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000,000 lire ($742,471,000), the receipts to 2,400,000,000; in

Mobilization of Financial Resources 427

other words, there would he a deficit for the fiscal year
1914-1915 of ahout 1,447,000,000 lire ($279,271,000). About
two-thirds of this prospective deficit was attributable to
the supplementary grants already made for the army and
the navy, and the remainder to the diminution in ordinary
revenue on account of the shrinkage of trade in conse-
quence of the war.

Decrees issued shortly after the outbreak of the Euro-
pean struggle in the summer of 1914 doubled the legal
maximum emission of currency by the banks and author-
ized the issue of treasury notes to the value of 250,000,000
lire ($48,250,000), secured by fractional silver coinage and of
bills of state to the amount of 175,000,000 lire ($33,775,000).
For the absorption of its unfunded debt, the government
issued a series of securities, bearing 4^2% interest, at 97, for
the amount of 1,000,000,000 lire ($193,000,000). This loan
covered the remainder of the expenses for the war against
Turkey and the military preparations in 1914. It was en-
tirely subscribed within the kingdom itself.

By the law passed May 22, 1915, almost unlimited powers
were conferred on the government to take the necessary
financial steps for carrying on the war, and in June, 1915, a
second loan bearing 4^% interest was floated at 95.


The Mobilization of the Military Forces

Universal service, reserve, and mobilization. Political aspect of mobiliza-
tion. Mobilizations : in Serbia ; in Austria- Hungary, partial mobilization
ordered on July 28th, extended to Galicia on the 30th, became general on
August 1st ; in Russia, partial mobilization on'July 29th, general mobiliza-
tion on the 31st; in Germany, military preparations, general mobilization
on August 1st; in France, precautionary measures, general mobilization on
August 1st ; in Belgium, August 1st decreed first day of mobilization.
Dispersal of British naval units postponed ; navy mobilization ordered
August 2d ; concentration of the Expeditionary Force. Time required for
mobilization. Assignment of reservists. Equipping the German reservist
Railway service in France. French army corps' headquarters. Trains
required in France. Transporting the British Expeditionary Force. Head-
quarters of the Germany army corps. Military administration of German
railway service. Secrecy of military movements.

As we have had occasion to notice in preceding chap-
ters, the fundamental principle underlying all modern
continental armies is universal military service. The French
Revolution inspiring the whole people with a frenzy of
patriotic enthusiasm produced the levee en masse, which
swept aside the antiquated systems of the eighteenth cen-
tury, when armies were made up of comparatively small
bodies of highly-trained soldiers, and heralded the national
armies of the present. But Prussia in the hour of her
humiliation was the first to adopt a short-term, universal
military service intended to provide military training for all
able-bodied citizens by a continuous process, so as to pro-
duce the "nation in arms."

The slowness of her possible enemies to appropriate
this basic principle of military service gave Prussia an



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The Mobilization of Military Forces 429

enormous advantage. Austria did not adopt it until after
1866, France until after 1870. The reserve, or whole body
of physically fit trained citizens, returned to civil life but
ever available for military service in time of war, is the
product and greatest advantage of universal short-term ser-
vice. By means of the reserve the armies can be increased
fourfold or more when active operations become necessary.
The advantages of such an enormous body of trained citi-
zens depend largely upon the rapidity with which they
can be assembled at points where their services will be
effective. This movement, known as mobilization, is there-
fore a process of critical significance. A mobilization in-
volving millions of men is an affair of tremendous difficulty,
presenting limitless problems. In particular, it lays an
unparalleled burden on the transportation system of the
country. Without the practical experience afforded by
the annual maneuvers it is doubtful whether the elabo-
rate organization of Germany would have stood the test

The youngest reservists join their old regiments in case
of mobilization. All the others, the greater part of the
reserve in the comprehensive sense (Reserve, Landwehr,
Territorial Army, Landsturm, etc.) have their own regi-
ments and officers. To simplify recruiting and mobiliza-
tion, the regional army corps system has been devised, in
which each corps is permanently located in a certain dis-
trict, from which it draws its recruits annually, and gathers
its reservists in case of war.

