tion in Alaska, 19 I. C. C. 81, 93.
(i) Section 15 is the dominating and
controlling expression of the real object
and meaning of the Act. It makes the
Commission a special expert body to deal
with rates and practices affecting rates,
not a body to take the place of courts.
Joynes v. Penn. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C.
(j) The general rule that a tribunal,
whose authority is invoked by a com-
plaint filed before it, must determine
whether the subject matter is within its
jurisdiction before it may consider the
merits of the controversy, does not in
all cases necessarily control an adminis-
trative body like the Commission. Snook
v. C. R. R. Co. of N. J., 17 I. C. C. 375, 376.
(jj) The Commission has jurisdiction
whenever the unreasonableness of the
rate is in issue. Porter v. St. L. & S.
F. R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 1, 5.
(k) Section 8 of the Act restricts the
Commission's authority to award dam-
ages to cases in which the carrier may
be liable under the Act only. Blume &
Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 15 I. C. C.
(1) No holding of the Commission can
render lawful that which is of itself un-
lawful. Nebraska-Iowa Grain Co. v. U. P.
R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 90, 94.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1 (m) (v)
(m) Under section 16 of the Act, pro-
viding for a trial de novo before a court
and jury whenever carriers refuse to
obey an order of the Commission for the
payment of money, and making at such
trial the findings and order of the Com-
mission prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated, the Commission has juris-
diction, without regard to the amount in
controversy, to award damages whenever
they arise under the Act, except in those
cases where the Act itself names an-
other forum. Washer Grain Co. v. M. P.
Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 147, 155.
(n) The Commission, in passing upon
the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of a rate, acts as an administrative body
having quasi judicial functions; when it
determines what the rate should have
been and shall be in the future it exer-
cises certain legislative functions; when
it computes the damages or reparation
due the shipper by reason of the enforce-
ment and collection of a rate unreason-
able to the extent that it exceeds a rate
which is declared to be reasonable, there
is a mere mathematical determination of
the damages the shipper should receive.
Washer Grain Co. v. M. P. Ry. Co., 15
I. C. C. 147, 15'6.
(o) In matters of jurisdiction and of
undue preference, prejudice or disad-
vantage the services of a jury may be
necessary in determining damages, and
although it may be proper for the Com-
mission to award money damages the
proofs to support such awards should be
very clear and exact and free from sur-
mise and conjecture. Washer Grain Co.
v. M. P. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 147; 157.
(p) The Commission has jurisdiction,
without regard to the amount in contro-
versy, to award damages whenever they
arise under the Act, excepting in those
cases where the Act itself names an-
other forum. Washer Grain Co. v M. P
Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 147, 155.
(pp) The Commission, as an admin-
istrative body having quasi judicial
power, has no authority whatever under
section 10, as such section is directed
solely to court procedure. Washer Grain
Co. v. M. P. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 147, 153.
(q) The power of the Commission to
award damages is limited to such cases
as arise out of a violation of the Act.
Woodward & Dickerson v. L. & N. R. R.
Co., 15 I. C. C. 170, 172.
(qq) It is the duty of the Commission
to determine a question of relative rates
on coal as between competing producing
districts upon a basis which will permit
them to compete in common markets
and under circumstances to which their
location and conditions of production
fairly entitle them with respect of their
relation one to another. Black Moun-
tain Coal Land Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 15 I.
C. C. 286, 295.
(r) The Commission has authority to
pass upon questions as to whether the
rates, charges and rules set forth in a
tariff schedule filed with the Commission
are unjust or unreasonable or discrim-
inatory, preferential or prejudicial, and
to award reparation or damages for vio-
lations of the Act, and also to prescribe
what shall be a reasonable rate for the
future, and when a rate has been found
and determined to be unreasonable and
unjust, and a just and reasonable rate
for the future has been established, to
make reparation for any such damages
as may have been caused thereby. Morse
Produce Co. v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
15 I. C. C. 334, 337.
(s) Complainant's suggestion that the
flour-milling industry of this country can
be fostered by an order requiring car-
riers to the seaboard to maintain lower
rates on flour than on wheat involves a
matter of national policy beyond the
authority of the Commission to adopt.
Bulte Milling Co. v. C. & A. R. R. Co.,
15 I. C. C. 351, 364.
(t) The Commission is not concluded
by the form, but looks to the substance
of the relations between corporations
engaged in interstate commerce. Eich^n-
berg v. S. P. Co., 14 I. C. C. 250, 266.
