Jiran t bal night.

Their retreat, however, was only the prelude JJ^ 61 *



572



LAWBENCB CAPfURES AWAH.



Book XII.
Chapter V.

1857.
November.

again in
greater
numbers
and attack
Nimach.



Lawrence
applies for
reinforce-
ments.



1858.
January.



On the
arrival of
some of them
he besieges,



and captures
A'-wah .



to an advance in larger numbers. On the 8th
November a body of them, numbering four thou-
sand, advanced on Nimach, occupied the station,
and forced the European and native troops to take
refuge within the fortified square. This they
attempted, but vainly, to escalade ; then, after a
siege of fifteen days' duration, hearing that re-
inforcements were advancing to the aid of the
British, they fell back.

On receiving intelligence of the murder of
Captain Burton and his sons, General Lawrence
had made an urgent requisition to Bombay for
troops. The first and smaller detachments of
these began to arrive in Rajputana in January
1858, but it was not until March that the rein-
forcements assumed a sufficient strength to justify
decisive action on a large scale.

The detachments which arrived in January,
however, enabled General Lawrence to throw off
the quiescent attitude which he had till then
deemed it politic to assume. In January he was
able to detach a force of eleven hundred men,
with a due proportion of guns, under Colonel
Holmes, 12th Bombay Native Infantry, against
A'wah. Holmes invested the place on the 19th,
and the same day his guns opened fire. At the
end of five days a practicable breach had been
made, and the assault was ordered for the follow-
ing morning. The garrison, perfectly cognisant
of all that was going on in the British camp,
resolved not to wait. Fortunately for them there
raged that night a storm so fearful, and there
ruled a darkness so intense, that sentries only a



REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE. 573

few paces apart could neither see nor hear each bookXii.

•. -r-r n r> i ^ Chapter V.

other. Under cover ot these portents they eva- —
cuated the place in the night. jan.-March.

The strength of the fortifications of A'wah, Thefortifi-
when it was occupied next morning by the British ^™ s of
troops, were such as to justify to the full General
Lawrence's determination regarding it in the pre-
vious September. It had a double line of de-
fences, the inner of strong masonry, the outer
of earthwork, both being loop-holed. Thirteen
guns, three tons of powder, and three thousand
rounds of small arms ammunition were found in
the place. The keep, the bastions, and all the justify (
masonry works were blown up and destroyed, so previous
as effectually to prevent the stronghold becom- retirement -
ino- a nucleus of rebellion for the future.*

This act of vigour had a very salutary effect.
Order was maintained in the country; and in
March, when the reinforcements from Bombay
poured in, the difficulty of the task for which
troops had been required in the previous Novem-
ber had in no way increased.

The reinforcements numbered five thousand The main

reinforce*

five hundred men of all arms. They were com- ments arrive
posed of the 92nd, 83rd, and 95th Regiments, the
10th Bombay Native Infantry, the 8th Hussars,
the 1st Bombay Lancers, the Sind Horse, Brown's
battery of artillery, eighteen field-pieces, of which
ten were 8-inch mortars and howitzers, and a
corps of sappers and miners. They were com-
manded by Major-General H. G. Roberts of the
Bombay ;inny.

* Forty-three Years in India, Sir (!. Lawrence.



574 THE CONDITION OF KOTA.

book xii. On the arrival of General Roberts in March,

, mpter General Lawrence resigned the military command

1858. j nto hi s h an( j s and reverted to his civil and poli-

Marcn. ' r

under tical functions as agent to the Governor- General.

Robert! ^ n ^hi s capacity he accompanied the force.
The state of The first operation to be attempted was the

Kota after re00V ery of Kota. Ever since the murder of

the murder of iVV/w J

Burton. Captain Burton disorder had prevailed in that

State. The sepoys, having tasted the pleasure of
revolt, drained the cup to the very dregs. They
imprisoned the Maharao in his palace. They then
forced him to sign a paper consisting of nine
articles, one of which was to the effect that he
had ordered the murder of Major Burton. The
Maharao endeavoured by compliance to keep the
rebels in good humour, but meanwhile he de-
spatched secretly messengers to the Raja of
Karaoli, begging him to send troops to his aid.
The Raja complied, and his troops, faithful to
their liege lord, drove the rebels from the part of
the town of Kota in which the palace was
situated, and released the Maharao. They were
still occupying it, for the defence of that prince,
when Roberts arrived in Rajpiitana. The rebels,
however, occupied the other part of the town,
reduced already by pillage and other excesses to
extreme misery.
The road A military march from Nasirabad, the head-

