measure of its division. In the Matter
of Through Passenger Routes via Port-
land, Ore., 16 I. C. C. 300, 310.
(i) The through fare from New
Castle, Pa., to New York via Pittsburg
was $11.75, the route being over the
Penn. Co. to Pittsburg, thence over
the Penn. R. R. Co. to New York, said
carriers being separate and distinct. The
regular fare from Pittsburg to New York
was $10.50 and from New Castle to
Pittsburg $1, making a combination of
$11.50. The New Castle to Pittsburg
rate was formerly $1.25, the $1 rate hav-
ing been put in force upon the passage
of the 2c rate law by the Pennsylvania
legislature, but not published, and avail-
able, for the construction of an inter-
state rate. The complainant purchased a
ticket for $1 from New Castle to Pitts-
burg and presented it, together with his
mileage book over the Penn. R. R., to
the Pullman Co., demanding a through
berth from New Castle to New York.
The tariff of the Pullman Co. provided
that accommodations in its cars should
be sold only to passengers holding trans-
portation required by the railroad con-
cerned. HELD, the Pullman Co. prop-
erly refused to sell a berth to complain-
ant upon the transportation offered by
him, but that defendant carrier should
revise its through rate from Pittsburg
to New York so that it should not ex-
ceed the combination of locals. Kurtz v.
Penn. Co., 16 I. C. C. 410, 414, 415.
(j) A passenger may properly pay a
fare to the state line and again from
the state line to destination, though he
thereby obtains through transportation
for less than published through rate, and
though deliberately seeking this means
of obtaining transportation at less than
the through rate. Kurtz v. Penn. Co.,
16 I. C. C. 410, 413
(k) While in some cases a higher
through passenger fare may be main-
tained than the sum of the local fares,
such fare can only be so maintained
under peculiar circumstances and for
special reasons. Kurtz v. Penn. Co., 16
I. C. C. 410, 415.
(1) If carriers maintain through pas-
senger fares made up of the sums of
locals they should use the lowest scale
available, especially when the higher lo-
cal includes privileges not directly per-
taining to the transportation and of
which the through passenger does not
care to avail himself. U. S. v. B. & O.
R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 470, 472.
(m) Circumstances can rarely exist
which would justify charging a passen-
ger more for a through ride between two
points than the combination of locals
between the same points, where the lo-
cals have been voluntarily established.
U. S. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 470,
(n) On the transportation of passen-
gers from Pittsburg, Pa., to Newport,
R. I., defendant assessed a through rate
via New York of $12.50. Defendant's lo-
cal fare from Pittsburg to New York, in-
eluding stop-over privileges, was $10.50,
and without said privileges $9.00. The
$12.50 rate complained of was $1.50 in
excess of said $9.00 local plus the local
from New York to Newport. Defend-
ant put in said $9.00 local in competition
with another carrier. HELD, since the
higher local included privileges not di-
rectly pertaining to transportation and
of which the through passenger did not
care to avail himself, the through rate
should have been based on a combination
of the lower locals, and is unreasonable,
Reparation awarded. U. S. v. B. & O.
R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 470, 472.
IV. CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES.
See Association, I (c).
15. Errors of Ticket Agents.
See Supra, 14 (d); Tariffs, 3 (2).
(a) Damages may be awarded where
additional charges accrue as a result of
f he error of the carrier's agent in in-
dorsing an excursion ticket. Gorman v.
C. & O. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 613.
(b) Complainant bought a round-trip
ticket from Norfolk, Va., to San Fran-
cisco, Cal., for $105.30. By a note in
the tariff the ticket was not good on the
Overland Limited from Chicago west.
PASSENGER FARES AND FACILITIES, 15 (c) PASSES
For $136.80 a round-trip ticket from Nor-
folk could have been obtained that was
good on any train. Complainant, when
he bought the ticket, was not told of the
restriction in the tariff and, in fact, the
agent of the defendant had reserved a
berth for him on the Overland Limited.
At the advice of the agent of the C. &
N. W. R. R., not a party to this proceed-
ing, but over whose line complainant
traveled in the Overland Limited, com-
plainant purchased another ticket from
Chicago to San Francisco and return to
St. Louis, Mo., for which he paid $105.75.
