discount the wholesome political effect which the work of
repatriation would undoubtedly have had.
The contrast between the view taken by Mr. Bryce in his
* Impressions of South Africa ' and that formed by Mr. Cham-
berlain some years later on his visit to Bloemfontein in
January, 1903, has been noted in a previous chapter. Two
equally divergent views may be found in recent Parliamentary
debates. In dealing with the subject of the Transvaal Con-
stitution, Mr. Churchill drew an idyllic picture of the Orange
River Colony as ' a tranquil agricultural State, pursuing under
a wise and tolerant Government a happy destiny of its own.' ^
* Good feeling between individuals,' said Lord Milner in the
Upper House, ' on which we are justified in resting so much
hope, is not going to save the British settlers from hostile
^ Contemporary Review^'' July, 1903.
2 The Times, August 25, 1906.
EEPATRIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 227
executive action in a country in which they have few repre-
sentatives or no representatives in the Legislature.'^ There
can be little doubt to anyone acquainted with actual con-
ditions as to which of these views is the more correct. The
former is imaginary ; the latter is only too real.
The political problem in the Orange River Colony is
probably more complex than is generally supposed, and the
subject of granting responsible government is too large a one
to be dealt with here. The home reader may be reminded,
however, that there are at least four communities to be
considered in the Orange River Colony. In addition to the
old British residents — whose last state will be worse than the
first if handed over to the Boers — * there are, first of all,
the British settlers whom we have placed on the land or
introduced into the Civil Service since the conclusion of the
war, and whose fortunes are entirely dependent on the effective
maintenance of our supremacy. There are the so-called
" Khaki Boers " — those who surrendered before the end of the
war, took service as National Scouts, or otherwise assisted the
British Government. Finally, there are the " echte vader-
landers," the Boers who fought to the bitter end, and who
form a vast majority, which can count on swamping the other
two classes combined."- And politically least, but numerically
greatest, there is the native population.
The attitude of these various classes to each other, which
necessitated special treatment in the case of repatriation, has
been described. The repatriation scheme was not responsible
for the wounds made by the war, but, on the other hand, it
did not succeed in healing them. The extremely moderate
and reasonable views of the land settlers have been quoted.
Their protest against the grant of self-government to the
inevitably irreconcilable Boer majority, like all the other
protests which have been made, is peculiarly void of any
personal ill-feeling or individual ill-will. But they have
pointed out that the Boer as a unit in a political organization
1 The Times, August 25, 1906. 2 jj^^
15—2
228 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
must be regarded on a different footing from the Boer as a
hospitable neighbour.
The following views of a British farmer of twenty-four
years" standing in the Orange River Colony, contained in a
letter to The Times, go far to show how extremely moderate
the land settlers are in their plea for protection :^ ' I even
go,' says this writer, and his view is not extreme, ' so far as
to question whether a single member of the present Govern-
ment's supporters would vote for responsible government
could he be induced to spend six months in the fastnesses of
Boerdom, and learn the hard facts of our everyday relation-
ship with these our erstwhile enemies, now our intolerant
fellow-citizens.
* He would see the young English settler struggling to
make ends meet on his isolated farm, enduring the boycott of
a cordon of Dutch neighbours. He would find the door shut
in his face by the " vrouw " of whom he asked a drink of
water, if he spoke not the " taal." ... At the Orange Unie
meetings he would hear his mother-tongue referred to as a
foreign language in this British colony, and learn something
of the deep-rooted sedition throughout the land. At the
average farmers' association meeting he would realize the
futility of interposing a remark in his own vernacular, for he
would get neither a hearing nor an answer. . . . But by far
the most serious of the disadvantages of the loyalists is trial
by jury. Our juries of nine usually consist of six Dutchmen
and three Englishmen, with the regrettable, but not altogether
unnatural, consequences that we, guided by long experience,
realize that in criminal cases which are beyond a magistrate's
jurisdiction the court of justice is closed to us ; that we have,
in fact, no remedy when the Boer is the transgressor. . . J
1 The Times, August 25, 1906.
'^ This statement has been severely challenged by the Chief Justice of
the Orange River Colony, and it may possibly be somewhat exaggerated.
