly unthinkable for Germany, impoverished
and broken. Secondly, it must be remembered
that the military interest in the World War,
which, with its subsequent effects, is undoubt-
edly ushering in a new period of world history,
will very soon revive in all quarters. It is thus
our duty to consider the important lessons of
this great struggle, under the impressions of
which we are still laboring, to visualize and
grasp them so that coming generations who
may have to apply them cannot charge us with
irresponsible negligence and carelessness. This
book is to meet that theoretical need and pro-
claim our helplessness. It is, therefore, far
from any desire or intention to sharpen the
sword of vengeance. Its purpose is only to
show that as things are we are no longer
physically able to do so; it will teach about the
war which we are no longer in a position to
make.

For the rest, there will doubtless be many
gaps in my work. That is inevitable, because
to all intents and purposes I am basing my ob-
servations on personal experience, and that
must necessarily be limited. I shall be grateful



viii PREFACE

to any one who feels called on to supplement
what I have to say.

Mountain warfare is left undiscussed of set
purpose, as I have had no personal experience
of it. Some one with greater qualifications must
write on that subject. From my own personal
experience I can only say here that there are
doubtless many points of comparison with
trench warfare in France, so that my remarks
on this aspect are in many respects applicable
to that also.

VON Bernhaedi

General

CUNNERSDORF



CONTENTS



CBAPTKR PAOB

Preface v

Introduction xi

L The Determining Factors in Modern Wab: 1

I. Masses 2

II. Military Technics 16

II. Tactics 53

I. Infantry 54

II. Artillery 86

III. Cavalry and Aircraft 125

IV. Fortifications, Engineers, and Eailway

Troops 146

III. Attack, Defense, and the Initiative . . . 167

IV. The Principles of the Offensive .... 182
V. The Sources of Power 192

VI. The Influence of Politics and Economics . . 208

VII. The General Distribution of the Troops . . 229

VIII. The Battle 245

I. The Struggle for Local Advantage in

Trench Warfare 254

II. The Barrage 275

III. The Decision in Trench Warfare . . 279

IV. Attack and Defense in Open Waepaeb . 290

IX. Conclusion 305



IX



INTRODUCTION

In my book Vom heutigen Kriege,^ which ap-
peared in 1911, I showed that the great funda-
mental laws of war remained the same at all
times and in all circumstances, because they
were based on human nature and the very es-
sence of the use of force. I demonstrated,
however, that their outward manifestations fre-
quently varied in accordance with the political
structure and culture of the warring nation,
and indeed with the means and methods cm-
ployed in war. These very external manifesta-
tions have a compelling character and involve a
certain adherence to rule, though only an ad-
herence which changes periodically with the
changing circumstances of life and military
eifort.

Thus the art of war moves between perma-
nent laws and those which change periodically
and are ever undergoing fresh development. It
is only within these limits that our art offers
the prospect of success to military undertak-
ings.

' Modern War

xi



xii INTRODUCTION

Neither the unchanging nor the periodic laws
may be infringed with impunity, and it is the
task of him who leads an army to give effect
to the general and eternal elements of circum-
stances which have temporary peculiarities and
features.

This is just where the difficulty lies, for there
is always the danger that the commander will
regard something which under certain given
circumstances was in accordance with the rules,
and therefore justifiable, as an eternal verity
and therefore applicable even though the con-
ditioning circumstances have already changed,
so that he is acting under the impulse of pre-
conceived opinions which, in view of the
changed situation, must bring him to ruin and
defeat.

Thus, in 1806, the Prussian army took the
field with the old linear tactics which could no
longer cope with the changed battle forms of
the Napoleonic period, and in spite of all its
heroism suffered a severe defeat. So again in
1866 the Austrians had been too late to realize
the importance of the breech-loading rifle : they
kept to their old percussion rifle and their Na-
poleonic columns and shock tactics, and were
simply decimated by the Prussian infantry,
which relied on its weapon and fought in open



INTRODUCTION xiii

formation. Examples of this kind can be mul-
tiplied at will. In such circumstances it is the
commander who has to bear the consequences
of insufficient preparation and energy on the
part of the governments which have not real-
ized the progress and development of the art
of war or learned to keep pace with that de-
velopment by prompt reforms.

