cially as the mutineers keep be glad if you will return
a large portion of their force this with such remarks and
encamped outside the city emendations as your expe-
walls, who, on our assaulting rience as Chief Engineer sug-
the city, could easily attack gests."
and capture our camp, with
HIS AEGUMENTS IN FAVOUE OF ASSAULT. 5
duties the large mind, the profound knowledge, bookX.
the prompt decision which had characterised him —
in his civil work. Neither the shock and pain S ept 7 i.
caused by a wound, nor the weakness and emacia-
tion produced by a severe attack of camp scurvy,
aggravated by diarrhoea, depressed his spirit or
lessened his energies. Refusing to be placed on
the sick list, though assured that mortification
would be the consequence of a continued use of
his wounded leg, Baird Smith clung to the last
to the performance of his duty. The advice
which he gave to General Wilson proved that
never was his courage higher, never were the tone
and temper of his mind more healthy, than when,
bowed down by two diseases and suffering acutely
from his wound, he seemed a livid wreck of the
man he once had been.
It was to such a man that Wilson appealed.
The answer was clear, emphatic, decisive. Baird
Smith was for action, for prompt and immediate
action. True it is, he reasoned, the besieged are The reasons
. . which influ-
more numerous than the besiegers ; true it is e nced Baird
their resources are greater, their position is for- ^ e lt i 1 ^ e ad '
midable, their defences are strong. But in war diate action.
something must be risked. In his opinion the
risk of a repulse in a well-contrived and well-
organised assault was inrinitely less than the risk
which would attend the waiting during along and
uncertain period for reinforcements from below.
The waiting for reinforcements involved inaction
— an inaction which might last for weeks. Such
inaction, at a time when the Panjab, denuded of
its last troops, was quivering in the balance, in-
WILSON YIELDS TO THEM.
Book x. volved a risk greater even than the risk of a re-
Chapter . p U j ge k e f ore the walls of the city. Nor was this
s^fi ^ ast danger so great, in Baird Smith's estimation,
as the General seemed to consider. He believed
that it would be possible by skilfully preparing
and effectively delivering an assault, to reduce it
to a small proportion. He gave the fullest ex-
pression, in his reply, to these convictions, and
concluded by urging the General to prepare for
and to deliver that assault without delay — before
the enemy should have time to strengthen his
position within and without the beleaguered city.
These arguments, forcible, clear, based on logic
and reason, had their natural effect on General
Wilson. Though he did not share to the full
Baird Smith's opinions as to the probable result
of an assault, he was brought to regard the risk
which would thus be encountered as considerably
less than the risk which would be involved by in-
wiisonyieids, action. He yielded * then, and directed the Chief
out^ein^ " Engineer to prepare a plan of attack,
convinced. rpj^ re i uc t a nt assent of General Wilson threw
upon the shoulders of his Chief Engineer the re-
sponsibility for the assault. Far from shrinking
from the burden, Baird Smith eagerly seized it.
* General Wilson wrote cannot suggest any other
thus on Baird Smith's memo- plan to meet our difficulties,
raudum : "It is evident to I cannot, however, help being
me that the results of the of opinion that the chances
proposed operations will be of success under such a heavy
thrown on the hazard of a fire as the working parties
die; but under the circum- will be exposed to, are any-
stances in which I am placed, thing but favourable. I yield,
I am willing to try this however, to the judgment of
hazard— the more so as I the Chief Engineer."
THE FORTIFICATIONS OF DEHLI.
In conjunction with his second in command, Cap- book x.
tain Alexander Taylor, a most able and inde- J
fatigable member of the same corps, one of those Se l p£ 7 { #
men who, once tried in difficult circumstances, Baird Smith
are found to be indispensable, he submitted a plan pr epa r e y a or
— previously prepared, but subject to alteration p^°J
resulting from daily-gained experience — simple,
bold, and effective — easily workable, on the sole
condition of hearty and zealous co-operation and
obedience on the part of his subordinates. The
result showed how well placed was the confidence
bestowed by the Chief Engineer in the officers
serving under his orders.
Before adverting to that plan, I propose to lay
before the reader a short description of the de-
fences of, and the approaches to, Dehli.