(u) The Commission has jurisdiction
to .prescribe maximum rates. National
Petroleum Ass'n v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co.,
14 I. C. C. 272, 281.
(v) The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission is given jurisdiction to hear com-
plaints in regard to rates, rebates and
the like, and the language of the Inter-
state Commerce Act in reference to
complaints to the Commission must be
construed as relating to those subjects
which are within the jurisdiction of the
Commission. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Scott,
133 Ky. 724, 730, 118 S. W. 990.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 2 (a) (j)
II. PRIMARY JURISDICTION.
2. In General.
See Cars and Car Supply, 33 (a);
Commerce Court, 1 (a); Courts,
1 (j), 7, 9 (e), (m), 11 (a), (d),
(y), (z), (aa), (cc) ; Demurrage, 1
<e), (h), (i), (j), (p), (r), (s),
(f); Undercharges, 3 (c).
(a) An interstate carrier refused to
accept shipments of liquor in Indiana
consigned to destinations in prohibition
counties in Kentucky. HELD, a bill in
equity was properly filed in the courts
to enjoin the carriers from refusing to
accept such shipments without first re-
sorting to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, since the question involved was
the validity of the prohibition law, over
which the Commission has no jurisdic-
tion, and did not present an administra-
tive question within the scope of its
powers. L. & N. R. R. v. Cook Brewing
Co., 223 U. S. 70, 83, 32 Sup. Ct. 189, 56
L. ed. 355.
(b) By the enactment of the amend-
ments of 1906 the jurisdiction of the
courts has been materially restricted,
and the primary jurisdiction of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, particularly
under section 10 of the Act of 1889, has
been considerably extended. Langdon
v. Penn. R. R. Co., 186 Fed. 237, 239.
(c) The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission alone has original jurisdiction to
determine whether an existing rate
schedule, or an existing regulation or
practice affecting rates, or an existing
regulation or practice of any other kind
affecting matters sought to be regulated
by the Act, is unjust or unreasonable, or
unjustly discriminatory, or unduly pref-
erential, or prejudicial, and the courts
cannot by mandamus, injunction or other-
wise control or modify any order of the
Commission made by it in the due per-
formance of its merely administrative
functions. Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Penn.
R. R. Co., 183 Fed. 929, 936.
(d) Where the practice of the car-
rier in granting unlawful rebates to a
shipper's competitors is involved and
affects not only the plaintiff shipper but
other shippers in the same region, such
regulation or practice is one affecting
rates and must be first brought before
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The U. S. Circuit Court has no original
jurisdiction, and this despite the fact
that the practices complained of may
have ceased. Mitchell Coal & Coke Co.
v. Penn. R. R. Co., 183 Fed. 908, 909.
(e) The jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion is primary in matters of unjust dis-
crimination, undue or unreasonable pref-
erence or advantage, undue or unrea-
sonable prejudice or disadvantage, and
generally whenever the Commission may
order the carrier to cease and desist
from violations of the Act. Washer Grain
Co. v. M. P. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 147, 156.
(f) Relief from excessive freight
charges upon interstate shipments, where
the charges are made according to estab-
lished rates fixed and promulgated as
required by the Interstate Commerce
Act, must be sought through the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. A. T. &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. The Superior Refining
Co., 83 Kan. 732, 734, 112 P. 604.
(g) Where the rate charged for a
through interstate shipment is the ag-
gregate of the local rates on the lines
of the initial and connecting carriers,
and where the connecting line has pre-
viously adopted and filed with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission a tariff
under which its proportion of the charge
on the through shipment is collected,
and there is a claim by the shipper that
the charge made is excessive, unreason-
able and unjust, his redress must be
through the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and cannot be obtained in a
state court. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. New
Era Milling Co., 80 Kan. 141, 144, 101 P.
(h) Under the Interstate Commerce Act
as amended a shipper cannot sue in a
state court to recover excessive demur-
rage charges exacted of him on an inter-
state shipment, but must first resort to
the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which has exclusive original jurisdiction
over such shipment. Starks Co. v. Grand
Rapids & I. Ry. Co. (Mich., 1911), 131
N. W. 143, 145.
(i) In an action in a state court by a
carrier to recover demurrage, based on
a schedule of demurrage charges duly
published and filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the court has no
jurisdiction to determine the reason-
ableness of the charges, as original
jurisdiction with respect thereto is
vested in the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. Erie R. R. Co. v. Wanaque
Lumber Co., 75 N. J. L. 878, 881, 69 A.