Litigation is, however, usually expensive and proverbially tedious, and it
is to be feared that the mere suspicion of unfair treatment, even if not in
every case well founded, may serve to impair that confidence in the
absolutely impartial administration of justice which has always been the
EEPATEIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 229
Already the jubilant majority of defeated, repatriated, and
compensated enemies of everything British are taunting us
with the well-founded threat that we shall very soon be
under their thumb once more and compelled to speak their
"taal.". . .
' Among the first consequences of the Boer rule will be :
The disbanding of the South African Constabulary and the
substitution of a small force consisting chiefly of young
Boers ; a gradual but general dismissal of British-born
officials from Government offices and railways ; the serving
out of rifles to ex-burghers at the expense of the State ; a
wholesale appointment of Boer Justices of the Peace ; the
establishment of a colony for "poor whites"; a scheme of
taxation which will be unduly burdensome to the commercial
community ; educational reform to favour the Dutch and
country districts at the expense of the British urban com-
munities. Most of these objects are declared in public
meetings fearlessly, as by masters of the situation. . . .
' Already the Boers are enjoying at our hands not only equal
civic rights with ourselves, but a pure and impartial ad-
ministration of their own laws. What they went to war about
rather than give us we have already given them, and more ;
but, true to their old proclivity, the power graciously accorded
them is to be used as a stepping-stone for more, for they are
already discussing at their political meetings whether they
will make it a five years' or seven years' residential qualifica-
tion for full civic rights — precisely the figures which produced
the war. Truly the situation is Gilbertian. . . .
* Are we never to profit by past experience in this land ? A
just and firm rule would insure us peace with honour, whereas
this constant evidence of weakness goes far to unsettle the Boers
and to feed their most sanguine hopes. I repeat that every
concession of power to them is not only an injustice to those
of us who stood by the Empire in the dark days of 1900-1902,
distinguishing feature of British rule. In other particulars the contents of
this letter are hardly open to dispute by anyone who knows the facts,
irrespective of his political opinions.
230 THE AFTEEMATH OF WAR
but it is an imperial danger. We have only to be generous
enough (should I not say " prodigal enough "?) to be sure of
having our work to do over again. Every grant of power will
be turned against us in the future, and every effort, secret at
first, will be made to undo Great Britain's constructive work
in this much-troubled land, . . .
* I bear no ill-will towards my Dutch neighbours. ... I
am Afrikander enough to feel that they are part and parcel of
the life here, and I would not be without them. Nor would I
voice a word of blame for their political aspirations were they
conceived in a more friendly spirit towards us. But at the
bottom of all the trouble is an unreasoning and fostered hatred
for us, a bitterness which, in the absence of literature or their
ability to read, is their daily pabulum, recommended, if not
insisted upon, by their predicants from the pulpit and traded
upon by their wire-pullers throughout the land. Nor do I
overstate a fact when I affirm that, in my experience of the
relationship between the two peoples, the Briton has always
tried to meet the Boer in friendship more than half-way.'^
I have quoted at considerable length from this letter,
because, to my mind, it only too truly represents the actual
situation. For this situation British policy is in the main
responsible. If that policy was generally misconstrued, it
must be admitted that the construction put upon it by the
Boer was not wholly wrong. Our so-called magnanimity and
much-trumpeted generosity were in their execution signs of
weakness, though in a sense somewhat different from that
alleged by the Boer. The war itself and the work of im-
mediate reconstruction have been characterized by a faltering
and inconsistency which would seem to indicate that the
Briton has lost faith in himself, that the fortitude and
^ The Times, August 25, 1906. ' The Afrikander character, the nature of
the country, the conditions of society, the attitude of the Boers, and the
position of the Dutch, receive no consideration at all. The poUcy of
England is founded on the erroneous assumption that our late enemies in
the field are prepared to meet us half-way, whereas everything they have
done and said since the conclusion of peace should lead us to the very
opposite conclusion ' (Empire Bevieto).
EEPATEIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 231
perseverance which distinguished his forefathers in building
up an empire are no longer his. He has, apparently, become
oversensitive himself and fearful of hurting the feelings of
others. This oversensitiveness has been particularly notice-
able in dealing with the Dutch, who were not slow to take
advantage of it. Lord Milner referred to this weakness in the
British attitude in a speech delivered at Johannesburg on the
eve of his departure from South Africa, and suggested a
remedy to his successors.
' We British,' he said, * are apt to be rather too fussy about
the attitude of the Dutch. It may be disappointing that,
whatever we do, the other party, or at least a large number
of them, still maintain an attitude of aloofness, if not of
suUenness. But it is, after all, no more than might have
been expected. How little are three years in the life of a
people ! It is a mistake to keep girding at them for not
showing more friendliness than they are as yet able to feel ;
but it is no less a mistake to try to coax them by offering
something more than they are entitled to, and something
which in our hearts we know we ought not to give up.
Courtesy and consideration for their feelings, always ; com-
promise on questions of principle, the suppression of our
natural and legitimate sentiments, never. There is a want of
good sense, and, worse still, of self-respect, about that sort of
kowtowing which makes it the worst way in the world to
impress or to win over a strong, a shrewd, and an eminently
self-respecting people. . . . The policy which I would
venture to commend to those who may be responsible for
the government not of this colony only, but of any South
African colony, is a somewhat different one. By all means
continue to treat Dutch and British with absolute equality.^
^ It may be remarked, however, that the British have not hitherto been
fairly treated by their own Government. The Boer has been pampered
and the Briton has been hampered. The contemplated distribution of the
converted Chamberlain loan would seem to indicate the continuance of a
policy of favouritism to the Boers which has already served to drive from
the country thousands of Britons who stood by the Empire in the hour of
need, and who had a preferential claim to the Government's consideration.
The distribution of this loan, as The Times has pointed out, means a dole
232 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
We have done for good and all with the system of having two
classes of white men in this country, a privileged and an
unprivileged class. I say, treat all equally ; indeed, try to
forget as far as possible the differences of origin. Show the
same solicitude, the same zeal, for the interests of every class,
of every neighbourhood, regardless whether this or that
section predominates in it ; but having done that, await
with patience the gradual approximation 'which equality of
treatment and community of interests will slowly but surely
produce. You can do nothing more to hurry it.'^
British policy in the new colonies has in the main been
based upon a radical misconception of the Boer character on
the part of the British public. This misconception has not
hitherto been confined to either of the great political parties ;
it has been common to both. Both Unionists and Liberals,
again, have made South African policy a party question. If
Chinese slavery placards served to win one election, it is
equally certain that misrepresentation with regard to the
progress of the Boer war helped to win another. But the
responsibility for the adoption of this policy must be borne
eventually, not by the Government of the day, but by the
British electorate. On the South African question that
electorate has repeatedly allowed itself to be cajoled by party
catchwords and to be led astray on side-issues. By their
ignorance of, and their lack of interest in. South African
affairs, the constituencies of Great Britain are rapidly losing
the confidence of their fellow-citizens in the sub-continent.
This lack of confidence is gradually becoming evident in a
growing determination on the part of both Briton and Boer,
who difier on every other question and whose ideals are
absolutely incompatible with each other, to eliminate the
Imperial factor from South African politics, and to regard
of two and a half millions to the Boers, as against one and a half millions
to the British settlers (see The Times for September 4, 1906). An Ad-
ministration -which fails to stand by its own people can hardly expect to
win the confidence or the esteem of its opponents.
1 Speech delivered at Johannesburg, March 31, 1905, Cd. 2842, p. 192.
EEPATRIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 233
any alternative as preferable to being made the plaything of
English political parties.