The characteristic features of the place were,
at the time, thus officially described by Baird
Smith: "The eastern face rests on the Jamna, The fortifica-
i ticras of
and during the season of the year when our Dehif.
operations were carried on the stream may be
described as washing the base of the walls. All
access to a besieger on the river front is therefore
impracticable. The defences here consist of an
irregular wall, with occasional bastions and
towers, and about one half of the length of the
river face is occupied by the palace of the King
of Dehli, and its out-work, the old Mogol fort of
Sclimgarh. The river may be described as the
chord of a rough arc formed by the remaining
defences at the place. These consist of a suc-
cession of bastioned fronts, the connection being
very long, and the out-works limited to one
8 THE FORTIFICATIONS OF DEHLI.
Book x. crown- work at the Ajmir gate, and martello
Chapter I. . . -, ■, • ,
__ towers mounting a single gun at such points as
Se 8 t 7 i require additional flanking fire to that given by
the bastions themselves. The bastions are small,
generally mounting three guns in each face, two
in each flank, and one in the embrasure at the
salient. They are provided with masonry para-
pets about twelve feet in thickness, and have a
relief of about sixteen feet above the plane of
site. The curtain consists of a simple masonry
wall or rampart sixteen feet in height, eleven
feet thick at top, and fourteen or fifteen at
bottom. This main wall carries a parapet loop-
holed for musketry, eight feet in height and eight
feet in thickness. The whole of the land front
is covered by a berm of variable width, ranging
from sixteen to thirty feet, and having a scarp
wall eight feet high. Exterior to this is a dry
ditch, of about twenty-five feet in width, and
from sixteen to twenty feet in depth. The coun-
terscarp is simply an* earthen slope easy to de-
scend. The glacis is a very short one, extending
only fifty or sixty yards from the counterscarp.
Using general terms, it covers from the besiegers'
view from half to one third of the height of the
walls of the place. The defences, in a word, are
'modernised' forms of ancient works that existed
when the city fell before Lord Lake's army in
1803. They extend about seven miles in circumfe-
rence, and include an area of about three square
miles. On the western side of Dehli there appear
the last out-lying spurs of the Aravelli mountains,
and represented here by a low ridge, which dis-
PLAN OF THE ATTACK.
Book X.
Chapter I.
appears at its intersection with the Jamna, about
two miles above the place. The drainage from
the eastern slope of the ridge finds its way to the Sept {
river alonsf the northern and the north-western
faces of the city, and has formed there a succes-
sion of parallel or connected ravines of consider-
able depth. By taking advantage of these hollow
ways admirable cover was constantly obtained for
the troops, and the labour of the siege was mate-
rially reduced. The whole of the exterior of the
place presents an extraordinary mass of old
buildings of all kinds, of thick brushwood, and
occasional clumps of forest trees, giving great
facilities for cover, which, during the siege opera-
tions at least, proved to be on the whole more
favourable to us than to the enemy."
Such being the place, the plan for assaulting it
traced by Baird Smith and Taylor may thus be
described.
It was inevitable that the attack should be Plan of the
made on the northern face of the fortress — the
face represented by the Mori, Kashmir, and Water
bastions, and the curtain walls connecting them.
These connecting curtains were merely parapets,
wide enough only for musketry fire. It had been
in the power of the enemy greatly to strengthen
these defences by pulling down the adjacent
buildings, and on their ruins erecting a rampart,
from which a continued fire of heavy guns should
bo concentrated on an attacking force. In neg-
lecting, as a rule, to use the advantage thus open
to them the rebel leaders added another example
to many preceding it, of the absence from their
10
THE DAT FIXED.
Book X.
Chapter I.
1857.
Sept. 1.
Its simplicity
and wisdom.
Effective
number of
the besieging
force.
Sept. 6.
Sept. 7.
councils of a really capable commander. The
neglect was likely to be fatal to the defence, for
it enabled the besiegers to concentrate on the
curtains a fire sufficient to crush the defenders'
fire and to effect breaches through which the in-
fantry could be launched against the town.
The plan of the Chief Engineer, then, was to
crush the fire of the Mori bastion at the north-
west corner of the city. That fire silenced, the
advance on the extreme left, which was covered
by the river, would be secure, and there the assault
would be delivered.
The simple wisdom of this plan will be at once
recognised. In the first place the advance was
effectually covered by the river on one flank, and
partially so by trees and brushwood in front.
The assault delivered, our men would not be
at once involved in narrow streets, but there
would be a space comparatively open in which to
act.