NaSbad quarters of Roberts's force, to Kota, was not one
and Kota. which a general could regard as being necessarily
a pleasure trip. Not only did the town of Kota
occupy a formidable position, covered by the river
Chambal on one side and by a large and deep lake



KOTA IS RECAPTURED. 575

on the other, but the approach to it offered many « 00K XI J ;

i £ Chapter V.

positions capable of easy defence by a small force

against one much larger. Chief amongst these March.

was the Mokandara pass — a long and narrow

valley between two ranges of hills.

But once more the want of true military instinct Roberts

was manifested. None of the difficult positions to Kota,

were defended. Roberts, marching from Nasir-

abad on the 10th, encamped on the north bank of

the Chambal, opposite Kota, on the 22nd March.

He found the rebels in complete possession of the

south bank, on which they had planted their

guns, many in number, and some of them large

in calibre. Roberts ascertained at the same

time that the fort, the palace, half the city, and

the ferry over the river, were held by the Malia-

rao with the Karaoli troops.

Early on the morning: of the 25th, information He attaoks
•/ ° . . and com-

reached him that the rebels were making an pieteiy

assault on the palace with a view to seize the jjjjjj the
ferry. Roberts instantly sent across three hun-
dred men of the 83rd, under Major Heath, to aid
the Maharao. The attack was repulsed. On the
27th he crossed over himself with six hundred of
the 93rd, and two 9-pounders, and having placed
the heavy guns in the fort in position to bear on
the enemy's camp, he opened upon it on the
29th a heavy fire of shot and shell. On the 30th,
whilst fche remainder of the force cannonaded the
rebels' position from the north bank, he, march-
ing from the Port in three columns, moved on it
on the south bank, and gained it with y<t\ small
loss. By this brilliant manoeuvre he not only



576 THE CONDITION OF RAJPUTANA.

book xii. completely defeated the enemy but captured fifty
chapter v. ^^ , The oaV jj I y j however, failed to intercept

MarciS'fii tne reDels > and tne J almost a11 escaped.

The authority The British troops occupied Kota for three

of the Maha- wee k s# ^ fc t he en( j f that time, the authority of

1'flO IS 1*6*

stored. the Maharao having been completely re-esta-

blished, General Roberts evacuated it and re-
turned to Nasirabad, despatching a portion of
his force to garrison Nimach. With the fall of
Kota peace and order had been completely re-
stored throughout Rajputana, and although, two
months later, both were broken by Tantia Topi,
the action of this famous leader was strictly an
invasion. Tantia induced neither prince nor
peasant to join his standard.
The reason Of all the large tracts of territory inhabited

tLa was%V mainly by a people boasting a common origin, not
mSe a affMted one P asse( ^ through the trying period of 1857-58
by the with smaller injury to itself, with less infliction

of suffering and bloodshed, than the territory of
Rajputana. Parcelled out into eighteen sovereign
States, each ruled by its own independent chief,
the circumstance may seem surprising. But the
causes of it are not far to seek. I attribute the re-
sult mainly to the fact that no people in India had
suffered so much or so recently as the Rajputs
from the lawlessness which characterised the sway
immediately preceding the suzerainty of the Bri-
tish — the sway of the Marathas. When the policy
of Marquess Wellesley towards the Rajput States
was reversed in 1805 by Lord Cornwallis and
Sir George Barlow, a system of oppression and
misrule was inaugurated, under which the buffalo



mutiny.



GEORGE ST. PATRICK LAWRENCE. 577

was to the man who held the bludgeon, and the book xii.
fair daughters of the land were to the strong arm ha ^f Y -
of the marauder. For twelve years the sufferings 1858,
of Rajputami cried to heaven for redress. That
redress came only when, in 1817, the Marquis of
Hastings reverted to the policy of his great pre-
decessor. Uuder that policy the princes of Raj-
piitana have been secured against invaders from
outside and against each other. Once more has
every man been able to lie down in his own
mango-grove and to eat of his own date-tree.
Security has prevailed throughout the land. The
honour of every man and of every woman has been
secured. It was the sense of this security, enjoyed
under British suzerainty, that ensured the loyalty
of the great bulk of the Rajputs during the
troublous times of the mutiny.

