1 Cd. 1551.
42 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
only, a man requires in South Africa — except in specially
favoured districts — a large extent of ground. The vast farms
of the small number of original settlers could bear one sub-
division, in some cases perhaps a second, but the process of
continual subdivision among large families was bound to
result in the individual holding becoming too small to support
a family in comfort. Under these circumstances one of two
things happened : either the landowner made special arrange-
ments for his land passing to only one member of his family,
or, where the land was already too much subdivided, the less
provident owners were gradually squeezed out, and the larger
farm, which was an economic necessity, was reconstituted by
the amalgamation of a number of smaller ones. In either
case a number of men were left without land, and as the
Boers as a body had not many opportunities of living other-
wise than by the land, and were reluctant to avail themselves
of such opportunities even where they existed, there was
nothing for it but that the landless man should " squat " in a
more or less dependent condition on the land of his more
fortunate fellow, who was generally also his relative.'^
Lord Milner here has traced briefly the origin and up-
growth of the class of poor whites. The bijwoner class is
as a whole indolent and unenterprising, but the number of
exceptions is of course considerable. Where they were
energetic and industrious, landowners were glad to have their
assistance in rebuilding their farms. Others possessed a
knowledge, usually more or less superficial, of some handi-
craft. Both these classes could be dealt with under the
ordinary repatriation scheme. The first could be returned to
their former homes ; the second simply needed aid in the way
of prepaid rental for some months, and tools and food to
start with. But it was very much more difficult to cope with
1 Cd. 1551. ' The only alternative for the landless man, crowded out
of any share in the family heritage, was to become a dependent on the
property of his more fortunate relatives, giving assistance on the farm, and
receiving in return his daily bread and butter, and such moral and social
deUcacies as usually fall to the lot of poor relations ' (' The New Era in
South Africa,' p. 31).
A Typicai. P)II\V()m:h.
A TvrKAI. IJllWdNKK J-AMII.V.
ARTICLE X. OF THE TERIMS OF YEEEENIGING 43
tliG large class of lazy and indifferent, and at the close of
hostilities the whole question was brought to a head by the
fact that a considerable number of landowners refused to take
back on to their farms their former quota of bijwoners. The
situation in such cases was critical in the extreme. ' With-
out assets of any sort, with claims for compensation that even
in the aggregate were insignificant, in many cases lacking the
stamina to make a fresh start in life, with the reputation of
wanting in both the wish and the ability to work, they formed
a class which it was extremely difficult for Government to
help, and there was every prospect that they would remain as
a permanent pauperized element in the population.'^ In the
Orange Piiver Colony a temporary solution was found in the
establishment of relief works ; in the Transvaal a more
permanent scheme was adopted by the institution of burgher
land settlements.
From the wording of Article X. it was clear that two
separate and distinct tasks were contemplated :'- Firstly, the
assisting the restoration of the people to their homes ; and,
secondly, supplying those who, owing to war losses, were
unable to provide themselves with food, shelter, and the
necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, etc., indispen-
sable to the resumption of their normal occupations. If before
the relief, which had to be provided to carry out the second
task, could be given, investigations as to whether such relief
was required owing to war losses were necessary, the evident
intention of Article X. could not be accomplished. To have
encumbered the local commissions with the duty of deciding
then and there who was or was not entitled to a free grant
would have materially delayed the more important work of
getting the people back on to their farms. Nor were there at
this period any sufficient data to show even the approximate
amount that any individual might expect in respect of com-
pensation for war losses. The relief to be effective had to be
1 Sir Hamilton Goold Adams' Report, Cd. 1551, p. 9.
2 Vide in this connection Cd. 1551, Cd. 3028, and The Times, Sep-
tember 28, 1903.
