knowledge, a depth of insight which later inquirers might
have profited, and still have to profit, by.
The side of Kant's doctrine now before us on which
it is most open to remark or exception, is where he dis-
tinguishes the two faculties of Sense and Thought. Nothing
could more cast suspicion upon the distinction amounting
to opposition as he puts it, than the heroic nature of the
effort necessary to bring the two again together. That the
two should be brought together was of the very essence of
his general doctrine : this we have seen already, and it will
still more decisively be seen another time in his criticism of
metaphysic as the science of the supernatural, or his criticism
of the rational faculty claiming to think without reference to
empirical intuition. His determination to bring them together
marks him as much off from the Rationalists, as, upon the
other side, his manner of distinguishing them separated him
xx VIIL] Elements of General Philosophy. 337
from the Experientialists. But what is the result of the
effort? An opposition like that between Sense, in which the
mind is merely receptive, and Thought, in which the mind is
all active, cannot be got rid of by placing Imagination between
the two, and declaring that on the one side it partakes of the
character of the one, and that on the other side it partakes
of the character of the other. Or if it can be so got rid of
and there is no contradiction in the union of such characters,
then the two extreme faculties have been unwarrantably
thrust apart, and there is no occasion for spending so much
pains to bring them together. Either way there is something
wrong with the theory.
The pure faculty of Imagination, with Kant, does in truth
everything for knowledge. Wherever synthesis has to be
operated and knowledge is a synthesis forth steps the
ready-witted agent to do the work, and never in vain. With
its two faces one towards Sense, the other towards Thought
it has the survey of all and acts accordingly. Nor was it in
Kant, compared with his predecessors of any school, a small
achievement to have thus set knowledge going as from one
mainspring. He did set it going. He did not only say :
' In knowledge there is this and this, as is plainly to be seen,'
but he showed how it might come to be, and proceed.
It is another question whether he succeeded in finding the
truest expression of the process when he called it an act of
pure subject. Let me recall what I have said or suggested on
a former occasion as to the now extended view of the sources
of psychological experience, particularly as to our direct
consciousness of muscular movement. That has a bearing
upon the development of our physical experience not less
than upon that of our apprehension of space and form. We
cannot move without having passive sensations along with
z
338 Elements of General Philosophy.
our consciousness of the movement ; we cannot receive
passively the sensations that enter into our apprehension of
objects without executing actual movements. Is not the
beginning of synthesis to be sought here ? To justify the
answer ' Yes,' a far more elaborate argument is necessary
than any experiential psychologist has yet attempted to work
out, but it is one for which the psychology of the present
time is preparing. When it is made, the attempt will have
the better chance of being successful, if Kant's profound
explanation of objective experience is at no point ignored.
LECTURE XXIX.
ON KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (continued).
V. The Ideas of Pure Reason.
THE general result of Kant's Transcendental Analytic, so
far as it is negative, has been sufficiently caught, and been
passed on as a commonplace, in later English philosophy,
agreeing, as it practically does, with the result attained in
their own way by the English inquirers themselves. But the
result of Kant's thought, so far as it is positive his explana-
tion, namely, of objective experience with the consequences
flowing therefrom as to the character of Science of Nature
has been only imperfectly apprehended, for want of the
patience requisite to follow the threads of an investigation
which the nature of the subject more than any fault of his
renders extremely complex. In that positive doctrine of
pure knowledge by way of understanding, however, lies
Kant's highest claim to philosophical importance.
It is, however, in as far as it is negative that we are now
to be concerned about the general result. Let it be
remembered that the object of the whole critical inquiry was
to test the pretensions of Metaphysic to be a science of the
supernatural ; oj^ in the other language employed by Kant,
to discover whether by pure Reason anything can be deter-
mined regarding that of which there can be no experience.
Z 2
340 Elements of General Philosophy. [LECT.
We have seen how, in Kant's view, there is a wholly pure
or rational science of mathematics, applicable to the world
of experience; also, to certain lengths, a pure or rational
science of nature, which is the realm of ordered experience.