On the 6th September all the reinforcements
which could be expected, together with the siege-
train, had arrived in camp. The effective rank
and file, of all arms, amounted to eight thousand
seven hundred and forty-eight men, of whom
three thousand three hundred and seventeen were
Europeans. In line with, and acting with them,
were two thousand two hundred native levies
from Kashmir, and some hundreds from Jhind.
The evening of the 7th was fixed upon for
the commencement of the tracing of the bat-
teries which were to assail the northern face of
the city. On that day General Wilson issued to
Wilson's order to the aemy. 11
the troops an order, in which he announced to book x.
them that the time was drawing near when he ° -in-
trusted their labours would be over, and they sept 7 7.
would be rewarded for all their past exertions, General
and for the fatigue still before them, by the t^*Xo
capture of the city. Much, he reminded the the troops his
. .. . .. m intention to
infantry, still remained to be accomplished. 1 hey assault.
had to aid and assist the engineers alike in the
erection of the batteries and in acting as covering
parties ; and when the way should be smoothed His appeal to
for them by the scientific branches of the service,
they would have to dare death in the breach.
When it should come to that point it would be
necessary for them to keep well together, to push
on in compact and unbroken masses.
As for the artillery, their work, General Wilson to the artii-
1CM
y-
warned them, would be harder than any they had
till then encountered. He expressed, at the same
time, his confidence that the members of that
branch of the service would bring to the perform-
ance of that harder work the same cheerfulness
and the same pluck which had characterised their
labours up to that time.
Reminding the troops of the cruel murders regarding
committed on their officers and their comrades, ?he foe*
as well as on their wives and children, General
Wilson declared that whilst the troops should
spare the women and children who might fall in
fcheir way, they should give no quarter to the
mutineers.
Upon the ri "'imental officers was impressed the tothoregi-
1 ° . ij* mental offi-
necessity of keeping their men together, ot pre- cera.
venting plunder, of carrying out the directions of
12
NO. 1 BATTERY TRACED.
Raid's
battery.
book x. the engineers. The Maior-Greneral concluded by
Chapter I. . ° _ . J 1 . J
asserting his confidence that a brilliant termma-
Sept.7. ** on °^ their labours would follow a zealous en-
forcement of his directions.
Before detailing the work which, on the even-
ing of the 7th, followed the issue of this order, it
is necessary to inform the reader that at the sug-
gestion of Major Charles Reid,* who commanded
on the ridge, a light battery had been erected on
the night of the 6th upon the plateau of the ridge
close to the Sammy house. The object of this
battery, known as Reid's battery, was to keep
the ground clear and to protect the contemplated
new heavy battery, No. 1, during its construction.
Reid's battery contained eight light pieces, six
9-pounders, and two 24-pound howitzers, and was
commanded by Captain Remmington.
To return. — On the evening of the day on which
General Wilson's order was issued the engineers
commenced their work. In pursuance of the re-
solve to trace out a battery, the fire from which
should crush the Mori bastion, Captain Alexander
Taylor and Taylor, assisted by Captain Medley, proceeded at
No. i battery, sunset, accompanied by half-a-dozen sappers, to
Hindu Rao's house. A site had previously been
selected to the left of the Sammy House, below the
ridge on the open plain, and within seven hundred
yards of the Mori bastion. Sand-bags had been
taken down on the night of the 6th and covered
over with grass and brushwood. These were
found untouched by the enemy. The two engi-
* Now General Sir Charles Reid, K.C.B.
THE TRACING COMPLETED. 13
neers at once set to work to trace a battery on BooK x.
this spot. The battery, styled No. 1 battery, was —
divided into two sections. The right section, sfpt.Y
commanded by Major Brind,* intended to receive its right
five 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, was to
silence the Mori bastion, and to prevent it from
interfering with the real attack on the left ; the
left section, and armed with four 24-pounders,
under the command of Major Kaye, was designed
to keep down the fire from the Kashmir bastion
until the order to assault it should be given.
These two sections were to be connected by a
trench which, carried on beyond the left section, its left
would communicate with the deep nullah close to
the rear, and form a sort of first parallel, giving
good cover to the guard of the trenches.
The tracing* of this battery had but i ust been com- The tracing
• P t» ■i» ^i / completed.
pleted when a strong covering party ot Keid s (iur-
kahs arrived. Camels with fascines and gabions
followed, and the work progressed rapidly during
the night. The working parties were but little dis-
turbed by the enemy, three well-directed showers
of grape from the Mori alone reaching them.
