were not shippers on their lines. (Clem-
ents & Lane Comm'rs, dissenting.)
Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co.
v. I. C. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 98, 104, 106.

4. Concentration.

See Concentrating Rates and Priv-
ileges.

(a) The policy of denying to Shreve-
port similar privileges in the concen-
tration of cotton as are accorded to
Texas cities is discriminatory and the
carriers will be ordered to make appli-
cable at Shreveport whatever lawful
practices obtain in this connection on
Texas points on defendants' lines under
like conditions. Meredith v. St. L. S.
W. Ry. Co., 23 I. C. C. 31, 48.

(b) Manufacturers of cottonseed
products at Alexandria and Natchitoches,
La., attacked the concentration charges
exacted on shipments of cottonseed from
Louisiana points to Alexandria and
Natchitoches of 3c per 100 Ibs., added
to the local rates governing the cotton-
seed from points of origin to the mill.
When the outbound shipments were not
tendered to the same carrier that hauled
the raw product in, the concentration
charge of 3c was forfeited, but if the
product was reshipped over the line
of the originating carrier the concen-
tration charge was refunded. Many
points at which there was a market for
products were located on lines from
which no seed was obtained. The con-
centration charge was not assessed at
points where there was absence of
competition between carriers. HELD,
the Commission does not condemn rea-
sonable non-discriminatory and properly
applied transit rates and privileges, or
a reasonable and non-discriminatory
charge for the additional service per-
formed in connection with a transit
privilege, but it is unreasonable for de-
fendants to add to their reasonable
local rates any sum as a penalty to
be forfeited if the outbound shipment
does not move over the same line
which hauled the inbound shipment, and
It is also unjustly discriminatory to
assess on interstate or export traffic
concentration charges at points where
there is competition between carriers
different from or greater than those



which they contemporaneously assess
at non-competitive points. Red River
Oil Co. v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 23 I. C
C. 438, 447.

(c) Paynesville and Alexandria,
Minn., are on the line of defendant
about 83 miles and 137 miles respect-
ively west of Minneapolis, and are con-
centrating points for butter and eggs
produced in the adjoining farming dis-
tricts. From these points defendant
maintained a proportional rate of 20c
to Manistique, Mich., limited to butter
and eggs that have come into those
markets over the rails of the defendant.
The 40c rate from both points is an
open proportional rate to Manistique
applicable on through shipments of but-
ter and eggs originating at those points
or that have come in over the rails
of other carriers from more distant
points of production. The defendant
had similar rates in effect from the
Twin Cities subject to the same condi-
tions. It appeared that little, if any,
traffic moves from Alexandria and
Paynesville under the 40c rate and on
the other hand very little of the traffic
from the Twin Cities enjoyed the benefit
of the 20c rate, for the reason that
the larger part of the butter and eggs
concentrated at the Twin Cities comes
in over other lines and therefore takes
the 40c rate to Manistique. HELD,
in so far as the record throws any
light on the matter there appears no
reason why the total through charges
from a given producing point on the line
of defendant to Manistique on a ship-
ment destined beyond should be greater
when the traffic is concentrated at the
Twin Cities than the total through
charges based on Alexandria or Paynes-
ville. St. Paul Board of Trade v. M.
St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co., 19 I. C.
C. 285, 288.

(d) The defendant is entitled to ad-
just its rates in such manner that the
butter and eggs produced in volume
at distant points on its line may reach
the eastern markets at a reasonable
through charge. With this end in view
and if the transit privilege is properly
policed so as to avoid abuses, the
Commission sees no reason why the
defendant may not make a distinction
in its rates between butter and eggs
that originate at the concentration
points, so far as its line is concerned,
and butter and eggs upon which it has
had a haul into the concentration



FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 4 (e) 7 (b)



391



points; but it can do this only under
proper tariff provisions connecting the
inbound with the outbound movement,
and thus fixing the through charges from
the producing point. To hold otherwise
would require it to exclude from consid-
eration the rates and other conditions
under which other lines may bring
butter and eggs to these points, and
would put it beyond the power of the
defendant so to adjust its own rates
as to enable butter and eggs produced
on its line north and west of the con-
centration points to compete at destina-
tion with butter and eggs produced at
the concentration points or which may
have been brought in under favorable
terms over other lines. St. Paul Board
of Trade v. M. St. P. & St. Ste. M. Ry.
Co., 19 I. C. C. 285, 288.