In this way complainant paid for his
transportation from Norfolk to San Fran-
cisco and return $211.05. HELD, repara-
tion should be awarded for the difference
between the amount complainant paid
and the sum of $136.80, for which he
could have obtained the same transporta-
tion but for the error of defendant's
agent. Gorman v. C. & O Ry. Co., 21
I. C. C. 613.
(c) Complainant desired to go from
Elko, Nev., to San Francisco and re-
turn, and applied to the agent of the
S. P. Co. at Elko for a return ticket.
The agent had no such ticket and in-
formed him to get a round-trip ticket
from Elko to Reno and from Reno
to San Francisco. Complainant attempted
to do this, and purchased a return ticket
from Elko to Reno, but the train upon
which he was riding did not stop long
enough at Reno to permit him to pur-
chase a round-trip ticket, and he was
compelled to pay his fare to San Fran-
cisco and purchase tickets at San Fran-
cisco back to Reno. HELD, the only
way in which complainant could obtain
passage from Elko to San Francisco and
back was to buy a one-way ticket each
way and the ticket agent at Elko had no
authority to bind the company by any
suggestion of the- sort which he "made,
and that complainant cannot recover the
difference between the amount paid by
him and what he would have been com-
pelled to pay had he been able to pur-
chase the round-trip ticket at Reno. Bal-
lin v. S. P. Co., 19 I. C. C. 503.
(d) Complainants purchased round-
trip tickets from Bloomfield, la., to Og-
den, Utah, of which only the going cou-
pons were given to complainants, with
an exchange coupon attached to be pre-
sented by them to the agent at Ogden
in exchange for return coupons, which
the selling agent was supposed to mail
to the Ogden agent immediately after
the purchase of the tickets. The tickets
gave stop-over privileges at any point
on the going or the return journey. The
selling agent failed to mail the coupons
to the Ogden agent, and the latter gave
to the complainants return tickets with-
out the stop-over privilege. Complain-
ants made the journey for the purpose of
getting employment as fruit pickers and
claimed that on account of their inability
to stop off at a certain point on the re-
turn journey they failed to secure em-
ployment at that point and suffered a
loss of $200 wages. HELD, the proof
of damages was too speculative to entitle
complainants to recover. Allender v.
C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 103, 105.
(e) Where a carrier by mistake issues
an interstate passenger ticket expiring
before the date called for by the terms
of the oral sale to the passenger, it does
not violate the Interstate Commerce Act
so as to subject itself to criminal prose-
cution, if it permits the passenger to
ride on the ticket after the expiration
date. I. C. R. R. Co., v. Fleming (Ky.
1912), 146 S. W. 1110, 1111.
(f) Where an agent inadvertently
sells a passenger ticket at less than the
lawfully published rate, the carrier is not
liable for failure to honor such ticket,
since every person dealing with an in-
terstate carrier is as effectually bound
by the law and the orders of the Com-
mission as is the carrier himself, and
neither party may be estopped from as-
serting the illegality and validity of a
contract made in violation of the inter-
state commerce law and the orders of
the Commission. Melody v. G. N. Ry.
Co., 25 S. D. 606, 610, 127 N. W. 543.
16. Lost Tickets.
(a) Complainant lost a commutation
ticket issued under a tariff that provided
refund would be made only when the
lost ticket was found and returned to the
proper officer of the issuing company.
The ticket was never used apparently
by the finder and defendant refused to
make refund on account of the tariff.
HELD, that the condition in the tariff
is unreasonable and discriminatory, be-
cause many cases exist in which recov-
ery of a lost ticket is impossible. Repara-
tion awarded. Moore v. N. Y. & L. B.
R. R. Co.. 20 I. C. C. 557.
See Crimes, III.
PAST RATES, PRECOOLING, II (d)
See Evidence, 29.
PEDDLER CAR SERVICE.
See Refrigeration, 3 (c).
(a) The operation of the peddler car
is as follows: The car is iced, for the
service must in all cases be under re-
frigeration, and loaded by the packer
with fresh meats and packing house prod-
ucts, in whatever quantity and proportion
may be desired. The car is then trans-
ported to the first unloading point, where
it is opened and a portion of the con-
tents removed. From thence it goes to
the next unloading point, and so on to its
final destination. The work of unloading
is performed by the employes of the car-
rier in the same manner that local freight
is unloaded at the various stations, no
special or additional storage facilities
being provided. The initial icing is by
the packer and if any subsequent icing
is needed the packer pays for the ice
actually used. In Re Investigation of
Unreasonable Rates on Meats, 23 I. C. C.
