Citizen's Sav. Bank v. Person, 98
Mich. 173, 57 N. W. 121; Kenney
V. Ranney, 96 Mich. 617, 55 N. W.
982; People v. Brooks, 40 Mich.
333, 29 Am. Rep. 534; Harding
V. Nettleton, 86 Mo. 658; Heath v.
Missouri, K. C. & T. R. Co., 83
Mo. 617; Palys v. Jewett, 32 N. J.
Eq. 302; Little v. Dusenberry, 46
N. J. L. 614, 50 Am. Rep. 445; Re
Christian Jensen Co., 128 N. Y.
550, 28 N. E. 665; Walling v. Mil-
ler, 108 N. Y. 177, 2 Am. St. Rep.
400, 15 N. E. 65; Rogers v.
Wheeler, 43 N. Y. 604; Chautau-
qua County Bank v. Risley, 19 N.
Y. 369, 75 Am. Dec. 347; James v.
James Cement Co., 8 N. Y. St.
Rep. 490; Read v. Brayton, 72
Hun 633, 25 N. Y. Supp. 186; Pres-
ton V. Loughran, 58 Hun 210, 12
N. Y. Supp. 313; Re Loos, 50 Hun
67, 3 N. Y. Supp. 383; Riggs v.
Whitney, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 388;
Taylor v. Baldwin, 14 Abb. Pr.
(N. Y.) 166; Miller v. Loeb. 64
Barb. (N. Y.) 454; Merritt v. Mer-
ritt, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 405; De-
Groot V. Jay, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 483;
Re Merritt, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 129;
Noe V. Gibson, 7 Paige (N. Y.)
513; Parker v. Browning, 8 Paige
(N. Y.) 388, 35 Am, Dec. 717;
Skinner v. Maxwell, 68 N. C. 400;
Olds V. Tucker, 35 Ohio St. 584;
Robinson v. Atlantic & G. W. R.
Co., 66 Pa. 160; Chafee v. Quid-
nick Co., 13 R. I. 442; Payne v.
Baxter, 2 Tenn. Ch. 517; Ellis v.
Vernon Ice, L. & W. Co., 86 Tex.
109, 115, 23 S. W. 858; Re Merrill,
54 Vt. 200; Reed v. Axtell, 84 Va.
231, 4 S. E. 587; Melendy v. Bar-
bour, 78 Va. 544; Davis v. Snead,
33 Gratt. (Va.) 705; Brown v.
Ranch, 1 Wash. 500, 20 Pac. 785;
Garden City Bkg. & T. Co. v. Geil-
fuss, 86 Wis. 612, 622, 57 N. W.
349; Littlejohn v. Turner, 73 Wis.
113, 124, 40 N. W. 621; Jones v.
Browse, 32 W. Va. 444, 9 S. E. 873;
Russell v. East Anglian R. Co., 3
Macn. & G. 104; Ex parte Coch-
rane, L. R. 20 Eq. 282; Searle v.
Choate, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 723;
Lane v. Capsey  3 Ch. 411;
Evelyn v. Lewis, 3 Hare 472;
Ward V. Swift, 6 Hare 312; Parr
V. Bell, 9 Ir. Eq. 55; Re Persee, 8
Ir. Eq. Ill; Tink v. Rundle, 10
Beav. 318; Swaby v. Dickon, 5
Sim. 629; Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves.
Jr. 335; Randfield v. Randfield, 3
DeG. F. & J. 776.
The rule of not allowing suits
against receivers without leave
applies to United States courts,
and will be maintained in those
courts where the receiver has
been appointed in a state court,
even though the state court has
LAW OF RECEIVERS.
terests of whatsoever nature between the parties that
grow out of or relate to the subject matter in contro-
refused to permit the receiver to
sue or be made a defendant.
Porter V. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 37
L. Ed. 815, 13 Sup. Ct. 1008. And
the rule applies to an action for
personal injuries received on a
railroad in the hands of a re-
ceiver; the recovery of a money
demand, damages, or for the re-
covery of the property in the re-
ceivei''s possession. Barton v.
Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, 26 L. Ed.
672. And vi^here the action is on
a money demand, the complaint
must allege leave of court ob-
tained. Keen v. Breckenridge, 96
Ind. 69. It also applies to an ac-
tion in tort where the permission
is asked to pursue redress in an
action at law. Palys v. Jewett, 32
N. J. Eq. 302. This is based on
the ground that a chancery court
will not try questions of tort.