(e) Any attempt on the part of a
carrier to connect outbound interstate
movements with inbound movements to
a concentrating point under state rates
not on file with the Interstae Commerce
Commission is unlawful. St. Paul Board
of Trade v. M. St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry.
Co., 19 I. C. C. 285, 289.

(f) A lower proportional rate estab-
lished after a separate movement from
a concentration point is not applicable
where the movement out was more than
a year prior to the establishment of
such a rate. Central Lumber Co. v. C.
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 495.

5. Cooperage and Bailing.

(a) Cooperage and bailing do not
affect the rate as such; they are simply
special services performed by the carrier
in transit when it is necessary to pro-
tect the shipment from* damage or loss,
and such services neither increase nor
diminish the rate, but are charges en-
tirely apart from it. Rail and River
Coal Co. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 14 I. C.
C. 86, 90.

6. Dumping and Trimming.

(a) The regulation of charges for
"trimming" or leveling coal on vessels,
loaded from the piers of coal-carrying
railroads, is within the jurisdiction of the
Commission, when the railroads do per-
form this service irrespective of wheth-
er or not they may be compelled to per-
form it. New England Coal and Coke
Co. v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 398,
401.



(b) The rates of 3c and 4%c per'
ton at Virginia and Maryland ports for
the "trimming" or leveling of coal in
the holds of ships were attacked as un-
reasonable. Prior to 1907 the charge
was 7c for all steamers. Complainant's
self-trimming vessels appeared and a
reduction to the present rates was
secured. These charges were lower
than at any other port, either foreign
or domestic. An exhibit by one defend-
ant showed the cost of dumping and
trimming to be 4.5c. Another defend-
ant filed an exhibit showing the aggre-
gate cost for dumping and trimming
1,604,495 tons of coal to be $185,377.56.
Of this amount $34,637.31 was regarded
as the cost of trimming, thus giving an
average cost of 2.16c per ton, and even
this was not fairly representative for
self-trimming vessels. HELD, that a
charge of 3c for trimming is not un-
reasonable, but 4.5c for dumping is to
the extent it exceeds 3c. New England
Coal & Coke Co. v. N. & W. Ry. Co.,
22 I. C. C. 398, 404.

7. Free Back-haul.

(a) A free back-haul in connection
with a milling-in-transit privilege, where
it results in discrimination, must either
be discontinued or made effective in
favor of the other milling points discrim-
inated against. Celina Mill & Elevator
Co. v. St. L. S. W. Ry. Co., 15 I. C.
C. 138, 143.

(b) The Frisco system runs from the
wheat fields of Kansas, Oklahoma and
Nebraska in a southerly direction
through Sherman, Celina and Carrollton,
Tex., to Fort Worth. Celina is 28 miles
south of Sherman and 27 miles north of
Carrollton. The Cotton Belt railroad
runs from Sherman southeasterly to
Commerce, Tex. Another branch of
the Cotton Belt extends north from Fort
Worth to Carrollton and thence in
an easterly direction to Commerce.
Celina is therefore located on a base
of a triangle whose vertices are Sher-
man, Carrollton and Commerce, and
whose sides are formed by the two
branches of the Cotton Belt. Complain-
ant flour millers at Celina demanded a
milling-in-transit privilege at that point
on wheat originating in Kansas, Okla-
homa and Nebraska, ground at Celina
and destined to points to the south-
east on the Cotton Belt and demanded a
free back-haul of the flour from Ce-
lina to Sherman. Celina was in the



392



FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 8 (a) 9 (a)



center of the wheat fields. Complainant
obtained his supply of wheat locally,
and chose Celina for its ' geographical
advantage in this respect. For some
years a charge had been made for the
back-haul from Celina and Sherman;
for a short time it was 7-10c, later 1.4c
and more recently 3c per 100 Ibs. Since
the filing of the complaint it was re-
duced to 2c. The 2c charge yielded for
the haul of 56 miles a per ton mile
revenue only slightly above 7 mills,
whereas the per ton mile revenue on a
typical haul of 857 miles from Kansas
to Texas points under a milling-in-tran-
sit rate was about 8 mills. HELD, that
although the defendants might volun-
tarily establish a free back-haul, the
Commission could not compel them to
do so, or to accept any rate less than
a reasonable one; that the back-haul
rate exacted was not unreasonable; that
complainant was entitled to a through
rate from Celina over the Frisco and
Cotton Belt lines through Carrollton to
points on the line of the Cotton Belt west
of Commerce, where the mileage via Car-
rollton was not greater than the mileage
via Sherman; and that intervening mill-
ers at Fort Worth were apparently en-
titled to a back-haul service at reason-
able rates from Fort Worth through
Sherman to enable them to market their
flour at points on the Cotton Belt. Ce-
lina Mill & Elevator Co. v. St. L. S. W.
Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 138, 141, 144.

