of the rate via Chicago. The rates via
Chicago to St. Paul and Minneapolis and
points in Minnesota and Wisconsin were
30^c. Via St. Louis the rate from Pitts-
burg to St. Paul was 36c, via Indianap-
olis 41c. Des Moines was accorded the
privilege in question on shipments from
the Pittsburg-Buffalo district to Missouri
River points and secured the through
rate of 45c to Chicago and St. Louis.
HELD, defendants having granted since
the hearing the privilege in question to
Indianapolis at an additional charge of
l^c per 100 Ibs., the complaint should
be dismissed without prejudice. Indian-
apolis Freight Bureau v. C. C. C. & St.
L. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 370, 375.
(s) The storage of grain beyond the
elevation period of 10 days and the mix-
ing, weighing and inspection of the same,
are commercial services and are in no
sense, a part of elevation, as defined in
the Act. In the Matter of Allowances to
Elevators by the U. P. R. R. Co., 14 I. C.
C. 315, 316.
(t) Elevators are essential to the
proper handling of grain. Traffic Bureau
of St. Louis v. M. P. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C.
(u) Defendants allowed live-stock men
in territory west of the Missouri River to
bring in cattle from the ranges in the
southwest, fatten them, and ship them on
to the market under a feeding-in-transit
privilege, by which they secured the
through rate from the range to the mar-
ket, plus the additional charge for the
privilege, and plus the local rate from
the feeding point for the additional
weight which the cattle took on in the
process of fattening. They denied this
privilege to complainant stockmen in
Iowa territory. Under this condition
complainants brought in very few cattle
from the ranges, and confined themselves
FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 15 (v) 16 (e)
to fattening feeders purchased at points
on the Missouri River. The evidence in-
dicated that if extended the privilege they
would bring in cattle from the ranges for
fattening purposes. HELD, the denial of
the privilege constituted an unjust pref-
erence. Corn Belt Meat Producers' Ass'n
v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 376, 378.
(v) A tariff providing a milling-in-
transit privilege stated that the same
would be extended only by special ar-
rangement. HELD, such tariff was open
to criticism, since the transit privilege
should be open to all shippers similarly
situated upon like terms, and those terms
should be so clearly and definitely stated
that knowledge thereof might be acquired
from examination of the carrier's tariff.
Quimby v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 13 I.
C. C. 246, 249.
See Courts, 10 (d); Export Rates
and Facilities, III (b); Facilities
and Privileges, 16, 21 (w) ; Repa-
ration, 21 (j); Special Contract,
2 (z); Terminal Facilities, 1 (a),
(9)> (h); Water Carriers, 3 (e).
(a) One Young obtained the lease of a
wharf at Galveston from the S. P. Ter-
minal Co., which company was controlled
through stock ownership by the Southern
Pacific Railroad and Steamship Systems.
The cake and meal purchased by Young
were bought by him in various states,
but chiefly in Texas and shipped to him
on bills of lading and waybills, showing
the point of origin in those states and the
destination at Galveston. The purchases
were made for export. His sales to for-
eign countries were sometimes for im-
mediate and sometimes for future de-
livery, irrespective of whether he had the
product on hand at Galveston. At times
therefore orders must be filled on cake
to be purchased in the interior or
shipped in transit to him. When the cake
reached Galveston it was ground into
meal and sacked by Young, and new
shippers' bills of lading were made out
to his order for foreign parts. HELD,
the manufacture or concentration on the
wharves of the terminal company were
but incidents in the shipment of the
product in export trade, and the regula-
tions of the terminal company in the
handling of its wharves was within the
power of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. S. P. Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 219
U. S. 498, 526, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279, 55
L. ed. 310, sustaining 14 I. C. C. 250.
(b) Where a railroad has a wharf at
which its tariffs offer delivery and at
which part of the shipping public is
served, but to which it does not give all
access, it must make delivery at the same
rate at some other wharf. Mobile Cham-
ber of Commerce v. M. & O. R. R. Co., 23
I. C. C. 417, 419.
(c) Where carriers publish ship-side
rates on export traffic to certain wharves
owned by them, they make such wharves
public terminals, and the necessary im-
plication arising from the publication of
such rates is that access must be given to
such wharves by whatever ship the
shipper chooses to have his freight car-
ried from the wharf by, so long as such
access may be safely and properly given.
