of the language which precedes it.
Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. R. R. Comm.,
171 Ind. 189, 210, 86 N. E. 328.
(ss) The construction of the Hepburn
Act, as amended by the Carmack
amendment, and the scope of its oper-
ation raise a Federal question, and as
to such question the state courts
will follow and are bound by the deci-
sions of the United States courts. But
contracts for reduced rates not being
affected by such law, no Federal ques-
tion arises and no Federal right is in-
volved, and hence the state courts are
free to apply their own rules to their
construction. McElvain v. Railroad,
151 Mo. App 126, 146, 131 S. W. 736.
(tt) An interstate common carrier
is free to exercise all its rights under
the common law to the full extent,
unless such exercise has been made
unlawful by the Interstate Commerce Act.
McElvain v. Railroad, 151 Mo. App.
126, 151, 131 S. W. 736.
(uu) Under the Interstate Commerce
Act as amended June 29, 1906, it ap-
pears that it was the purpose of Con-
gress to assume jurisdiction over the
entire subject-matter relative to inter-
state shipments from the time of the
origin of such shipment down to the
point where the shipment is entirely
at an end and its character as a trans-
action of interstate commerce ceases.
St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. State, 26
Okla. 62, 72, 107 P. 929.
(vv) Where the facts are such that
it is not clear that the conditions are
eo similar as to render the Act to Regu-
late Commerce or the rate published
thereunder inapplicable, such rate will
be held, in a civil proceeding, to con-
trol. Coeur d'Alene & S. Ry. Co. v.
U. P. R. R. Co. (Wash., 1908), 95 P.
Ml. TIME OF TAKING EFFECT.
(a) The law stands for what it
means from the date when it takes
effect and not from the date when it
:s construed by the Commission. Ordi-
narily the date of the announcement by
the Commission of its interpretation of a
particular provision is therefore of little
real importance. Liberty Mills v. L. &
N. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 182, 185.
(b) A statute passed to take effect at
a future date must be understood as
speaking from the time it goes into
operation, and not from the time of its
passage, and before the time of going
into effect no rights may be acquired
under it and no one is bound to regulate
his conduct according to its terms. Nic-
ola, .Stone & Myers Co. v. L. & N. R. R.
Co., 14 I. C. C. 199, 206.
(c) The legislative intent was to
make August 28, 1906, the effective date
of the Hepburn Act, which was approved
June 29, 1906. Nicola, Stone & Myers
Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C.
(a) A suit to enforce an order of
eparation entered by the Interstate
Commerce Commission brought under
the Interstate Commerce Act as amend-
ed June 29, 1906, is an action sounding
in tort for damages. Naylor & Co. v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 188 Fed. 860,
(b) Section 8 of the Act does not
have any relation to the jurisdiction of
the Commission. It creates a substan-
tive right of action to recover damages
for the violation by a carrier of some
provision of the Act, but leaves the
right enforceable only in the courts.
Joynes v. Penn. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C.
(c) The decisions of the United
States courts and the opinions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission con-
struing the Act to Regulate Commerce
have no application to intrastate ship-
ments. A. G. S. Ry. Co. v. McCleskey,
160 Ala. 630, 634, 49 So. 433.
(d) The Interstate Commerce Act is
a part of the law of the state of Mis-
rouri, and enforceable m its courts,
when rights under it or given by it arise
as incidents of a trial. McElvain v.
ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE, V (a) ADVANCED RATES
Railroad, 151 Mo. App. 126, 151, 131 S.
(a) The general rule of construction
is that a general statute will not re-
peal the provisions of a former one
which is special or particular unless
there is something in the law, or in
the course of legislation upon its sub-
ject-matter, that makes it manifest that
the legislature contemplated and in-
tended a repeal. The law does not
favor a repeal by implication, and where
it is possible to so construe the statute
as to maintain the integrity of both
it must be done. West End Improve-
ment Club v. O. & C. B. R. & B. Co.,
17 I, C. C. 239, 246.
(b) The law does not favor a repeal
by implication. It is only where there
is irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy
that the special or particular statute
falls under the repealing clause of the
general statute. West End Improvement
Club v. O. & C. B. R. & B. Co., 17
I. C. C. 239, 246.
(c) That Congress did not see fit
to alter the third and fourth sections
is highly persuasive that it was the
intention of that body to leave the
law and its practical working exactly as
it has been. City of Spokane v. N. P.
Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 376, 388.
