& Olmsted Co. v. L. S. & M. S. Ry Co
17 I. C. C. 56.

(j) Where carriers have in effect a
uniform rate per 100 pounds for any
quantity, which rate applies uniformly to
all shippers, a different rate applied to
carloads than that applied to less-than-
carloads will not be ordered when such



differential will have a tendency to in-
crease the rate on less-than-carloads, and
permit the large dealers to drive the
smaller dealers out of the market and cut
off the consumers and small dealers from
purchasing at distant markets in less-
than-carload lots. Duncan & Co. v. N.
C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 590, 595.

(k) One of the benefits, if not one of
the objects, of an "any-quantity rate" is
that it leaves the carrier with some free-
dom in the use of its equipment. Such
a tariff gives the shipper no right to de-
mand a car of a given size. Falls & Co.
v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 269,
272.

(1) Under a local any-quantity rate
the carrier may use any available equip-
ment, notwithstanding the fact that the
tariffs of a connecting lice provide a
minimum weight under a carload rate.
Falls & Co. v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
15 I. C. C. 269, 272.

ASSOCIATION.

I. RIGHT TO SUE.

See Long and Short Hauls, 11 (a).

(a) Under section 5 of the Act of June
18, 1910, c. 309 (36 Stat. 543), creating
the Commerce .Court, an association of
grain dealers of Nashville and the Nash-
ville Board of Trade, the leading com-
mercial organizations of the city, are
competent parties to intervene by peti-
tion to the Commerce Court to enjoin the
enforcement of an order entered by the
Interstate Commerce Commission requir-
ing defendant carriers from granting to
Nashville rebilling or reshipping priv-
ileges so long as they deny said privilege
to Atlanta, Columbus, and other cities.
Nashville Grain Exch. v. U. S., 191 Fed.
37, 39.

(b) The Interstate Commerce Act au-
thorizes incorporated boards of trade of
cities and associations of like character
to apply to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for relief, and such corporations
and members representing such associa-
tions may likewise apply to the court for
relief from injuries unlawfully inflicted
by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Peavey & Co. v. U. P. R. R. Co., 176 Fed.
409, 415.

(c) A voluntary improvement associa-
tion consisting of business men of Coun-
cil Bluffs, la., is a competent party com-



72



ASSOCIATION, I (d) ASSORTING PACKAGES, (c)



plainant to assail as unreasonable and
discriminatory the fare charged passen-
gers for a haul between Omaha and Coun-
cil Bluffs, by an interurban railway con-
necting said cities over a toll bridge
crossing the Missouri River. West End
Improvement Club v. O. & C. B. Ry. &
Bridge Co., 17 I. C. C. 239, 240.

(d) A commercial association is a
proper party to maintain a petition for
relief from the exaction of an illegal or
unreasonable charge or for any violation
of the law's requirements. California
Commercial Ass'n v. Wells, Fargo & Co.,
16 I. C. C. 458, 463.

(dd) An unincorporated association
has a sufficient legal status to be entitled
to demand service of an express com-
pany and under section 13 of the Act to
file a complaint for the latter's failure
to furnish the same. California Com-
mercial Ass'n v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 14
I. C. C. 422, 425.

(e) Complainant Bureau was organ-
ized as follows: An office was maintained
by its manager. Members became such
by entering into written contracts with
the Bureau by which they paid a stipu-
lated annual fee. The Bureau undertook
to perform certain services in the ad-
justment of disputes with railroads and
in the prosecution of necessary proceed-
ings. HELD, such Bureau was a volun-
tary association within the meaning of
section 13 of the Act and capable of in-
stituting proceedings as to rates before
the Commission. Forest City Freight Bu-
reau v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 13 I. C. C.
118, 121.

ASSORTING PACKAGES.

See Additional Services.