A railroad may not have a preferred line
of steamships to the exclusion of other
ships. It may prefer one line and have
more intimate relationship with such line
than with others, but its duty as a com-
mon carrier by rail cannot be neglected
because of such arrangement. It may set
aside one or more docks for the use of
such allied lines so long as such practice
does not conflict with its duty to give de-
livery at its docks to whomsoever may
apply for the freight properly deliverable
at that point. If it chooses to give up its
entire dock facilities to some particular
line it may do so, but it must make de-
livery upon equal terms to other ships, at
that port, for it has undertaken to deliver
the freight it transports at the ship's
side. Mobile Chamber of Commerce v.
M. & O. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 417, 423.
(d) A railroad line has the right to
reserve for certain boat lines certain of
its water terminals, provided such reser-
vations do not effect discrimination
against traffic destined to such waterside
terminals and to be carried therefrom- by
other boat lines. Mobile Chamber of
Commerce v. M. & O. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C.
(e) The Southern Railway and the
Mobile & Ohio Railroad own docks at
Mobile to which they make ship-side de-
livery on export traffic. The export rate
includes not only transportation to Mo-
bile but switching to the wharves, use of
the docks and the unloading of the cars.
No separate charges are published for
these terminal services, they being in-
cluded in the export rate. Each of these
carriers makes ship-side delivery at the
docks of the other without additional
charge. Neither will make delivery at
FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 16 (f) 17 (i)
any other wharf without a charge for the
terminal services. Neither carrier will
issue through bills of lading except for
certain preferred steamship lines. The
result of this is to limit the export traffic
of Mobile to the ships favored by defend-
ants. HELD, that the defendant carriers
must not discriminate in extending de-
livery at ship-side rates at the port of Mo-
bile on traffic moving over their wharves
when destined to one water line or an-
other. Where a railroad has a wharf at
which its tariffs offer delivery and at
which part of the shipping public is
served, but to which it does not give all
access, it must make delivery at the same
rate at some other wharf. "The Mobile
docks of defendants are public terminals
and if the carriers desire to extend their
use to a favored few equal facilities for
the others must be provided elsewhere.
The defendants must also cease to dis-
criminate in the issuance of through bills
of lading on export traffic. The same
service they give to the shipper in the
Interior who uses one line of ships from
the port should be given to another ship-
per who wishes to use a different line of
ships, provided both lines of ships submit
to the same reasonable conditions im-
posed by the rail carrier. Mobile Cham-
ber of Commerce v. M. & O. R. R. Co.,
23 I. C. C. 417, 427.
(f) If a shipper is so situated that he
cannot conveniently remove goods from
a dock within a reasonable time, and
therefore requires dock insurance, there
is no hardship in compelling him to pay
for such protection, according to the
length of time for which it is needed.
Wyman, Partridge & Co. v. B. & M. R. R.
Co., 15 I. C. C. 577, 579.
III. PUBLICATION AND TARIFFS.
See Tariffs, 3 (d).
17. Obligation to Publish.
See Tariffs, 4 (L), 9 (d).
(a) Transit is a privilege that may be
accorded by carriers to shippers only
when properly provided for in their
tariffs. Liberty Mills v. L. & N. R. R. Co.,
23 I. C. C. 182, 185.
(b) Facilities or privileges granted
or allowed in connection with rates
should be stated in tariffs. In Re Mileage,
Excursion and Commutation Tickets, 23
I. C. C. 95.
(c) Transit privileges and charges
thereunder on interstate or export ship-
ments must be clearly and definitely
shown in tariffs published and filed in
conformity with the requirements of sec-
tion 6 of the Act. Red River Oil Co. v.
T. & P. Ry. Co., 23 I. C. C. 438, 447, 448.
(d) There must be proper tariff pro-
visions connecting the inbound with the
outbound movements, thus fixing the
through charge from the producing point.
St. Paul Board of Trade v. M. St. P. & S.
S. M. Ry. Co., 19 I. C. C. 285, 288.
(e) Under section 6 of the Act re-
quiring the filing of tariffs with the Com-
mission showing all charges and facilities
granted, it is not enough to state the
amount of the charge unless the services
and privileges covered by it are also
stated. Whenever any service is ren-
dered beyond the ordinary receiving,
transporting and delivering of freight, the
precise character of that service should
appear in the printed schedule, and this
applies to charges made for loading and
unloading carload freight. Schultz-Han-
sen Company v. S. P. R. R. Co., 18 I. C. C.