(d) The amendments to the Inter-
state Commerce Act are to be treated,
as to matters occurring after the enact-
ment of the statute, as if they had been
in the original Act. State v. Adams Ex-
press Co., 171 Ind. 138, 141 85 N E.
337 and 966.
ACTIONS AT LAV/.
See Cars and Car Supply, 33; Dis-
crimination, 16; Courts, I- Special
See Allowances, 2 (e); Assorting
Packages; Bridge Tolls, I (a);
Cartage; Concentrating Rates and
Privileges (aa). Facilities and
Privileges, 10 (m); 21 (e); Im-
port Traffic, II (b): Precooling, II
(f); Refrigeration, 3 (f).
(a) Aii additional charge may be
made by a carrier when an additional
service is given. After the shipper pays
for team track delivery and does not re
ceive it, but asks instead and is given
side track deliery which costs the car-
rier no more, he may not be compelled
to pay an additional charge upon the as-
sumption that he has received a terminal
tram track service which has not been
given. A carrier may not so construct
its rates as to compel an extra charge
for like service. Associated Jobbers of
Los Angeles v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 18
I. C. C. 310, 318.
ADJACENT FOREIGN COUN-
See Through Routes and Joint Rates,
(a) Although mandamus will not lie
so as to interfere with the exercise of
its discretion by the Commission, it
will lie to compel the Commission to
take jurisdiction over carriers operating
between Alaska and the United St.ites
and between Alaska and adjacent for-
eign countries, where the Commission
has refused to do so pursuant to its
belief that the Interstate Con-merce Act
has conveyed upon it no authority over
such carriers. I. C. C. v. H. S. Co., 224
U. S/474, 484, 32 Sup. Ct. 556, 56 L. ed
(b) Cuba is not an "adjacent foreign
country," within the meaning of the Act.
The word "adjacent," as used in the Act
to modify the words "foreign country,"
would seem to mean adjacent in the
sense of the possibility of substantial
continuity of rails. Lykes Steamship
Line y. Commerc'al Union, 13 I. C. C
I. CONTROL AND REGULATION.
1. Jurisdiction of Commission.
(1) Inquiry into reason-
(2) Power to require ad-
(3) Prescribing minimum
(4) To suspend advance.
(5) To suspend reduc-
2. Limitation on power.
II. JUSTIFICATION OF INCREASE.
S3. Burden of proof.
ADVANCED RATES, 1 (1) (a) (b)
To avoid reducing
To equalize rates.
To preserve com-
On bona fide invest-
On unearned incre-
O n reproduct i o n
For permanent im-
All traffic will bear.
Cost of insurance.
7. Change in conditions.
(1) In general.
(2) Increased operating
(3) Impairment of credit.
(4) Cessation of compe-
(1) Continuance of prior
(2) Temporary reduction.
9. Concerted action.
10. Economy of management.
11. Scientific management.
12. Branch lines.
13. Detriment to shipper.
14. Benefit to industry.
15. Standard for judging ad-
16. Uniformity of advance.
IV. REASONABLENESS OF AD-
17. In gen-eral.
18. Circumstances and condi-
(1) Low receipts per ton
1,2) Water competition.
(3) Heavy and uniform
(4) Low-grade commod-
(5) Ratio of rate to
(6) To gain import duty.
(7) Rates in like terri-
(8) Circuitous route.
(9) Use of commodity.
(10) Increased divisions.
V. DISCRIMINATION THROUGH AD-
19. In general.
VI. REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE.
22. In general.
I. CONTROL AND REGULATION.
1. Jurisdiction of Commission.
See Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 1 (ee), 9 (w).
1. (1) Inquiry into Reasonableness.
(a) The final determination of the
question of the reasonableness or just-
ness of a proposed increase in interstate
rates is one for the Interstate Commerce
Commission and not for the courts. Ar-
lington Heights Fruit Co. v. S. P. Co., 175
Fed. 141, 142.
(aa) The Commission is not con-
cerned with the motives of the carriers
which lead to an increase in rates,
provided the rates which it is proposed
to establish are reasonable. It does
not sit as a supreme traffic manager
for the railroads of the country. Con-
sideration of the policy which the
railroads may pursue is not a matter
delegated to it so long as such policy
does not infringe upon the prohibitions
of the law. In Re Advances on Coal
to Lake Ports, 22 I. C. C. 604, 612.
(b) Defendants filed tariffs increasing
all the class rates and about one-half of
the commodity rates in Official Classifica-
tion territory. Justification presented by
the carriers was -the want of additional
revenue, and the question presented to
the Commission was whether defendants
were justified in laying the additional
transportation burden irpon the public
for the purpose of obtaining greater
net revenue, HELD, strictly speaking, the
ommission has no jurisdiction to hear
and determine that question; that it
has no authority as such to say what
amount the defendants shall earn, nor
to establish a schedule of rates which
will permit them to earn that amount.