But the commander is faced with the further
danger of being overawed by external phe-
nomena and under their pressure neglecting to
give full effect to the great fundamental and
eternal principles of war, either because he has
an insufficient grasp of these principles himself
or because his control of the war-machine is in-
sufficient to enable him to apply his knowledge.
The last Russian campaigns offer eloquent ex-
amples. In the war with Japan, for instance,
Kuropatkin utterly underestimated the impor-
tance of the initiative and the offensive and con-
fined himself to defensive operations — without
any offensive reaction — from the outset. On
the other hand, he was unable to maneuver and
employ the mass of the Russian army, unwieldy
and mentally inert as it was, in such a way as
to do justice to his plans. Apart from the lack
of the offensive spirit and many other defects,
his schemes broke down time after time on the



xiv INTRODUCTION

want of judgment and resolution displayed by
his subordinate commanders. He patently
failed to remedy the friction in the military ma-
chine, friction which is a phenomenon of every
war and was particularly noticeable in the
great masses of the Russian army. Nor could
he make the latter conform to the great laws of
war.

These difficulties, which are of the very es-
sence of war, have increased materially in re-
cent times, for we also are living in a period
of many changes in the external phenomena of
war, a period of great development and trans-
formation of many military values which seem
calculated to confuse judgment and lead us on
wrong paths. In the main this development be-
gan during the war itself and on many points
has taken us by surprise. Of course, develop-
ments had been foreseen in some directions
without our fully realizing how far they would
go. In other directions we had foreseen noth-
ing and got on wrong lines. But the voices
which told us we were straying were not
heeded.

That heavy artillery would play a more im-
portant role was expected and, within certain
limits, allowed for. But we did not realize how
great that role would be. The strength of for-



INTRODUCTION xv

tresses was utterly exaggerated because the
power of the hostile artillery was underesti-
mated.

Nor had we foreseen what enormous masses
of combatants would have to be called up for
the World War. No measures were therefore
taken for such a wholesale levy. The policy of
peace at any price which we pursued, and our
wholly baseless confidence that we should be al-
'lowed to pursue it, had blinded the eyes of our
leading statesmen. All who raised a warning
voice were denounced as unscrupulous fire-
brands or officially cautioned, and the army bills
in the last years before the war were totally
inadequate.

The importance of cavalry was totally mis-
understood. It was considered an offensive
weapon in spite of the obvious effects of mod-
ern firearms.

We hopelessly underestimated the impor-
tance of aircraft and, in naval operations, the
submarine arm, the development of which was
at the outset held up for the benefit of the bat-
tle-fleet. Lastly, we absolutely misunderstood
the importance of the economic side, although
warning voices were raised on this matter. We
had made no sort of preparation for the block-
ade of all our ports and frontiers, or for a sit-



xvi INTRODUCTION

uation in which we should be completely cut off
from maritime communication with our import-
ing and exporting countries. The wholesale
transformation of our economic system which
those eventualities inevitably involved had to
be improvised. Indeed, we had not even
thought of warning and recalling our merchant
vessels which were in foreign waters, so little
did we believe in the possibility of war even
when Russia was in the throes of mobilization.
It might be said that as a result of our total
failure to realize the world situation we walked
blindfolded into the trap which our enemies had
set for us. However, we entered upon the
struggle itself with the extended military and
political views, so to speak, which had devel-
oped out of the war of 1870, and to a certain
extent the experiences of the Russo-Japanese
war. In the General Staff, indeed, thanks to
tireless work, many of the requirements of the
times had been realized, if not all. Unfortu-
nately our efforts thoroughly to exploit our
knowledge failed time and time again, owing to
politically false judgTQents of the situation
which not only prevailed in political circles but
were reenforced by the chronic shortsightedness
and prejudice of the Reichstag, which allowed
itself to be swayed by domestic party contro-



INTRODUCTION xvii

versy and liad lost all vision for the peril with-
out. Before the war every one who pointed out
the true significance of political developments
was exposed to complete and hopeless miscon-
struction in these circles.

Thus, when the war assumed a scale which
had never been foreseen, we found ourselves
unprepared and faced by absolutely novel con-
ditions, so that to cope with them we had to im-
provise in the very middle of the war. Both the
army and the fleet have shown that they were
quite equal to this colossal task and able to gain
the upper hand in every department, even in a
war against practically the whole world —
a world which had prepared for this war for
years. German science also has performed
brilliant feats in assisting the combatant forces
and, in the early years at any rate, German
labor, with relatively few exceptions, proved
itself an auxiliary force of the first rank in pro-
ducing the weapons of war. The only failures
were the civil government — notwithstanding
devoted efforts on the part of many officials —
and the politicians, who were too often influ-
enced by the Reichstag, and by their defective
measures made the nation's task in its heroic
struggle considerably more arduous.