(f) The holding, storing, unloading
and reloading of Pacific coast shipments
of shingles at Menasha, Wis., subject to
rebilling and reconsignment under the
proportional rate from Minnesota Trans-
fer to Chicago, is a privilege and service
that requires publication in a tariff in
order to be lawful. Folmer & Co. v. G.
N. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 33, 36.
(g) The privilege embodied in a sep-
arate storage and reconsignment tariff
of one carrier cannot be availed of un-
der a joint tariff to which that carrier is
a party, unless the tariff by express ref-
erence to the former so provides. Wash-
ington Broom & Woodenware Co. v. C. R.
I. & P. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 218, 219.
(h) A shipper cannot be deprived
through a carrier's negligence of any
lawful privilege offered by another car-
rier, but such privilege must itself be not
only one which the carrier may lawfully
allow, but it must also be duly estab-
lished and filed with the Commission.
Kile & Morgan Co. v. Deepwater Ry. Co.,
15 I. C. C. 235, 238.
(i) Reparation will not be awarded
on the basis of a reconsignment priv-
ilege customarily extended by the car-
rier, but not duly published in its tariff.
Sunderland Bros. Co. v. B. & 0. S. W.
R. R. Co., Unrep. Op. 267.
FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 17 (j) 18 (oc)
(j) In absence of tariff authority
privilege of milling in transit cannot be
granted. Neosho Milling Co. v. K. C. S.
Ry. Co., Unrep. Op. 433.
(k) Through a defect in its tariff
defendant failed to properly provide for
a concentration privilege in connection
with shipments of cotton. Subsequently
corrected. Reparation awarded. Rennert-
Millette Co. v. G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co.,
Unrep. Op. 525.
18. Reshipping Under Through Rate.
See Reparation, 2 (f) ; Tariffs, 14
(e) ; Through Routes and Joint
(a) As provided in the tariff, charges
were assessed on grain products at rates
in effect when shipment moved from
milling point and not at rates in effect
when grain moved from point of origin.
Damages denied. Liberty Mills v. L. &
N. R. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 182.
(aa) If inbound and outbound move-
ments are separate and distinct it is
improper to apply any rates other than
the regularly established local rates.
Red River Oil Co. v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 23
I. C. C. 438, 446.
(b) Complainants claimed that defend-
ants through the adjustment of rates,
rules and practices granted to dealers at
Nashville, Tenn., undue preferences and
advantage in the handling of grain,
grain products and hay moving from
the Ohio and Mississippi River cross-
ings and from points north and west
thereof through Nashville to southeast-
ern destinations. The particular prac-
tice attacked was that of rebilling or
reshipping which was permitted on grain,
grain products and hay at Nashville, but
which was not accorded at any other
point in the southeastern territory.
Under this privilege grain moving
through Nashville could be unloaded
and held not longer than six months
and then reshipped at the through
rate from origin to destination instead
of at the sum of the rates into and
out of Nashville. HELD, considering
particularly the traffic involved, viz.,
the transportation of grain, grain prod-
ucts and hay from the grain-growing
region lying to the north and west,
by taking out the privilege at Nashville,
benefits would be derived by all parties
and interests concerned, by a due ob-
servance of the statute, which would in
and of itself justify the action, ana the
results on the business at Nashville
would not be as dire and chaotic as
represented by the defendants. Duncan
& Co. v. N. C. & St. L. Ry., 21 I. C.
(bb) Reshipment is the right of a
shipper to reship goods received by him,
without removal from the car, upon pay-
ment of the freight charges to that
point, the goods going forward under a
new transportation contract. It is an
incident to the transportation facilities
offered. Any consignee has the right
to reship. Detroit Traffic Ass'n v. L. S".
& M. S. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C. 257, 258.
(c) Complainant shipped crude cot-
tonseed oil into Savannah, Ga., on the
ocal rates from the various points of
origin, and after refining at that place
it was reshipped on the balance of the
through rate from points of origin to
iltimate destinations, but between the
times of inbound and outbound move-
ments the rates had been advanced 2c
per 100 Ibs., and under the provisions
of the tariffs as interpreted by defend-
ants they applied the higher through rate
in effect at the time of reshipment. The
refining-in-transit rules provided that the
through rates to be applied should be
those in effect at the time of reship-
ment. HELD, that this provision in the
tariff was clearly contrary to law and that
the rate applicable to all through ship-
ments is the rate in effect at the time
of the initial movement. Southern Cot-
ton Oil Co. v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 19 i.
