the other half at £3. Many of the mules were poor, and the
price of £27 was therefore altogether too high. Lord Milner
stated that he could buy mules in good condition at the coast
for .£18 10s. apiece, and that he therefore considered his offer
of £20 apiece a reasonable one. Mr. Chamberlain very per-
tinently pointed out that, if mules could be bought for i>18 lOs.
at the coast, it would appear to be advisable to buy more at
the coast and less from the military authorities. This sug-
gestion was very sound, but hardly practicable. The railways
were blocked, and the great advantage of taking over military
animals was that they were on the spot.

The price of a mule-waggon before the war was £40. The
waggons taken over could certainly not be put at half the
value of new ones, but the civil authorities in South Africa
were prepared to offer £25 each. The fact of the matter was
that the military had the whip hand, and the civil authorities
were bound to take what they could get. Consequently, they
ran a great risk of either having to face a considerable deficit
or charging the burghers a price * so excessive as to be regarded
as a swindle and an attempt to evade our obligations in respect
of the free grant.'

The list given above represents approximately the animals,
transport, and building material originally taken over from
the military authorities in both colonies. With the Trans-
vaal this volume is not concerned. From the following
schedule may be gained some idea of the stock and materials
taken over by the Orange River Colony Repatriation Depart-
ment :



DIVERS DIFFICULTIES



85



Statement showino Stock and Stores purchased from the
Military.



11,577 horses

6,000 mules

11,851 oxen

110 donkeys

153 cattle

990 waggons

77 trolleys

265 Scotch carts

120 Cape carts
21 water-carts
Equipment and gear

Saddlery, halters, spare waggons,
equipment, leather, tents, etc.

Building material, wire fencing,
tools, etc. ...

2,410,275 pounds meat and vege-
table rations and tinned pre-
served meat

159,742 pounds coffee

270,681 pounds sugar

2,948,167 pounds compressed
forage ... i:19,129 3 11

6,258,054 pounds

hay 21,502 8 8

882,852 pounds

oat-hay ... 3,146 2 6

175,258 pounds

bran 688 3 10

6,603,600 poimds oats and mealies
2,208,933 pounds flour and biscuits
97,011 pounds meal, mealie meal,

and oatmeal

Sundries ...

1,500 blockhouses...



£ s. d.

219,310 2

128,972 18 4

118,510

880

879 15

35,530

770

3,180

360

315

6,680 4 6



] 3,025 19 10



3,109 9 3



115,096 14 8
5,098 12 6
2,060 17 9



44,465 18 11
28,802 9 9
24,637 1 4

475 16
3,730 12 7

15,000



s. d.



515,387 19 10



13,025 19 10



3,109 9 3



224,368 3 6

15,000

.£770,891 12 5



If the military animals on the spot were diseased and
poverty-stricken, the horses transferred to the Repatriation
Department a few months later from the military remount



86 THE AFTERMATH OF WAE

depots in Natal and Cape Colony— cliieHy from ]\Iooi River,
Port Elizabeth, and Stellenbosch — were most serviceable.
Each horse was valued as it was taken over, and the average
price worked out at i;21 apiece.

The whole question of prices came up for revision later at
a meeting held at Pretoria between representatives of the
Army and the Repatriation Departments on February 27,
1903. But the prices had originally been fixed, oddly enough,
in London, and only two points were raised. Firstly, the
deficiency of equipment supplied with the vehicles taken over,
and this the army consented to make good. Secondly, the
price of the mules. It was pointed out that, had the military
authorities been under the necessity of disposing of these
mules by public auction within a reasonable time, the price
of mules on the market would undoubtedly have rapidly gone
down, because the amount of ready-money in the country at
the time of purchase by the Civil Government was small,
except that in the hands of speculators and dealers, who
would certainly have combined to lower prices. Attention
was drawn to the fact that casualties from glanders and
debility had been particularly heavy among these mules, and
reference was again made to the difference between the price
of military mules and those imported from oversea. Some
6,000 of the latter of a good class had in the meantime been
purchased by the civil authorities at j£17 10s. a head. Colonel
Birbeck considered that an average price could have been
obtained by the army of about =t20. Colonel McLaughlin
stated that he had disposed of a large number of the military
mules at £17 apiece. He found it extremely difficult to get
any higher prices, and it was impossible to get a market in
the Orange River Colony at as high a figure as £20 for the
class of mules which he had received. The arguments
advanced by the civil authorities on this occasion were j)er-
fectly sound and eminently reasonable. The military had
thrown off something of that stubbornness and obstinacy
which had characterized their dealings with the Civil Govern-
ment some months before. Consequently, after a good deal



DIVERS DIFFICULTIES 87

of discussion, the price of the mules in question was fixed at
i.'17 10s. each.

