cope with a mass of work such as was bound to accumulate
upon the commencement of repatriation. Little provision
had been made for the various appointments which were
suddenly created throughout the colony, and the difficulty
of providing at a moment's notice twenty-two competent
accountants, who had to be instructed as to the methods of
the accounts which they were expected to keep, was one
which was found to be beyond the power of the Central
Board. This was due to the fact that the best material
in the country was still in the field, and that repatriation had
to be undertaken before the irregular corps had been dis-
banded. The Civil Service had not been organized, and there
was an entire lack of trained accountants. The district
repatriation officers, especially the secretaries and accountants,
had, like the Resident Magistrates, to be taken almost entirely
on trust. Forms had to be evolved to suit the exigencies of
the department, and these had to be printed and sent out to
the districts. Postal communication between the districts
and the head office was infrequent and irregular, owing to the
great distances which had to be covered, and to the scarcity
of transport and inhabitants, and it was sometimes weeks
' Vide Appendix A, p. 263.



216 THE AFTEEMATH OF WAR

before the local accountant, when appointed, found himself in
possession of the requisites necessary to carry out his work.

Meanwhile the Resident Magistrates had got out to their
districts, and the local boards had been formed. The position
at the time, then, was this : The Central Board was engaged
in ascertaining the requirements of each district ; in purchasing
stock, seed, building material, farm implements, food-stuffs ;
in confirming loans made by the local commissions ; and in
deciding the questions of principle which from time to time
arose. The local commissioners were employed in returning
families to their farms ; in transporting supplies, which were
being received from the military and from the head office, to
the district depots ; in issuing rations ; in granting advances
of stock, stores, and cash to individuals ; and in generally
supervising the control and management of large mobs of
draught animals which had been taken over from the military,
and which demanded a considerable amount of attention on
account of their wretched and diseased condition. In addition
to repatriation work, the chairman of the board, whose duty
it was to supervise the accounts, had his own magisterial
duties to perform, and could not always be on the spot owing
to his absence on other duties, such as inquests, periodical
courts, etc. The commissioners had their own private business
to attend to. Consequently, to a great extent in many
districts the details of the accounts were left in the hands of
the secretary, who was also the accountant, assisted in the
first instance only by an issuer and head conductor ; for it was
not until most of the mischief had been done that the Central
Board granted the extra clerical assistance which was so
essential. The majority of the accountants were untried and
unproven men, who in most cases had to pick up the details
of the work as best they could. Several of the magistrates
and many of the accountants were still further handica^jped
by ignorance of the locality and the inhabitants.

That the accounts in many of the districts were found at a
later date to be in a state of hopeless confusion is not to be
wondered at when it is understood that at first the only super-



EEPATRIATION FEOM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 217

vision exercised over them was from the head office, upon
examination of the monthly returns, which were often received
in a most irregular manner. This is the explanation, but not
the justification, of bad book-keeping. While every allowance
must be made for the difficulty that was experienced at the
time in obtaining competent men to take up positions of trust,
it is to be regretted that the Central Board did not engage
inspectors of accounts at the outset, who, when duly qualified
at the head office, might have been employed in travelling
in the districts for the purpose of seeing that instructions
were being carried out and accounts properly kept. It is also
to be regretted that the Eesident Magistrates did not at the time
emphasize the fact that they were unable properly to super-
vise the work of their accountants.

It was not possible to lay down any system of purchasing
stores, still less to adopt the principle of public tender. At
the commencement the department called for tenders, and
advertised both in the Orange Eiver Colony press and in that of
the adjoining colonies. The call, it has been seen, met with
no response. In the first instance, so far from local mer-
chants being able to make quotations, they sought the aid of
the department to get their stocks up-country and to replenish
their stores. The whole business of the country was dis-
organized. The railway system was congested. There were
so few stores of any kind in the colony that the ordinary
methods of purchase could hardly have been applied.