I shall not go in any detail into these matters



xviii INTRODUCTION

in this book, which deals with the purely mili-
tarj'' aspect alone, though it is only natural that
the direct effects of politics and economic ques-
tions on the operations, as they have developed
in present-day circumstances, must be exam-
ined and discussed, as those effects are of far-
reaching military importance.

Otherwise my essential purpose is to inquire
into the significance of all the novel phenomena
of modern times which determine the form of
military operations, phenomena some of which
facilitate them, while others make them more
arduous. Secondly, I have to consider how, in
the changed circumstances, the great fundamen-
tal and vital principles which mean success in
war can be vindicated even to-day : retaining the
initiative; using the offensive as the decisive
form of action ; concentration of force at the de-
cisive point; the determination of that point;
the superiority of the moral factor to purely
material resources ; the proper relation between
attack and defense ; the will to victory ; the un-
conditional dependence of policy on the require-
ments and results of strategy or military ef-
fort.

It is of vital importance to every army, and
therefore every state, to be perfectly clear on
these points. Thus, and thus alone, can policy



INTRODUCTION xix

and war be successfully conducted. In that
way only will states be in a position to develop
their full powers unhindered.

There is a certain beautiful dream of nations
living in peace side by side, voluntarily impos-
ing restraints upon themselves and recognizing
their obligation to have regard for the just
needs and wishes of other states. It is a dream
in which the peoples which are morally and in-
"tellectually the strongest will be in a position
to assert themselves as the arbiters of culture,
even though such a thing is impossible without
a more or less autocratic authority, which is in-
compatible with equal rights.

But it is none the less a dream only. As long
as men remain men, force in its widest sense
will determine the political and cultural im-
portance of states. In the last resort it is the
foundation of all intellectual and moral prog-
ress.



THE WAR OF THE FUTURE

CHAPTER I

- THE DETERMINING FACTORS IN MODERN WAR

When we look over the whole range of the
lessons and experiences of the World War, we
soon realize that they fall into two great
groups, which are the determining factors in
modem war : on the one side the employment of
colossal armies such as the world had never
seen, with all their attendant phenomena, and
on the other the immense development of the
mechanical side and chemistry, which have re-
sulted in the appearance of a whole series of
new weapons or weapons the power of which
has been greatly increased. Both together have
revolutionized war conditions.

The first group has mainly influenced
strategy, though it is not without a certain tac-
tical importance, while the new triumphs in
military mechanics have primarily brought
about tactical changes and have affected

1



2 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE

strategy and maneuver to a secondary degree,
and that to a certain extent indirectly.

I. — Masses

When we mobilized in 1914 we put a mighty
army into the field. A large number of reserve
divisions had been formed according to plan
and a number of Landsturm battalions called
up as frontier and railway guards. But it would
be impossible to speak of a general summons of
the nation to arms. We were not prepared for
anything like that. We had neither the arms
nor the equipment. Still, our army seemed
strong enough to carry through our plan of
campaign. This plan, in its main lines, was
based on our belief in a slow Russian mobiliza-
tion, and aimed at overthrowing France deci-
sively at the outset and then concentrating
against Russia which would meanwhile have
been kept in check by a few army corps and an
Austrian offensive.

This plan broke down because the Russian
mobilization — though not perhaps officially —
was actually in progress for a long time while
we were still thinking it possible to preserve
peace and taking steps with that end in view.
East Prussia was overrun by the enemy before



THE DETERMINING FACTOES 3

we had thought it possible. Troops had to be
brought from the west to protect the very core
of Prussia, and the result was that in France
our armies were not strong enough to exploit
strategically the tactical successes they had
gained. We had to fall back on the defensive
and extend our front to the sea in order to save
our right wing from envelopment.

As the Russians had meanwhile deployed all
their armies and were pressing forward on a
broad front, it became imperative to strengthen
our armies, and we now proceeded to call upon
the man-power of the whole nation for the bene-
fit of the army. New army corps were formed
of men who had not previously been called up,
all the Landsturm were summoned to arms, and
even depot troops were sent to the front to fill
the yawning gaps. The enemy, however, re-
plied with similar measures. In France the last
man was called up. Savage peoples were
brought to the European battlefields. Italy
joined the ranks of our enemies. Rumania and
finally America followed her example. Com-
pulsory service was introduced in England. In-
dia had to send her dusky sons and Africa her
black children to Europe.