8. Free Storage.

(a) Competition at New York justi-
fies a longer free time for unloading of
flour than at Philadelphia. Brey v. P.
R. R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 497.

(b) On shipments of flour upon the
domestic rates to the ports of Phila-
delphia and New York, defendants al-
lowed four days' free storage in Phila-
delphia, while ten days were allowed
in Jersey City, when destined to New
York, and three days additional to that
city, with one additional day for lighter-
age from Jersey City to the New York
docks, thus making substantially four-
teen days from the time the flour ar-
rived at Jersey City to the time of de-
livery. Other carriers at New York,
competing with defendants, had refused
to reduce the free storage time at New
York, but these carriers did not enter
Philadelphia. Under the pleadings, the
sole question was, whether Philadel-
phia was discriminated against, as com-



pared with New York, and no question
was raised as to the reasonableness of
the free storage time at either city.
HELD, on account of competition Phil-
adelphia was not unduly discriminated
against. Brey v. Penn. R. R. Co., 16 I.
C. C. 497, 500-501.

(c) Defendants on merchandise from
Buffalo and other eastern shipping
points by boat line to Duluth or Su-
perior, Wis., and thence by rail to
points beyond Duluth, allowed freight
storage in their warehouses at Duluth
and Superior from the time of the close
to the time of the opening of navigation.
At the end of the freight storage time,
merchants at St. Paul or Minneapolis
might order goods remaining in the
warehouse to be sent forward and the
same were transported by defendants at
the balance of the through rate from
eastern points of origin. Duluth mer-
chants at the end of the free storage
time received the unsold remnants of
their goods at the lake port and were
compelled to pay storage on goods so
received for the time they had been in
the warehouse and also dockage and
switching charges. St. Paul and Minne-
apolis jobbers were allowed to order
goods forward from the warehouses from
time to time during the winter to met
business requirements. Complainants
at Duluth alleged that this practice de-
stroyed Duluth's natural advantage of
location. Similar privileges were ex-
tended by defendants' competitors at
Milwaukee, Manitowoc, Green Bay and
other points. Defendants were com-
pelled to extend such privileges in order
to share the business. HELD, the privi-
leges were not unlawful, since the in-
land jobbing center by reason of its
location at a point where the competi-
tion of several lake ports operated,
gained this privilege as an advantage
of its location. Commercial Club of
Duluth v. N. P. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 288,
291.

9. Grain Doors.

(a) Grain and lumber are not com-
petitive articles, and the fact that extra
doors are provided for grain shipments
is quite insufficient to establish a charge
of undue discrimination against shippers
of lumber on open cars who are re-
quired to furnish stakes, binders and
racks. National Wholesale Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. A. C. L. R. R. Co.,
14 I. C. C. 154, 163.



FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 10 (a) (j)



10. Loading, Unloading, Bracing, etc.

See Advanced Rates, 8 (1) (i);
Classification, 13; Evidence, 63
(a), (e), 65; Facilties and
Privileges, 17 (d), (f ) ; Tariffs, 4
(L); Terminal Facilities, 4 (c) ;
Track Storage, II (a); Transporta-
tion, 10, 12 (f).

(a) Any charge by defendants for
readjusting a load of piling or poles,
made necessary by shifting, improper
loading or heavy grades, must be pro-
vided for by proper tariff rule. Cali-
fornia Pole & Piling Co. v. S. P. Co., 22
I. C. C. 507, 509.

(b) A lower rate to a large shipper
providing facilities for prompt unloading
than accorded to a small competitor
unable to provide such facilities would
constitute unjust discrimination. In Re
Restricted Rates, 20 I. C. C. 426, 435.

(c) Where the tariff provides that
during certain seasons of the year re-
frigerator cars will not be furnished
individual shippers unless loaded to 10,-
000 Ibs. minimum and contains another
rule that an unloading charge will be
assessed against separate shippers using
a car for a consolidated shipment, it is
unreasonable to assess an unloading
charge against that shipper who orders
a car and loads it to the minimum,
even though other shippers subsequent-
ly from the same shipping point also
load into the car which then moves as a
consolidated shipment. Davies v. I. C
R. R. Co., 19 I. C. C. 3.