ADVANCED RATES, 1 (1) (c) 1 (5) (a)
The authority of the Commission is lim
ited to inquiring into the reasonable-
ness of a particular rate or rates and
establishing that rate or practice whicl
is found lawful in place of the one
condemned as unlawful. In Re Advances
in Rates Eastern Case, 20 I. C. C. 24?
(c) While the authority of the Com
mission only extends to the passing up
on the reasonableness of the rate pre
sented for its consideration it is not con
fined to single rates. Any number o^
rates may be embraced in the same com
plaint and the duty of the Commissior
is to consider and pass upon all thosf
so presented. When there is involved
the propriety of advances which affec
(he entire rate fabric within Official
Classification territory embracing one
half the tonnage and one-half the freight
revenues of the whole country, and wher
that advance is justified mainly upon tlu
ground, not of commercial conditions, bu;
by lack -of adequate revenue upon the
present rate basis, the Commission must
determine the fundamental question. Ii
Re Advances in Rates Eastern Case, 2<
I. C. C. 243, 248.
(d) The restriction of the Commas
mission's order upon flexibility in rate,
established by it is inhibitive only of ai
advance within the prescribed period. I]
the carriers participating in a join!
through rate desire to reduce or increase
the separately established local rates vir-
tue same route, the order of the Commis
sion requiring the maintenance of a join:
through route is no bar to their so do
ing. Michigan Buggy Co. v. G. R. & I
Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 297, 299.
1. (2) Power to Re -ire Advance.
(a) The Commission has no author-
ity to compel the advance of a rate for
the purpose of removing discrimination
In Re Advances on Fresh Meats, 23 I.
C. C. 652, 655.
(b) The contention that there ex-
ists no power anywhere to let a shipper
into a market by advancing the rate
to another shipper does not appear to
be sound. Boileau v. P. & L. E. R. R
Co., 22 I. C. C. 640, 654.
(c) The Commission has no power to
require the increase of a rate. Mer-
chants' Dispatch Storage Co. v. I. C. R.
R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 98, 102. Kansas City
Transportation Bureau v. A. T. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 491, 497.
1. (3) Prescribing Minimum Rate.
(a) The Commission has no authority
to prescribe a minimum rate. Percy Kent
Co. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 15
I. C. C. 439, 442.
1. (4) To Suspend Advance.
(a) The Commission is not empowered
to suspend the operation of a schedule
after it has gone into effect. Re-hearing
denied. In Re Investigation of Rates on
Lumber, 21 I. C. C. 16, 17.
1. (5) To Suspend Reduction.
(a) The Commission was called upon
to postpone the effectiveness of certain re-
ductions in rates because discriminatory
against complainant. They consisted of re-
duced proportional rates on packing-
house products and fresh meats from Ft.
Worth, Tex., to St. Louis, Mo., on fresh
meats from SS^c to 35 J /e, and on pack-
ing-house products from 33c to 32 %c.
As these commodities from Ft. Worth
moved largely to points beyond St. Louis
and these proportional rates were used in
combination to make up through rates
to such points beyond, the effect was to
reduce the existing rates from Ft. Worth
to northern and eastern points generally.
The contention was made that these rates
discriminated against Oklahoma City,
Okla. The present differential in favor
of Oklahoma City of 7c per 100 Ibs. on
fresh meat and 4 Me per 100 Ibs. on pack-
ing-house products on shipments to
points in Central Freight Ass'n terri-
tory appeared to- be an offhand adjust-
ment of a trade and transportation dis-
pute of which the Commission had no
means of determining its fairness or cor-
rectness on the present hearing, and com-
plainants requested the reductions to*be
postponed until the general investigation
now before the Commission be finished
HELD, the Commission decides that it
has the power to suspend reductions of
rate in any case where such suspension
will operate to prevent an apparent dis-
crimination. However, a prima facie case
clearly and affirmatively persuasive
should be presented before the power to
suspend is exercised. This, not having
been done, the complaint is dismissed.
In Re Suspension of Rates on Packing-
House Products, 21 I. C. C. 68, 70.