Where a receiver appointed by
the supreme court dies, a pur-
chaser from one of the litigants
pending the litigation will not be
allowed to interfere with the pos-
session of a new receiver by an
independent suit, without leave
of court first had and obtained by
permission pro interesse suo.
Brien v. Paul, 3 Tenn. Ch. 357.
Any title such purchaser might
acquire at a tax sale of the prop-
erty would inure to the successful
litigant. Brien v. Paul, supra.
The receivers of a railroad com-
pany located in another state may
be sued in the courts of New
York where leave is granted by
the court appointing them. Car-
rey V. Spencer, 5 Inters. Com. Rep.
636, 72 N. Y. St. Rep. 108, 36 N. Y.
The general rule that a receiver
can not be sued without the leave
of the receivership court is also
stated by the more modern deci-
sions: Harmon v. Best, 174 Ind.
323, 91 N. E. 19; First Nat. Bank
V. Dovetail Body, etc., Co., 143
Ind. 534, 42 N. E. 924; National
State Bank v. Vigo County Nat.
Bank, 141 Ind. 352, 50 Am. St. Rep.
330, 40 N. E. 799; Chalmers v.
Littlefleld, 103 Me. 271, 69 Atl.
100; Prather Engineering Co. v.
Detroit, F. & S. Ry. Co., 152 Mich.
582, 116 N. W. 376; Garden v.
Garden, 34 Misc. Rep. 97, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 481; Galveston, H. & H. R.
Co. V. Pennefather & Co., 59 Tex.
Civ. 636, 126 S. W. 948; Andrews
V. King (Tex. Civ.), 170 S. W.
862; Andrews v. Jeter & Co. (Tex.
Civ.), 171 S. W. 838.
In absence of statutory law,
receiver could be sued only with
permission of court appointing
him. Commonwealth Bonding &
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bowles (Tex.
Civ.), 192 S. W. 611.
Receivers can not be sued with-
out permission of the federal
court which appointed them. In-
ternational & G. N. Ry. Co. V.
Dawson (Tex. Civ.), 193 S. W.
See, also, Martin v. Atchison, 2
Ida. 590, 593, 33 Pac. 47, 48;
Spalding v. Commonwealth, 88
Ky. 135, 138, 10 S. W. 420, 422;
Melendy v. Barbour, 78 Va. 557;
Reed v. Axtell, 84 Va. 231, 234, 4
S. E. 587, 588; Jones v. Browse,
32 W. Va. 444, 446, 9 S. E. 813,
THE PROCEDURE OF RECEIVERSHIPS.
versy.2 It may, however, permit a jury to be called to
pass upon disputed questions of fact, or may refer the
matter to a conmion law court and jury for settlement
874; Swope v. Villard, 61 Fed.
2 It is necessary to have leave
to file an original action against
receiver. Minot v. Mastin, 95 Fed.
734, 37 C. C. A. 234.
"By the order of appointment
the court takes the whole subject
into its own hands; and ultimately
disposes of all questions, whether
legal or equitable, growing out of
the proceeding." Beverley v.
Brooke, 4 Graft. (Va.) 187. That
the court will not permit the pos-
session of its receiver to be inter-
fered with without its permission,
see Vermont & C. R. Co. v. Ver-
mont C. R. Co., 46 Vt. 792; Rus-
sell V. East Anglian R. Co., 3
Macn. & G. 104; Ex parte Coch-
rane, L. R. 20 Eq. 282; Spinning,
etc., V. Ohio L. Ins. & T. Co., 2 Dis-
ney (Ohio) 336, 368; Fort Wayne,
M. & C. R. Co. V. Mellett, 92 Ind.
535; Skinner v. Maxwell, 68 N. C.
400; Potter v. Spa Springs Brick
Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 442, 20 Atl. 852;
Jacobson v. Landolt, 73 Wis. 142,
9 Am. St. Rep. 767, 40 N. W. 636;
Riggs v. Whitney, 15 Abb. Pr. (N.
Y.) 388; Brien v. Paul, 3 Tenn. Ch.
357; Woerishoffer v. North River
Const. Co., 99 N. Y. 398, 2 N. E.