The proper distinction is not always drawn between
military preparation and mobilization. The first consists
in the movement or redistribution of the troops of the
standing army while still on a peace footing, the collection
of supplies, preparatory transportation measures, etc. The
second refers exclusively to the calling up of reservists and

430 • The Great War

requisitioning of horses for the purpose of raising the army
from a peace to a war footing. It is generally admitted
that military preparations in the above-mentioned sense
may properly be taken by any government, when it believes
that the diplomatic situation is strained, without giving its
neighbors justifiable grounds for resentment. But in con-
sequence of the recent development in the rapidity and
accuracy of military movements, and the emulous zeal with
which strategists calculate, and strive to appropriate, every
preliminary advantage, priority of mobilization is looked
upon as an element of success no less fundamentally im-
portant than it is indivisible in its nature, and therefore a
provocation. The existence of such an element of advan-
tage is a constant source of suspicion. Mobilization by any
power at a time of diplomatic crisis is regarded as a threat
by rival powers. It destroys all confidence in the pacific
intentions of the power that takes the step. The nations
were drawn headlong into the present gigantic struggle
ostensibly by a premature mobilization. It follows that a
consideration of the order in which the different belligerents
commenced to mobilize is of capital importance. Serbia
was the first of the belligerent nations to mobilize. General
mobilization was ordered in Serbia, as has already been
observed, at three o'clock in the afternoon of July 25th.

A partial mobilization in Austria-Hungary to meet the
situation in Serbia was naturally the next in succession.
Count Berchtold made the statement in a dispatch to the
Austro-Hungarian ambassador in London that until the
Serbian reply had been received, July 25th at six o'clock
in the afternoon, Austria-Hungary had made no military
preparations, but that the Serbian mobilization compelled
her to do so. If by "military preparations" Count Berch-
told means in this instance mobilization, his declaration
has not been disproved. Even the report of the Russian

The Mobilization of Military Forces 431

consul in Prague on July 26th. that niohilizatinn had been
ordered, is probably premature.

The Russian consul in Fiunie reported on July 28th
that a state of siege had been proclaimed in Slavonia,
Croatia, and Fiume and that reservists of all classes had
been called up. The F^rench Havas agency reported also
on the 28th that eight Austro-Hungarian corps were being
mobilized, and this agrees with a communication by the
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stating that the mobi-
lization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been
ordered on the 28th, since the Austro-Hungarian establish-
ment comprises altogether sixteen army corps. The Russian
ambassador in Vienna reported on the 28th that the order
for general mobilization had been signed; but this statement
must have been due to an error with regard to the scope of
the partial mobilization. The report does not state that the
order had been issued or that mobilization had been com-
menced. The French ambassador in Vienna submitted
the following report on the 29th: "The French consul at
Prague confirms the mobilization of the eighth army
corps, which had already been announced, and that of the
Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divi-
sions in Galicia are also mobilizing; regiments and cavalry
divisions from Vienna and Buda-Pesth have already been
transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now
being called together in this district."

There is an apparent discrepancy in the information on
this subject furnished by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British
Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Although he telegraphed
from Vienna on August 1st: "General mobilization of
army and fleet," his subsequent special dispatch on the
rupture of diplomatic relations contains the following state-
ment: "Russia replied to the partial Austrian mobilization
by a partial Russian mobilization against Austria. Austria

432 The Great War

met this by completing her own mobilization, and Russia
again responded, with the results which have passed into
history." If the earlier statement was correct, that Austria-
Hungary proceeded to general mobilization on August 1st,
Russian general mobilization, which was put into effect
early on July 31st, was not a reply to it, but preceded it.
In connection with this apparent contradiction a statement
by M. Sazonoff may be noticed. In a summary of the
situation sent to Russian diplomatic representatives abroad,
after aUuding to the formula for an accommodation with
Austria-Hungary, offered by Russia on the 30th and re-
jected by Herr von Jagow on the same day, the Russian
Foreign Minister added: "Meanwhile in St. Petersburg
news was received of a general mobilization on the part of
Austria. At that time military operations were going on
in Serbian territory, and Belgrade was subjected to further
bombardment. In consequence of the failure of our
peace proposals, it became necessary to take larger mili-
tary precautions."

