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unity." He might, by the constitution of the Empire,
call upon each free city and sovereign for soldiers and



232 The Great War

subsidies, but they obeyed the summons only when it suited
their pleasure and convenience. Separation of the states
into independent kingdoms and principalities had so far
progressed, when, by the death of Charles VI, the male
branch of the house of Hapsburg became extinct, and the
electors chose Charles of Bavaria as Emperor Charles VII,
who claimed the Austrian succession against Maria Theresa ;
hence Austria stood without the Empire and at war with
it. Although the House of Austria, the Hapsburgs, again
held the imperial scepter the separatist policy of Maria
Theresa tended towards the development of the hereditary
estates and the regarding of the imperial dignity as the
natural and inalienable right of the rulers. The Seven
Years' War, carried on with the Reich, hastened the work
of disruption so that by the end of the eighteenth century
Germany was a loose Confederation lacking unity or cohe-
sion. Such was the condition when the "waves of the
French Revolution came surging into Germany."

The war which soon engulfed Europe and the rise of
Napoleon put an end to the old order. From the Empire
various states were created under the protection of France,
and Francis II laid down the scepter of Charlemagne to
take up that of Austria, as Francis I. The Hapsburgs had
so long worn the imperial crown that it is not unnatural to
think of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the outgrowth,
the legitimate descendant, of the Holy Roman Empire.

The Hereditary Estates comprised many nationalities and
races. The monarch was described as King of Hungary,
Bohemia, Croatia, Slavonia, and Galicia; Archduke of
Austria; Grand Duke of Transylvania; Duke of Styria,
Carinthia, and Carniola; and Princely Count of Hapsburg
and Tyrol. This "Mosaic of political curiosities" he
united under the title of Emperor of Austria. Eleven
distinct languages were spoken in the Austrian Empire,



The Army of Austria-Hungary 233

and all efforts to establish German as the common means
of communication have failed.

Of the non-German races the Hungarians were by far
the strongest, and were possessed of an ardent national and
racial feeling, but loyal withal to the House of Hapsburg.
The awakening of political consciousness throughout
Europe, in 1848, aroused in the Hungarians a desire for
a separate national life, but it was not until many years
had passed that, in 1867, it finally reached its long-sought
goal, and the Empire became known to the world as
Austria-Hungary, each a separate kingdom, with its own
national army, yet each supporting the dual monarchy
and owning allegiance to the one head, the reigning
Hapsburg.

The armies of 1866, inferior in organization and training,
arms and equipment, suffered decisive defeat at Koniggratz,
and were able to offer no further effective resistance to the
victorious Prussians. The result was a new army law which
established universal service, made provision for a first-line
army of 800,000 on a war footing, and created a Landwehr
for Austria and one for Hungary. Thus the new double
monarchy had an army which was divided into three parts,
each dependent on a separate legislative body for its sup-
port. The joint army was maintained at a greatly reduced
strength, and the Landwehr, or second-line forces, were
scarcely more than paper organizations. The events of the
War of 1870 demonstrated clearly the weakness of an army
maintained at a low peace strength and the absurdity of a
reserve without adequate training and which possessed
neither the numbers nor the equipment to make it an
effective force. An effort was then made to bring the
Landwehr up to the requirements of first-line troops. The
problem was one which under most the favorable conditions
wovild require a long period, and the difficulties which the



234 The Great War

military authorities experienced were greatly increased by
the obstacles placed in their way by Hungary. Much
progress had been made by the military, but the Hungarian
opposition to reform was not overcome until the crisis of
1908-1909, when Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia
and Herzegovina, which she had occupied since 1878. The
Russian mobilization and the imminent danger of war
brought the two monarchies to a realization of the folly of
their policy of internal strife and the needs of the army
began to receive consideration.