An examination of the list of debtors on the books of the
department would reveal the fact that many persons were
assisted by the department who were not entitled to such
assistance under the terms of Article X. And it would be
possible to quote examples of assistance being given to farmers
in possession of unmortgaged or slightly mortgaged farms ; to
land settlers ; to storekeepers and other persons for the
purpose of obtaining better prices on the realization of the
department's stocks and stores. These examples are twelve
in number, but the loans are small in amount. From what
has already been said as to the general misinterpretation of



218 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

Article X., the reader may be somewhat astonished to discover
that more loans of this character were not made. It has
already been pointed out that the assistance granted by the
Repatriation Department to land settlers in the Orange River
Colony was insignificant compared with that granted to the
same class in the Transvaal. There is no doubt that the
Orange River Colony Department erred in adhering too
strictly to the wording of Article X. in this connection. It is
true that assistance was also given to persons other than ex-
burghers in the form of allowing credit for purchases made ;
but the department, it is submitted, was justified in thus dis-
posing of its surplus stores, on the ground that, if immediate
cash had been insisted upon, no sales, or sales at only very
inadequate prices, would have taken place.

The sum of £119,865 lis. is arrived at as follows :

£ a. a.

Horses, deaths and missing, 2,895 57,734 15 4

Mules, „ „ 2,693 48,555 7

Cattle, ,, „ 3,623 45,222 8 10

Sheep, „ „ 1,771 3,272 19 10

154,785 11

Less rebate allowed by military authorities

in respect of above losses 34,920

Net losses on live-stock ^119,865 11

I do not propose to describe afresh the poverty-stricken
and diseased condition of the draught animals transferred by
the army, because the subject has been dealt with at some
length in previous chapters. It may here be stated that it
is not quite obvious how the restoration of the people to their
homes could possibly have been undertaken — at least, for
some months — unless this" transfer had been effected ; and it
must be admitted that, bad as they were, the animals and
stores taken over from the military authorities materially
hastened the work of repatriation. In respect of losses, the
War Office granted a rebate to the Repatriation Departments
of both colonies, and £34,920 represents the Orange River
Colony's share. The percentage of deaths to the total number



REPATKIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 219

of animals handled during the whole period of the depart-
ment's existence was as follows :

Horses 24*4 per cent.

Mules 22-8 „

Oxen and cattle ... ... ... 9'5 ,,

Sheep 0-9

The numbers of horses and mules appear large in the
aggregate, but the average per depot really only works out at
less than three and six respectively, and in view of the number
dealt with (11,713 horses and 10,659 mules), and the circum-
stances which have already been explained, as well as the
period covered, this loss may not be considered excessive.
With regard to sheep, there appears to have been a want of
uniformity in the districts in taking on and issuing young
lambs. Frequently lambs were taken on charge, but ewes
sold with lambs at feet were issued as one head.

The unsatisfactory condition of the live-stock purchased in
the Cape Colony by buyers on commission has been referred
to in a previous chapter. It must be pointed out that these
buyers were in nowise official or directly connected with the
Government. The object was to restock the country as soon
as possible without it being generally known that the depart-
ment was purchasing. The buyers were perfectly competent
and of the utmost probity. The explanation of losses must
be attributed to the reason previously given. The stock in
many cases was bought in distant parts of the Cape Colony,
and had to be sent by road for long distances — the railway at
the time being monopolized by the exit of the army. In
transit by road there is every reason to believe that un-
scrupulous persons along the line of route used to subvert the
drivers in charge of the stock, and carry out an exchange of
valuable for practically worthless animals. The frauds thus
perpetrated were impossible to discover at the time, especially
as only a small proportion of the whole consignment was some-
times affected. Purchases of considerable magnitude were made,
and a large extent of territory had consequently to be tapped.
There is little doubt, though it was never admitted, that the



220 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

buyers nominated by the department frequently employed
agents, not so honest as themselves, who, acting under tele-
graphic instructions, bought and despatched herds of inferior
cattle without submitting them for inspection.