The evidence for the date of Austria-Hungary's general
mobilization is therefore conflicting. It points in part to
a date anterior to the Russian general mobilization, in part
to August 1st. This contradiction creates a problem of
considerable importance, because the priority of a general
mobilization in Austria-Hungary would have a very im-
portant bearing upon the question of moral responsibility
involved in Russia's general mobilization. The Austro-
Hungarian Red Book affords the basis for a conjecture
which would explain the apparent incongruity. In the
course of a long conversation between M. Sazonoff and
Count Szapary on July 29th allusion was made to the
uneasiness in Russia occasioned by Austria-Hungary's
mobilization of eight army corps for action against Serbia.
On the 30th Count Berchtold pointed out in a dispatch to

Russian reservists leaving to join tlit colors.

German uiiiiy and iiaw icbcrvists obeying the order ot niobiliiaiion.

The Mobilization of Military Forces 433

Count Szapary that Austria-Hungary had mobilized exclu-
sively against Serbia, proof of which was the fact that the
first, tenth, and eleventh army corps, whose headquarters
were at Cracow, Przemysl, and Lemberg respectively, had
not been mobilized. But he added that in consequence of
the military measures taken by Russia, Austria-Hungary
would have to extend her measures. On the 31st a com-
munication by Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian
diplomatic representatives contained the following state-
ment: "As mobilization has been ordered by the Russian
government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to
take military measures in Galicia."

These "military measures in Galicia" would surely in-
clude the mobilization of the three above-mentioned
Galician army corps at least. We may readily surmise
that this measure taken on the 30th, which brought the
mobilized part of the Austro-Hungarian forces up to
eleven army corps at least, out of a total of sixteen, was
inaccurately reported as a general mobilization and fur-
nished a motive for a more extensive mobilization in Russia.
This conjecture might explain the undoubtedly erroneous
opinion that Austria-Hungary precipitated the crisis by her
earlier general mobilization.

Still another statement apparently contradicts the view
that general mobilization in Austria-Hungary was pro-
claimed as late as August 1st. It is contained in a report
by M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, on July
31st, in the following words:

"General mobilization for all men from nineteen to forty-
two years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian
government this morning at one o'clock. My Russian
colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in con-
tradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count

434 The Great War

The mention of a declaration by the Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Minister doubtless refers to the conversation of
Count Berchtold and M. Shebeko on the 30th which was
conducted in a friendly spirit, and in which Count Berch-
told remarked that while Austria-Hungary would have to
extend her mobilization, this did not imply an attitude of
hostility. Bearing in mind the view of the Russian ambas-
sador as expressed to his French colleague with reference
to the measures cited in the latter's report, we may again
explain an apparent incongruity by the supposition that the
extension of the Austro-Hungarian partial mobilization to
Galicia was misinterpreted as a general mobilization.

That the general mobilization in Austria-Hungary was
formally annovmced on August 1st is established by practi-
cally indisputable evidence. The official press in Vienna and
Buda-Pesth contained the following notice that morning:

"According to an official communication of July 31st,
His Majesty the Emperor has ordered the general mobili-
zation of the army, fleet, both Landwehre7i (the Austrian
and Hungarian), and the mustering in of the Landsturm.
This measure is occasioned by the mobilization ordered by
Russia. No concealed aggressive tendency is involved in
the measures commanded by His Majesty, but only a pre-
cautionary step for the indispensable protection of the

Stated concisely, our conclusions with regard to the suc-
cessive steps in the Austro-Hungarian mobilization are
these : a partial mobilization against Serbia, probably ordered
on July 28th, involving eight army corps, was extended to
embrace the Galician frontier on the 30th, and was finally
merged in a general mobilization on August 1st.