' Since the peace the Afrikanders have evinced a stubborn
tenacity of their own ideal, altogether admirable when con-
trasted with the feeble desertion of the other side by its
Imperial allies, who, as usual, have gone off upon a side-
issue.'^ In the Orange River Colony the political situation
has gone from bad to worse. The relations between the two
races, and between different sections of the same race, have
become more strained than ever ; and, in proportion as the
weakness of the Administration has become more apparent,
the irreconcilables have grown louder in their demands.
' British South Africans know that for the second time they
have been thrown over, and that their sacrifices on behalf
of Imperial unity have been ignored. It seems to them that
the people at home after eight years of constant effort to
retain South Africa under the Union Jack are now seemingly
indifferent to the loss of the sub-continent which England
has paid for so often both in blood and in money. That is
how the Government and electorate of Great Britain are
judged by loyal South Africans with regard to the loftiest
obligations of statesmanship.' ^
Although it plays a most important part, racialism is
not, however, the dominant factor in South African politics.
The struggle is really one between progress on the one hand
and retrogression on the other. This is the main issue at
stake, but it has frequently been confused owing to the fact
that, as a natural outcome of their past history, the British,
generally speaking, belong to the progressive party, and the
Dutch to the party of retrogression. The difference between
the two parties is in its essence rather moral than racial,
and there exists a corresponding difference of ideals. ' The
one postulates pure government, progressive government, and
the attainment of national unity by a general process of
assimilation to the British type of character, which implies
1 Morning Post, October 16, 1906.
• National Review, September, 1906.
234 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
an active support of the Imperial connection as an important
factor in national evolution. The other ideal, which so far
has not generally been associated with honest and progressive
government, postulates the attainment of national unity
by assimilation to the Dutch type, in relation to which
process the Imperial connection is regarded as a necessary
evil for the time being, or at least only useful for holding
the ring against the intrusion of other foreign influences.'^
Nowhere in South Africa is the Dutch ideal so predominant
or so confidently avowed as in the Orange River Colony,
and nowhere are the adherents of Imperial unity in such a
small minority. The question whether or not this plucky
minority will make any headway must, unfortunately, depend
for some time to come upon the amount of support accorded
to it by the Imperial Government.
It is commonly held that the ultimate solution of the
South African problem will be found in federation, and to
such federation the grant of responsible government all
round has usually been regarded as an essential preliminary.
But the grant of responsible government immediately to the
new colonies may tend to retard federation, because, as a
recent writer has pointed out, it may increase and strengthen
* those vested interests of provincial Governments which in
Australia proved a serious obstacle to the federal movement.'
It is difficult to imagine a permanent Dutch majority in the
Orange River Colony prepared to forego any portion of its
monopoly of government in the interests of South African
federation.
On the present political horizon it is possible to discern
two forces, both of which are really centrifugal. On the one
hand, Natal and the Transvaal are obviously drawing together,
and, in the event of a British majority in the latter colony,
their projected amalgamation may shortly become an ac-
complished fact. But, on the other hand, * what would be
the effect of amalgamation on the Cape and the Orange River
Colony, to say nothing of Rhodesia ? In the Orange River
i Morning Post, October 23, 1906.
EEPATRIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 235
Colony the Boers are in a permanent and overwhelming
majority. In the Cape the enfranchisement of the rebels will
not improbably result in a Bond victory when the next
General Election takes place. Is it, therefore, unlikely, or
indeed unreasonable, to suppose that, given an absolute
British majority in the Transvaal-Natal Colony, the Cape
and Orange River Colony would be drawn together, in the
hope of establishing an equally solid and permanent Dutch
supremacy south of the Vaal ? In this event racial distinc-
tions would be rendered identical with political boundaries,
and would become an insurmountable obstacle to federation.' ^
The Natal loyalists are alive to this danger, and they are,
consequently, averse to immediate amalgamation. ' The
reasons why,' wrote a Natal colonist recently, * we doubt the
wisdom of amalgamation are not entirely local. The change
might not be a benefit Imperially ; no doubt it would secure
a British majority in the united colony, but it might be
answered by the amalgamation of the Orange and Cape
Colonies, which would then have a certain Dutch majority.