It was not, however, even then without great difficulty
that the needed reforms were brought about. The army
law of 1889 was still in force. The annual contingent of
recruits amounted to 103,000 for the active army, 20,000 for
the Austrian Landwehr, and 12,000 for the Hungarian
Landwehr which, excluding the artillery, is the Honved.
This force retains the title of the revolutionaries of 1848-
1849, Honved (Defenders of the Fatherland). The annual
draft once fixed was not to be changed for ten years, except
that in case of emergency the crown could modify it.
Two ten-year periods had passed and the number of recruits
was the same as in 1889. The population had increased
during this time not less than 10,000,000, with a corres-
ponding increase in the number of men capable of military
service, but the surplus could not be utilized, and had to be
passed into the general levy. These men belonged, of
course, to the ultimate reserve strength of the army, but
received so Uttle training that they were of doubtful value.
There had been many changes in the tactical and technical
requirements of the army. The field artillery had been in-
creased and the machine-gun organizations as well as new
units of communication troops had been created. This had
resulted in a dangerous decrease in the peace strength of
the other units.




The Army of Austria-Hungary 235

The two-year service was already firmly established in
[[jirrnany and there was a popular demand for a corres-
ponding reduction of color service in Austria-Hungary.
This would require a still further increase in the annual
draft, which was not to be secured without a political
struggle. Short service imposes heavy burdens on the offi-
cers and non-commissioned officers responsible for the
training of the recruits. Without a numerous staff of pro-
fessional instructors and a class of recruits capable of inten-
sive training it is not possible to maintain a short service
army on a basis of modern efficiency. This standard had
been established on a high plane by Germany, which had
solved the problem of providing suitable non-commissioned
officers before adopting the two-year service; but no such
solution of the problem had been reached by the Dual
Monarchy. The educational standard of the people was
not so high as in Germany and, besides, the problem of a
number of different languages presented particular difficul-
ties. The effort on the part of Austria to introduce German
as the language of command was persistently combated in
Hungary, and army orders and regulations which were to
reach all the troops had to be published in many different
languages. It was a delicate task that confronted the mili-
tary administration, that of creating a national army out
of many different peoples, but observers at the autumn
maneuvers of 1912 and 1913 testified to the efficiency of
the troops and, according to the estimate of a former min-
ister of war for Austria-Hungary, the Landwehr divisions
were, in 1914, not inferior to the divisions of the active
army. The Landwehr, still maintained by each monarchy
as a separate force, formed, with the joint army, the first
line in war; the Austrian and Hungarian Landsturms made
up the third line. There was, strictly speaking, no second-
line force. 1



236 The Great War

Like the other armies of the continent, this was a national
army based on universal compulsory service. Members of
the priesthood and teachers were exempt, and men who
were the sole support of dependent families were assigned
to the Ersatz Reserve, or general levy, without service with
the colors; as were certain others, for economical reasons.
Those, however, who escaped service paid a tax in lieu
thereof. Service, except for the mounted branches, was for
two years in the active army and ten in the reserve. The
cavalry and the horse artillery served three years with the
colors and seven in the reserve.

Young men possessed of the required educational quali-
fications passed into the reserve after one year with the
active army. Liability to serve began with the twenty-first
year of age and ended with the completion of the thirty-
fifth year. Men fit for service were divided between the
active army and the Landwehr ; those in excess of the re-
quirements of these establishments and the favored tlasses
were in the Ersatz Reserve. Volunteers were accepted
beginning with the eighteenth year of age, but only with
the consent of their parents or guardians. Foreigners were
also accepted with the consent of their own government
and approval of the emperor. Reservists \yho had com-
pleted two years with the active army were subject to be
called out for four periods of training not exceeding a total
of fourteen weeks. Those who had served three years
with the colors were liable only to eleven weeks' reserve
training, divided into three periods; while four-year men,
such as marines, were not subject to be called out for
further training. One-year volunteers received four periods
of supplementary training, each of four weeks. The
Ersatz Reserve received ten weeks' continuous instruc-
tion and were called out later for three periods of four
weeks each. \



The Army of Austria-Hungary 237

f Service in the Landsturni was for twenty-four years, begin-
ning with the nineteenth year of age. The first category
of the Landsturm included men not over thirty-seven, and
was destined to fill the ranks of the active army and the
Landwehr in case of war. The unfit paid an annual tax so
long as they were of military age. This tax was based on
income and applied also to the parents of a son who was
subject to a tax. The minimum taxable income was for
the son, 1,200 kronen ($240), and for the parents, 4,000
kronen ($800).