The misinterpretation of the sense of two documents in
the diplomatic correspondence has created an erroneous
opinion concerning the date when Russia commenced to

The Mobilization of Military Forces 435

mobilize. Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador in St.
Petersburg, in reporting his conversation with M. Sazonoff
and the French ambassador on July 24th, represented the
Russian Foreign Minister as declaring that he "thought
that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be
carried out. The dispatch from the Tsar to the Kaiser on
July 30th, in which the hope was expressed that Russia's
military preparations would not compromise the Kaiser's
position as mediator, contains the following statement:
"The military measures now taking form were decided
upon five days ago. On the basis of these passages the
impression has been produced that Russian mobilization
was under way as far back as July 25th or even the 24th.
But the truth is, that the expression "to be carried out" as
attributed to M. Sazonoff does not here refer to an action
already proceeding, but to an undertaking which must
eventually be put into execution. The decision to mobi-
hze taken on the 25th was only a contingent decision, and
it was not carried into effect until the 29th. A report of
M. Bienvenu-Martin, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
in France, on July 26th, furnishes the information that on
the day before the Russian council of ministers considered
the mobilization of thirteen army corps intended eventually
to operate against Austria-Hungary, to be made effective
upon notice given by the Russian Foreign Minister in the
event that Austria-Hungary should bring armed pressure to
bear upon Serbia. In general the evidence is not at variance
with this statement. There is considerable evidence which
shows that active military preparations were in progress
from the 25th onwards, but the evidence which has been ad-
duced to prove that mobilization commenced before the 29th
is scarcely sufficient in the face of the categorical denials.

The German ambassador transmitted a message of Gen- '
eral von Chelius, German honorary aide-de-camp to the

436 The Great War

Tsar, dated July 25th, stating that the maneuvers at the
camp at Krassnoye-Selo had been suddenly interrupted,
the regiments returned to their garrisons, and the military
pupils raised to the rank of officers without waiting until
the customary period in the fall, and that preparations for
mobilization against Austria-Hungary were being made.
On the 26th the German ambassador forwarded a commu-
nication of the German military attache to the General
Staff in Berlin, in which the conviction was expressed that
mobilization orders had been issued for Kieff and Odessa.

As early as the 26th Count Pourtales endeavored to im-
press upon M. Sazonoff the peril involved in employing a
mobilization as a means of diplomatic pressure. For as soon
as the purely military view of the General Staffs prevailed,
the situation would get out of control. In reply M. Sazon-
off assured the ambassador that not a single reservist or
horse had as yet been called up. Only preparations were
being made in the Kieff, Odessa, Kazan, and Moscow dis-
tricts, which naturally faced towards Austria-Hungary. On
July 27th the German military attache reported that the
secretary of war had given him his word of honor that,
while general preparations were being made, no order to
mobilize had been given, no reservists had been called, and
no horses had been mustered. He said that if the Austrian
forces crossed the Serbian frontier, such military districts
as are directed towards Austria-Hungary, Kieff, Odessa,
Moscow, and Kazan, would be mobilized, but under no
circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna,
and St. Petersburg. This conversation had taken place late
on the evening of the 26th.

The Daily Chronicle correspondent in St. Petersburg
reported on the 28th: "Already a rapid mobilization is pro-
ceeding in the west and southwest virtually from the Ger-
man frontier to the Black Sea." Reuter's correspondent

Rcgiinunt uf Canadian "Highlanders" on its way tu

It Valcartier.

Troops niardiing tliroiigh Vienna in July, 1914-

The Mobilization of Military Forces 437

stated on the 29th that a partial mobilization had been
ordered the night before, confined to the military districts
of KieflF, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, and affecting the
Austrian, not the German, frontier. The greater definite-
ness of the Reuter report, which can be harmonized with
the statement of the French acting Foreign Minister, as
cited above, commends it as more trustworthy. The state-
ment of the Daily Chronicle is probably due to the common
and perhaps not unnatural error of confusing military
preparations with mobilization.