ADVANCED RATES, 2 (a) 3 (aa)
2. Limitation on Power.
(a) The railroad rates of this country
have not been constructed, as a rule, up-
on any scientific basis, and this is es-
pecially true of the interstate rates. The
traffic officials who have established
these rates have generally done so with-
out any special inquiry as to the total
amount of revenue which ought to be
produced, or as to the part of that burden
which a particular commodity ought tc
bear. This Commission is called upon
to deal with rates as they exist, and in
so doing it ordinarily considers them not
from the revenue standpoint but rather
from the commercial and traffic stand-
point. At the same time it is now the
settled law that there is a limit below
which the revenue of railroads cannot be
reduced by public authority, and if there
were no such constitutional limitations
it would nevertheless behoove every reg
ulating body to permit the existence oi
such rate when possible, as would yield
just earnings to the railway. The ques
tion of revenue is therefore fundamental
and ever present in all considerations
as to the reasonableness of railroad rates,
although it may not be, and seldom is
where single rates are presented, the
controlling question. In Re Advances in
Rates Eastern Case, 20 I. C. C. 243, 248.
II. JUSTIFICATION OF INCREASE.
3. Burden of Proof.
See Evidence, I, 1 (a), (aa), (b),
(k), 29 (f) ; Through Routes and
Joint Rates, 4 (e).
(a) By withdrawing its concurrence
the St. L. & Hannibal Ry. put thc-
Clover Leaf R. R. in such a position that
it was compelled to cancel the joint
through rates which it had theretofore
published on coal of 82c per ton, from
certain points on its line in Illinois,
including more particularly the mines at
Panama to Hannibal and other destina
tions in Missouri on the line of the St. L.
& Hannibal Ry. If this rate was withdrawn
there would be available to shippers
only the combination of local rates un-
der which it is clear the traffic could not
move. HELD, as the withdrawal of the
through rates leaving in operation the
lowest combination of local rates would
increase the charges on coal moving
over that route, the defendants were un
der the burden of justifying their course
and in showing that the resulting charges
would be just and reasonable. No effort
having made to do this and no substan-
tial reason given for the cancellation of
the joint through rates, the present
through routes^ and joint rates are or-
dered maintained. In Re Advances in
Rates on Soft Coal, 23 L C. C. 51S.
(aa) In Hood & Sons v. Delaware &
Hudson Co., 17 L C. C. 15, the Com-
mission found that for the transporta-
tion of fluid milk from Poultney and
West Pawlett, Vt, and Cambridge. Gran-
ville, Middle Granville, Salem and Shu-
shan, N. Y;, to Jagle Bridge, N. Y.,
destined to Boston, Mass., a rate of $16
per car of 250 cans of 40 quarts each,
and Qy 2 c per can for any excess over
250 cans, was a reasonable carload rate.
The defendant sought to advance the
rate to 9c per can of 40 quarts each
based on a car minimum of 250 cans,
excess at the same rate per can on
Boston shipments of milk from the
points mentioned to Eagle Bridge. From
Poultney to Boston the distance is
213 miles. The distance from Eagle
Bridge to New York via Albany is 290
miles. The carload rate to New York
was 28. 8c per can of 40 quarts. For
the haul from Eagle Bridge to Albany,
a distance of about 142 miles, defend-
ant got 50 per cent of the through
rate to New York, or 14. 4c per can
of 40 quarts, which is equivalent to
3.6 mills per quart. For the 45 miles
from Eagle Bridge to Poultney it is
equivalent to 1.13 mills per quart, and
deducting the terminal charges on New
York milk of 2c per 100 Ibs. would
leave a net rate of about 1.07 . mills
per quart. Under the proposed advance
the rate on cc -nplainant's milk would be
equivalent to 2.25 mills per quart from
Poultney and intermediate points to
Eagle Bridge. Between Providence, R.
I., and Boston, Mass., a distance of 45
miles over the N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R.,
the rate was $17.24 per car, the equiva-
lent of 6.9c per can, or 1.7 mills per
quart. Other instances in nearby terri-
tory were similar. 'The advanced rate
proposed was $22.50 per car, or 2.25 mills
per quart. HELD, that the proposed
increased rate is unreasonable and un-
just, but that there is probable justifi-
cation for an advance in the present
rate to $17.25 per car of 250 cans of
40 quarts each, and 7c per can for any
excess over 250 cans. In Re Advances
in Rate for the Transportation of Fluid
Milk, 23 I. C. C. 500.
ADVANCED RATES, 3 (b) 5 (a)
(b) After January 1, 1910, under the
15th section of the Act, the burden of
proof to show an increased rate just and'
reasonable rests with the carriers. Citi-
zens of Somerset v. Wash. Ry. & Elec.