47; Re Day, 34 Wis. 638; Marshall
V. Lockett, 76 Ga. 289; Re Chris-
tian Jensen Co., 128 N. Y. 550, 28
N. E. 665; Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164,
37 L. Ed. 089, 13 Sup. Ct. 785; Ed-
wards V. Norton, 55 Tex. 405;
Ellis V. Vernon Ice L. & W. Co.,
86 Tex. 109, 23 S. W. 858; Russell
V. Texas & P. R. Co., 68 Tex. 646,
5 S. W. 686; Robinson v. Atlantic
6 G. W. R. Co., 66 Pa. 160; Thomp-
son V. McCleary, 159 Pa. 1S9, 28
A court has inherent power to
protect receiver against actions
brought without its consent, and
to enjoin any one, especially a
creditor and a party to the re-
ceivership proceeding, from inter-
fering with property. In re French,
181 App. Div. 719, 168 N. Y. Supp.
A receiver of the property of
an insolvent appointed by a state
court can not be made a party
defendant to a creditor's bill in
the federal court without leave of
the appointing court. Rejall v.
Greenhood (C. C), 60 Fed. 784.
It is within the discretion of
the receivership court to refuse to
permit a third person to intervene
and take testimony after the court
has acted on a claim. Alexander
V. Maryland Trust Co., 106 Md.
170, 66 Atl. 836.
The receivership court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to determine
questions relating to possession
thereof, unless it grants leave to
sue its receiver in another court.
Odell V. H. Batterman Co., 223
Fed. 292, 138 C. C. A. 534; Pier-
son V. Pierson Engineering, etc.,
Co., 92 Conn. 96, 101 Atl. 485.
The rule of non-interference
with the receiver applies whether
the party claims paramount to or
under the right which the receiver
was appointed to protect. Day v.
Postal, etc., Co., 66 Md. 354, 369,
7 Atl. 608.
LAW OF RECEIVERS.
and adjudication, but, in such case, the court retains the
property or funds under its control.^
This same general rule respecting the necessity to
obtain leave of the receivership court to sue, also applies
to the receiver himself,'* although such leave may be in
3 Even where it would be proper
for the court to dispose of the
controversy under an intervention
in the original suit, it may never-
theless grant permission to bring
an independent suit. De Forrest
V. Coffey, 154 Cal. 444, 98 Pac. 27.
â– i Green v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.) 60; Wynn v. Newborough,
3 Bro. C. C. 88; Battle v. Davis,
66 N. C. 252, Contra, Weill v.
First Nat. Bank, 106 N. C. 1, 13, 11
S. E. 277; Everett v. State, Mc-
Kaig, 28 Md. 190; Screven v.
Clark, 48 Ga. 41; Davis v. Ladoga
Creamery Co., 128 Ind. 222, 27
N. E. 494; Keen v. Breckenridge,
96 Ind. 69; Elkhart Car Works
Co. V. Ellis, 113 Ind. 215, 15 N. E.
249; Garver v. Kent, 70 Ind. 428;
Moriarty v. Kent, 71 Ind. 601;
Harrell v. Kent, 71 Ind. 602; Man-
love V. Burger, 38 Ind. 211; Her-
ron V. Vance, 17 Ind. 595; Battle
V. Davis, 66 N. C. 252.
But see Gray v. Lewis, 94 N. C.
392 (statutory proceeding); Davis
V. Snead, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 705;
Screven v. Clark, 48 Ga. 41; Hill
V. Western & A. R. Co., 86 Ga.
284, 12 S. E. 635; Merritt v. Mer-
ritt, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 405. affirm-
ing Re Merritt, 5 Paige 125; Green
V. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
60; Wynn v. Lord Newborough, 3
Bro. C. C. 88; Ward v. Swift, 6
Hare 312; Conyers v. Crosbie, 6
Ir. Eq. 657; Anon. 6 Ves. Jr. 287;
Swaby v. Dickon, 5 Sim. 629; Mel-
endy v. Barbour, 78 Va. 544; Reed
V. Axtell, 84 Va. 231, 4 S. E. 587;
Re Christian Jensen Co., 128 N. Y.
550 (40 N. Y. S. R. 621), 28 N. E.
665; Pendleton v. Russell, 144
U. S. 640, 36 L. Ed. 574, 12 Sup.
Ct. 743; Barton v. Barbour, 104
U. S. 126, 26 L. Ed. 672.
Receiver must have leave of ,
court appointing him to intervene
in an action in another county.
Miller v. Continental Assur. Co. of
America (Mo. App.), 196 S. W.
A receiver appointed by a state
court, should obtain authority to
institute a suit in a federal court
sitting in another state. Coal &
Iron Ry. Co. v. Reherd, 204 Fed.