(a) Services rendered by the defend-
ant in providing a place where consign-
ments of perishable produce can be han-
dled and in assorting into lots the pack-
ages marked with the names of the sin-
gle dealers to whom they are consigned
is a thing of value to the shipper for
which he may properly be required to
pay. Davies v. I. C. R. R. Co., 17 I. C.
C. 186, 188.

(b) In Wholesale Fruit & Produce
Ass'n v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 14 I. C.
C. 410, the Commission held that on con-
solidated carloads of fruit consigned to
Chicago the carriers should remove same
from the cars to the station platforms



and distribute the fruit in lots to the va-
rious owners and might charge one cent
per hundred pounds for this service.
HELD, under this order the carrier dis-
charged its obligation by removing the*
fruit to the platform and assorting the
packages in piles for the various owners,
and that it was not bound to deliver the
same to the owners by checking off the
packages as called for. Davies v. I. C.
R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 186, 188.

(c) Complainants, relying on the de-
cision in Wholesale Fruit & Produce
Ass'n v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 14 I. C.
C. 410, asked that the order in said case
requiring railroads at Chicago to bring
packages of fruit and vegetables to the
car door for unloading be extended to
package freight of all kinds, and fur-
ther asked that the order with respect
to the unloading of fruit and vegetables
be applied to St. Paul and Minneapolis.
It appeared that at Chicago the fruit
and vegetable traffic was very con-
gested; these products being shipped
in packages of estimated weight, it
was necessary for the carriers to count
said packages upon unloading; and that
the men stationed to do this could per-
form the service of carrying the pack-
ages to the car door without additional
expense to the carrier. At Minneapolis
and St. Paul different conditions pre-
vailed. Fruit and vegetables were al-
lowed to be kept in the cars for a
longer free time than at Chicago and
were unloaded at no definite time, but
at whatever time the shipper desired.
To compel the carriers at those points
to bring the packages to the car doors
for unloading would impose a hardship
on them in compelling them to have
men ready at all times to perform such
service. At said cities no custom as
fixed and definite had grown up for the
performance of said service as at
Chicago. Dealers in fruit and vegeta-
bles at St. Paul and Minneapolis were
not in competition with those at Chi-
cago. HELD, the rule applying to Chi-
cago requiring the carrier to assist in
ur loading fruit and vegetables should
not be applied to other package freight;
that on account of different conditions
at Minneapolis and St. Paul, carriers
at those points should not be required
to perform such service with respect to
fruit and vegetables. Wholesale Fruit
and Produce Ass'n v. A. T. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C. 596, 600-602.



ASSORTING PACKAGES (d) AUCTION COMPANY (a)



73



(d) Where the owners of packages of
fruit and vegetables shipped to Chicago
consolidate same in carloads in so-called
granger cars, the carrier discharges its
full duty by placing the carload upon
its team tracks and bringing the pack-
ages to the car door for delivery; it
is under no obligation to furnish any
place for the sorting of these packages
and making delivery to the different
individuals to whom they are addressed,
and in Chicago, where the conditions of
the business require such assortment, a
carrier may charge Ic per 100 Ibs. for
said additional service. Wholesale Fruit
& Produce Ass'n v. A. T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 14 I. C. C. 410, 420.

ATTORNEYS' FEES.

See Courts, 11 (j); Overcharges, 6;
Procedure Before Commission, 9.

(a) In a suit against the initial car-
rier to recover for loss of goods, no au-
thority is given to tax attorneys' fees by
section 8 of the Act to Regulate Com-
merce of February 4, 1887. A. C. L. R.
R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186,
208, 31 Sup. Ct. 164, 55 L. ed. 167.

(aa) The provision in section 16 of
the Act allowing the recovery of an
attorney's fee in a suit in the courts to
enforce an order of reparation of the
Commission is rot unconstitutional as
being class legislation. Chicago, Burl-
ington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Feintuch,
191 Fed. 482, 489.