The wretchedly poverty-stricken condition of the oxen and
mules transferred led to considerable difference of opinion
between the local transport officers and the commissioners as
to classification, and many of the district commissions at first
refused to take over. The Resident Magistrate at Vrede stated
that out of ninety-two mules taken over from Harrismith
forty-two died almost immediately ; that these mules were
' hairless, and cold winds and frost killed them.' The animals
at Harrismith were described as 'very poor and unfit for use';
at Heilbron, as ' poor and useless.' The Resident Magistrate
at Fauresmith reported the arrival of nine waggons from
Bloemfontein which had ' left foundered oxen at various farms
en route,'' and he stated that the remainder were ' in a wretched
state from poverty and could not move.' In answer to protests
from Ladybrand and Bethlehem, the commissions at those
places were instructed to take over oxen * if fit to walk to
good grazing, and if they had a fair chance of living until
the spring.' It will readily be understood that such animals
as these took some months to get into trekking condition ;
meanwhile, not more than one-third of the number taken over
were fit for immediate use. The disposal of these poverty-
stricken beasts was left largely to the discretion of the district
commissions. In some districts they were herded together in
kraals, where they were soon attacked by disease and died off
like flies ; in others they were distributed in small lots among
the farmers, and the mortality among them was comparatively
small. ^

^ ' The large number of animals, mainly required in the first instance
for transport, which we took over from the military were for the most
part in the most wretched condition. Hundreds of them died before they
had done any work at all ; many thousands were useless for several
months, and were only gradually resuscitated by the greatest care and at
considerable expense' (Lord Milner's Report, Cd. 1551).

Telegram from Heilbron, July 25, 1902 : ' Transport officer has instruc-
tions to hand over 460 of his poorest oxen. Commissioners estimate that
75 per cent, will die immediately. They are useless except at very low
figure — say i"3 to .£5.'

Eeply to above, dated July 28, 1902 : ' A. A. G. T. promises that no



88 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

The state of the transport animals was equalled by the
condition of the vehicles. None of the waggons and carts
were complete ; many were only fit for firewood ; all required
repairs. These repairs were carried out by the establishment
of workshops in several of the refugee camps, especially
at Springfontein, Bloemfontein, Kroonstad, and Heilbron.
Employment at a good wage was thus afforded to many
whose time had hitherto been wasted, and by dint of hard
work they were given a practical opportunity of accelerating
the return of the general population.

The food- supplies handed over were mostly from the oldest
stocks. After years of exposure to sun and rain, a large
percentage was discovered to be unfit for consumption. The
biscuits were mouldy, the meat decomposed, the forage musty.
The condition of tinned stuff was difficult to detect when taken
over in large quantities, and was frequently not discovered
until retailed to individual burghers, who naturally resented
what they considered an attempt to palm off on them bad
food.i

But whatever the losses incurred in and the disputes
occasioned by the transfer of stock and stores from one
Government department to another, it was essential that the
farmers should be allowed to have promptly what they wanted,
and that the Repatriation Department should sell at the best
prices obtainable without appearing extortionate or causing a
grievance. Sir Hamilton Goold Adams has pointed out ' that
the department was precluded from asking farmers the same
monopoly price which it had had to pay to the military

oxen shall be handed over unless fit to move to good veldt from present
farm. Have decided to take over on these terms. Shall no doubt lose
percentage, but prices reasonable. Must do best we can, with care and
extra hay if necessary.'

1 E.g., wire from Bethlehem, July 21, 1902: 'Large quantities of
meat and biscuits taken over by us in rotten state. Impossible to detect
condition of military stores before opening.'