There are many items in the loss account which must be
placed to the debit of excessive, and what turned out to be
mistaken, purchases. This was particularly the case in con-
nection with mules and meat. A larger number of mules was
purchased than was asked for by the local boards, and they
later became a drug on the market.

It has been seen that Rhodesian red-water broke out in the
Transvaal. The Orange River Colony Agricultural Depart-
ment had not at the time organized a veterinary branch. The
Repatriation Department was called upon to perform the
veterinary duties of the whole colony. It was more than
probable that red-water would spread to the Orange River
Colony, even if it did not swamp the whole country. These
were the considerations which induced the department to
purchase additional mules beyond the immediate require-
ments of the various districts. It was feared that red-water
might envelop the Orange River Colony and sweep away the
draught oxen, upon which so much depended to get ground
ploughed for the necessary raising of cereals. In contemplation
of such a contingency the department could not do otherwise
than make some provision against it. Fortunately, owing to
the splendid cordon drawn at this time by the South African
Constabulary, whose services in this connection won the warm
appreciation later of Lord Selborne, our anticipations were
not realized, and some hundreds of mules were not actually
taken up.

There was an additional expense incurred in connection
with the importation of mules, due to the fact that the port
of disembarkation had frequently to be changed from East
London to Cape Town, and vice versa. This largely depended
at the time upon the amount of rolling-stock placed at the
disposal of the Cape ports by the Cape railway authorities :
sometimes one port was more favoured than another, or home



EEPATEIATION FEOM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 221

shippers were using one place more than the other. In the
matter of truckage it has been seen that repatriation had to
take its chance with the general public. In the absence of
any definite and regular allotment at all the ports, it often
happened that one week's trucks were obtainable at one port
and not at another, so that on the arrival in South Africa of
a shipment of mules, arrangements had to be made for the
steamer to be sent to a port other than that originally
determined upon. The actual distribution of trucks at one
particular date was also materially affected by the exigencies
of the military demands thereon, and these the military
authorities could not forecast with any exactitude for any
length of time.

The most disastrous transaction from a financial point of
view undertaken by the department was the purchase of some
7,000 Merino rams, and the difficulty of disposing of these
rams on account of Boer conservatism has already been
mentioned. In this particular instance the Boer was per-
fectly correct in his judgment. The rams, although sold by
a dealer possessing excellent credentials, were not up to the
standard expected, and they had lost in condition during a
long sea voyage ; but the few rams which were taken up by
the farming community turned out in many cases exceedingly
well, and the distribution of the others improved considerably
the standard of wool. The purchase was an experiment, and
experimenting is usually a costly business. A direct financial
loss to Government was sustained, but it may fairly be said
that a portion at least of this loss has been subsequently
made up by the improvement in sheep effected throughout
the colony.

The remaining trading losses sustained were in the main due
to the broad fact that the department had been obliged to buy
in a dear market, but that it had to realize in a cheap one.
In fact, it may be said all along to have been cutting its own
throat, for its whole work tended to spoil the market in which
it would eventually have to dispose of its surplus stocks and
stores. Under these circumstances, which were obvious from



222 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

the beginning, surpluses should not, of course, have been
allowed to accumulate. They were not allowed to accumulate
to any large extent, with one exception, and that exception
was food-stuffs. Meal and flour, however, as well as coffee
and sugar, found a ready market. With tinned meat the case
was otherwise.