Recruiting was territorial, not only for the active army,
but also for the Landwehr and the Landsturm. The new
army laws of 1912 were expected to produce for the first
year 136,000, for the second year 154,000, and for the fol-
lowing nine years 159,000 recruits for the active army. The
annual contingent for the Austrian Landwehr was estimated
for the same period to increase from 20,000 to 27,000 ; that
of Hungary from 17,000 to 25,000; and that of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from 6,400 to 7,800. The peace army amounted
to 414,000 officers and men. The war strength without the
Landsturm and Ersatz Reserve was estimated at 2,000,000. I
j The non-commissioned officers for the army came froril
"the ranks and had no special schools for their instruction,
except such as were maintained by the regiments. The in-
troduction of the two-year service brought up, as we have
seen, a serious problem with respect to the non-commis-
sioned officers. Many solutions were discussed in military
circles. The number of long-service non-commissioned
officers decreased from year to year, while the needs were
greater than ever before. In order to meet the demand,
the military administration planned to establish schools
where boys should be taken at the age of fifteen or sixteen,
after they had finished the public school course, and pre-
pared for the grade of non-commissioned officer as a



238 The Great War

profession. There was no difference of opinion as to the
value of such schools but it would be some years before
they produced results, and the demand was immediate. The
provision of the two-year law which proposed to retain in
the service for another year those who before the end of the
second year had been appointed non-commissioned officers
would impose an additional burden on the very men who
were deserving of the greatest consideration. It was recog-
nized that proper provision should be made not only for
the social and material condition of the non-commis-
sioned officer while in the service, but that he should
be provided for after he left it. In this way selected
men could be induced voluntarily to give the best part of
their lives to a profession which was already endeared to
them by tradition and through patriotic spirit. It was not
necessary that the career should offer great material advan-
tages ; a merely decent maintenance in the sphere in which
they found themselves honored defenders of the father-
land was sufficient. This was accomplished in 1912 and
would without doubt furnish the army with a high class of
non-commissioned officers, without which a trained citi-
zenry, or national army, is not to be created. These men
are no less important than professional officers of a superior
quality ; no army worthy of the name, much less a trained
citizenry, can exist without both. !

\ The officers of the active army were drawn from a num-
ber of military academies or cadet schools, by appointment
of officers of the reserve, or by direct examination. Non-
commissioned officers who had served not less than six
years were appointed officers in the supply departments,
subject to examination. Officers of the reserve were drawn
from the one-year volunteers or from the officers of the
active army, by transfer to the reserve. Officers of the
Landsturm were only appointed in case of need.



The Army of Austria-Hungary 239

J The army of Austria-Hungary, composed of so many
elements and nationalities, imposed burdens on its officers
not experienced by the officers of the other Great Powers
of Europe. These officers were drawn, as a r»le, from the
classes best suited for the military training of the nation,
and were, in general, well ciualified by education and train-
ing for their important duties. Tradition and devotion to
the crown made them worthy servants of the state. The
schools maintained for the theoretical and practical instruc-
tion of the officers were ample and of the same character
as those of Germany. The German military system was a
model for all modern armies, but the influence was more
potent in Austria-Hungary than elsewhere, and this influ-
ence was sure to be a most powerful factor if the armies of
these two allied nations should operate together in joint
campaigns against a common enemy. While the profes-
sional officers of the active army measured up to the
standards of modern military efficiency, the same could
not be said of the reserve officers. These officers came, as
in Germany, from the class of one-year volunteers ; but in
Germany, the one-year volunteers existed for the benefit
of the state, — if possessed of the high qualities fitting him
to command men, a volunteer might become an officer;
otherwise not. In Austria-Hungary, on the other hand,
the appointment as a reserve officer was his normal career ;
if the young man completed his one-year volunteer service
in a fairly satisfactory manner, he was sure of his commis-
sion. The result was a large percentage of reserve officers
who were neither socially nor professionally acceptable in
military circles.'