It is proper to add that this recollection of past George
and present benefits was stimulated and enforced LawreiS?
by the choice made by the Government of India
of the agents to carry out their policy. Foremost
among these was George St. Patrick Lawrence.
His tact, his energy, his fearlessness, his readiness
of resource, when he had not a single European
soldier at his disposal, stamp him as a man emi-
nently fitted to rule in troublous times. The
display of these ' ju;i 1 ities begat confidence in the
minds of the native princes, fear and dismay
among the adventurers who welcomed turmoil.
His presence, thus, proved itself to be worth an
army. But for his promptitude, Ajmir would
have fallen, and with Ajmir occupied by two or
three regiments of Bril ish sepoys, Bril ish aul hority
ii. " 37



578 THE STORY REVERTS TO BOMBAY.

book xii. would have disappeared. The preservation of
chapter v. j^jp^.^ then, will ever be connected with the
1858 - name of this gallant and distinguished officer.
The story The inroad of Tantia Topi into Rajputana, and

Bombay* tne campaign in pursuit of that famous leader,
will be treated of in its proper place in the next
volume. Before dealing with him it will be my
pleasing duty to record the statesmanlike mea-
sures by which Lord Elphinstone caused Bombay
to become a strong wall of support to the threat-
ened edifice of British rule in India, and to narrate
how Sir Hugh Rose illustrated the highest genius
of the inspired warrior by his daring and suc-
cessful campaign in Central India.



579



APPENDIX A.



1.— (Page 39 of text.)

Major Reid's plan of attack on the strong position of
Kishanganj lias never been published. I therefore give it
verbatim. On the 2nd February, 1858, after he had in a
measure recovered from his wound, he wrote as follows :

" With regard to Kishenganj I can only say that were I
ordered to attack the place to-morrow, supposing the enemy's
heavy guns to be in the same position they were in on the
14th September last, my plan of attack would be just what
it was then.

" Tou have seen the position, and know the localities and
great strength of the place, and will therefore understand
me when I say the hugging the garden wall on the lefl of
the roa<l I \ei We you come to the canal bridge, and then the
loop-holed serai wall, as also the garden wall which runs
parallel to it, places one, comparatively speaking, ou1 of
harm's way. The beavj guns in the two batteries could no1
l"- broughl to hear, nor could the loop-holes be made use of
for musketry, so Long, mind you, as the column hugged the

:57 *



580 APPENDIX A.

walls above alluded to < four deep,' as I had my troops on
the 14th September.

" I was just about to carry out this plan and make a feint
in front of the heavy batteries whilst I made a real attack
in rear of the serai,* when I was knocked over, but my in-
tentions were to have attacked the strong works at the end
of the road — their second line of defence — and had this been
successful, I should have entered the serai through the breach
which was made by my order in rear of the heavy batteries,
as also through the gate, which I could have blown in, and
through which I entered when I took the place on the 17th
June.

" My object in detaching four hundred infantry, two
hundred cavalry, and four guns of the Jaramoo contingent
to the Eedgar was to make a diversion and place Trevelyan-
ganj between a cross fire, as also to watch the enemy and
prevent my right flank being turned ; and I had a still fur-
ther object in view, namely, to make the enemy believe that
our real attack was to be on the right ! That they were
deceived by this movement there can be but little doubt,
otherwise they would not have reinforced Kishanganj in the
way they did, for at the time I fell the enemy mustered at
least fifteen thousand strong.

" After getting possession of Kishanganj I should have
turned the four captured heavy guns, as also the two 8-inch
mortars, on Trevelyanganj. Their fire, coupled with that
of the four guns of the Jummoo contingent, would have made
it too hot for them, and I calculated on their retreating into
the city. Had they done so, I should have left half the
reserve in the serai, and proceeded with my column along
the dry bed of the canal up to the Kabul gate, which
Nicholson would have opened for me after he had reached
that point with his column inside the city walls.

* A loop-holed stone wall enclosure round a village.



APPENDIX A. 581

" A good deal would have depended on circumstances, but
certain it is I should not have attempted to enter the city
so long as the enemy were in force on my right.

" My desire was to attack Kishanganj before daybreak,
but I was over-ruled by the General, and it was decided that
I should wait for the explosion — the blowing in of the
Cashmere gate. But after all, I could not wait, as the de-
tached party of the Jummoo contingent became engaged
with the enemy. Had my orders been obeyed they would
have got into the Eedgar without firing a shot long before
daybreak, but the party was late in stai'ting from the camp,
and before getting half way to their destination the day had
dawned, and the enemy were on the alert and at once
attacked them, eventually driving them back and capturing
their four guns."