(j) The opinions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission interpreting the
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 2 (k) 3 (c)
Interstate Commerce Act are entitled
to great respect in the courts. Green-
wald v. Weir, 130 Api>. Div. 696, 701, li.5
N. Y. Supp. 311.
(k) In a suit by a carrier to recover
the published interstate rate .the defend-
ant cannot set up as a valid plea the
unreasonableness of such rate, since
original jurisdiction over the question
of reasonableness in establishing inter-
state rates is vested with the Interstate
Commerce Commission. B. & O. R. R.
Co. v. La Due, 128 App. Div. 594, 596,
112 N. Y. Supp. 964.
(1) A United States circuit court has
no jurisdiction to enjoin the putting into
effect of a schedule of interstate rates
without prior application to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which body is
vested with exclusive jurisdiction over
questions of the reasonableness of inter-
state rates under the Interstate Com-
merce Act as amended June 29, 1906.
A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Foster Lumber
Co. (Okla., 1911), 122 P. 139.
(mn) The question of the reasonable-
ness of an interstate rate, lawfully j?ub-
lished, can be heard, in the first instance
at least, only before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. Oregon R. & Nav.
Co.v. Coolidge (Ore., 1911), 116 P. 03, 95.
(o) The United States courts and the
Interstate Commerce Commission have
exclusive jurisdiction of actions based
upon the Interstate Commerce Act, or
brought to enforce a right created by
the Act. Hardaway v. Southern Ry. Co.
(S. C., 1912), 73 S. E. 1020, 1023.
(p) Under the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act no court has
any power, in the first instance, to in-
quire into the reasonableness of any
rate that has been regularly established
by a railway company and filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission and
published by posting; and the question
of whether or not a rate is reasonable
and just is one to be determined, in the
first instance, in a proper proceeding be-
fore the Commission. Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Loonan Lumber Co. (S. D.,
1910), 125 N. W. 644, 645.
(q) Where the published interstate
rate is collected and an action is brought
in a state court to recover for the ex-
cess exacted above a sum alleged to
be a reasonable charge, the only evidence
that will justify the action is a prior
judgment of the Interstate Commerce
Commission holding the rate complained
of to be unreasonable. Robinson v. B.
& O. R. R. Co., 64 W. Va. 406, 410, 63
S. E. 323.
/ (r) Where an interstate rate has been
duly published and filed and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission lias made
no ruling holding the same to be un-
reasonable, a shipper cannot, upon the
exaction of such rate, sue in a state
court to recover the excess collected
above the sum claimed to be a reason-
able charge. Robinson v. B. & O. R. R.
Co., 64 W. Va. 406, 409, 63 S. E. 323.
3. Finality of Findings.
See Allowances, 3; Courts, 2, 9 (a);
Forwarders, I (b) (c), (d); Proced-
ure Before Commission, 11; Rea-
sonableness of Rates, 1 (f), (I).
(a) The orders of the Commission are
final unless (1) beyond the power which
it can constitutionally exercise; -or (2)
beyond its statutory power; or (3) based
upon a mistake of law. I. C. C. v. U. P.
R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 547, 32 Sup. Ct
108, 56 L. ed. 308.
(b) In decisions of the Commission
questions of fact may be involved in the
determination of questions of law, so that
an order, regular on its face, may be
set aside if it appears that the rate is
so low as to be confiscatory and in vio-
lation of the constitutional prohibition
against taking property without due
process of law; or if the Commission
acts so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix
rates contrary to evidence or without
evidence to support it; or if the authority
therein involved has been exercised in
such an unreasonable manner as to cause
it to be within the elementary rule that
the substance, and not the shadow, de-
termines the validity of the exercise of
tne power. I. C. C. v. U. P. R. R., 222
U. S. 541, 547, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L.
(c) The Supreme Court cannot as-
sume that an order of the Commission
reducing rates was based upon the power
conferred upon it to prescribe reasonable
rates rather than upon a basis beyond
the scope of its authority, where so to
assume would make the order entered
repugnant to the statute as being un-
justly discriminatory against a certain
locality. S. P. Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S.