[Th us, the first-line army of 1914 was made up of the joint
army, the Austrian Landwehr, and the Hungarian Land-
wehr. The joint army included 102 regiments of infantry
from regiments of Tirolese Jager (hunters), 26 battalions of



240 The Great War

field Jager; 4 infantry regiments and 1 battalion of Jager
furnished by Bosnia and Herzegovina. These regiments
were all of 4 battalions. The Austrian Landwehr was
made up of 37 infantry regiments and 3 Tirolese regi-
ments. The Tirolese regiments and 2 of the infantry
regiments were mountain troops with special organiza-
tion, equipment, and arms. There were 28 regiments of
infantry and 1 independent company in the Hungarian
Landwehr. Of these regiments 10 had 4 and the other 18
only 3 battalions each. All battalions except the mountain
troops had 4 companies. The strength of the Austrian
company was about the same as that of Germany and
France, and the battalion of 4 companies corresponded to
that of the other armies. The regiment, however, was of 4
battalions, making it larger by one-third than the German
regiment, and numbering slightly more than 4,000 rifles.
In addition to 4 field battalions, the regiment had also 1
depot-battalion, which was only a skeleton organization in
time of peace, but which on mobilization formed 2 bat-
talions, one of which was destined to take the field and the
other, which remained a depot-battalion, was to supply
reserves to replace the casualties in the regiment in the
front. The Jager battalion was, like the infantry, of 4 com-
panies, and had a depot-company which bore the same rela-
tion to the battalion at the front as did the depot-battalion
to the infantry regiment. All armies have recognized the
desirability of maintaining skeleton organizations which in
peace have only the officers and non-commissioned officers,
and in war are quickly recruited to full strength. This is a
very plausible scheme, because the greatest obstacle to the
creation of new units after the outbreak of war is the diffi-
culty of obtaining suitable officers and non-commissioned
officers. A very serious objection is that these officers,
having no commands in peace, are not likely to be efficient




Austrian infantry on dress parade,




Portahle cooking stoves, vised in tlie Austrian Army, whici

the troops mareii.



t-nal^le c«Miking to lit- doni- wiule



The Army of Austria-Hungary 241

commanders in war. On mobilization each regiment formed
a reserve battalion, and the Jiiger battalion formed reserve
companies. All regiments had in peace two machine-gun
detachments and the Jager battalion had one. Several
Jiiger battalions had organized bicycle companies. It
should be remembered that the Jiiger did not differ in
any essential from the infantry of the line. The regiments
were located in peace either in or near the districts in which
they were recruited.

The third line was made up entirely of Landsturm troops,
whose organization was not uniform and their training was
mediocre; hence they would require some training after
the outbreak of war before they would be a dependable
force. The infantry was armed with a repeating rifle, caliber
about .32, model of 1895, 1890, and 1888. It compared
favorably with the French, but was inferior to the German
rifle in muzzle velocity. A high initial velocity and a pointed
bullet gave a flat trajectory, the importance of which lies in
a decrease of the dead space. The ideal rifle would be one
the path of whose bullet would at no range be higher than
a man's head; that is, a rifle that would eliminate the dead
space. The ammunition supply, the technical equipment,
and the regimental sanitary service did not differ materially
from those of the other armies of Europe.
,' There were 42 regiments of cavalry in the joint army,
6 in the Austrian Landwehr, and 10 in the Hungarian
Landwehr. They were classed as dragoons, hussars, and
uhlans, but, as in other armies, they did not differ except
in name. The cavalry was equipped with saber and repeat-
ing carbine, and the regiments were supplied with machine-
guns. The machine-guns were carried on pack animals,
not only in the cavalry, but also in the infantry, because of
the mountainous character of the country, especially on
the frontiers.



242 The Great War

' There were in the joint army 42 regiments of field artil-
lery, 14 regiments of field howitzers, 8 divisions of horse
artillery, and 14 divisions of heavy howitzers. The rifle
regiments had 5 and the howitzer regiments 4 batteries, all
of six-guns. A division of horse artillery was composed of
3 four-gun batteries and a howitzer division of 2 four-gun
batteries. One field howitzer and 3 field artillery regiments
formed a brigade of corps artillery. The horse batteries
w«re attached to the cavalry divisions.