In order to draw off the enemy's attention as
much as possible, Major Reid, who was with
* Now General Sir James No. 1 battery ; Majors Frank
Brind, K.C.B. General Wil- Turner and Edward Kaye
son's orders in writing, and being attached for the sub-
verbally given by the Assist- ordinate command of the right
ant Adjutant-General of Ar- and left wings. Major Turner
til lory, Edwin Johnson, were being struck down by serious
to the effect that Major Brind, illness, the left wing was
commanding the Foot Artil- placed under charge of Major
lery of the Delhi Field Fmve, Kaye, sup Tvised throughout
was to command the Key, or by Major Brind.
14 THE ENEMY ATTEMPT TO IMPEDE THE WORK.
BookX. Taylor and Medley, sent directions to Captain
Chapter I. -. J . J « ,
ftemrumgton to keep up a constant fire on the
Bept.7. Mori bastion. This had the desired effect, for
Reid diverts the Mori at once opened on Reid's battery and
the Moi/° m the Sammy House, and did not again molest the
bastion. working parties. Indeed the enemy did not
discover till the day dawned this fresh work
upon which the besiegers had been engaged.
Much to their dismay they beheld Brind's bat-
tery all but completed. Though great efforts
had been made, however, all was not ready in
it, and but one gun was in position as the
Sept. 8. morning of the 8th dawned. The rebels on the
Mori bastion were not slow to notice the results
At dawn of of the work of that long night. Instantaneously
enLr/dis- they took measures to demolish it. With the day-
Series D6W n o n t there poured on the barely armed battery
showers of grape and round shot. So terrible and
so incessant was the fire, that almost every man
who ventured from the protection of the battery
was knocked over. To this storm the defenders
of the battery had but one gun to reply. Major
Brind's James Brind, one of the heroes of this long siege,
eLrdons. who, as already stated, commanded the entire No. 1
battery, noting this, dragged, by great exertion, a
howitzer to the rear, and fired over the parapet at
the Mori. The fire of the enemy still poured
in, however, fierce, incessant, relentless. Em-
boldened by the weakness of the British reply,
they even thought it might be possible to carry
The enemy's by assault the newly m;<de battery. With this
carry the ° object they despatched a body of cavalry and
infantry from the Lahor gate. This little
BUT A.EE FOILED. 15
force, emerging from the gate with resolution, book x.
took at once the direction of the battery. But J
they had not gone far when they encountered septus
a hot fire from the 18-pounder and howitzer in battery is
the right section of No. 1 battery, from the guns baffled -
on the ridge, and the light guns on the plateau.
This threw them into confusion — a confusion
changed into a rout by the opportune discharge
of a volley of grape from Brind's battery. The
volley sent them back faster than they had come.
All this time the men in this battery had been The right
section is
working hard, and though pelted incessantly from armed.
the Mori bastion, they soon succeeded in finishing
a second platform, then a third, soon after a
fourth and a fifth. On the completion of each
platform the gun placed on it opened at once on
the enemy. The effect of the fire, thus gradually
increasing, was soon felt on the Mori. In Maior Major Brind
Brind the officers and men possessed a commander Mori harm-
of great perseverance, rare energy, a strong will, ess
and a thorough knowledge of his profession.
Under his skilful direction the shot from the
battery told with tremendous and unceasing effect
on the masonry bastion. Gradually the fire from
it diminished ; by the afternoon it ceased alto-
gether. The bastion was then a heap of ruins, and
although the enemy, displaying rare courage,
managed to replace the heavy guns in succession
to those knocked over, and to discharge them at
the battery, the want of cover made it deadly
work, and their fire soon languished. One part
of the Engineer's plan had thus been carried out.
The Mori bastion bad been made harmless.
16 PART OF NO. 1 BATTERY DESTROYED.
Book x. Heavy fire was, however, continued upon it from
Chapter I. ^ ^.^ gecti()n an( J f rom ^ r ^ ge ^fl ^q
a 18 4 . 57 o night before the assault was delivered.
bept. O. O nil 111
The left Whilst the right section of the battery had thus
section been blazing away at the Mori, the 24-pounders
in the left section under Major Kaye had been
doing their work well, their fire directed on the
Kashmir bastion. This fire was continued day
is destroyed and night until noon on the 10th, when the bat-
ioth re ° n the tery caught fire from the constant discharge of
our own guns. The sand-bags first caught the
flame, then the fascines, made of dry brushwood,
and at length the whole battery was in a blaze,
which it was feared might extend to the right
section and expense magazine.
