Holdridge Ozro Collins.

The military record of John Green Ballance online

. (page 6 of 13)
Online LibraryHoldridge Ozro CollinsThe military record of John Green Ballance → online text (page 6 of 13)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook


expedition of General Lawton to capture San Isidro, AND HAD, ON

ACCOUNT OF THE SKILL AND SERVICES THEREIN SHOWN, BEEN RECOM-
MENDED BY GENERAL LAWTON FOR THE BREVET OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL
IN THE REGULAR ARMY.

HE MADE THE PLANS FOR THE ADVANCE, submitted them to me,
and I approved them in every particular, AND THEY WERE CARRIED OUT
AS PLANNED BY HIM, with the exception of the delay of an hour in



65

the advance on San Isidro, which I directed in order to ascertain
the situation in regard to Batson and Castner. THE TACTICAL SKILL
EXHIBITED BY MAJOR BALLANCE IN HANDLING HIS ADVANCE GUARD AND
BRIGADE, HIS BRAVERY IN LEADING IT ON, AND THE COMPLETE SUCCESS
HE ACHIEVED FULLY JUSTIFIED THE CONFIDENCE I HAD PLACED IN HIM.

FOR CONSPICUOUS GALLANTRY IN ACTION AND SUPERIOR TACTICAL
ABILITY IN HANDLING TROOPS IN THE FIGHT AT CALABA, AND CAPTURE
OF SAN ISIDRO, I RECOMMEND THAT MAJOR JOHN GREEN BALLANCE

BE APPOINTED A COLONEL BY BREVET IN THE REGULAR ARMY.

In my northern march to get around Aguinaldo's forces I took
with my cavalry only one battalion of infantry (Ballance's Twenty-
second) as it was necessary for me to move with great rapidity, AND

I KNEW THIS BATTALION WOULD KEEP UP WITH ME WHEREVER I LED

WITH MY CAVALRY AND THE SCOUTS, of which my advance guard was
composed. The infantry battalion moved in advance, preceded by its
screen of scouts, followed by the artillery, and then the cavalry.

The road was, as is usual at this season of the year, very bad.
The land on either side was principally flooded rice fields, interspersed
with bamboo thickets, tropical jungles, and lagoons, over which it was
an impossibility for horses to pass, so I could not, at this time, make
use of a cavalry screen.



The ordinary formation for the advance guard did not furnish
sufficient precaution for advance, so Ballance adopted a method of
using his scouts as a screen, keeping them some distance ahead of
his advance guard. His scouts were men selected from his companies
on account of their physical endurance, courage, and marksmanship.
THEY WERE PERFECTLY FEARLESS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR WORK
AND RENDERED MOST EXCELLENT SERVICE.

Some two miles beyond San Fernando there is an unfordable stream
. the screen of scouts had to assemble at the bridge for the
purpose of crossing.

In making the attempt they were met by a strong fire from a
concealed enemy, but without faltering they rushed across the stringers
of the bridge, gained the opposite bank, which they held, and protected
the bridge until the arrival of the advance guard, although 25 per cent
of their number were shot in doing so. Even after being severely
wounded, these scouts continued to use their rifles.



66

BALLANCE MOVED UP HIS INFANTRY AT A RUN, GOT THEM
ACROSS THE STREAM, and deployed on each side of the road AND DROVE

THE ENEMY BACK FROM THE STREAM.

***

FIGHT AT CALABA.

The enemy contested our advance, and owing to the extremely
difficult country to operate over, it was impossible, in most places,
to move anything but troops on foot anywhere except on the direct
road. The main road was very bad but the moment the animals got
off of the traveled road they sank up to their knees in mud and water,
and at other times up to their bellies. THE INFANTRY WAS DEPLOYED
ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD and the artillery in the road. The progress
was necessarily slow, THE INFANTRY WADING AND PLOWING THEIR WAY

THROUGH THE SUBMERGED RICE FIELDS, LAGOONS AND THICKETS, BEING
SUBJECTED TO AN ANNOYING FIRE FROM AN ENEMY CONCEALED IN THE
BAMBOO THICKETS, DRIVING THEM BACK AS THEY ADVANCED. The artillery

on the road fired as it advanced when an opportunity offered.

The enemy fell back to his intrenchments near Calaba, a barrio
of San Isidro, and BALLANCE ADVANCED TO THEIR ATTACK.

The enemy had intrenched himself in a bamboo grove on the far
side of an opening through which our troops had to pass. This opening
was not over 80 yards wide at any place, and averaged much less.
As the advance emerged from the thicket to pass over this open space
it was met by a fusillade from the enemy's trenches. Our troops
charged across the opening and drove him out of his intrenchments.

It was very fortunate for us that this opening in front of their
trenches was not any wider, for we were able to charge across it with
a cheer that demoralized the enemy and before he could recover from
it our men had driven him out.

THE FIRING WAS CONTINUED UNTIL WE ARRIVED AT CALABA, where

a halt was made. ... I gave permission to Ballance, who was
chafing at the delay, to proceed forward.