(b) In a suit to enforce an order
of the Commission awarding reparation
for diverting a shipment from the speci-
fied route, plaintiff is entitled to an
allowance for an attorney's fee on ac-
count of the appellate proceedings, in
addition to the allowance made by the
Circuit Court. Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 191 Fed. 705, 712.

(bb) The provision in" section 8 of the
Act allowing attorneys' fees to a shipper
in a suit against the initial carrier for
loss of goods is valid. Riverside Mills
v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 168 Fed. 990, 992.

(c) Under section 8 of the Act the
damages therein contemplated and the
attorney's fee provided for can only be
recovered in a suit brought in a court.
Washer Grain Co. v. M. P. Ry. Co., 15 T.
C. C. 147, 152.

(d) The Commission has no authority
to assess costs or to allow attorneys'



fees. Washer Grain Co. v. M. P. Ry. Co.,
15 I. C. C. 147, 154.

(e) In an action in a state court to
recover the excess exacted by a car-
rier over and above the published inter-
state rate, plaintiff is not entitled to re-
cover an attorney's fee under any provi-
sion of the Interstate Commerce Act,
granting in certain cases the right to
shippers to recover such fee, since the
suit is not to recover a penalty from
the carrier for violation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, but is in the
nature of an action for money had and
received by a carrier collecting a greater
amount of charges than it was entitled
to receive. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v.
Tonn (Ark., 1912), 143 S. W. 577, 581.

(f) The provisions of the Act, as
amended June 29, 1906, and April 13,
1908, relating to attorney's fees do not
give the right to recover such fees in
a state court in a suit for loss or dam-
age in transit. Blair & Jackson v.
Wells. Fargo Co. (la., 1912), 135 N. W.
615, 620.



AUCTION COMPANY.

See Exclusive Contracts (c) ; Termi-
nal Facilities, 3 (j).

(a) Defendant granted the exclusive
right to a company to conduct its busi-
ness as an auctioneer of fruit and vege-
tables on its terminal premises at St.
Louis. Complainant, a rival company,
asked for the same facilities. HELD, that
the granting of the exclusive right to
maintain a fruit auction company was
somewhat analogous to the station res-
taurant, news stand, barber shop, and other
conveniences which travelers arriving at
a station may make use of if they so de-
sire. They are enterprises that outsiders
are frequently permitted to engage in at
railroad terminals, not as a part of the
service that the carrier renders to the
public, but as something that adds to
the general convenience of the public.
The telegraph, telephone, transfer and
cab offices ordinarily found in passenger
stations rest upon the same basis. They
add to the convenience of the passenger
before the transportation by the carrier
has commenced or after it has been com-
pleted without adding to the service un-
dertaken by the carrier for the traveler
under its published rates. It is a matter
that is wholly outside and apart from the
service of transportation performed by



74



BACK HAUL BILLS OF LADING



defendant, and is a reasonable use for
the defendant to make of its property.
Southwestern Produce Distributers v.
Wabash R. R. Co., 20 I. C. C. 458, 460, 462.

BACK HAUL.

See Facilities and Privileges, 7;
Long and Short Haul, 1 (xy), 5
(f), (II), (oo), 7 (i), 10 (b), (I);
Reconsignment, 3 (I); Routing and
Misrouting, 7 (rrr).

BAGGAGE TRANSFER.

I. CONTROL AND REGULATION.

1. Jurisdiction of Commission.
II. EXCLUSIVE CONTRACT TO SO-
LICIT.
I. CONTROL AND REGULATION.

See Exclusive Contract, (a); Spe-
cial Contract, 2 (h).

1. Jurisdiction of Commission.

(a) The Commission has no jurisdic-
tion over local baggage transfer agen-
cies. Cosby v. Richmond Transfer Co.,
23 I. C. C. 72, 74.