(b) Carriers should publish tariffs
according peddler car service on packing
house products and fresh meats from
Oklahoma City and Wichita to various
points in Oklahoma, Texas and New Mex-
ico; the rate upon packing house prod-
ucts should be 130 per cent and upon
fresh meats 150 per cent of the carload
rate; and a minimum may be required
equivalent to the earnings upon 10,000
Ibs. of fresh meat to the most distant
point. Refrigeration should be provided
or paid for by the shipper in addition to
the above rates. In Re Investigation of
Unreasonable Rates on Meats 23 I. C. C
See Reasonableness of Rates, 16
See Interstate Commerce Commission,
8; Evidence, 49 (aa).
See Discrimination, 8 (5) (h); Long
and Short Haul, 10 (I), (z) ; Rea-
sonableness of Rates, 8 (h), (n),
I. JURISDICTION OF COMMISSION
II. RIGHT OF SHIPPER.
III. EFFICIENCY OF METHOD.
IV. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE.
I. JURISDICTION OF COMMISSION.
(a) Shippers, being entitled to pre-
cool upon a reasonable charge, the Com-
mission has authority to determine that
reasonable charge and require carriers
to file tariffs establishing it. In Re Reg-
ulations and Practices With Regard to
Precooling and Preicing, 23 I. C. C. 267.
II. RIGHT OF SHIPPER.
See Refrigeration, 3 (a), (b), (d).
(a) Carriers involved herein, comply-
ing with an order of the Commission in
Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. So.
Pac. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, filed tariffs es-
tablishing the rate of $7.50 per car for
precooling oranges shipped from points
in southern California to the east, and
immediately thereafter filed other tariffs
canceling these tariffs and withdrawing
the privilege of precooling altogether.
Upon protests from interested shippers
the Commission suspended the tariffs can-
celing the precooling privilege. HELD,
that shippers have the right to precool;
that $7.50 per car is a reasonable charge
to be made by the carriers for their serv-
ice in that connection; that the tariffs
withdrawing this charge are unlawful;
and that the present tariffs or their
equivalent, granting this privilege, should
be continued in effect. In Re Regulations
and Practices with Regard to Precooling
and Preicing, 23 I. C. C. 267, 271.
(b) A carrier may decline to use an
equipment, needed for precooling, fur-
nished by the shippers, but it cannot re-
fuse to furnish proper equipment upon
fair terms. Arlington Heights Fruit Ex-
change v. S. P. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 118.
(c) A carrier may insist upon fur-
nishing all equipment needed for move-
ment of precooled shipments and might
decline to use equipment furnished by
shippers. Arlington Heights Fruit Ex-
change v. S. P. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 118.
(d) A shipper is not obliged to sub-
mit fruit to the hazard of a system of
precooling by the carrier which the car-
rier declines to guarantee, but a shipper
PRECOOLING, II (e) III (b)
has the right himself to precool and pre-
ice his shipment. Arlington Heights
Fruit Exchange v. S. P. Co., 20 I. C. C.
106, 119, 120.
(e) Precooling is of two kinds: that
furnished by the carriers and that which
is furnished by the shippers. That fur-
nished by the shippers is performed im-
mediately after the fruit is picked; that
furnished by the carriers can only be
done after the cars are loaded and hauled
to the precooling stations at San Ber-
nardino or at Colton, when whole train
loads and carloads are precooled at once,
whereas the shippers precool each box
separately. After being precooled by the
carriers the shipments must be reiced
before reaching destination, which does
not appear to be the case when pre-
cooled by the shippers. HELD, that the
precooling system of the shippers is su-
perior to that used by the carriers and
that the shippers have a right to precool
and preice their shipments. Arlington
Heights Fruit Exchange v. S. P. Co., 20
I. C. C. 106, 120.
(f) The car used for the shipment
of oranges and lemons from California
is exactly the same whether the move-
ment is under ventilation or refrigera-
tion, or is precooled and preiced. The
use of this special car is taken account
of in the rate. Carriers are not, there-
fore, in case of shipments precooled by
the shipper, entitled to additional com-
pensation by reason of the fact that a
car of this type is necessary and fur-
nished. Arlington Heights Fruit Ex-
change v. S. P. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 120.
(g) The public is not required to
make good a carrier's blunders in erect-
ing facilities. Arlington Heights Fruit
Exchange v. S. P. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 122.
(h) Discrimination, it seems, will not
result in favor of the larger shipper
from allowing shippers to precool their
own shipments. Arlington Heights Fruit
Exchange v. S. P. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 121.
III. EFFICIENCY OF METHOD.
See Minimums, 7 (f).