From Kroonstad : ' Owing to the distance which the burghers had to
come, it was found necessary to issue them their rations by the month,
and in the majority of cases the badness of the meat was not discovered
until the man had reached his home, and could not by any means effect
an immediate exchange.'



DIVERS DIFFICULTIES 89

authorities. In many cases it would have been unable to
dispose of the stock at all ; in other cases where, by the
exercise of a virtual monopoly, it might have compelled the
farmer to buy from the repatriation depots at inflated prices,
the bargain would have left an aftertaste of grievance
against the Government, which it was essential to avoid at all
costs.' ^

The action, or rather the attitude, of both the military and
the civil authorities to each other in this connection was
severely criticised later by the War Stores Commission, as
will be seen from the following extracts, which are taken from
the report published last August :

* The report of the committee, presided over by Lieutenant-
General Sir \Yilliam Butler, suggested that a simple method
of avoiding loss might have been found in handing over to the
Repatriation Department " the whole surplus army stock at a
joint valuation," and we have accordingly inquired how far
this was feasible and how far it was done.

' Both Lord Milner and Lord Kitchener were agreed that
it was desirable to hand over to the Civil Government for the
purpose of repatriation as much of the surplus army stores as
was possible, and Lord Milner did, in fact, take over stores to
the total value of £3,521,000. ... It would have answered
no useful purpose if Lord Milner had taken over the whole of
the surplus supplies beyond the requirements of the Repatria-
tion Department ; moreover, he was limited to £8,000,000 in
the first instance, and could not buy in bulk at that time to a
greater extent. Lord Milner's view is that they took over in
the first instance as much as they could deal with. They had
to consider the prospects of the harvest (which eventually
turned out badly, so that the Civil Government had to keep a
good many people supplied for more than a year), and they
also had to consider the extent of their available depots and
the number of officials at their service. Many of the supplies
also were unsuitable for repatriation requirements. Lord
Milner has, in fact, been criticised for taking too much.

1 Cd. 1551.



90 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

* The actual arrangement made between Lord Milner and
Lord Kitchener was that the miUtary should give repatriation
their prices, and that the latter should have all that they
chose to take at those prices, but that both the army and
repatriation should be free to sell to or to buy from others if
they could get better terms. There was undoubtedly great
difficulty in arriving at any sure estimate of the amounts
required on either side. Burghers were being brought back
from Ceylon, St. Helena, and other places, and the amount
of food-supplies varied largely from month to month. On
the other hand, the troops were being demobilized and
leaving the country, and it was necessary to keep a sufficient
supply in hand to feed the varying numbers as troops were
from time to time withdrawn. We cannot see that any better
arrangement than that arrived at by Lords Milner and
Kitchener was feasible ; but, at the same time, we think that
the two departments were too much disposed to regard them-
selves as rivals, each trying to get the better of the other in
bargaining, rather than as joint administrators for the benefit
of the British taxpayer of supplies and money coming from
the same source. Between September and December 31,
1902, repatriation were buying oats at 9s. and 9s. 6d. at the
coast, which with railage would be 12s. 6d. or 13s. at Pretoria ;
and in January, 1903, the director of supplies accepted
Meyer's tender to buy all surplus sound oats at lis.' The
two departments were in constant communication with each
other. The repatriation officers stated, and the military
officers to some extent agreed with them, ' that on the con-
clusion of peace the repatriation demand for forage was
enormous, and that they took over all the forage that the
army could spare, but that there was not enough, and in
consequence they had to go elsewhere, with the result that
subsequently, when the garrisons had been reduced and
surpluses arose, the Repatriation Department had already
made their arrangements for supplies from other sources.