Thus gradually those giant armies came into
being which were compelled to stretch their line



4 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE

from sea to sea, on the one hand to be safe
against envelopment, and on the other to make
full use of their weapons. It was a distribution
of force which can be described by the expres-
sion '' linear strategy." Then, with a view to
increasing the powers of resistance of these
far-flung lines — safe against envelopment —
against frontal attacks by a superior force, and
with the further purpose of keeping down the
losses inflicted by shell fire in a long and stub-
bom defense, the process of fortifying the posi-
tions began. Deep trenches and shell-proof
shelters were constructed to provide cover for
both attacker and defender without preventing
either from using his own weapons. Obstacles
were erected to make it difficult for the enemy
to approach and hold him do^vn under the fire
of the defender.

This form of battle had a vital influence upon
the attacker also. In the first stage, in his en-
deavor to keep on enveloping the enemy lines,
threaten their tactical flanks and upset or cut
their communications, he was compelled to
reach out ever farther until the sea or land
frontiers stayed his progress. Then he had to
change his method entirely.

Before the war the envelopment of one or
both of the enemy's wings was considered the



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 5

decisive form of operation. The real problem
of the commander was to bring about strategic
envelopment and finally carry it through tac-
tically. We entered the war imbued with those
ideas. Our operations were in accordance with
them at the beginning of the war, and every one
knows how brilliantly Field Marshal von Hin-
denburg translated this theory into action in
his great and annihilating victories in the east.

Unfortunately, in view of the new linear
strategy, this form of operation is feasible
only under particularly favorable conditions.
Where there are no flanks to be turned there is
nothing for it but to attack the enemy frontally.
We had never expected that in peace time. The
voices — among others my own — which said that
even break-through battles ^ were possible, and
might become inevitable under modern condi-
tions, were either ignored or not heard. As a
matter of fact it was in that direction that mat-
ters developed.

In the trench warfare of to-day there are no
flanks to envelop. Almost everywhere we find
ourselves facing a long continuous front. The
flank to be enveloped has first to be produced
by an irruption into the enemy's lines, and the
enemy stops at nothing to prevent such a breach

* Vurchiruchsschlachten.



6 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE

and close any gaps with reserves. Thus the
frontal battle has become the inevitable and
characteristic feature of mass warfare. To
prepare for it and carry it out successfully is
the great and vital — though extremely difficult
— problem of the commander, a problem which
both we and our opponents have often vainly
endeavored to solve. The art of war has thus
assumed a totally different aspect, for it is now
a matter — at any rate in the opening stage —
not of strategy but of concentrating and em-
ploying by surprise so large a force at a given
point of the enemy's front that success is as-
sured. As we shall see later, this is no simple
task.

But if, as a result of mass armies, the frontal
attack has become a permanent feature of
operations, we must guard ourselves against
the assumption that it must always be so. This
view of the form of action must not become
axiomatic. We can realize that by remember-
ing the first battles of this war, not to mention
the actions in Rumania or the last stage of the
fighting in Russia. Indeed, this method of
operation will become inevitable only where the
enemy really succeeds in establishing a continu-
ous front which cannot be enveloped at any
point; such a front as the French from the



THE DETERMINING FACTORS 7

Swiss frontier to the North Sea, or the Italian
from the Swiss frontier to the Adriatic. If
the enemy cannot do so, former conditions will
be reproduced and it will once more be a ques-
tion primarily of strategical and tactical en-
velopment. There is even a definite relation be-
tween the size of the theater of war and the
strength of the army to be employed in it.

The purely frontal action became inevitable
in France because the Franco-British armies
were large enough to hold a continuous front,
and where any gap occurred close it again with
reserves. In Russia, on the other hand, the
same course was possible only within certain
limits, because the front was too long in itself
and became even longer as the theater of war
extended eastwards with the successive en-
forced retirements of the armies of our enemy.
The combined Russo-Rumanian armies man-
aged to form some sort of continuous line
from the mouth of the Danube along the Car-
pathians and northwards to the mouth of the
Dvina, even though apparently they were with-
out the necessary reserves. But when that line
was once broken, geographical circumstances
forced the hostile armies apart, and it was no
longer possible for them to reestablish a single
front. The conditions of a war of movement



8 THE WAR OF THE FUTURE

once more came into their ovm, and we saw how