(cc) As long as no discrimination
exists, the Commission will decline to
require a carrier to furnish a car shed
under which vegetables could be loaded
without damage from the weather. Pon-
chatoula Farmers' Ass'n v. I. C. R. R.
Co., 19 I. C. C. 513, 515.

(d) Defendants' tariffs provided that
they might load or unload carload
shipments at any time for any shipper
at a specified additional charge to. that
of transportation or might refrain from
so doing, the service to be performed
at the option of the carrier. HELD,
such provision was discriminatory and
unlawful. Schultz-Hansen Co. v. S P.
Co., 18 I. C. C. 234, 237.

(dd) It is not improper for a railroad
to make a reasonable charge for un-
loading carload freight, provided the
service is clearly stated in the tariff, as
consignees are generally required to un-
load carload freight. Schultz-Hansen
Co. v. S. P. Co., 18 I. C. C. 234, 235.



(e) Services rendered by carriers in
loading and unloading a carload of
freight and charges for such services
are analogous to other terminal services
and charges such as demurrage, milling-
in transit, storage, switching, etc. Schultz-
Hansen Co. v. S. P. Co., 18 I. C. C. 234,
237.

(f) Loading carload freight by the
carrier means the performance by it of
services which the shipper ordinarily
performs, consisting of taking the freight
from a wagon, platform or warehouse
and stowing it in the car for shipment;
and unloading consists of taking the
freight from the car and placing it on
a wagon or platform or in a warehouse.
Merely rendering assistance to shippers
in making car door delivery and in re-
ceiving freight at the car door does not
constitute unloading and loading.
Schultz-Hansen Co. v. S. P. Co., 18 I.
C. C. 234, 238.

(g) Under a tariff specifying a
charge to be exacted by the carrier for
loading and unloading in addition to
the transportation charge, the carriers
cannot lawfully exact a charge for
merely bringing the goods to the door in
unloading, and receiving them at the car
door in loading, since such a tariff pro-
vision does not cover that kind of
service. Schultz-Hansen Co. v. S. P.
Co., 18 I. C. C. 234, 237.

(h) Where a specified charge by the
carrier for loading and unloading is a
reasonable one, it is excessive for serv-
ices rendered by the carrier merely in
making car-door delivery and in receiv-
ing freight at the car door. Schultz-
Hansen Co. v. S. P. Co., 18 I. C. C.
234, 238.

(i) Throughout the country loading
and unloading carload freight is consid-
ered extra service if performed by car-
riers. Schultz-Hansen Co. v. S. P. Co.,
18 I. C. C. 234, 239.

(j) For many years defendant car-
riers at San Francisco made car-door
delivery of continental package freight
in carloads, and received carload ship-
ments of package freight to continental
points at the door without charge. On
December 1, 1906, they discontinued
such free assistance. Charges for such
assistance were collected during this
period on shipments from and to Ne-
vada, New Mexico and Arizona. De-
fendant S. P. Co. since 1872 required in



394



FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 10 (k) (r)



its tariffs that shippers should load
and unload. Despite these privileges,
for a period of some thirty years the
carriers at San Francisco were accus-
tomed to furnish assistance in loading
and unloading transcontinental carload
package freight. Carload freight mov-
ing by the Sun Set Gulf route from
New York to Galveston and thence by
rail to San Francisco was until recent
years broken up in transit and the
packages distributed through different
cars. As a result, it was necessary
for the carriers to assist in unloading
and defendant carriers were compelled
to adopt this practice. This situation
ceased in recent years and freight now
reaches San Francisco in unbroken car-
load lots. HELD, on account of these
changed conditions defendants were not
obliged to continue this free assistance
in loading and unloading despite their
long-continued practices in this respect,
and defendants were justified in making
reasonable charge for any service over
and above transportation and delivery.
Schultz-Hansen Co. v. S. P. Co., 18 I.
C. C. 234, 239.

(k) Competition at certain points
may justify a carrier in rendering as-
sistance in loading and unloading car-
load freight while refusing to do so
at another. Utica Traffic Bureau v.
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 18 I. C. C.
271, 272.