On closing down, the department was found to be in posses-
sion of over 600,000 pounds of surplus tinned meat (much of
it bad), for which it had paid from 7d. to 8d. per pound, and
for which it managed with some difficulty to obtain 2d. per
pound (no allowance being made for any that was bad),
involving a loss approximately of A'15,000. This loss, again,
can be explained. The reader is again asked to take into
consideration the following circumstances, which have pre-
viously been referred to, and which will now be merely
restated : So far as anything is known of the certainties, or
rather uncertainties, of the South African climate, 1904,
instead of being a favourable season, should have been the
climax of the drought. The purchaser of supplies was still
haunted by the cries for food which had characterized the
early days of repatriation, and he determined to err on the
safe side. The matter of supplies was admittedly a very
difficult one to regulate. Some loss on tinned meats
was inevitable, but the loss proved very much heavier
than had been anticipated. The meat and vegetable rations
had been in the hands of the department for over two, and in
the country for probably something like four, years. The
recent meat scandals have shown that the contents of so-
called tins of meat are not always what their labels indicate.
The meat in question had travelled incessantly, and had been
exposed to all weathers — to the heat by day and the cold by
night ; and it was hardly matter for wonder, therefore, that a
large percentage of it had become decomposed.

It was the amount of bad meat — known to be considerable —
which was the main factor in determining the price. There
were other factors, such as the almost entire absence of ready-
money, except among Jewish dealers, who did not fail to



EEPATEIATION FEOM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 223

combine. On the other hand, the Government lay particularly-
open to attack on account of the lack of co-operation between
civil and military departments. The purchase and sale of
meats is a practical illustration of the censure, so Justly
deserved, which was recently passed by the War Stores Com-
mission on the attitude of the military authorities and the
Eepatriation Departments to each other. * It is certainly
strange,' the report of the Commissioners stated — and the
significance of that report cannot be too strongly emphasized —
* that more dealings did not take place between the two
departments unless there was a reluctance to deal, such as
some of the civilian witnesses believed to exist.' ^ The Orange
Eiver Colony Eepatriation Department purchased preserved
meat to the extent of 791,696 pounds only from the army,
while the purchases of this article from other sources amounted
to 3,787,566 pounds. The Eepatriation Department took over
originally all the meat that the military authorities could
conveniently spare. Later a quotation received from them
was higher than that obtained elsewhere. It is true that a
revised quotation was subsequently received from the Army
Service Corps, but meanwhile the department had made other
arrangements. The issue of bad meat to burghers naturally
caused, it has been seen, considerable dissatisfaction : the
risk of loss from purchasing from old military stocks was very
great. Eventually both military and repatriation were found
to be glutting the same market at the same time with surpluses
of the same article, and they had pitted against them, as
roughly the only possible purchasers, a ring of Jews. The
only thing that can be said in favour of the Orange Eiver
Colony Eepatriation Department is that it succeeded in
securing a price for its meat which compared more than
favourably with that obtained by other departments in a like
predicament.

There were additional minor losses, which were due to
deterioration and pilfering on the part of natives and
others. A considerable quantity of seed corn, especially
^ Parliamentary Paper^ Cd. 3127.



224 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

wheat and mealies, was delayed in issue on account of the
drought, and, different kinds of grain being overcrowded in
store, weevil frequently spread from one to the other on
account of inattention to periodical overhauling. It has been
seen that large quantities of forage and supplies had some-
times, as in the cases of Vredefort and Frankfort, already
quoted, to be stacked on the open veldt. They were guarded
at night by natives. In several cases these natives them-
selves stole ; in many more they slept on sentry-go. Deficien-
cies in stores were inevitable at the commencement, and it
was too much to expect that they should be satisfactorily
accounted for months later, when the circumstances had
frequently been forgotten. These deficiencies were not on the
whole excessive, and a few instances are given.

Article. ^Xd. Deficiency. J^^ZSe).

Meal ... 9,000,000 pounds 38,996 pounds 0-43

Mealies ... 88,000,000 „ 27,586 „ 0-03

Oats ... 98,000,000 „ 66,230 „ 007

Potatoes ... 2,300,000 „ 47,476 „ 2-06

Such was to some extent the work of repatriation and relief
regarded from within. What precisely was the effect of that
work on the population dealt with is difficult to trace. Mis-
conception of the terms of Vereeniging has been very general.
They have been regarded as a treaty of peace, which they
were not.^ The question of effective occupation is too thorny
a subject to be entered upon here ; but while there is little
doubt that the proclamation of May 24, 1900, annexing the
Orange Free State, was most distinctly premature, there is
still less doubt that the British occupation had become
thoroughly effective at least six months before the cessation
of hostilities.^ The Boer war was terminated, not by a treaty

1 ' The agreement embodying the Terms of Surrender of the routed
remnants of the Boer forces has, therefore, no internationally legal basis.
The case would be different if the British Government had really recog-
nised the existence of the Government of the South African Republic
down to May 31, 1902' ('International Law,' L. Oppenheim, vol. ii.,
p. 279).