433, 450, 31 Sup. Ct. 288, 55 L. ed. 283.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 3 (d) 9 (a)
(d) It is not for the Commerce Court
to say whether the Commission has prop-
erly attached great or little weight to
evidence adduced upon a given point or
whether the conclusion reached by the
Commission upon testimony as to facts
alone shows a mistake as to some partic-
ular fact not essential or vital to the
proceeding, or an inadvertency, or is not
such a conclusion as the Commerce Court
might have reached. If the particular
matter in issue and inquired into was
one of fact and a full hearing was af-
forded and the conclusion reached is
supported by substantial evidence, it will
not be nullified by the courts. N. & W.
Ry. Co. v. U. S., 195 Fed. 953, 959.
(e) By the Hepburn amendment the
rate-making power was conferred to a
certain extent upon the Commission. To-
day its conclusions of fact in administer-
ing the first, third and apparently the
second sections are conclusive. City of
Spokane v. N. P. Ry. Co., 21 I. C. C.
(f) Within broad lines of discretion
the courts regard the Commission's con-
clusions on questions of fact as final.
In Re Advances of Rates Western Case,
20 I. C. C. 307, 317.
(g) The courts are not competent to
determine questions of fact within the
jurisdiction of the Commission as against
the Commission after the latter, upon
complaint and answer, has investigated
such questions and found thereon. Gund
& Co. v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 18 I. C. C.
Ml. OVER PROCEDURE.
(a) Under sections 12 and 14, of
the Interstate Commerce Act, the Com-
mission through examiners may make
Investigations where the report of the
carrier is not accurate or truthful, or
the information furnished is not suffi-
ciently complete to enable the Commis-
sion to perform its duty, and may in-
quire into the intrastate business of the
carriers where such inquiry is essential
to know the true condition of inter-
state business. Goodrich Transit Co. v.
I. C. C., 190 Fed. 943, 965.
See Allowances, 3.
(a) The Commission has complete
power to suspend or modify its orders.
Loftus v. Pullman Co., 19 I. C. C. 102,
(b) Orders with respect to rates are
not conclusive beyond a period of two
years. National Hay Ass'n v. M. C.
R. R. Co., 19 I. C. C. 34, 37.
(a) The Commission has no author-
ity under the Act as amended to re-
quire witnesses to answer any question
it chooses to ask in an investigation
instituted by it for the purpose of dis-
covering any facts tending to defeat
the purposes of the Act, or for the
purpose of recommending additional leg-
islation relating to the regulation of
commerce that it may conceive to be
within the power of Congress to enact;
but the purposes for which it may exact
evidence embrace only complaints for
violations of the Act and investiga-
tions by it upon matters that might
have been made the object of com-
plaint. (Day, Harlan and McKenna, JJ.,
dissenting.) Harriman v. I. C. C., 211
U. S. 407, 419, 29 Sup. Ct. 115, 53 L. ed.
IV. OVER RAILROADS.
See Evidence, 7; Express Compa-
nies, 24; Reasonableness of Rates,
(a) The Commission is without con-
trol over capitalization. It cannot place
limitations upon the purposes for which
stocks or bonds may be issued, nor
designate what property they shall rep-
resent. Advances in Rates Western
Case, 20 I. C. C. 307, 334.
(b) The Commission has no juris-
diction over stock and ..bond issues of
corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce. Morgan Grain Co. v. A. C. L.
R. R. Co., 19 I. C. C. 460, 471.
8. Physical Valuation.
See Evidence, 49 (aa).
(a) The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission has no authority to make a-
physical valuation of a carrier. In Re
Advances in Rates Eastern Case, 20
I. C. C. 243, 256.
V. OVER RATES.
See Commerce Court, 4.
(a) In Western Oregon L. M. A, v.
S. P. Co., 14 I. C. C. 61, the Com-
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 9 (b) (j)
mission ordered a reduction of the rate
of $5 per ton upon rough green fir
lumber and laths from points in the
Willamette Valley to San Francisco to
$3.40. Its opinion indicated that the car-
riers formerly maintained a lower rate;
that the lumber industry had been built
up upon those rates; and that it was
inequitable to the shippers for carriers
in view of these facts to raise the rate
to $5. It did not find, however, that
the rate was unreasonable but based
its decisions on the foregoing consid-
erations. HELD, the Commission ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction in assuming that
it had power to substitute a new rate
for a just and reasonable rate on the
ground that it was a wise policy to
do so, or that the railroad had so
conducted itself as to be estopped in
the future from being entitled to re-
ceive a just and reasonable compensa-
tion for the service rendered. S. P.
Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U. S. 433, 443, 31
Sup. Co. 288, 55 L. ed. 283.
(b) A decision as to reasonableness
of rates is peculiarly within the prov-
ince of the Commission to make, and
its findings are fortified by presump-
tions of truth. I. C. C. v. Chi. R. I.
& P. Ry., 218 U. S. 88, 110, 30 Sup.
Ct. 651, 54 L. ed., 946.
(c) Not only is the Commission
vested with a discretion in determin-
ing the reasonableness of rates which
cannot be disturbed but it is entitled
to select the testimony which it will
believe and rely upon according as it
addresses itself to the discriminating
judgment of the Commission. L. & N.
R. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 195 Fed. 541,
(d) The Commission may not con-
demn an existing rate whenever it is
of the opinion that the same is un-
just and unreasonable merely upon the
expert knowledge and accumulated ex-
perience of its members, but may do
so only upon a full hearing giving an
opportunity to the carrier to be heard
and upon investigation by the Com-
mission itself of the lawfulness of the
rate in question. A. C. L. R. R. Co.
v. I. C. C., 194 Fed. 449, 457.
(e) The Commission, in an investi-
gation of rates, may bring to the solu-
tion of the question the accumulated
experience and expert knowledge of
its members, and it is its duty to do
so, but before an existing rate may be
condemned there must be a finding of
some sort that it is unjust and unrea-
sonable, and this finding must be based
upon evidence of which the carrier is
apprised so that it may meet the case
brought against it if it so desires. A.
C. L. R. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 194 Fed.
(f) The courts will not interfere
with the action of the Commission in
fixing rates unless it clearly appears
that the Commission went beyond its
authority and the rates established in-
juriously affected some substantial right
of the carrier are confiscatory, to use
that term in its broad sense. Whether
the rates are so or not is the test of
their reasonableness. L. & N. R. R.
Co. v. I. C. C., 184 Fed. 118, 125.
(g) Congress did not in the Act and
its amendments intend to vest admin-
istrative authority in the courts in the
matter of fixing rates but on the con-
trary committed the power to and
imposed the duty to ascertain facts and
determine what is reasonable in regard
to rates and charges in view of such
facts on the Commission. L. & N. R.
R. Co. v. I. C. C., 184 Fed. 118, 124.
(h) The fixing of the rates to be
charged by public service corporations
is a legislative function, and when
Congress in the Act as amended June
29, 1906, confers upon the Interstate
Commerce Commission the power to
determine what are and should be
reasonable rates to be charged by the
carriers of interstate commerce, its
action in the premises is conclusive on
the courts, subject to the inhibition of
the Constitution of the United States,
which protects such companies against
confiscatory rates. S. P. Co. v. I. C.
C., 177 Fed. 963, 964.
(i) The courts have no power to fix
railroad rates, such power being vested
in the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, and where the Commission acting
in its administrative capacity establishes
certain rates the courts will not inter-
fere unless some legal, constitutional or
natural right has been violated. Phila.
& R. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 174 Fed. 687, 688.
(j) Under sections 12 and 15 of the
Act as amended by the Hepburn Act of
June 29, 1906, the Commission has au-
thority to order a railroad to so adjust
its rates as to prevent discrimination
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 9 (k) (q)
against a shipper without prescribing
the new rates to be applied or specifying
how the ctiarges should be equalized
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 168
Fed. 131, 136.
(k) The rates on live stock to the
terminal of defendant carriers at Chi
cago was published separately from
the terminal charges for the haul from
the terminal to the Union Stock Yards
The terminal railroad owned by the
Union Stock Yards & Transit Co
charged defendants for the haul over its
tracks. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, in 12 I. C. C 507, found the ter-
minal charge of $2 excessive and or-
dered it reduced to $1, but based its
order on the finding, not that the ter
minal charge was unreasonable in itself,
but that when combined with the gen-
eral transportation rate, produced on
the whole an unreasonable charge for
the entire haul. HELD, not having
found the terminal charge unreasonable,
the Commission had no authority to
order it reduced in order to correct the
total transportation charges. Stickney
v. I. C. C., 164 Fed. 638, 644.
(I) Power to determine and pre-
scribe what are just and reasonable
maximum rates to be charged in inter-
state commerce is, in a limited way, con-
ferred upon the Interstate Commerce
Commission by existing statute laws;