44 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
prompt. If nothing was to be done until the free grant of
£3,000,000 had been allotted to the Boers and distributed
according to their proved war losses, it would moan a delay
of many months, the tedious examination of war claims, the
waste of the current ploughing season, and the loss of a
harvest. In the meantime they w^ould all have to be kept
and fed in the concentration camps. So that the two tasks
might be carried out simultaneously, the Government deter-
mined to allow the local commissions to make all necessary
and proper advances in cash and kind to all persons requiring
the assistance and relief contemplated in Article X., and
directed that the value of such advances should be debited
against the persons to whom they were made. The burghers
were allowed to anticipate their share of the £3,000,000
grant, and to purchase their requirements on credit.
It was decided that all advances and issues should in the
first instance be treated as loans. These loans, like the
population they were intended to assist, fell roughly into two
classes — secured and unsecured. The former were issued on
mortgages or promissory notes, the latter against an acknow-
ledgment of indebtedness. It will be readily understood
that the bijwoners, whose precarious situation has already
been described, fell mainly under the second class. The first
class applied generally to landowners
The free gift of £3,000,000 was obviously intended for
those who could not help themselves. It followed, therefore,
that all those who could provide for themselves had no claim
to aid from the Grant Fund. Examples of this latter class
were men who had farms unmortgaged or only lightly mort-
gaged, and had good credit ; men, again, who had filed
receipts with the Military Boards, which were likely to be
paid in full. Such men might, however, be assisted from
the Loan Fund against securities or bonds to the satisfaction
of the Government. Landowners in possession of an unmort-
gaged farm of 2,000 acres and upwards were generally
regarded as not coming within the scope of the Loan Fund.
It was considered that these men could obtain money from
AETICLE X. OF THE TERMS OF VEEEENIGING 45
any bank at the ordinary rate of 6 per cent, per annum, and
that the amount of interest payable thereon would not
incapacitate them from recovering their former position. On
the other hand, in cases where landowners possessed a farm
of 2,000 acres or less, or one larger, but which was mortgaged,
and when it was considered that they, although possibly able
to borrow money from the banks, would still be unable to pay
the interest thereon without being unduly hampered, the
Eepatriation Department authorized loans on first or second
mortgage. In cases where it was deemed advisable, the
Department occasionally consented to take over or retire
existing mortgages at the original rate of interest, or not
more than 6 per cent., in addition to any advance granted
under Article X. This was only done in cases where it was
feared that bonds might be foreclosed, and that the benefit
resulting from any advance made by the Department would,
consequently, be lost, or where the margin of safety was
considered insufficient to advance money on a second or
third mortgage, unless the first mortgage was held by
Government.
The amount of the Loan Fund, originally not specified, was
later, as already pointed out, limited to £3,000,000. The
advantages it afforded will be appreciated when it is stated
that the ordinary rate of interest obtaining in South Africa
on mortgage bonds is 6 or 7 per cent. Added to this
was the fact that such loans were for two years to be free of
interest. The ordinary loan did not exceed £500, and averaged
usually from £300 to £400. ' A period of years ' was inter-
preted to mean generally five years, and very few loans were
advanced for a longer time. In all but exceptional cases the
ordinary loan consisted of one-third cash and two-thirds kind,
the most useful form at the time and the most acceptable to
the Boer.^
^ In several districts — as, for instance, Frankfort — the local records had
during the war been lost or destroyed. All mortgages were registered at
Bloemfontein, but reference to, and search at, headquarters involved
delay.
The Eesident Magistrate at Heilbron urged the necessity of simplifying
46 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
The second form of security was that of promissory notes.
These notes up to .1'150 had to be backed })y one landed pro-
prietor, and by two if that amount was exceeded. The
amounts were payable in two years, no interest being charged.
The form of promissory note sanctioned by the Governme)it
was specially prepared by the Central Board to meet the
circumstances of repatriation. Its language was fuller than
that of the ordinary promissory note, and it stated in complete
detail, for the information and guidance of the country people
and local commissioners, what in ordinary business circles
would be presumed or implied. ^ It, moreover, specified a
the system by which apphcants for loans who had lost their title-deeds
might obtain the benefits of the Loan Fund. He pointed out that local
rates of interest were high, and that there was danger of landowners
parting with the option of their farms for insufficient consideration if they
were obliged to raise money locally (Heilbron Keport, July 19, 1902).