Co., 22 I. C. C. 187, 188. Davis Sewing
Machine Co. v. P. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
22 I. C. C. 291. In Re Advances on Iron
and Steel Articles, 22 I. C. C. 486. In Re
Advances on Grain, 21 I. C. C. 22, 35. In
Re Advances on Locomotives, 21 I. C. C.
103, 111. In Re Advances in Rates by
Carriers Operating between the Missis-
sippi and Missouri Rivers, 21 I. C. C.
546, 555; Ohio Allied Milk Products v.
Erie R. R. Co., 21 I. C. C. 522, 528; U. S.
Leather Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 323,
325; Victor Mfg. Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 21 I. C.
C. 222, 226.
(c) Where the cancellation of joint
through rates increases the total rate
from point of origin to destination the
burden is on the carrier to prove the
reasonableness of the increased rates.
In Re Advances on Lumber and Forest
Products, 21 I. C. C. 455, 456.
(d) Carriers running west of Chicago
increased some 200 commodity rates. It
was urged that the Interstate Commerce
Act as amended should be given the same
construction as the English act and that
the burden only rested on the carriers
to prove the reasonableness of the in-
crease in the rate, and not the increased
rate as a whole, and that the purpose of
Congress was to regard all rates in ef-
fect on Jan. 1, 1910, as the maxima which
could not be increased until it was shown
that there was reason and necessity for
the specific increase made. HELD, it is
clear from the language of the statute as
well as its history that the purpose of
Congress differed from the purpose of
Parliament; that Congress did not intend
to prescribe that any existing rates were
reasonable; and that it was the duty of
the Commission to deal with the in-
creased rate and not the increase in the
rate; that the Commission may continue
in effect the present lower rates; or
may reduce the existing rates. In Re
Advances in Rates Western Case, 20 I.
C. C, 307, 311, 314.
(e) The English statute of 1894 pro-
vides that the carrier shall justify the
"increase of the rate." The Interstate
Commerce Act provides that the burden
of proof shall be upon the carrier to
show that the "increased rate" is just
and reasonable. The English act creates
a presumption that the rates in effect on
Dec. 31, 1892, were reasonable rates, and
the justice of any increase must be tried
by that standard. The Interstate Com-
merce Act does not intend to enact that
all rates in effect on Jan. 1, 1910, are
just and reasonable, upon the contrary
it is open to any shipper to attack such
a rate as unjust and unreasonable. The
only effect of the Act is to cast in cer-
tain cases the burden of proof upon the
carrier. In Re Advances in Rates East-
ern Case, 20 I. C. C. 243, 255.
(f) A rate which has been in force
for a long period of years and with re-
spect to which commercial conditions
have been adjusted which rate has pre-
sumably afforded a reasonable return to
the carriers may not be materially ad-
vanced without imposing upon the car-
riers the burden of justifying the in-
crease. Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs.
Ass'n v. N. P. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 23, 39.
(g) When certain rates have been in
force for a long period of time and busi-
ness conditions have become well set-
tled thereon and the carrier is earning a
liberal income and paying liberal divi-
dends while expending large sums in im-
provements and renewals, a material in-
crease in those rates unaccompanied by
a corresponding decrease in other rates
places upon the carrier the obligation of
justifying the increase. Oregon & Wash-
ington Lumber Mfrs. Ass'n v. U. P. R. R.
Co., 14 I. C. C. 1, 13.
(a) A group of carriers cannot cast
the responsibility of maintaining the bur-
den of establishing the reasonableness of
certain advances upon a single carrier
and claim the benefit of whatever the
case made by that carrier may establish.
In Re Advances on Coal to Lake Ports,
22 I. C. C. 604, 611.
5. Right to Advance Rates.
(a) Within certain limits it may be
the right of the Commission to consider
the question of advanced rates in Official
Classification territory as one of public
policy and not one of strict legal right.
If the true interest of the whole com-
munity requires it the railroads might
perhaps be allowed fair earnings with
which to aid their properties in addition
to the payment of return to their stock-
holders even though there is not strict
requirement of law which commands it.
ADVANCED RATES, 5 (b) (d)
In Re Advance in Rates Eastern Case,
20 I. C. C. 243, 266.
(b) It is not probable that increased
rates will be necessary in the future to
carriers in Official Classification territory.
In Re Advance in Rates Eastern Case,
20 I. C. C. 243, 305.
(c) The ordinary considerations of
justice require that money invested in
railroads by invitation of the govern-
ment should be allowed a fair return.
This does not mean that the Commission