Gallantry Lieutenant Lockhart, now Colonel Lockhart,
Lockhart nan commanding 107th Foot, who was attached to
Reid's Grurkahs, was at the time on duty with two
companies of the regiment in the connecting trench
between the two sections. The necessity to ex-
tinguish the fire was so apparent to him, that he
at once suggested to Major Kaye whether it might
not be possible to save the battery by working
from the outside and top of the parapet. Kaye
replied that he thought something might be done
if a party were to take sand-bags to the top, cut
them, and smother the fire with the sand. Lock-
hart instantly jumped on to the parapet, followed
by six or seven Giirkahs, and began the work in
the manner suggested. The enemy were not slow
to discover what had happened, and, determined
that the flames should not be extinguished, they
at once brought every gun to bear on the blazing
GALLANTKY OF LOCKHART.
17
battery and poured in a deadly fire of grape and
musketry. Two of the Giirkahs fell dead, and
Lockhart rolled over the parapet with a shot
through his jaw. The shot penetrating through
the right cheek, passed under his tongue, and
went out through the left cheek, smashing the
right jaw to pieces.* The fire was eventually
extinguished by means of the sand from the
sand-bags, but the section was destined.
* The noble example set by
Lockhart was witnessed by
Major Reid, and mentioned
as a case worthy, he consi-
dered, of the Victoria Cross.
Unfortunately Reid's pencil
reports, like many more de-
spatches of his written daily
from the ridge in pencil and
under fire, were destroyed by
General Wilson, as, being
written in pencil and not in
the regulated form, they were
not considered " official." It
thus happened that when
General Wilson penned his
final despatch, he had none
of Reid's pencil notes and
reports to refer to. Reid
I 1 1 ' nt 1\ represented that
his recommendations had not
been attended to ; that lie had
again and again brought to
notice the gallant conduct of
officers of ihe 60th Rifles and
others who had served under
liim ; and at Length he him-
self sent in a supplementary
i'li, through Colonel
Norman, then Acting Adju-
tant-General. The' reply he
received was that in Lord
Clyde's opinion "the time
ii.
had altogether passed for pub-
lishingany further despatches
relative to seiwices of officers
at Delhi, which, however meri-
torious, are now of old date."
This was in February 1859.
Prior to this Reid had been
urging General Wilson to
take notice of his recommen-
dations. But it was in vain.
Neither his pencil notes
written under fire, nor his
reports after the siege, were
ever properly attended to,
and many deserving officers
were consequently left unre-
warded. Among these was
Captain John Fisher, second
in command of the Sirmur
lion, who was on the
ridge with the regiment
throughout the siege, who
commanded it during the as-
sault, and who was the only
officer out of nine who escaped
being wounded. This officer
did not even receive a brevet.
For the same reason Major
Reid's appreriatory mention
of t he services of the Engineer
and Artillery officers, ex-
pressed in the strongest, lan-
guage, remained unpublished,
o
Book X.
Chapter I.
1857.
Sept. 10.
18
NO. 2 BATTERY TRACED.
Book X.
Chapter I.
1857.
Sept. 7.
Tracing of
battery No. 2.
Sept. 8.
To return to the 7th. At the same time
that the batteries just referred to were traced
on the right, preliminary arrangements for the
real attack had been made on the left. On the
evening of the 7th, Kiidsia Bagh and Ludlow
Castle were occupied by strong pickets. No op-
position was offered to this occupation, the muti-
neers being impressed with the idea that the real
attack would be made on the Mori. With these
two posts strongly occupied as supports, the engi-
neers were able, on the evening of the 8th, to
trace out battery No. 2. This trace was made in
front of Ludlow Castle, and five hundred yards
from the Kashmir gate. Like battery No. 1 —
called, after the commandant, Brind's battery — it
was divided into two portions, the right-half
being intended for seven heavy howitzers and
two 18-pounders ; the left, about two hundred
yards distant, for nine 24-pounders, The fire
from these two portions was intended to silence
the fire from the Kashmir bastion, to knock away
the parapet right and left that gave cover to the
defenders, and to open the main breach by which
the place was to be stormed.*