C. C. 434, 435, 436.
(cc) Complainant shipped 125 bales of
cotton from Lawton, Okla., to Chick-
asha, Okla., for concentration, charges
being collected at the local rate of
$1.50 per bale. Defendant's tariffs pro-
vided that on reshipment to final des-
tination the through rate from the
point of origin would be protected. The
consignment was destroyed by fire
while standing on the platform of the
compress at Chickasha. Complainant
sought to recover the charges paid for
the movement from Lawton to Chick-
asha. HELD, transit privileges are
allowed upon the theory that the in-
bound shipment may be stopped and
the identical freight, or its product,
or its exact equivalent of the same com-
modity moving into the transit point
under the same privilege, may be
shipped to ultimate destination under
the through rate from point of origin.
FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 18 (d) (g)
If for any reason reshipment becomes
Impossible the carrier is under no obli-
gation to refund the charges collected
for the movement to the transit point.
Complaint dismissed. Anderson, Clay-
ton & Co. v. St. L. & S. P. R. R. Co.,
17 I. C. C. 12.
(d) Complainant lumber dealers at
Cairo attacked the reshipping privileges
allowed by defendants to lumber dealers
at Memphis and denied to complainants
on shipments of lumber from Mississippi
points to points north and east of the
Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Under such
privilege the Memphis dealer was per-
mitted to ship lumber from the Missis-
sippi mills to Memphis, and unload the
same, assort and dry it, covering a pe-
riod of 90 days, and then reship same to
the north and east at the through rate.
Memphis dealers t ecured their lumber
from mills located in Mississippi com-
paratively short distances from Memphis.
The millmen supplying the same had
small capital and were financed by the
Memphis dealers. The timber was
cleared by the millmen without regard
to the kinds of lumber cut. The mill-
men had neither the means nor the prac-
tical facilities for assorting and drying
the lumber, and it was therefore neces-
sary that these processes be carried on
at Memphis. The greater portion of the
lumber shipped into Memphis was green.
Nine railroads led into Memphis, result-
ing in keen competition. The reconsign-
ment privilege at Memphis was estab-
lished to enable Memphis to compete
with Cairo and St. Louis for Arkansas
lumber. At Cairo lumber was received
from millmen located much farther from
that city than the millmen supplying
Memphis were distant from Memphis.
The greater portion of lumber coming to
Cairo was already graded and dried.
Competition between the five railroads
running into Cairo was less keen than
at Memphis. HELD, the difference in
conditions at Memphis justified the de-
fendants in granting the reshipping priv-
ilege at that point and denying the same
to Cairo. Sondheimer Co. v. I. C. R. R.
Co., 17 I. C. C. 60, 67, 68.
(dd) Whenever by any transit arrange-
ment through rates are applied such
rates must be as of the date of first
movement from point of origin under
such through rates. In Re Milling-in-
Transit Rates, 17 I. C. C. 113.
(e) Complainant shipped a carload of
cement containing 60,000 Ibs. from Acme,
Tex., to East St. Louis and there placed
the same in its warehouse, paying the 18c
rate in effect between said points. Com-
plainant then removed one-half of the
carload, leaving 30,000 Ibs., and rebilled
the car to Braidwood, 111., and was as-
sessed the local rate to Braidwood of
9c. The rate from Acme to Braidwood
via East St. Louis, minimum 30,000 Ibs.,
was 23c. The tariff at the time of ship-
ment provided for a reconsignment at
East St. Louis. It had befen the custom
of defendant to apply in cases like the
one in question the balance of the
through rate of 5c for the haul from St.
Louis to Braidwood, and at the time of
the hearing defendant had in effect a
proportional rate from East St. Louis
upon shipments of this character. HELD,
assuming there ought to have been in
effect such a reconsignment privilege,
still complainant was not entitled to rep-
aration, since such privilege could not
be held to permit the removal of a por-
tion of a carload in transit and the send-
ing forward of the balance at the through
rate. Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. C. &
A. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 220, 222.
(f) A condition that the ultimate des-
tination must be shown on the original
bill of lading, to obtain the through rate,
is unreasonable. Roper Lumber-Cedar
Co. v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 16 'I. C. C. 382.