(b) If a carrier undertook to make
delivery of passenger baggage, and to
issue baggage checks at residences for
the rate of fare stated in its tariffs, this
would be a service over which the Com-
mission would have jurisdiction, and
which must in all regards become sub-
ject to the mandates and prohibitions of
the Act, even though the service in
whole or in part was not performed by
the carrier itself but was rendered by
some agency under contract or other-
wise. But in merely granting the ex-
clusive privilege of soliciting on its
trains, and issuing baggage checks at
residences, to one baggage transfer com-
pany, a carrier does not undertake an
additional service to the public. The
carrier's duty to the public as to baggage
begins and ends in the baggage room pro-
vided by it. Baggage transfer is prior
or subsequent to the transportation serv-
ice, as to which the carrier owes a duty
to the public, and is therefore outside the
jurisdiction of the Commission. Cosby
v. Richmond Transfer Co., 23 I. C. C.
72, 75.

(bb) The Commission has no juris-
diction over alleged unreasonable
charges of a transfer company where
the railroad carrier does not undertake
to make delivery of passenger baggage
at residences for a rate of fare stated



in a tariff. Cosby v. Richmond Trans-
fer Co., 23 I. C. C. 72, 74.

(c) The Commission has no jurisdic-
tion to order a railroad to give a local
baggage transfer company an opportunity
to bid against another one for the privi-
lege of soliciting on trains, any more
than it would have power to compel a
railroad to place its fruit venders' privi-
lege up at auction, for neither one is
transportation under the Act, and over
neither one has the Commission juris-
diction. Cosby v. Richmond Transfer
Co., 23 I. C. C. 72, 77.

(d) The soliciting of baggage on
trains by a transfer company is no part
of the transportation service. Cosby v.
Richmond Transfer Co., 23 I. C. C. 72, 74.

(e) Unless the railroad carrier under-
takes to make delivery at residences a
transfer company is the agent of the
passenger in transporting the latter's
baggage. Cosby v. Richmond Transfer
Co., 23 I. C. C. 72, 76.

II. EXCLUSIVE CONTRACT TO SO-
LICIT.

(a) Although defendant carriers give
to one transfer company, which is
controlled by their officers, the exclusive
privilege of soliciting baggage transfer
on their trains without any monetary con-
sideration, there is no undue discrimina-
tion against a competitive company
which is willing to pay for such privi-
lege, because defendants owe no duty
to provide such service either under
statute, common law or custom, and have
performed what is required of them when
they accept baggage at their depot,
transport it and make delivery at desti-
nation upon their own terminals. Cosby
v. Richmond Transfer Co., 23 I, C. C. 72.

BASING POINTS AND LINES.

See Evidence, 5; Discrimination, 3
(L); Equalization of Rates, 4 (4)
(h); Passenger Fares and Facilities,
3; Proportional Rates, I (c) ; Rea-
sonableness of Rates, 2 (1), 28
(p), (q); Routing and Misrouting,
4 (mm).

BILLS OF LADING.

I. CONTROL AND REGULATION.
1. Jurisdiction of commission.
2. Recommendation of certain

forms.
II. DUTY OF CARRIER TO ISSUE.

3. Rail-and-water transportation.
4. At transit points.
5. One lading for several ship-
ments.



BILLS OF LADING, 1 (a) 4 (a)



75



III. CONSTRUCTION.
6. In general.
7. Statement of weight.
8. Statement of shipping point.
9. Conflicting provisions.

(1) Between rate and
route.

(2) With tariff.

IV. LIMITATION OP LIABILITY.

See Export Rates and Facilities, II;
Routing and Misrouting, 3;
Through Routes and Joint Rates.
Ml.

I. CONTROL AND REGULATION.
1. Jurisdiction of Commission.

See Interstate Commerce, 3 (a).

(a) The Commission has authority to
consider and determine the reasonable-
ness of regulations and practices in re-
spect of issuance, form and substance of
bills of lading, and to determine and pre-
scribe what regulations and practices are
just and reasonable. Shaffer & Co. v.
C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 8, 10.