(a) Precooied shipments, without ad-
ditional compensation, are more desirable
traffic than either the ventilated or re-
frigerated movement. Arlington Heights
Fruit Exchange v. S. P. Co.. 20 I C. C
(b) The system of refrigeration
known as precooling is essentially differ-
ent from the standard form of refrigera-
tion. In actual practice it takes two
forms. Precooling by the shipper and
precooling by the railroad. In precool-
ing by the shipper the basic idea is to
bring the fruit under the influence of a
low temperature at the earliest possible
moment. The oranges are brought from
the tree to the packing house, packed in
a box, which is immediately deposited
in a cold room. At the end of twenty-
four to forty-eight hours all parts of the
fruit and all parts of the box have been
reduced to a uniform temperature of
from 33 degrees to 35 degrees F. The
box remains in the cold room until it is
loaded. The box is taken directly to the
car and packed solid and not with air
spaces between, as in case of ordinary
refrigeration or ventilation. The bunk-
ers of the car are filled with large blocks
of ice, especially intended for that pur-
pose, and the bunkers and vents sealed
up so as to make the car as nearly air-
tight as possible. This is all done by
the shipper, and the car is then delivered
to the railroad with instructions to trans-
port to destination without reicing and
without breaking the seal. By this
method an additional tier of boxes can
be loaded, thereby increasing the paying
load of the car one-sixth. Under this
system the fruit is in cold storage from
the beginning and can be held without
danger, and thereby minimizes the effect
of car shortage. The cost of precooling
and preicing a car in this manner, in-
cluding interest on the investment and
depreciation of the plant on a fair aver-
age, is about $32.50. There is an expense
in repairing the ice bunkers of about
$5.00 per car per trip. The average
weight of the ice- during the entire jour-
ney is about 5,000 Ibs. The extra tier
which can be loaded when precooled by
the shipper adds a revenue in the case
of the Santa Fe lines of $53, and in case
of the S. P. Co., $55 on a haul from
California points to Chicago, while the
actual additional cost of moving the car
does not exceed half these sums. HELD,
that the shippers who have devised and
perfected this 'system of precooling
should not be compelled to pay for the
privilege of using it more than the fair
cost to the carrier of providing the ad-
ditional facilities which are not included
in the ventilated rate, with a fair profit,
and that the precooling charge of $30.00
per car charged by defendants when car
is precooled by the shipper is unreason-
able to the amount that it exceeds $7.50
534 PRECOOLING, III (c) PROCEDURE BEFORE COMMISSION, 1 (aa)
per car. Arlington Heights Fruit Ex-
change v. S. P. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 121.
(c) Complainants attacked the mini-
mum weight on peaches from Georgia to
markets east of the Mississippi and
north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers in
refrigerator cars, of 22,500 Ibs., which
compels complainants to load peach
crates five tiers high. HELD, that the
ordinary refrigeration metnod will not
perfectly cool the two top tiers, because
Georgia peaches are picked and packed
in very hot weather and moved through
hot regions of the country; that the prop-
er method of shipping these peaches
would be to precool the crates before
loading into the car; that comparisons
cannot be made with the transportation
of California peaches (these peaches be-
ing cooled by exposure to the cool night
air or in precooling stations, and subject
to a cool mountain haul shortly after
moving), nor in the northern states,
where there is a short haul. Complaint
dismissed. Georgia Fruit Exchange v.
S. Ry. Co., 20 I. C. C. 623.
(d) Fruit may be safely transported
under the precooling method. Arling-
ton Heights Fruit Exchange v. S P. Co.,
20 I. C. C. 106, 113; Georgia Fruit Ex-
change v. S. Ry. Co., 20 I. C. C. 623, 626.
IV. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE.
(a) A carrier's entire duty is dis-
charged when it places the precooled car
on its train and hauls it to destination.
Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. S.
P. Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 116.
(b) When shipments are precooled
by the shipper at the packing houses the
car is delivered sealed to the carrier
with instructions not to open nor reice
until destination is reached. HELD, that
the carrier under such circumstances as-
sumes no liability for defective refrig-
eration, and if it handles the precooled
car with due diligence it is not liable for
any damage due to deterioration of the
shipment. Arlington Heights Fruit Ex-
change v. S. P. .Co., 20 I. C. C. 106, 117.
See Demurrage, 5 (c), 9 (d), 11
See Evidence, IV.
PROCEDURE BEFORE COM-
1. In general.
2. Form and issues tendered.
3. Notice of complaint.
7. Oral argument.
9. Costs, attorneys' fees, etc.
10. Dismissing complaint.
(1) In general.