* There appears to have been a tendency on the part of the
officers of both departments to try to make bargains and to



DIVEES DIFFICULTIES 91

raise difSculties rather than to accommodate matters, and
there are indications that this developed on the part of the
Army Service Corps into a desire to sell to anyone rather than
to repatriation. Except in the hay case already described,
it has been impossible to ascertain the facts in any given
instance with sufficient certainty to fix blame definitely on any
individual. It is certainly strange that more dealings did not
take place between the two departments, unless there was a
reluctance to deal, such as some of the civilian witnesses
believed to exist.' ^

The ways of the War Office are not always clear to the
ordinary mind, and its representatives in South Africa at the
conclusion of the war in their dealings with the Civil Govern-
ment seemed, temporarily anyhow, bent on putting every
possible obstacle in the way of resettlement. Fortunately
there were many exceptions, many officers who realized that
military and civil were merely parts of the same administra-
tive machine and who did all in their power to co-operate
heartily in what was, after all, a common task. The vast
number of animals and amount of stock taken over have been
enumerated ; the state of the country will not have been for-
gotten. For the feeding of the animals in question the
Repatriation Department had to rely solely in the first
instance on the military depots of grain and forage. When
the animals were taken over, there was a tacit understanding
that supplies might be drawn on repayment from these depots
in such quantities and for so long as they might be required.
It will be remembered that the railway was practically blocked
so far as obtaining supplies from the coast was concerned.
Yet no sooner had the military got their surplus animals and
transport off their hands than they stopped supplies. With-
out any warning and without advising the Eepatriation Depart-
ment, a telegram was suddenly despatched from Pretoria
that ' no further Army Service Corps supplies of anj^ sort
were to be issued to repatriation.' The eflect of such
an order can be better imagined than described. The
1 Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 3127.



92 THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

following reports received from Heilbron and Winburg are
merely examples of those received from other districts. The
Resident Magistrate, Heilbron, wired : ' Have 1,500 horses
and mules to feed, and, on reduced rations, can only hold out
five days, not allowing for any sick cattle.' * If we cannot
get hay and oats here,' wrote the Resident Magistrate, Win-
burg, ' all our animals will starve ; there is no grazing within
a radius of twelve miles from the town, and we have only a
week's supply on hand.' The result of making strong repre-
sentations to army headquarters, Pretoria, was that the
military authorities consented to continue issuing up to
September 15, when the fodder already ordered at the coast
was expected to arrive.

Special buj-ers were in the first instance engaged by both
the Transvaal and Orange River Colony Repatriation Depart-
ments to purchase live-stock in the Cape Colony and Natal.
Unfortunately, no arrangement as to the prices to be offered
was made between the two departments. The buyers were
usually unknown to each other, and at auction sales frequently
bid against one another.^ The colonial farmer, the moment
he got an inkling that Government was buying, raised his
prices. The employment of special buyers on commission, so
far as the Orange River Colony was concerned, proved any-
thing but a success, and the purchases they made were un-
satisfactory. Many of the local commissions objected
strongly to the cattle and sheep allotted to them. In the
case of Smithfield a commissioner stated that, out of a herd
of 350, 80 were useless. The Jacobsdal Commission reported
that they could not realize 50 per cent, of the cost price.
This dissatisfaction may perhaps be accounted for apart from
the bad judgment of the buyers. These cattle and sheep had
to be driven for many miles, and it is not impossible that

^ ' In addition to having to purchase stock for the requirements of the
department, stock was also purchased for the Transvaal Land Settlement
Board, and practically for the whole of the Government departments, as
His Excellency the High Commissioner considered it advisable that there
should be only one purchasmg party, in order to avoid the various Govern-
ment departments entering into competition with each other ' (Eeport on
Transvaal Repatriation, Cd. 1551). Apparently the Orange River Colony
was overlooked 1



DIVEES DIFFICULTIES 93

exchanges were frequently effected en route, good being
replaced by inferior animals between the place of purchase
and the place of distribution. The objection of farmers in
many of the country districts was based on pre-war prices,
and they did not realize the rise caused by the war until they
came to purchase for themselves.^

But, whatever its faults or advantages may have been, the
employment of special buyers was very soon discontinued, and
the local commissions were empowered to purchase on their
own, on the understanding that they undertook to recover the
cost price, which they usually had little difficulty in doing.
In some districts, when stock was not immediately available,
the farmers were allowed to purchase elsewhere for themselves,
and the District Eepatriation Commission honoured the bills.
In such cases, armed with a stock pass, which enabled them
to travel on the railway, they usually proceeded to Cape Colony,
When they had made their purchases and driven their herd
or flock into the railway line, they applied to the Central Eepa-
triation Board for trucks, which were granted to them when-
ever they could be spared. On the whole, the cattle obtained
in Basutoland by the department proved the most satisfactory.
They were full}^ acclimatized, free from disease, and in perfect
condition.