What then of metaphysic which professedly deals with all
that transcends experience ? Can pure Reason determine
anything synthetically in that region speak positively and at
the same time with a real meaning there ? The mere want
of experience would not seem to be a bar against such
knowledge of the supernatural. Mathematics, in which
Reason proceeds by way of pure intuition, depends upon no
experience is not knowledge of anything given in experience?
Yes, but mark the difference. Mathematical science, while
it is intuitive, extends only to the form of things, and
determines nothing as to their real nature. For the know-
ledge of that we are dependent upon sensible experience, so
that our knowing consists farther only in the interpreting and
ordering of this under certain pure concepts which are
expressions for the varied functions of the mind's synthetic
activity.
Now, unless it is asserted that we have pure intuitive
knowledge of things metaphysical which can only mean
that we have the power constructively to generate them, in
other words, to create them, as is the case with mathematical
figures and this nobody maintains, it is clear that our
knowledge of these also must proceed by way of general
thinking or comprehension ; and then it does become
important whether we have hold of anything to think about.
In physical knowledge or common objective experience we
have matter for thought in the affections of sense which we
receive, and when this is elaborated through the action of
understanding the result is knowledge. Is metaphysic in
xxix.] Elements of General Philosophy. 341
like manner, or in any corresponding manner, knowledge, or
* it only mere thinking ?
It is, then, with physical knowledge or knowledge of Nature
not mathematics that Metaphysic must be compared.
Physical knowledge is a knowledge of things or objects : but
objects of what sort ? Let us see, working backwards from
the position we have reached. Objects were constituted such
in relation to pure self-consciousness under pure concepts
of the understanding within schemata developed by the
pure faculty of imagination ; and what were they else, that is
to say, previous to being so constituted ? A variety of
sensations, which are subjective affections, received within
the subjective forms of Space and Time. We see that even
when the part of intellect or understanding is left out of
account, the matter of knowledge is purely subjective is
something which appears to the senses is Phenomenon.
Knowledge must thus be declared to be of phenomena only.
Outside of this subjective circle we cannot get. However,
then, we may be able to make universal and necessary
determinations about phenomena and that we can do so is
the positive result of Kant's investigation so far we make
them about nothing but phenomena. This is the general
result on its negative side. How should we be able to pass
outside the circle of sensible appearances ? We may, indeed,
says Kant, be quite sure that the sensible appearances portend
somewhat else ; we may have most sufficient reasons for
denying that the phenomena are mere illusion and show
Kant, as was said before, vehemently resents the imputation
that he could suppose them such ; we may nay, we must
conceive of Things-in-themselves as the real ground of
things as they appear to our sensibility, and because they are
conceived call them Noiimena by opposition to Phenomena.
342 Elements of General Philosophy. [LECT.
It matters not, so far as knowledge of ours is concerned : at
least it matters not, so far as any knowledge is concerned
that goes beyond mere conviction that they are. What
Things-in-themselves are, we cannot know. We can know
them only as they sensibly affect us, and then they are no
longer Things-in-themselves. We do, however, know some-
thing of what they are not. They are not in Space or Time ;
for Space and Time are mere subjective forms of our sensibility
and contain sensations only. Neither have the Categories
any application to them ; for the Categories have application
through the transcendental scheme only to what is given in
Time. Thus the conception of Things-in-themselves is one*
wholly devoid of positive meaning; and knowledge is
confined to that of which there is experience, actual or
possible. On the one hand we have sensible experience to
be knit up into knowledge through the Categories, and we
have no other matter of experience to be knit up. On the
other hand the Categories are there as pure forms, empty till
there comes matter to fill them bare functions effecting
nothing till sense gives them that upon which they may set
to work.
Metaphysic as a general science of the supernatural, of
things whereof there can be no experience general because
it employs concepts is upon that showing impossible.