(b) The Commission in submitting
standard bills of lading does not order
their adoption, since such an order would
exceed its authority. In the Matter of
Bills of Lading, 14 I. C. C. 346, 349.

2. Recommendation of Certain Forms.

(a) The standard forms of bills of lad-
ing (copies of which are set out in 14
I. C. C. 351-355), recommended by the
Commission, are designed for use with
respect to miscellaneous freight and gen-
eral merchandise, and as a substitute
for the bills now in use in the carriage
of such property, but are not intended
to supplant special bills of lading issued
on particular commodities requiring ex-
ceptional provisions, such as live stock,
for example, and perhaps perishable
property. In the Matter of Bills of Lad-
ing, 14 I. C. C. 346, 349.

(b) The Commission, in submitting
standard bills of lading, does not attempt
to indicate just what commodities are to
be excepted from their operation, nor to
determine the special provisions suited
to any excepted commodity. In the Mat-
ter of Bills of Lading, 14 I. C. C. 346, 349.

(c) The Commission, in submitting
standard bills of lading for Official Clas-
sification territory, expects carriers sub-
ject to the Act outside such territory to'
adopt the same to the fullest extent pos-



sible. In the Matter of Bills of Lading,
14 I. C. C. 346, 349.

(d) The approval of the standard bills
of lading by the Commission does not im-
ply aceptance by it of any construction
of the Carmack amendment at variance
with its apparent purpose and intent, nor
does such approval preclude it from pass-
ing independent judgment upon any pro-
vision in these bills of lading, which may
be drawn in question in future proceed-
ings. In the Matter of Bills of Lading,
14 I. C. C. 346, 350.

II. DUTY OF CARRIER TO ISSUE.

See Through Routes and Joint
Rates, 12.

3. Rail-and-Water Transportation.

See Export Rates, II; Foreign Com-
merce, 1 (f).

(a) There is no legal obligation on a
rail carrier to give a through bill of lad-
ing covering movement by water beyond
its line. Such practice is, however, of
great advantage to shippers, and if given
in the name of one boat line, should be
given in the name of others who are
similarly circumstanced. A railroad may
entirely destroy the export traffic of a
port by refusing to issue two bills of lad-
ing; and to say that it may exercise this
great power wantonly and arbitrarily is
contrary to the spirit and letter of the
Act. Mobile Chamber of Commerce v.
M. & O. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 417, 424, 425.

(b) If a rail carrier makes a rate and
issues a bill of lading for ship-side de-
livery at a port, that rate, and a similar
bill of lading, should be open to all who
conform to the reasonable conditions of
the carriers. A railroad cannot adopt a
policy or practice which will put its fa-
cilities and its rates at the exclusive
service of one line of steamships, or of
one set of shippers patronizing that line.
Mobile Chamber of Commerce v. M. & O.
R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 417, 428, 427.

4. At Transit Points.

(a) When carriers are parties to a
milling-in-transit privilege, it is proper
for the inbound carrier to issue and sign
the bills of lading for the outbound move-
ments, because, the records of the in-
Dound shipments being in its possession,
n no other way could the transit privi-
ege be protected against abuse. Broclr-
Rauch Mill & Elevator Co. v. St. L., I.
M. & S. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 651, 652.



76



BILLS OP LADING, 5 (a) (e)



5. One Lading for Several Shipments.

See Allowances, 14 (h); Cars and
Car Supply, 7; Demurrage, 6;
Minimums, $8 (b), (d), (e) ; Re-
frigeration, 3 (h); Tariffs, 7 (ee),

(ggg).