To deal with and buy imported produce, and to advise on
prices to be paid, agents were appointed at the four chief
coast ports — namely, Cape Town, East London, Port Elizabeth,
and Durban. These agents were paid 2h per cent, for buying
and forwarding, and their charge was 2s. 6d. per ton for
forwarding oversea goods. Mules were imported from the
Argentine, sheep from Australia, ploughs and building
material from the United States.

1 ' The present system is not at all satisfactory from a practical point of
view, because the farmer can, or imagines he can, buy more suitably in
Cape Colony for himself (extract from Report of Tiesiclent Magistrate,
Winburg, dated August 21, 1902).

' The reason why these people can get sheep at this price is that they
go to Afrikanders and farmers in the colony who are in sympathy witla
ihem, and these farmers supply them with five, ten, or fifteen head, or
more, from their flocks at nominal prices' (Report from Resident Magis-
trate, Boshof).



CHAPTEE V

ANIMAL DISEASES AND THEIR TREATMENT

' Diseased nature oftentimes breaks forth
In sti'ange eruptions.' — Shakespeare.

Disease and famine are commonly said to be the aftermath of
war, and in this respect the war in South Africa proved no
exception to the rule. The mere existence of the Kepatriation
Department precluded the possibility of famine, which was
imminent, firstly, on the conclusion of hostilities, and threatened
later by a prolonged drought ; but animal diseases were not so
easily coped with. Nothing hampered so persistently the
return of the people to their homes, nothing hindered to such
an extent the cultivation of the soil and the restocking of the
country, as the prevalence of disease. Among the many
difficulties which beset the task of repatriation, animal
diseases claim a foremost place. Some of these diseases were
indigenous ; others were imported during the war ; all became
rampant after the declaration of peace. In what follows the
knowledge of a veterinary surgeon or an agricultural expert
will be found wanting, but a modest attempt will, with some
diffidence, be made to trace the origin of these diseases, to
indicate their bearing on repatriation, and to describe the
methods adopted by the department to overcome them.^
The Boer methods of stock-raising, not unlike possibly

1 Vide Cd. 963, 1463, 1551, on which the first portion of this chapter is
based. The latter half is the result of personal observation, and compiled
from the reports of the Repatriation Departixient veterinary officers and
stock inspectors.

94



ANIMAL DISEASES AND THEIE TREATMENT 95

those described in the Old Testament, were primitive in the
extreme. Quantity rather than quahty was their main aim,
and their one idea was to increase the number of their
animals, with as little trouble and expense as possible to them-
selves. Consequently, the animals were left very much to
their own resources, and promiscuous breeding was the
natural result. The animals were kept entirely on the veldt,
and no attempt was made to improve the various breeds,
either by selection, the introduction of fresh blood from
abroad, or by the adoption of enlightened systems of feeding
and management.^ The farms were, with very few exceptions,
unfenced, and the animals were herded during the day and
confined in foul, unwholesome kraals or yards at night.
Skilled veterinary assistance was practically tabooed by the
ignorant Boers. They regarded the outbreak of contagious
disease, which destroyed immense quantities of stock during
the decade preceding the war, as a visitation from Providence
not to be interfered with with impunity.- The Free State
Government did very little for the actual assistance or
encouragement of animal husbandry. It is true that it
passed an excellent Fencing Act and various other Acts
dealing with specific contagious diseases, such as rinderpest,
glanders, etc. ; but these Acts, though not bad in themselves,

^ ' The Boer was not an advanced stock-farmer in any sense of the word.
He found certain diseases indigenous to the country, which he did not
seriously attempt to cope with. He rarely fenced his stock-routes and
outspans, or endeavoured to improve the carrying capacity of the land by
paddocking. ... In the quality of his stock he was equally backward.
In the Afrikander ox he had the makings of one of the hardiest and
strongest draught animals in the world ; in the Afrikander pony he had
the basis of a wonderful breed of riding horses, to whose merits the late