But, however it may be with metaphysic as a science of
the supernatural, if there is one thing clearer than another,
it is that men will not, and even cannot, rest shut up within
the circle of actual or possible experience ; they will put out
from their island, as Kant calls it, for a land a very different
land beyond the sea. That region, which they cannot find,
they will conceive of as they can, peopling it with thoughts
and fancies to stand for objects or real beings there. In
xxix.] Elements of General Philosophy. 343
other words Metaphysic is a natural and ineradicable
tendency of human reason. No conviction as to the limits
of knowledge, founded upon such an inquiry as has now
been carried through, can avail to prevent it. Nor can any
critical inquiry, even when directed to Metaphysic itself,
avail to stem it. But direct criticism may, notwithstanding,
be of use to expose once for all the true character of the
tendency and to call off the mind to other pursuits, this one
being seen to be vain. Therefore Kant proceeds to subject
to the closest scrutiny the metaphysical dogmas set out by
previous thinkers, especially those of Wolff, the most syste-
matic dogmatist of all. In one sense, as has already been
more than once observed, this part of the critical doctrine is
his crowning labour. Equally, however, may it be urged
that such scrutiny is entered on as affording the best test
of his positive theory of objective knowledge wrought out
before. At one stage in particular this will be seen to be
the uppermost thought on Kant's mind namely, in the
famous doctrine of the Antinomies.
In the Kritik, the question now presents itself in this
shape : Is Thought by itself knowledge ? Can we by pure
thinking, without reference to matter of intuition, make
synthetic determination a priori ? The part of Transcen-
dental Logic which expounds the elements of pure know-
ledge by way of thinking, is called by Kant Transcendental
Analytic, and is a Logic of Truth. When, without regard to
the material element of Intuition, the mere form of Thought
* O
is made to give an illusion or show of knowledge.
Transcendental Logic becomes what Kant calls dialectical.
The critical scrutiny of such dialectical illusion is the second
part of this Logic, and gets the name of Transcendental
Dialectic. It is in the main a critical inquiry into the facuhy
344 Elements of General Philosophy. [LECT.
of Reason, taken in the special sense in which it is opposed
to the faculty of Understanding. Both are included under
the general faculty of Thought, or intellectual combination
through general notions, but they differ as regards the
notions they employ 1 .
The function of Reason as a natural faculty of mind,
has reference to all such knowledge as the Understanding is
competent to attain to. The knowledge that we have through
Understanding operating on the manifold of sensations is
Ordered Experience a knowledge that is limited every way.
The experiences limit or condition one another, and hence ,
the need arises to have them brought to a higher intellectual
unity. In the processes of thought as exhibited in Formal
Logic Reasoning or Syllogism has the function wi.h
reference to bare judgment, that it brings a conditioned
under its condition. And in like manner, argues Kant,
Reason as a synthetic faculty has laid upon it the obligation
of bringing together under the higher conditions, or rather
under the highest possible condition, the varied knowledge
operated through Understanding. Short of the condition
which is itself unconditioned there is no halting-place ; for
anything less only leaves occasion for the same work of
rational interpretation to be repeated. Now, seeing that
with everything given as conditioned all its conditions must
at the same time be supposed given, Reason is moved to
conceive of the whole sum of conditions as unconditioned
1 By ' faculty of Reason ' Kant does not mean that which he calls
'Pure Reason' Jn the title of his work), and which is his name
for the general faculty of knowledge a priori. This, in the result, is
shown to include a faculty of Pure Intuition, and a faculty of Under-
standing through pure concepts It does not include, or it includes
only upon an altogether different footing, the faculty specially called
Reason in contradistinction to Understanding.
xxix.] Elements of General Philosophy. 345
ground that is wanted for ultimate intellectual satisfaction.
But in the clear impossibility that there is of mustering
and keeping hold in thought such an endless series of condi-
tions, what Reason actually does is to make an object out
of its mere notion or idea of the Unconditioned ; and then,
treating this as if it were an actual object of which we could
have experience, Reason would make use of it to give
the ultimate theoretic explanation of all that Experience
does in fact bring to view. Such, in the most condensed
form, is a representation of Kant's view of the function and
procedure of the faculty of Reason with regard to human
knowledge in general. It may now be understood how the
Criticism in detail will consist in the exposure of a tendency
which, however natural, gives a mere pretence of real
knowledge.