(a) Complainant shipped 169 barrels
of sugar from New Orleans, La., to Sioux
City, la.; 104 barrels were loaded into
one car and 65 into another, and one bill
of lading was taken for each car. Freight
charges were calculated uron a weignfc
of 38,361 Ibs. for the car containing 104
barrels, and upon the minimum carload
weight of 33,000 Ibs. for the car contain-
ing 65 barrels, the actual weight of which
was 24,205 Ibs. Complainant contended
that the charge upon the second car
should have been based upon the actual
weight. Rule 8 of the Western Classifi-
cation applied: "When the minimum car-
load weight or more of one article is
shipped in one day by one consigner to
one consignee covered by one bill of lad-
ing the established rate for a carload
shall apply on the entire lot, although it
may be less than two or more full car-
load lots ." HELD, the rule was in-
applicable because of complainant's
action in securing a bill of lading for
each car. Scudder v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 22
I. C. C. 60, 61.

(b) Complainant shipped sugar, New
Orleans, La., to Sioux City, la. He had
a sufficient number of barrels to make
more than one carload and less than two
carloads. He took two bills of lading
for the shipments and was assessed a
carload rate on one and the less-than-car-
load rate on the other. Western Classifi-
cation contained a rule as follows:
"When the minimum carload weight or
more of one article is shipped in one day,
by one consigner to one consignee, cov-
ered by one bill of lading, the established
rate for a carload shall apply on the en-
tire lot, although it may be less than two
or more full carload lots." HELD, under
the classification, to obtain the applica-
tion of the carload rate at the actual
weight of the part carload, the entire
consignment must move upon one bill of
lading. Complainant's action in secur-
ing a bill of lading for each car rendered
the rule inapplicable and each carload
became a separate shipment subject tJ
the prescribed minimum rate per car.
Reparation denied. Scudder v. T. & P.
Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 60.

(c) Two separate bills of lading were
taken out by complainant covering two
cars of machinery shipped on the same



day to the same consignee. Under rule
8 of the Western Classification, defend-
ants assessed charges thereon on the
basis of the minimum carload weight for
each, HELD, that under the rule the
established rate for a carload can only
apply on the entire lot when the ship-
ments are covered by one bill of lading,
that this rule having been considered and
approved in prior cases cannot be held
unreasonable, and the charges were
properly assessed. Goodman Mfg. Co. v.
C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 21 I. C. C. 583.

(d) Complainant had shipped to it
two carloads of news printing paper, Los
Angeles, Cal., to Grand Rapids, Wis.,
under a rate of 75c per 100 Ibs. The first
car weighed 51,000 Ibs., the second car
23,000 Ibs., shipped different days under
separate bills of lading. The minimum
weight for each car was 30,000 Ibs. Rule
8 of Transcontinental Freight Bureau tar-
iff I. C. C. 889, in force when shipments
were made, provided that when minimum
carload weight or more is shipped in one
day by one consignor to one consignee
covered by one bill of lading, the estab-
lished rate, for a carload shall apply on
the entire lot, although it may be less
than two or more full carload lots. The
consignor was notified of this rule, but
loaded the cars in the manner he did in-
stead of loading two cars to the full
minimum, or shipping them on the same
day under one bill of lading. HELD,
complainant not entitled to reparation on
second car on difference between actual
weight and minimum weight. Consoli-
dated Water Power Co. v. S. P., L. A. &
S. L. R. R. Co., 20 I. C. C. 169.

(e) Complainant shipped a steam
shovel from Coffeyville, Kan., to Toledo,
O. ( under two bills of lading, one cover-
ing the steam shovel on its own trucks,
and the other the crane, dipper and other
parts. The shovel on its own trucks,
weighing 66,200 Ibs., was assessed the
class rates of 33c per 100 Ibs., and the
parts, weighing 21,900 Ibs., were assessed
60c per 100 Ibs. on a minimum of 30,000
Ibs. The two bills of lading were is-
sued at the insistence of the carrier's
agent. The class E rates, under West-
ern Classification, was applicable to loco-
motives, extension pile drivers, log-load-
ing machines, portable steel-rail saws,
snowplows, steam wrecking cranes, der-
ricks, etc., hauled in train or on trucks