859, 123 C. C. A. 155.
In Everett v. State, McKaig, 28
Md. 190, where an appeal was al-
lowed from an order appointing re-
ceivers, and the appeal was not
sustained, it was held that it was
the duty of the receivers to insti-
tute action on the bond immedi-
ately upon the affirmance of the
order appointing them, and no or-
der directing them to do so was
In Helme v. Littlejohn, 12 La.
Ann. 298, where a receiver was
appointed to collect partnership
assets, the order was held to be
sufficient authority to bring suit
against a debtor of the partner-
Where the statute gives the re-
ceiver authority to sue, special
leave is not required. Hayes v.
THE PROCEDURE OF RECEIVERSHIPS.
general or special form as it is evident that a receiver
without the power to sue for and recover the property
belonging to the estate would in many cases defeat the
very purpose for which he was appointed.^ But as the
Brotzman, 46 Mo. 519; Baker v.
Cooper, 57 Me. 388; Manlove v.
Burger. 38 Ind. 211.
He must not only show leave of
court but he naust also show the
equity of the party whose rights un-
der the order of court appointing
him he represents, to maintain
the action which he attempts to
prosecute. A receiver in general
is not clothed with any right to
maintain an action which the par-
ties or the estate which he repre-
sents could not maintain. Coope
v. Bowles, 28 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 10.
A receiver can not as a general
rule institute an action for the
recovery of real property without
first obtaining leave of the court
which appointed him. Green v.
Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 60;
Wynn v. Lord Newborough, 1
Ves. Jr. 165; Angel v. Smith, 9
In Weill V. First Nat. Bank, 106
N. C. 1, 11 S. E. 277, in a supple-
mentary proceeding, the court
made an order that the receiver
should take charge and custody
of all property, choses in action
and things of value of the defen-
dants, with all the rights, powers,
and privileges of a receiver under
the law. The court say:
"While the court may exercise
very great control over the re-
ceiver and may direct, in appro-
priate cases, that he shall or shall
not do particular things, yet, or-
dinarily, where he is invested with
full power as receiver, he will
have authority to bring appropri-
ate necessary actions without spe-
cial leave or direction of the
In Schultz v. Phenix Ins. Co., 77
Fed. 375, the receiver of a corpo-
ration was ordered and em-
powered to get in the assets of the
company and for that purpose
to bring such suits as might be
necessary. It was held that the
receiver could sue in a Federal
court upon a contract for insur-
ance made with the company.
A receiver appointed by a state
court can not defend an action in
a federal court without the ex-
press authority of the court whose
officer he is, so as to bind any
property or effects in his hands
as receiver. Pendleton v. Russell,
144 U. S. 640, 36 L. Ed. 574, 12
Sup. Ct. 743; Reynolds v. Stockton,
140 U. S. 254, 35 L. Ed. 464, 11
Sup. Ct. 773.
The receiver should obtain di-
rections from the court to partici-
pate in litigation pending at the
time of his appointment. Gads
den V. Whaley, 14 S. C. 210; Tracy
V. First Nat. Bank, 37 N. Y. 523.
5 Where by the decree it is pro-
vided that an administrator shall
pay a certain sum to a receiver,
and that an execution issue there-
for, and that in default the re-
ceiver enforce the decree against
the executor and sureties, the re-
ceiver is authorized to sue. El-
liott V. Trahern, 35 W. Va. 634, 14
S. E. 223.
â– Where the decree appoints a re-
ceiver to collect partnership debts
2016 LAW OF RECEIVERS.
primary purpose of his appointment is the preservation
of the estate, it is necessary that he should not indulge
in doubtful litigation. Ordinary prudence would suggest
that he should not involve the estate in expensive litiga-
tion without the leave of the court. In the earlier Eng-
lish practice the receiver was not allowed even to make
application to do so^ or at least without the plaintiff's
consent." All suits by the receiver are under the direc-
tion and control of the receivership court.*
Â§ 748. Nature of Leave to Sue as to Whether Jurisdictional
X All of the diversity of judicial opinions upon the etfects
of a failure to obtain leave to sue from the receivership
court are due either directly or indirectly to their attitude
upon the question as to whether leave to sue affects the
jurisdiction or is merely an irregularity. As usual in
cases of such divergence of decisions, the courts fre-
quently follow one rule or the other without assig-ning
the reasons therefor or merely basing their ruling upon
precedent. The question is not free from difficulty, and
respectable authorities are found on both sides of the
question. The cases divide into three general groups,
namely, those holding that leave of court is a prerequisite
to jurisdiction of a suit against the receiver, those hold-
ing that such leave is not jurisdictional in that respect,
and those which make an exception to the effect that
leave of court is only necessary where the object of the
it is sufficient. Helme v. Little- ing to the court for an order to
John, 12 La. Ann. 298. sue, unless the right to the rent
6 Ireland v. Eade, 7 Beav. 55; ^^ in dispute. Pitt v. Snowden, 3
And especially so if the tenant
has attorned to the receiver. Rain-
TCollaghan v. Reardon, Sausse ^^^^j. ,. simpson, Dick. 120, note;
& S., 682. joUy v. Arbuthnot, 4 DeG. & J.