Kant, by a new stroke of subtle refining, seeks to show
that just because there are three and only three forms of
syllogistic reasoning in pure logic, so the faculty of Reason,
in its synthetic operation upon the knowledge got by under-
standing, develops three pure concepts or as he prefers, in
view of their peculiar nature and use, to call them Ideas
as functions of unity. Commentators have often and justly
remarked that this exercise of his subtlety, if open to no
other exception, is thrown away. In truth he had Wolff's
system of dogmatic Metaphysic before him, and there within
the general doctrine of pure Being or Ontology he found
wrought out a rational doctrine of Soul or Psychology, of
the World or Cosmology, and of God or Theology. Being,
with Wolff, was either Matter or Spirit, and Spirit \vas either
finite like the human soul or infinite as God. Then Wolff
only set out systematically the subjects that all metaphysicians
had been confidently reasoning about ; and Kant, for his
346 Elements of General Philosophy. [LECT.
task of criticism, had here no need of other clue to guide
him. ^Was the question one as to Metaphysic claiming to
be a science of all that was most truly real ? The World as
macrocosm, the Soul as microcosm, and the Deity as ground
of both, were by universal acknowledgment the unseen and
deeper realities whose nature was to be rationally expressed.
Was the question as to the faculty of Reason working to
interpret by its Ideas, or from out its Ideas to develop,
all lower knowledge related to experience? These and no
others in their rational expression were the parent-con-
ceptions of all.
The Rational Psychology of Wolff and other metaphy-'
sicians, when it seeks to determine the essential nature of
the Soul or thinking principle, and thence to afford the
explanation of all mental experience, involves, according to
Kant, in every one of its affirmations a Paralogism or Fallacy
of Pure Reason. The doctrine asserts (i) that the Soul is
a thinking or immaterial Substance ; (2) that it is a Simple
Substance, and so not liable to dissolution ; (3) that it is
a substance always identical with itself, in other words,
a Person; (4) that it has an existence apart from other
things, though able to enter into relation with Body. In the
case of every one of those assertions the fallacy consists in
the Reason making a real thing or entity out of that pure
consciousness of self which, for him, was involved in every
act of thinking.
Logically regarded, self is the subject to which all thinking
is referred, but logical subject'is not the same as real sub-
stance. So, in thinking, self is undoubtedly to be regarded
as simple with reference to the manifold which is bound
together; again, as one and the same while the manifold
varies; once more, as distinct from all else which comes
xxix.] Elements of General Philosophy. 347
before it. But, argues Kant, all this proves nothing what-
ever as to the real nature of the soul. Accordingly all
speculations based upon the metaphysical assertions thus
shown to be false conclusions from the facts and conditions
of phenomenal consciousness have no warrant. Immortality,
for example, cannot be established by any effort of Specu-
lative Reason. As little, however, can any assertions running
counter to the foregoing be upheld. Materialism in iis
principles, and in iis conclusion against immortality, can by
no possibility be proved. As regards immortality upon which
interest is here centred, the result of the critical inquiry is
that no valid reason of the theoretic sort can be given either
for or against it ; and as there can be none against it, it is
open to be proved upon other grounds.
When Reason, acting upon its general idea of the Uncon-
ditioned, proceeds next to interpret the phenomena of Nature
or the mind's Objective Experience, it involves itself in diffi-
culties of quite another cast. Taking phenomena on the
side of their conditions, and impelled to conceive of these in
their totality or completeness, it goes beyond experience and
thinks a world or cosmos as a separate whole. The start
here is from experience, but in every way the extension made
is such that experience can never come up with it. So, under
the four heads of Categories through which experience is
constituted, absolute determination is made of the world in
four ways. It is asserted (i) to have absolute beginning
in Time and bounds in Space ; (2) to be compounded, in
respect of its sensible reality, of parts absolutely simple;
(3) to involve causes which act with absolute freedom in no
necessary dependence upon one another ; (4) to imply the
existence of an absolutely necessary Being as either part
or cause.