South Africa would then be split up into two very antago-
nistic bodies, and federation, our real goal, deferred to a very
distant future.'-
I have digressed thus far in order to remind the reader that,
although the ebullient Imperialism of warfare may be suc-
ceeded on the part of the British public by the inevitable
apathy of peace, yet the situation in the Orange River Colony
to-day is possibly more critical than it was at the conclusion
of the war. The great explorer Barth once remarked : * It
seems that the English are more apt to perform a great deed
than to follow up its consequences.' In South Africa we have
come dangerously near to verifying his censure.
When all is said and done it must be remembered that
even in the Orange River Colony, Dutch to the backbone as it
is, the main factor of progress is the Briton, and the question
whether that colony will ever be able to compete in the
^ Morning Post, September 1, 1906.
2 Spectator, October 13, 1906.
236 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
agricultural market of the world will be decided chiefly by the
progressive farmer and the land-settler. The pity of the
whole business is that the land-settler should have to suffer
for the sins of ofificialdom, and that the development of land-
settlement should have been hampered indirectly by the work
of repatriation. The first essential for the promotion of
British land-settlement was land, and land could not to any
large extent be bought. The scarcity of land on the market was
largely due to the fact that by its system of loans the Repa-
triation Department enabled landowners of mortgaged farms to
retain their land instead of selling. Mr. Buchan has pointed
out this flaw in the repatriation scheme, and there are probably
few who will not endorse his criticism. ' There is no doubt
in my mind,' he wrote, ' as to what would have been the
wisest and kindest form of repatriation for landowners, had
we had the courage to adopt it — compulsory sale of a portion
of the farm, and out of the capital thus supplied the farmer
could have bought what he wanted at reasonable prices from
Government depots. Such a method would have given the
Government more good land, which it urgently wants ; it
would have saved the endless credit accounts, which in the
long run will give trouble both to Boer and Government ; and
it would have saved the pauperization into which the Boer is
only too ready to sink. There would, of course, have been
many exceptions in the case of the very poor and landless
classes, but for the landholder it would have been not only
the most politic, but in his eyes the most intelligible plan.'^
While practically ousting the would-be land-settler, the
repatriation scheme tended to strengthen the hold upon the
land of the more backward of the indigenous population, and
in so doing to retard agricultural progress and to postpone the
future prosperity of the colony. It tended to bolster up the
indolent and lazy bijwoner class, and to fortify the excessively
Dutch for the fight which is now possibly to be transferred
from the veldt to the council-chamber. These are some — and
there are others — of the bad points of repatriation.
1 ' The African Colony,' p. 138.
KEPATKIATION FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT 237
Regarded simply as the fulfilment of a pledge, an act of
grace to a fallen foe, the scheme will probably rank as
one hitherto unparalleled in history. In any case. Great
Britain can rest assured that so far as repatriation was con-
cerned, she has more than carried out the promises made
to her new subjects at Vereeniging. This is, after all, the
main point. Although the full-grown men of to-day have
failed to recognise and to acknowledge benefits received, it is
not unreasonable to hope that, in spite of the deadly influence
of priests and women, the work of the concentration camps
and repatriation will not be wholly lost on the children of to-
morrow and on generations yet unborn.
CHAPTER IX
COMPENSATION
' No man ought to looke a given horse in the mouth.' — Heywood.
' Solomon himself, even if backed up by the purse of Fortunatus, would
probably make more enemies than friends if he had to give compensation
for war losses.' — Contemporary Review.
Of the two tasks contemplated in Article X. of the Terms of
Surrender only one has hitherto been described ; the other —
less attractive perhaps, but more important — still remains to
be dealt with. The subject of so-called compensation — for I
shall continue to employ the misnomer generally in vogue in
South Africa at the time — is somewhat intricate, and it is
impossible to give any adequate idea within the limits of a