In England it has been held that 224.
a receiver has the right to dis- s Re Merritt, 5 Paige (N. Y.)
train for rent due without apply- 125.
Clark V. Fisher, Sausse & S. 684;
Parker v. Dunn. 8 Beav. 497.
THE PROCEDURE OF RECEIVERSHIPS.
suit is an actual interference with the possession of the
^receivership court. ^
NCases holding that the obtaining of leave to sue from
the receivership court is a prerequisite to jurisdiction
of the suit^ are generally based upon the case of Barton
V. Barbour,- decided by the United States Supreme Court,
1 Keen v. Breckenridge, 96 Ind.
71; Wayne Pike Co. v. State, 134
Ind. 673, 34 N. E. 440; Curtis v.
Manger, 186 Ind. 118, 114 N. E.
408; Thompson v. Scott, 4 Dill.
508, Fed. Cas. No. 13,975; Pacific
Coast Pipe Co. v. Conrad City
Water Co., 237 Fed. 673; United
States V. Illinois Surety Co., 238
In Martin v. Atchison, 2 Idaho
590, 33 Pac. 47, it was held that a
receiver can not be sued without
obtaining a permission from the
court by whom the appointment
was made. It is said "If such
proceedings can be tolerated then
the appointment of receivers by
courts would be a useless cere-
mony and a farce. The plaintiffs
are not without a remedy for they
may ask the court to allow the
receiver to be made a party under
such restrictions as the court
deems best for the preservation
of the property, of its own author-
ity and the protection of its offi-
cers." The decision is based upon
Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. 126,
26 L. Ed. 672, which was founded
on Davis v. Gray, 83 U. S. (16
Wall.) 203, 21 L. Ed. 447.
In Keen v. Breckenridge, 96 Ind.
69, where the complaint was filed
against a receiver in his official
capacity upon a money demand,
which did not allege that leave to
bring suit had been granted by
"the court, was held to be bad upon
11 Hecâ€” 127
demurrer based upon the follow-
ing cases: DeGroot v. Jay, 30
Barb. (N. Y.) 483; Higgins v.
Wright, 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 461; Bar-
ton v. Barbour, 3 MacArth. (D. C),
212, 36 Am. Rep. 104; Barton v.
Barbour, 104 U. S. 126, 26 L. Ed.
i-' In Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S.
126, 26 L. Ed. 672, the receiver
was operating a railroad and the
suit against the receiver was
based upon personal Injuries re-
ceived while traveling on the road.
The decision is based upon Wis-
wall V. Sampson, 55 U. S. (14
How.) 52, 14 L. Ed. 322, and Ames
V. Birkenhead Docks, 20 Beav. 332.
In this last case Lord Rommily,
Master of the Rolls, said that it
was an idle distinction that the
rule forbidding any interference
with property in the course of
administration in the court of
chancery only applies to property
actually in the hands of the re-
ceiver and declared that the rule
applied to debts, rents, and tolls
which the receiver was appointed
The court in the course of its
"The evident purpose of a
suitor who brings his action
against a receiver without leave
is to obtain some advantage over
the other claimants, upon the as-
sets in the receiver's hands. . . .
If he has the right, in a distinct
LAW OF RECEIVERS.
wliicli, tlioiigli not the first case, is regarded as the lead-
ing one holding in supjjort of the jurisdictional rule. A
close reading of the case, however, will show that the rule
announced therein was limited to the facts of the case
and that the claim for damages was regarded as an ex-
pense incurred in the execution of the trust.
y/^Uhe reason generally assigned for the jurisdictional
rule is that it is necessary to prevent one creditor or set
of creditors from obtaining an undue advantage over
others in the enforcement of their claims; otherwise
courts outside the jurisdiction of the court which ap-
pointed the receiver might proceed to judgment and sell
the property within their reach under execution, and the
suit, to prosecute his demand to
judgment without leave of the
court appointing the receiver, he
would have the right to enforce
satisfaction of it without leave.