2 ' The fact that all the towns and all the lines of communication were
in the hands and under the administration of the British army, that the



REPATRIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 225

of peace, but through subjugation.^ The Boer demands at
the time could not be taken seriously, and they were probably
not seriously intended. What really happened was that the
British dictated their own terms, and those terms were so
liberal that the Boers could not do otherwise than accept
them. The Boers had no real say in the matter. They could
not back up their demands, or, in fairness to them be it said,
they would not have left in the lurch those rebels and
foreigners who had assisted them, and who were excluded
from benefiting by the provisions of Article X.-^ The benefits
granted under this article were obviously an act of grace on
the part of the victor, and not a matter of right for the con-
quered. Great Britain felt that she was acting magnanimously,
and she expected her magnanimity to be accepted with
gratitude.

But the repatriation scheme, like the fatal policy of con-
ciliation which preceded and led up to it, was capable of being
misunderstood, and was misunderstood. Magnanimity was
interpreted to be a sign of weakness, and repatriation was
demanded as a right. It was, therefore, in no friendly spirit
that the Boers regarded the scheme, and that scheme was

inhabitants of small places were taken away into concentration camps,
that the enemy forces were either in captivity or routed into comparatively
small guerilla bands, and, finally, that wherever such bands tried to make
an attack a sufficient British force could within reasonable time make its
appearance, was quite sufficient to assert British authority over that vast
territory, although it took more than a year before peace was finally
established' (ibid.).

^ ' Although nowadays no longer so frequent as in former times, subju-
gation is not at all of rare occurrence. Thus modern Italy came into
existence through the subjugation by Sardinia in 1859 of the Two Sicilies,
the Grand Dukedom of Tuscany, the Dukedoms of Parma and Modena,
and in 1870 the Papal States. Thus, further, Prussia subjugated in 1866
the Kingdom of Hanover, the Dukedom of Nassau, the Electorate of
Hesse-Cassel, and the free town of Frankfort-on-the-Main. And Great
Britain annexed in 1900 the Orange Free State and the South African
Republic ' {ibid.).

2 ' Mais I'Angleterre, ce que Ton ne peut lui reprocher, avait entendu
reserver ses droits de souverainete sur ses sujets et ne pas subordonner k un
arrangement avec les Boers soumis son action penale a I'egard de ses
nationaux coupables de felonie envers elle ' ('La Guerre Sud-Africaine au
Point de Vue du Droit International,' Despagnet).

15



226 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

rendered more difficult of execution by the mere fact that
it was included in the Terms of Surrender. The Boers viewed
repatriation ' as a tardy recognition of a wrong done.'^ It is
impossible to think that they were thankful for our generosity,
or that the restoration to their homes won their gratitude.
There were, of course, exceptions. When on tour, it was no
uncommon thing to meet in the district towns many of the
better-to-do Boers who had come in, frequently from long
distances, to meet one in order to express their appreciation
of all that the Government was doing for them. The attitude
of the population generally, however, was sullen and critical.
Article X. would, undoubtedly, have been more beneficial in
its effect if, instead of forming part of the terms of Vereeniging,
it had been published immediately after the surrender had
been completed. There could then have been no doubt of
Great Britain's intention to deal with her new subjects on
terms of unprecedented liberality. But all might still have
gone well if repatriation had been favoured with good seasons.
The drought, however, which followed not only hampered con-
siderably the efforts of the department for the material well-
being of the farming population, but also tended somewhat to