2.— (Pages 42 and 43 of text.)

A great difference of opinion having been expressed at
the time regarding the action of the fourth column after
the fall of Major Reid, the matter was referred by Captain
Lawrence, with the approval, I understand, of Major, now
Lieutenant-General, Sir Henry Norman, to the late Colonel
Sir Herbert Edwardes, K.C.B., for investigation. Sir Herbert
Edwardes, after examining many witnesses who were p resent
on the occasion, and giving to the subject the must patient
attention, recorded his opinion in the manner stated below.
It will be observed that, for reasons which seem to me suffi-
cient, I have imt adhered implicitly t<» Sir Eerbert's conclu-
sions, l>ui 1 consider it only fair to General Richard Lawrence
that they should be placed on record in this volume.



582 APPENDIX A.



Memo. : on a correspondence connected with the operations
of the fourth column of attack on Delhi, on the 14th
September, 1857, referred to me for arbitration by
Majors Norman and Lawrence.

1. Major Lawrence complains of three passages,, in a Nar-
rative of the Siege of Delhi, published by Major Norman.
The passages are as follows :

" No. 4 column, under Major Reid, advanced from the
Siibzee Mundi towards Kissengunge, the Cashmere contin-
gent co-operating on its right. The latter, however, was so
sharply attacked by the insurgents, who were in great force,
that, after losing a great number of men and four guns,
they were completely defeated, and fell hack to camp>."

" Major Reid's column met with the most strenuous oppo-
sition, greatly increased, doubtless, by the failure of the Cash-
mere contingent.

" Captain Muter, 60th Rifles, the next senior officer (a)
judiciously withdrew the troops to their former posts (b) at
Hindoo Raos and in the Subzee Mundi."

' 2. The sentences in italics contain the statements objected
to ; and I proceed to express the opinions I have formed on
the documentary evidence placed before me by Majors Law-
rence and Norman, aided by conversation on the matter with
Brigadier- General Chamberlain previous to my perusal of the
papers ; and a fuller personal inquiry made by me now from
Captain Boisragon (who was in the action) after perusing
the documents, for the sake of clearing up doubtful points.

3. The first passage is certainly very inaccurate, inasmuch
as it conveys the impression that either the whole, or at all
events the main body, of the Cashmere contingent was co-
operating on the right of No. 4 column, and lost four guns ;
whereas the contingent on that occasion acted in two bodies.
First, the main one (eight hundred strong, under Major R.



APPENDIX A. 583

Lawrence) as reserve to "No. 4 column in its attack on Kis-
sengunge, which shared in the failure of that column, and
lost no guns ; and secondly, a detachment of four hundred,
under Captain Dwyer, which acted separately against the
Edgah at a distance of three-fourths of a mile on the right
of No. 4 column, which was completely defeated, and did
lose four guns. This inaccuracy is fully admitted by Major
Norman in his reference to me, and it is unnecessary to
discuss it farther than to mention that it arose apparently
from the official report of Major Muter.

4. The second passage would similarly be admitted by
Major Norman to be so far inaccurate as he spoke of the
"Cashmere contingent" instead of a detachment of the
Cashmere contingent ; but with that exception he is still in-
clined to think that the passage is correct, that Captain
Dwyer' s detachment attacked the enemy at the Edgah
before Colonel Reid attacked at Kissengunge, and that its
defeat was sufficiently early to bring down a greater pres-
sure on Colonel Reid's column, and so to contribute to its re-
pulse. The evidence on these points is not always positive,
and is very conflicting. Lieutenant Evans, who was in the
Crow's Nest battery, evidently saw Captain Dwyer's detach-
ment engaged with the enemy at the Edgah while No. 4 column
was forming up ; and I consider his testimony decisive upon
that point. His evidence is not precise about the time of the
retirement of Captain Dwyer's detachment, though it leans
apparently to its having occurred previous even to Colonel
Reid's assault. This cannot be the case, as Colonel Reid
precisely states that some time after he had been wounded,
and was making over the command to Major Lawrence,
one hundred yards in rear of the canal, he told Major Law-
reDce "to support the four hundred Jummoo troops on the
right, who were becoming hotly engaged with the enemy."
This establishes that the two engagements were going on
simultaneously at Kissengunge and Edgah, and the inquiry