The Bethulie District Repatriation Commission asked to be allowed to
employ attorneys to draw up mortgage bonds, and suggested that the
expense incurred in this connection should be met out of repatriation
funds. The Central Board, however, decided that the borrowers must
pay their own costs.
' The Central Board is prepared to leave to the discretion of your Com-
mission the question of advancing loans up to i£300 in cash in cases
v/hich you consider would thereby benefit ' (Letter to Eesident Magistrate,
AVinburg, dated August 26, 1902).
^ The following is a specimen of the promissory note in question :
Repatriation Funds.
{Place of issue) Bloemfontein.
{Date of signing) August 1, 1902.
^160 IDs. 6d.
I, Johannes Hendrik Dinges, residing at Dingesfontein, hereby
acknowledge to be lawfully indebted to the Colonial Treasurer of the
Orange River Colony, for the Repatriation Department, his order,
successor, or assigns, in the sum of one hundred and sixty pounds ten
shillings and sixpence sterHng for the value received in cash and kind,
which said sum I hereby promise to pay to the said Colonial Treasurer or
his order on demand, without interest, and otherwise if prolonged beyond
the period of twenty-four months, on the first day of August, 1904,
together with the interest thereon at 3 per cent, per annum, reckoned
from the first day of August, 1904, at the Ofiice of the Colonial Treasurer
at Bloemfontein.
{Signature of debtor) J. H. Dinges.
As Sureties and Co-principal Debtors —
{Signature) Jacobus Schutte,
{Address) Leeuw Spruit.
{Signature) John Smith.
{Address) Erf. No. 02485, Bloemfontein.
AETICLE X. OF THE TERMS OF VEEEENIGING 47
domicile of payment, and also the unusually low rate of
interest to be charged if payment should be deferred. This
system of promissory notes was intended to meet, and did
meet, the requirements of the better class bijwoners, men
who had little actual security to offer, but who were deserving
and trustworthy, and commanded the confidence of land-
owners.
Draught and breeding animals, transport vehicles, agri-
cultural implements, building material, etc., were issued on
mortgages or promissory notes, both of which were recover-
able, and most of which were eventually redeemed. Food-stuffs
and seed corn, on the other hand, were issued against acknow-
ledgments of indebtedness. These acknowledgments of in-
debtedness were devised to meet the cases of those who had
absolutely no security to offer. They were in no sense of the
word legal instruments; they were neither stamped nor
registered, and had little in common with the ordinary pro-
missory note. * They may best be compared with an ordinary
tradesman's account, which may or may not become a bad
debt.' In the majority of cases no attempt was made to
recover the values advanced against these documents. They
were written off as free grants. In a considerable number
of cases, however, it was possible for the Department to
recover its advances out of the money that was ultimately
paid to some of the debtors by the Central Judicial Com-
mission.i
The advisability of keeping in all cases a personal account
against every individual was at first questioned. It was pro-
posed originally to debit everyone assisted who had fixed
property or other assets ; but to the poorer bijwoners or other
persons without property, who had no security to offer, and
from whom it was useless to expect repayment of any part of
the assistance rendered, it was suggested that such assistance
should be given at once in the form of a free grant, on the
ground that it would serve no good purpose to open personal
accounts for such grants, and that the work of accounting
1 Vide Appendix E, p. 274.
48 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
would be inordinately increased thereby. It was decided,
however, that an account must be kept against all belonging
to the latter class. * Though they may at the present time,'
wrote Lord Milner, ' have no means of paying such advances,
yet they may in the future find themselves enabled to do so —
at any rate, in part ; for instance, they may have claims for
cattle commandeered by the British forces. It, therefore,
seems to me important that an account should be kept against
every individual, no matter what his condition, and that he
should be made to understand that he will be required to pay
as much of the advance as possible.'^ Although it involved
an infinite amount of troublesome detail work, the wisdom of
Lord Milner's decision will hardly be questioned. The greatest
care was required to avoid anything and everything which
might tend to foster the pauperization of those receiving aid.