By virtue of his judgment he
could, unless restrained by injunc-
tion, seize upon the property of
the trust or attach its credits. If
his judgment were recovered out-
side the territorial jurisdiction of
the court by which the receiver
was appointed, he could do this,
and the court which appointed
the receiver and was administer-
ing the trust assets would be im-
potent to restrain him. The effect
upon the property of the trust, of
any attempt to enforce satisfac-
tion of his judgment, would be
precisely the same as if his suit
had been brought for the purpose
of taking property from the pos-
session of the receiver.
A suit, therefore, brought with-
out leave to recover judgment
against a receiver for a money de-
mand is virtually a suit the pur-
pose of which is and the effect of
which may be to take the prop-
erty of the trust from the re-
ceiver's hands and apply it to the
payment of the plaintiff's claim
without regard to the rights of
other creditors or the orders of
the court which is administering
the trust property. We think,
therefore, that it is immaterial
whether the suit is brought against
the receiver to recover specific
property or to obtain judgment for
a money demand. In either case
leave should be first obtained."
In respect to the jurisdictional
point the decision was limited to
the case before the court, which
was one based on negligence of
the receiver while operating a rail-
A dissenting opinion was filed
by Mr. Justice Miller in which he
drew a distinction between classes
of receiverships, taking the view
that the majority rule would be
proper in a case where the re-
ceivership was one in which the
sole duty was to convert the prop-
erty of the defendant into a fund
for distribution to its creditors.
THE PROCEDURE OF RECEIVERSHIPS. 2019
appointing court would be powerless to prevent tlie in-
justice.^ Another reason for the rule is that given by
the court in Porter v. Sabin^ to the effect that where a
court appoints a receiver of all the property of a cor-
poration, it assumes exclusive jurisdiction of the ad-
ministration of the estate, and the possession of the re-
ceiver is its possession. And it is for it to decide, in its
discretion, whether it will determine for itself all claims
of or against the receiver, or allow them to be litigated
elsewhere. In other words it is the rule that where a
court has once acquired jurisdiction over a particular
subject matter, it retains it free from interference by
any other court.^
Where the jurisdiction of a court of equity has attached
over the affairs of a failing debtor to protect the rights
of creditors, it will retain jurisdiction to do complete
justice and fully administer the property, and in so doing
it "will, if it sees proper to do so, adjust claims against the
property arising either out of tort or contract and make
all proper orders in respect to the time and manner of
their payment." From the various reasons assigiied for
the jurisdictional rule it is apparent that the controlling
reason is that the receivership court has a prior and
exclusive jurisdiction of the rem and that hence no in-
terference can be allowed in respect to the receivership
property without the permission of the receivership
court, whether that interference be physical or a mere
3 Curtis V. Mauger, 186 Ind. 118, Mavor v. Northern Trust Co., 93
114 N. E. 408. 111. App. 314; Ratcliff v. Adler, 71
The reason assigned for the ju- ^^^'^- '^^^' '^^ ^- W. 896.
risdictional rule does not apply "* ^^^^er v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473,
where the action against the re- " â– - ^^- ''^' '^ ^"P- ^t- 1008.
, , . ,^ â€¢'â– ' Links V. Connecticut River
ceiver is brought in the same n i â€¢ r^ /./- ^ Â«^â€ž â€ž^
Banking Co., 66 Conn. 277, 284, 33
court which appointed the re- ^^^j ^qq^ ,qq-
ceiver. Curtis v. Mauger, 186 Ind. Â« ghedd v. Seefeld, 230 III. 118,
118, 114 N. E. 408; Payson v. ]20 Am. St. Rep. 269, 13 L. R. A.
Jacobs, 38 Wash. 203, 80 Pac. 429; (N. S.) 709, 82 N. E. 580.
LAW OF RECEIVERS.
diminution of it by means of claims determined in an-
/Cases holding that the obtaining of leave to sue is not
jurisdictional are based upon the ground that to com-
mence a suit against a receiver without sucli leave is a
mere irregularity not affecting the judgment which may
be waived or cured by subsequent permission,' although