There were 8 field howitzer divisions in the Austrian
Landwehr and 2 field regiments and 8 divisions in that of
Hungary. The regiments were of 4 and the divisions of 2
batteries, all of six-guns. In addition there were 10 regi-
ments of mountain artillery, composed each of 1 rifle
division and 1 howitzer division.

1 The mountain gun was a 2.9^nch rifle carried on pack
animals, and the 4-inch mountain rifle was mounted on
a low carriage drawn by two horses placed one behind the
other. The Austro-Hungarian artillery differed from that
of Germany and France principally in the large percentage
of mountain guns. The field guns, in caliber, in rapidity of
fire, and in the non-recoil equipment, were not unlike those
of the other European armies.

The supreme command of the army was vested in the
emperor, and the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand was, at
the time of his assassination, Inspector-General of the Land
Forces. Directly responsible to him stood the Chief of the
General Staff. Then followed the chiefs of the six army
inspections, and the inspectors of the cavalry, artillery, and
the various technical corps.

In war the land forces were to be formed into field armies
of 3 to 4 corps and 1 to 3 cavalry divisions. There were 16
army corps, composed normally of 2 army and 1 Landwehr
division and the technical troops and equipment necessary



The Army of Austria-Hungary 243

to make them independent orj^anizations. There were 49
infantry divisions, each of which was normally composed
of 2 brigades of infantry, 2 or 3 sfjuadrons of cavalry, the
divisional artillery, ammunition pack train, sanitary service,
and field bakeries. The fighting strength was 15,000 rifles,
8 to 10 machine-gun sections, 450 sabers, and 42 field guns.
/JThe cavalry division was composed of 2 brigades of cavalry,
horse artillery and machine-guns — a total of 3,600 sabers, 4
machine-guns, and 12 field pieces.

The organization and ecjuipment of the engineers, pio-
neers, and sappers, of the communications troops and the
train, and of the sanitary and the supply service were
normal and well adapted to the needs of the line of the
armv. There is less available information about the fortress
and siege artillery than about any other part of the armed
forces.) It was known that Austria-Hungary had some
large-caTiber rifles, howitzers, and mortars, but it was not
known whether these large pieces could be successfully
transported and made available for field operations. If there
was one weak point in the army it was in the aerial service.
There was such a service charged with the development of
airships and aeroplanes for military use, but little practical
progress had been made.

Much had been accomplished in organization and equip-
ment since 1912:. • Although, the army had suffered greatly
from the political opposition of Hungary, this opposition
was never aimed at the army itself, and the approval of the
law of 1912 eliminated its stifling effect, at least, until new
legislation should be required. The strongest tie that
united the two monarchies was the ruling family. Loyalty
to emperor and king was as strong in Hungary as in Austria,
and the army under his personal command was the one
national institution which more than any other could rely
on the united support of all the people. There was no



244 The Great War

division of opinion that the safest guarantee not only for
national existence, but for the uninterrupted development
of the national ideals, was the strength of the armed forces.
The army at least received the support to which it was en-
titled by the place it held in the affections of the people,
but which it had long been denied by their representatives
in the parliaments of the Dual Monarchy. An army which
triumphed over party politics in time of peace, was not
likely to fail in its duty when war made it the nation's sole
support.




Russian armoreii train.




Siege g\m iist-il in the Au i:,,ii. ,iiiii\. ( )ii ilu iii;lit i^ the nmtDr-tractor, t-n i
gun, and in the center is the mount, whicli must be placed on a concrete base before the gun
can be used.



CHAPTER VII

The Armies of Turkey and Bulgaria

Western migration of the Oghuz Turks; they settle in Asia Minor; adopt
crescent as their device. Foundation of the Ottoman Empire by Osman.
The first Vizier. Permanent military organization. The "Janissaries."
Suleiman, the Magnificent; his feudal forces; his navy; curbed power of
the Janissaries. Decline of the Ottoman power. Destruction of the Janis-



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