34-3 Elements of General Philosophy. [LECT.
But however cogent be the reasons that are assigned for
these assertions from the point of view of pure dogmatism
whence they are made, the strange fact presents itself that,
from another point of view, precisely opposite assertions can
be made and upon grounds of reason not a whit less strong,
(i) The world is as to Time and Space infinite; (2) there is
nothing simple, but everything without exception is com-
posite ; (3) there is no freedom, but everything happens
according to natural law ; (4) nothing exists that is abso-
lutely necessary.
On the one hand, in the series of conditions, a first is
taken as itself unconditioned and made the absolute ground"
of the series ; on the other hand, it is the series itself that is
taken as unconditioned. Either course may be justified
equally and developed to its consequences.
Such is a brief representation of what Kant calls the
Antinomy of Pure Reason, and nothing, he declares, is so
much calculated to pull it up in its headlong course of spe-
culative interpretation. Once give Reason way, and it cannot
help becoming thus divided against itself. Criticism is the
only means of filling up the breach of composing the strife.
To be able so to do is, with Kant, the true test of any philo-
sophical theory of knowledge, and none but his own can
withstand it. As thus : The Antinomies fall into two
classes the first two to be called Mathematical, the other
two Dynamical, in the same sense as that in which those
terms were used to distinguish the Principles of Pure Under-
standing. In the Mathematical Antinomies the uncondi-
tioned in either form of it is homogeneous with the
conditioned which it is set up to explain ; thus in the first
Antinomy, the world, whether taken as infinite or absolutely
bounded in space, is conceived after the fashion of things which
xxix.] Elements of General Philosophy. 349
we have sensible experience of in space. In the other class
of Antinomies the unconditioned and conditioned need not
be thus homogeneous ; a cause may be of a nature quite dif-
ferent from that of its effect. Now where the unconditioned
and conditioned are alike, the two opposed assertions in the
Antinomy are contradictory and exclude one another; not
one only, however, but both must be held false. For, as we
know that it is only phenomena that are in Space and Time,
and these pure forms of our sensibility have no application
to things in themselves, the world of Reason, which is not
the world of Experience, cannot possibly have ascribed to
it either infinity or absolute limitation in the one or the
other form.
The second Antinomy is to be resolved likewise. Divi-
sion in space has application only to phenomena of which
there is experience, and takes place as there is experience of
it : the opposite views err alike in misconceiving the world of
sensible experience for a world of things-in-themselves, or in
applying to the latter language which has a meaning only
in relation to the former. Different is the resolution to be
made of the Antinomies of the other class. Here the
counter-assertions are verbally opposed, but may both be
true in a different application. It is quite possible that all
phenomena may be connected with other phenomena as
their cause, and so the chain of cause and effect in nature
be unbroken, and yet that they should depend on causes
working freely in the intelligible world of Noiimena or
things-in-themselves. So, again, it may well be that there is
nothing within the realm of phenomena that is not subject in
every way to conditions, and yet there may exist intelligibly
an absolutely necessary being the unconditional ground of
all that appears.
Elements of General Philosophy. [LECT.
Kant's conclusion, then, is that, if not sought within the
sphere of phenomena, free agency or freedom of will is
possible, also that no argument from experience can exclude
the possibility of an absolute being the supernatural cause
of Nature. But he proceeds to show that, when Speculative
Reason, planting itself wholly outside of Experience, seeks to
determine Being in general, and turns its subjective Ideal of
Being brought to highest unity into an objective existence,
including all reality and perfection, moreover conceived as
a person, the step, regarded from the critical point of view,
is wholly inadmissible. As if conscious of the uncertainty of
the step, Reason, in the way of Speculative Theology, hms
sought to justify it by a variety of arguments ; and Kant
accordingly subjects these, known as the proofs of the
existence of Deity, to a scrutiny which remains for ever
memorable.
The proofs commonly given are brought to three (i) the
a priori or ontological argument, from the very nature of the