(1) Defendant's tariffs formerly pro-
vided that owners should load and un-
load freight except that the carriers re-
served the right to load and unload at
their convenience. Later the tariff was
amended eliminating the exception and
defendants gradually ceased giving as-
sistance in unloading to complainant
merchants at Utica, N. Y. On account
of competition they did, however, render
some assistance in loading and unload-
ing at New York City, Yonkers and
other points. HELD, the rule as amend-
ed was not unreasonable nor did the
practice of defendants at the other cit-
ies constitute unjust discrimination.
Utica Traffic Bureau v. N. Y. C. & H.
R. R. R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 271, 274.

(m) Loading, furnishing material and
placing in cars is an additional service
for which carriers are entitled to re-
ceive reasonable compensation. Davies
v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 540.

(n) Defendant charged for loading,
stripping and bracing carloads of to-



matoes, strawberries and cabbages
shipped from Gibson and Humboldt,
Tenn., to Chicago, rates of $10, $8 and
$7 per car respectively. The evidence
indicated these charges to be less than
the actual cost of the service to the
carrier. Under these charges, however,
the total charges for the carload ship-
ments were larger than on less-than-
carload shipments, no charge in the
latter case being made for loading and
bracing. HELD, the charges for load-
ing, stripping and bracing complained
of were not unreasonable; but that the
carload and less-than-carload rates should
be adjusted so as to avoid the existing
anomalous situation. Davies v. L. & N.
R. R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 540, 542, 543.

(o) Providing a place where con-
signments can be handled, and in as-
sorting into lots packages marked with
names of several dealers to whom they
are consigned is a thing of value for
which the shipper may be required to
pay. Davies v. I. C. R. R. Co., 17 I. C.
C. 186, 188.

(p) The Penn. R. R. gave an unload-
ing service and furnished facilities at
its coal terminals at Baltimore, which
rendered it impracticable for a shipper
not on its line to deal in coal from
the Alden, Pa., district. These terminal
facilities consisted of chutes and bins,
which it rented to the coal dealers of
Baltimore at an annual rental. These
terminals adjoined its main tracks and
coal was switched into them and there
delivered on the through rate, no extra
charge being made for the delivery.
No coal dealers could engage profitably
in the selling of Alden coal without
the benefit of such service. The Penn.
R. R. refused to furnish such a yard
and service to complainant coal deal-
er. HELD, such discrimination was un-
lawful and must cease. Enterprise Fuel
Co. v. Penn. R. R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 219,
224.

(q) Staking a load of lumber on an
open car is in reality a part of the
operation of loading. National Whole-
sale Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. A. C.
L. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 154, IbO.

(r) Where it is practically impossible
for commission men handling hay to
build storehouses at the railroad yards,
and it would increase the cost of hand-
ling the hay from $10 to $15 per car if
the same were unloaded and hauled to
storehouses at a distance, railroads can-



FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 10 (s) 12 (a)



395



not require commission men to give
up the use of such cars for storage
purposes and supply storehouses. N. Y.
Hay Exchange Ass'n v. Penn. R. R. Co.,
14 I. C. C. 178, 182.

(s) Where a course of business has
grown up with the permission and en-
couragement of a railway which allows
commodities to remain for storage pur-
poses in cars, and which practice is not
in itself vicious but rather in the inter-
est of economy, such fact ought to be
taken into account in determining to
what extent penalties in the way of
demurrage charges should be inflicted.
N. Y. Hay Exchange Ass'n v. Penn. R.
R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 178, 185.

(t) Whether the shipper or the car-
rier should load and unload commodities
depends not upon whether the commod-
ity is put up in packages, but upon the
nature of the commodity itself, or,
rather, the manner in which it is
handled. Wholesale Fruit & Produce
Ass'n v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 14 I. C.
C. 410, 418.

(u) In determining" whether the car-
rier or the shipper is bound to load and
unload freight, the question must be de-
cided with respect to each commodity,
the physical conditions existing at the
points of loading and unloading, and the
previous practice of the carrier. Whole-
sale Fruit & Produce Ass'n v. A. T. &
S. F. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 410, 419.

(v) The I. C. R. R., having provided
at Chicago a fruit house for handling
fruits and vegetables to avoid the liabil-
ity of freezing in the delivery of the
same, may impose a reasonable charge
for handling such products through that
house. Wholesale Fruit & Produce Ass'n
v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C.
410, 420.

(w) The furnishing by an interstate
carrier of bulkheads with cars for the
transportation of grain does not consti-
tute the granting of the "privileges or
facilities" which are required to be pub-
lished with the Interstate Commerce
Commission by section 6 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act; and a shipper,
where the carrier fails to furnish bulk-
heads, may therefore recover in an action
at law in a state court for the expense