The average Boer is only too prone to accept gifts, but he has
an instinctive horror of debts of all kinds. The keeping of
personal accounts, and the knowledge that he might be called
upon eventually to pay, checked him from becoming too
deeply indebted even to a benevolent Government.
The district commissions were to be representative of the
inhabitants — that is, presumably, of the strictly burgher
element; for British subjects and foreigners were excluded
from benefiting by the repatriation scheme in the Orange
River Colony, and the Orange River Colony Volunteers were
dealt with by their own ex-officers. Under these circum-
stances the members of the commissions were nominated by
the Government mainly on the recommendation of the Central
Repatriation Board. ^ In this nomination it must be admitted
that the icilde Boer secured the strongest representation. That
1 Letter dated June 25, 1902.
2 ' I was fortunate in secviring for this Central Board the services of a
number of gentlemen of proved business capacity, who from long partici-
pation in affairs under the late Orange Free State had acquired an intimate
knowledge both of local conditions and of the leading people in the various
districts. Guided principally by their recommendations, I was able to
appoint local district commissions that may be fairly said to have been
representative, even at the outset, of the divergent interests in the
individual districts ' (extract from Sir Hamilton Goold Adams' Eeport,
Cd. 1551, p. 47).
ARTICLE X. OF THE TERMS OF VEREENIGING 49
Buch should be the case was almost inevitable, because the
work of repatriation had to be begun at once, and the guerilla
was the only man available. An examination of the lists
of members of local commissions will reveal the fact that
numerically the last to surrender predominate.^ This pre-
dominance possessed certain drawbacks in theory, because
there was a danger of its leading to favouritism ; in practice
it worked out fairly successfully. The ex-Commandants dis-
played a praiseworthy keenness in the work, and the local
information they possessed was frequently invaluable.
It will be readily understood that the Repatriation Depart-
ment was never intended to be run on political lines. The
majority of the members undoubtedly possessed the only
essential qualifications, which were that they should be
prominent citizens, likely to have the confidence of the inhabi-
tants of their respective districts, and of known integrity.
They were all men who could at least be expected to exercise
a wise discretion with firmness in affording relief for the
welfare of the people, even if they did not act always strictly
in accordance with the interests of the Government.
The members of the local commissions numbered four,
exclusive of the Resident Magistrate, who acted as chairman.
The Resident Magistrates should certainly have been given a
seat on the commissions, but the wisdom of appointing them
chairmen was questioned at the commencement, and in the
event many of them proved hardly a success. In the Orange
River Colony their failure must be attributed to the fact that
some of them were unfitted not only for repatriation, but for
Government service of any kind. Several of them had served
in the capacity of magistrates under the Free State Govern-
ment, and had been allowed to continue in office under the
military regime in the early days of the war, when the mis-
taken policy of conciliation was rampant. Others were drawn
from the Civil Service of the Cape Colony, and had received
their training in too narrow a sphere to fit them for respon-
1 The Vredefort Commission was an exception in the first instance, but
an ex-Boer Commandant was appointed later.
4
60 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
sible work. A certain number were selected from the irregular
forces, and these proved, on the whole, to be the most
successful so far as repatriation was concerned. The above
is true generally speaking, but there were exceptions in each
class. The real fault lay, not so much with the individual,
as with the system under which he was appointed. The
social upheaval caused by the South African war w^as tre-
mendous, and it is generally true to say that the best material
in the country was to be found fighting either on one side or
the other. In anticipation that the vfav would close long
before it actually did, a civil administration was appointed
months before it was required. Under these circumstances
many men of both nationalities were given appointments for
which they were absolutely unfitted. It was understood that
such appointments were merely temporary, and subject to
revision and confirmation ; but the majority of them have
been made permanent, to the detriment of British administra-
tion in South Africa.