(2) Adjustment since fil-
IV. ORDERS OF COMMISSION.
11. Modification, validity and ef-
13. Necessary and proper par-
14. In general.
VII. EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.
15. Equities of cause.
16. Judicial notice.
17. Res judicata.
18. Requesting information of
19. Tests of revenue.
See Advanced Rates, VI; Allowances,
I; Claims; Commerce Court, II;
Crimes, IX; Discrimination, V; In-
terstate Commerce Commission,
III; Long and Short Hauls, V; Re-
consignment, V; Reparation, V.
1. In General.
See Absorption of Charges, 4 (a);
Cars and Car Supply, 6 (a); Elec-
tric Lines, II (a).
(a) Liberal rules of pleading are ap-
plied by the Commission. Stonega Coke &
Coal Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C.
(aa) Where a complaint was filed
after the filing of a fourth section ap-
plication involving the same rates,
whether a hearing can properly be had
upon the complaint before the applica-
tion is disposed of is of no practical im-
portance. Grand Junction Chamber of
Commerce v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 23
I. C. C. 115, 117.
PROCEDURE BEFORE COMMISSION, 1 (b) 2 (d)
(b) The Commission has endeavored
to simplify its practice and procedure,
without permitting technical matters to
interfere with substantial results. Cin-
cinnati & Columbus Traction Co. v. B.
& O. S. W. R. R. Co., 20 I. C. C. 486, 489.
(bb) The practice rules of the Com-
mission, while not overlooking the def-
inite requirements of the law in respect
to filing complaints, were intended to re-
lieve complainants, so far as possible,
from observance of the technical rules
of pleading, in order that shippers un-
skilled in such matters might bring their
troubles to the Commission in their own
proper persons. Memphis Freight Bu-
reau v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C.
(c) It is improper practice for a car-
rier to decline to make application for
the informal adjustment of an unreason-
able charge, thereby compelling the ship-
per to file formal complaint, and then, by
answer and stipulation, admit the allega-
tions of the complaint and agree to sub-
mission of the case on the pleadings.
Davenport Pearl Button Co. v. C. B. &
Q. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 193, 194.
(d) The Commission is given a rea-
sonable discretion in entertaining and
refusing to entertain complaints that are
presented to it. Even if it had the
power to entertain a complaint seeking
general damages, that discretion is rea-
sonably exercised when it declines in the
general public interest and in deference
to the other important work before it to
deal with matters about which it can
know but little, and which thei courts,
where such matters properly belong, can
deal with much more efficiently. Joynes
v. Penn. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 361, 367.
(e) However strongly the Commis-
sion might feel inclined to relieve condi-
tions complained of, its actions must be
within the provisions of law and with
due and proper regard for the rights of
every affected interest. Commercial
Club of Hattiesburg v. Alabama Great
Southern R. R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 534, 545.
(f) The conclusion of the provision,
"any reasonable ground," leaves the ques-
tion whether investigation shall result
to the legal discretion of the Commis-
sion. Taylor v. M. P. Ry. Co., 15 I C.
(g) The Commission is an administra-
tive body, created to effect substantial
justice in the matters under its control,
and is not bound or limited by the strict
rules of pleading. Nollenberger v. M. P.
Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 595, 598.
(h) It is not the proper course of
procedure for complainants to file com-
plaint and proceed no further. Some
obligation rests upon a complainant who
seeks reparation to prosecute his case
with, due diligence. Advance Thresher
Co. v. Orange & N. W. R. R. Co., 15
I. C. C. 599, 600.
See Long and Short Hauls, 11.
2. Form and Issues Tendered.
(a) Complaint filed in Corporation
Commission v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 19 I. C.
C. 303, examined, and, HELD, to be suf-
ficient to bring in issue the local rates
of the N. & W. from Roanoke and
Lynchburg to Winston-Salem and Dur-
ham. N. & W. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 195 Fed.
(aa) The joint rate under which this
shipment moved not having been at-
tacked, and the proper parties defendant
not having been joined, the complaint
must be dismissed. Reno Grocery Co.
v. S. P. Co., 23 I. C. C. 400.
(b) Commission refrains from pass-
ing upon an import rate which was not
attacked in the complaint, though re-
ferred to at hearing and argument. Case
held open to permit readjustment or fil-
ing of amended petition. Thropp v. P.
R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 497, 499.
(bb) In dealing with certain class
rates applicable to specific kinds of a