(g) Defendant's tariff provided that
shipments of lumber, shingles, posts and
poles might be dressed, sawed or con-
centrated in transit, and carried at
through rates from point of shipment
to the concentration point, thence to
point of ultimate destination. Prior to
Oct. 2, 1907, the tariff provided that a
shipper could avail himself of this transit
privilege only by showing in the original
shipping bill the ultimate destination of
the shipment. Enforcement of this pro-
vision was impracticable, the rhipper
not usually knowing the ultimate destina-
tion of a shipment until after it reached
the concentration point, and therefore
this provision in the tariff was generally
ignored. On shipments by complainant
between 1906 and 1907, however, the con-
dition was strictly enforced, resulting in
a denial of the transit privilege to com-
plainant. Oct. 2, 1907, however, it was
cancelled. HELD, the condition was un-
reasonable. Reparation awarded on the
basis of the through rate on the 190'o-
1907 shipments. Roper Lumber-Cedar
Co. v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 382.
FACILITIES AND PRIVILEGES, 18 (h) 19 (e)
(h) If there is offered to a shipper
under the tariff a right of stopping in
transit, reconsignment, storage, or return
of freight, he is entitled to the use of
such privilege, even though it may later
be canceled out of the tariff before the
time allowed for the exercise of such
right has expired. Interstate Remedy
Co. v. American Express Co., 16 I. C. C.
19. Retroactive Application.
See Infra, 20 (e); Long and Short
Hauls, 5 (j) ; Reconsignment, 6.
(a) In April and May, 1909, there
were shipped from McKenzie, Tenn., to
complainants at Evansville, Ind., eight
carloads of logs, the rate charged being
12c per 100 IDS. Between February and
May, 1909, there were shipped from Hum-
boldt, Tenn., to complainants twelve
cars under a rate of lie per 100 Ibs.
During the same period defendant main-
tained a rate of 7c from certain stations
immediately north and south of McKen-
zie and Humboldt, applicable on logs
shipped into Evansville, there manufac-
tured into lumber and shipped out in
manufactured form. In December, 1909,
the 7c rate was made applicable from
McKenzie and in February, 1910, from
Humboldt. In November, 1910, com-
plainants filed claim against defendant
to have the subsequently established
milling-in-transit rate applied to the ship-
ments. The outbound shipments upon
which this claim was based were made
about eighteen months after receipt of
the inbound shipments at Evansville. It
did not appear affirmatively whether the
inbound shipments were manufactured
into lumber at Evansville and the prod-
uct reshipped, or whether they were dis-
posed of locally. HELD, there was no
obligation on the carrier to make the
milling-in-transit privilege retroactive,
and the period which intervened between
the inbound and outbound shipments was
unreasonably long. Young & Cutsinger
v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 22 I. C. C. 1, 3.
(b) Defendant charged 7.7c per 100
Ibs. on logs from McLean's Spur, Ky , to
Louisville, Ky. Complainant claimed to
have an understanding that a refund
would be made on the basis of 5c upon
proof that the manufactured product had
been reshipped via defendant's line. The
carrier failed to establish the rate con-
tended for until after the inbound ship-
ment had moved. The rate was alleged
to have been unreasonable in so far as
it exceeded 5c. HELD, the Commission
would not order the establishment in
the first instance of a transit privilege,
or permit the retroactive application of
one voluntarily established by a carrier,
except for the purpose of removing a
discrimination. Complaint dismissed.
Wood-Mosaic Flooring & Lumber Co. v.
L. & N. R. R. Co., 22 I. C. C. 458.
(c) Reparation was awarded on the
basis of a transit privilege made ap-
plicable after the date of movement; not
viewed as the retroactive application of
a transit privilege, the privilege being
held applicable to a station not specific-
ally mentioned in the tariff. Henry v.
E. Ry. Co., 20 I. C. C. 171.
(d) Complainant shipped five double-
deck carloads of sheep, Vaughn, N. M.,
to Kansas City, Mo., fed in transit at
Pampa, Tex., under a rate of 25c to
Pampa and 36 %c beyond. Defendants
admitted the rate to be unreasonable to
(he extent that it exceeded a rate of 41c
plus a feeding-in-transit charge of 7c,
but refused to apply such rate, on the
ground that the feeding-in-transit charge
was not applicable to a shipment from
Vaughn until a date subsequent to that
of the shipment. The tariff under which
the shipment moved was lawfully on
tile prior to May 1, 1907. At the time
shipment moved there was in force to
Kansas City from points south of Vaughn
a joint rate of 40 y 2 c plus a feeding-in-
transit charge of 7c. A large majority
of these points are farther distant from
Kansas City than Vaughn. HELD, that
the tariff, being lawfully on file prior to
May 1, 1907, was not strictly subject
to rules of interpretation subsequently
promulgated, and that under the cir-
cumstances this case did not involve the
retroactive application of a transit priv-