At the conclusion of hostilities, when more capable men
were set free, the whole administration — both central and
local — should have been thoroughly overhauled, and the
inferior temporary official replaced. Had such a process of
weeding out been adopted, admirable selections might have
been made from the Dutch as well as from the British side.^
^ ' As regards civil appointments, they are unattainable save with the
aid of powerful home influence. Vacancies are almost invariably given to
ex-Boer officials and returned prisoners of war. To say that you are a
Britisher is the worst recommendation but one for a Government billet ;
the very worst is to say that you have fought for the Empire, or lost
all you had because you were loyal. I used to think that there was a
certain amount of cant about the phrase, "Loyalty doesn't pay in South
Africa." I know now that it is the cold-drawn truth' (Mr. George
Griffiths, in the Daihj Mail, March 24, 1903).
' "While they would undoubtedly be a source of danger politically if
entirely neglected, yet as officials they are far more unpopular with the
farmers than men fresh from home. ... It is amusing to hear the sigh
of relief with which a Boer learns that an official cannot speak his
language, and the distrust with which he is regarded if he can ' {Monthly
Review, April, 1902).
' Hundreds are to be found in the various departments who have come
to the country since the war, lookuig for plums which others had the
pluck, manhood, and endurance to fight for through a long and arduous
AETICLE X. OF THE TEEMS OF VEREENIGING rA
The war afforded in quick succession opportunities of
experience not to be acquired by years of service outside
it. The Government, at its close, missed a chance of
securing capable men which is unlikely to recur. The work
of repatriation was certainly hampered by incapacity. But
even had all the Resident Magistrates been men of pro-
found ability, which they were not, it would have been a
physical impossibility for them to adequately carry out the
all-absorbing work of restoration and resettlement in the
midst of their other numerous and multifarious administrative
duties. One or other department of their work was bound to
suffer under so severe a strain, and, had the Government
realized originally the magnitude of the repatriation scheme,
the department would assuredly have been allowed to appoint
its own district representatives.^
As soon as the district commissions were constituted, those
commissioners who had not already done so were called upon
to take tlie oath of allegiance, and to swear to perform their
functions as commissioners without fear, favour, or prejudice,
to the best of their judgment, and to preserve secrecy as to
their deliberations.
The district commissions were empowered to take evidence
on oath from applicants and others, and to examine other
impartial persons likely to know the previous condition, habits,
mode of life and character, of those applying for assistance.
campaign. There are thousands of those who fought through the war,
and thus helped to win the country, who are now left stranded ' {Con-
temporary Review, March, 1904).
1 ' The affairs of the . . . Repatriation Board were grossly and care-
lessly mismanaged, and the Resident Magistrate was consequently called
upon to resign his chairmanship. In self-defence he wrote as follows :
" On many occasions I was tempted to ask permission to resign, as my
own work was sufficient for me, and I had constantly to work in the
evening, and adjourn cases to attend meetings, and be absent from my
office on repatriation work . . . but I feared it would be thought I was
trying to shirk my duties. I therefore refrained, and when . . . was sent
here, and the letter to me stated that it was practically impossible for the
magistrate here to discharge both offices, I received it with relief, mixed
with a certain amount of gratification, that at all events I had not shirked
attempting the impossible." '
4—2
52 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
The commissioners were instructed to meet at such times
and places as the}' might deem hest, and without delay to
obtain statistics of the number of farms in their districts, the
number and condition of their occupants, and to decide upon
the quality and quantity of assistance and supply likely to be
required. They were held and bound periodically to visit the
farms of all recipients of either grants or loans, in order to
report upon the manner in which the aid or loan was being
applied, and for that purpose were expected to divide their
districts into convenient sections for visitation.
The system obtaining in England, where so much of the
local government is carried on by country gentlemen who
receive no remuneration, could hardlj' be adopted in a country
where the cost of living is so great that a pound a day is
regarded as little more than a living wage. The commis-
sioners could not be classed among the ' great unpaid ' ; both
they and the magistrates received from repatriation funds an
honorarium of ^61 per diem, in addition to a travelling allow-
ance of 15s. a day when visiting.^