A communication to the Russian ambassadors dispatched
by M. Sazonof?^ on August 2d stated that the Russian gov-
ernment had been compelled to order mobilization of the
four districts mentioned above in consequence of Austria-
Hungary's action. The statement was added: "This deci-
sion was caused by absolute necessity, in view of the fact
that five days had elapsed between the day of the handing
of the Austrian note to Serbia and the first steps taken by
Russia, while at the same time no steps had been taken by
the Viennese cabinet to meet our peaceable overtures, but
on the contrary the mobilization of half the Austrian army
had been ordered." This would indicate that Russia's first
definite decision to proceed to a partial mobilization was
made on the 28th, and from the Reuter dispatch we learn
that the decision was made on the evening of the 28th.
Likewise on the 28th M. SazonofT telegraphed to the Rus-
sian ambassador in Berlin informing him that the Russian
government would announce mobilization in the four dis-
tricts on the next day. A comparison of these documents
would lead to the conjecture that the mobilization orders
were issued on the evening of the 28th, probably as soon as
news of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia
had been received, but that they were not made public,
and therefore that mobilization did not actually commence,

438 The Great War

until the 29th. The British ambassador reported Russian
partial mobilization on the 29th.

The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Paris Tef?7ps re-
ported on the 29th that mobilization was really proceeding
in the districts of Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg,
although no public announcement of this had been made.
The military organization in these localities was directed
against Germany, and so if the report of the Temps was
true, the imeasiness which was rapidly developing that
same day in German ruling circles was reasonable. This
report was almost more sensational than any statement
from German sources. On the same day the German
military attache at St. Petersburg reported a conversation
with the Russian Chief of Staff in which the latter gave
his word of honor in the most solemn manner that
nowhere had there been a mobilization, viz., calling in of
a single soldier or horse up to the present time, /. e. three
o'clock in the afternoon. When the attache remarked that
he had received news of the calling in of reserves in the
different parts of the country, including Warsaw and Vilna,
the Chief of the General Staff declared that such news was
wrong. But the attache went away with the impression
that the statement made to him was a deliberate attempt
to conceal the true state of affairs.

It is interesting to compare in this connection the letter
of the Belgian attache in St. Petersburg written on the 30th
and intercepted in the German mails. The significant part
of the text of this communication is as follows :

"This morning an official communication in the news-
papers announced that the reserves in a certain number of
governments have been called to the colors. Anyone who
knows the custom of the official Russian communications
to keep something in reserve can safely maintain that a
general mobilization is taking place.


German warship in course of construction at the Krupp works, Kiel.

The French tirst class battleship NormanJu: in cunstriutmu .ii .-.m.i Nazaire.

The Mobilization of Military Forces 439

"The German ambassador has this morning declared
that he has reached the end of his efforts which since
Saturday he has been making without interruption for
a satisfactory arrangement, and that he has almost given
up hope.

"To-day they are convinced in St. Petersburg, and even
have definite assurance, that England will support France.
The assurance of this support carries great weight and
has contributed considerably to give the military party the
upper hand.

" In the council of ministers which took place yesterday
morning differences of opinion still showed themselves;
the declaring of a mobilization was postponed, but since
then a change has appeared, the war party has attained the
upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the mobili-
zation was ordered."

The mobilization here referred to is of course the partial
mobilization, but the statement that it was not ordered
until four o'clock on the morning of the 30th is puzzling.
Perhaps the scope of the partial mobilization was rapidly
expanded until it was merged in the general mobilization
as the natural culmination of a succession of one or more
intermediate stages.

The British ambassador in St. Petersburg telegraphed to.
Sir Edward Grey on the 31st: " It has been decided to issue
orders for general mobilization. This decision was taken
in consequence of report received from Russian ambas-
sador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined

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