584 APPENDIX A.

is thus narrowed to which of the two repulses occurred
first. Major Muter says that No. 4 column attacked thus
twice, and failed in being able to get up another attack, the
loss was so heavy, the confusion so great, and the men so
disheartened. This all occurred within a quarter of an hour
of the fall of Major Eeid, who was one of the first hit ; in
that quarter of an hour we lost two hundred men out of the
seven hundred and fifty. Here it is precisely stated that
No. 4 column had been finally repulsed a quarter of an hour
after Colonel Eeid was wounded; Colonel Eeid describes
himself as having been " for some time " insensible on the
ground after being hit, and when he became conscious he
was carried to the rear, where he met Major Lawrence. It
would seem, then, that the second attack must have been
about failing, if it had not failed, when Colonel Eeid asked
Major Lawrence to send aid to Captain Dwyer's detachment,
which was then " becoming hotly engaged with the enemy " ;
but Colonel Eeid goes on to say that " up to this time the
troops were well in hand, and were as steady as possible, and
I made sure of success," which would be irreconcileable with
Major Muter' s account, if we did not remember that Major
Muter was in front engaged in the action, and therefore
cognizant of the facts, while Colonel Eeid was in the rear
after having been some time insensible. Again, Captain
Shebbeare is clear that one reason for the retirement of
No. 4 column was the running in of Captain Dwyer's men
upon the right flank of No. 4 column, which allowed the
enemy to work round to the rear ; on the other hand, Lieu-
tenant Manderson, who was with Captain Dwyer's party, is
equally clear that as he was returning he met two Cashmere
guns coining back from No. 4 column, and the native officer
in command related how No. 4 had been repulsed. The
opinion I form upon these statements (which are perhaps
not more conflicting than those of officers engaged in diffe-
rent parts of a field usually are) is that the two engagements



APPENDIX A. 585

at Edgali and Kissengunge were raging simultaneously, and
that the repulse of neither was long enough before the other
to have any effect on the result, considering that they were
nearly a mile apart. The loss of more than one-fourth of
No. 4 column, as described by Major Muter, sufficiently
accounts for its repulse. It was obviously too weak for the
operation, and I should say this alone was the cause of its
failure.

5. The third passage contains two statements which Major
Lawrence objects to.

1st. That Major Muter was " the next senior officer " after
Colonel Reid's withdrawal.

2nd. That Major Muter " withdrew the troops to their
former posts."

It is now acknowledged by all that the next senior officer
in the field on the occasion was Major R. Lawrence, who
was commanding the main body of the Cashmere contin-
gent, which formed Colonel Reid's "reserve"; and Colonel
Reid states that, on recovering his senses after his wound,
he called out for Major Lawrence, and meeting him one
hundred yards over the bridge, gave over the command to
him : therefore, by military usage, Major Muter could not
be described as " the next senior officer," though in point
of fact he was the senior officer of all those who were in
front with the troops which formed the column of attack,
and, that being the case, in an affair wherein minutes were
hours, while two desperate attacks had crowded themselves
into oue quarter of an hour, been overwhelmingly repulsed,
and followed by hopeless confusion, Major Muter might fitly
have retired with the attacking column, at all events as tar
as thr reserve, and there have left the real senior officer to
resume the attack or not. But I do not consider that he
could fitly have withdrawn from the field the column which
he knew was not under Ins command. Hut ii does uol
appear in these documents thai Major Muter ever assumed



586 APPENDIX A.

the command of the troops in front, or organised the re-
tirement. Captain Shebbeare describes " all the officers in
front as agreeing among themselves, in the absence of a
commander, to retire, as the attack was a failure, and as
having reported what they had done to Major Lawrence,
when they found him after recrossing the canal, knowing
him to be the next in command to Colonel Reid, on which
' he,' i.e. Major Lawrence, confirmed the order, but shortly
after ordered an advance, which he again countermanded
almost immediately. When he reached the serai in the
Subzee Mundi, he, at my suggestion, ordered me to occupy
the Crow's Nest and the line reaching right up to the bat-
tery. These are distinct acts of command amounting to
this, that the final relinquishment of the attack, and the re-
tirement of the majority of the troops in No. 4 column ' to
their former posts,' were really carried out under the orders
of Major R. Lawrence, who was also the proper person to
issue them. Captain Wriford states that on Colonel Reid