After leaving Calaba the road to San Isidro forks, . . . When
Ballance arrived there with his advance guard he learned that part of
the forces of the enemy had gone on each road, so he sent part of his
battalion on each road, and reported to me the situation. I directed
Captain Rivers with two troops (dismounted), Fourth Cavalry, and
Scott and Lowenberg with four guns of the battery and dismounted
troop Thirty-seventh U. S. Volunteers, to report to Ballance. The
latter proceeded down the direct road with these troops and two com-
panies of infantry. . . .



67

SKIRMISH AND CAPTURE OF SAN ISIDRO.

i

Ballance threw a line of skirmishers on both sides of the road,
which he preceded by his scouts, the artillery in the center moving
up the road and the dismounted cavalry in support.



The extreme difficulties encountered by the infantry in the for-
ward movement were surmounted with an efficiency and cheerfulness
that won the admiration of those of the other branches of the service
present and cemented a friendship and regard for each other that
lasted throughout the campaign.

This column had not proceeded far from Calaba before it encoun-
tered the skirmishers of the enemy. The firing and skirmishing kept
up for two miles to San Isidro, through that town on the Gapan road,
past the barrio of San Nicolas, where the last dead insurgent was seen.
It being nearly dark, Ballance was recalled from the pursuit. Owing to
the rapidity of our advance and the fact that we were fighting all the
way until nearly dark, we were unable that day to search for the dead in
the trenches where they fell, but on the following day a searching party
was sent to collect the dead in the fields and thickets, and especially
those who had been seen lying in the trenches, but it was found that
every inch passed over by our skirmish line had been thoroughly
searched and every body and everything else had been carried away.
Not even an empty cartridge shell could be found. (See Ballance's
report, Appendix 9.) The enemy's loss is known to be heavy, particu-
larly in the trenches at Calaba, the opposing forces at that time only
being a few yards apart, but we do know of one officer and 12 men
that were killed and one officer and five men wounded. . . . The
forces opposed to us did not seem to exceed 700 or 800 on east bank
and 100 on west bank.

THE RAPID AND BEAUTIFUL TACTICAL WORK OF BALLANCE, WHO

BRAVELY KEPT UP WITH HIS SCOUTS, and supplied emergency demands for
tactical changes without a moment's hesitation, and the intrepid, daring
and brilliant actions of the officers of the command WERE NOT EXACTLY
SURPRISES TO ME, for I knew their ability, BUT THEY EXCITED MY

ADMIRATION.

I FOUND AS A GENERAL, THAT AFTER making a disposition of my
forces and GIVING GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BALLANCE, NO MATTER
WHAT FORCES HE HAD IN HIS COMMAND, ALL I HAD TO DO WAS TO
COMMAND "FORWARD" TO HAVE MY PLANS ACCOMPLISHED IN THE BEST

MANNER



68

I SPECIALLY SELECTED BALLANCE's BATTALION, AS I KNEW ITS
METAL AND TRAINING. I HAD KNOWN ITS COMMANDER FOR MANY
YEARS, AND I KNEW HE WOULD ACCOMPLISH WHAT HE WAS ORDERED
TO DO.

I was fully cognizant of the dangers of ordinary war which it
would have to undergo, but I did not anticipate all the obstacles and
hardships which it did encounter and overcome, in the way of trop-
ical deluges, mud and water, the swimming, bridging and rafting of
innumerable streams, most of which were not on the maps.

WHETHER IT WAS REQUIRED TO GO ON A RECONNOISSANCE, MAKE
AN ATTACK, CARRY AN INTRENCHMENT, SWIM A RIVER, FLOUNDER
THROUGH A SWAMP, OR BRIDGE A STREAM, HIS BATTALION WAS ALWAYS
READY AND WILLING AND PERFORMED THE DUTY WITHOUT A MURMUR
OR COMPLAINT, ALTHOUGH MANY OF ITS MEMBERS WERE AT TIMES
WITHOUT FOOD, SHELTER, BLANKETS OR SHOES, AND ALMOST NAKED.
A STRAGGLER OF THIS COMMAND WAS NEVER SEEN, AND THEIR FIRE DIS-
CIPLINE WAS MOST EXCELLENT.

WITHOUT REFLECTING IN THE LEAST ON THE MANY OTHER EXCEL-
LENT BATTALIONS IN THE ARMY, I CONSIDER THIS BATTALION AS THE
FINEST AND MOST EFFICIENT ONE I HAVE EVER SEEN IN THE AMERICAN
ARMY.

IT SKIRMISHED AND FOUGHT THROUGH MILES OF MUD AND WATER
AND JUNGLE, AHEAD OF MY CAVALRY, FROM ARAYAT TO CABANATUAN,
AND FROM THERE ON IT DID MOST REMARKABLE WORK IN THE FACE OF
THE GREATEST DIFFICULTIES.

ITS MARCH FROM HuMINGAN TO ROSALES, WHEN IT CUT LOOSE
FROM EVERYTHING BUT ITS GUNS AND AMMUNITION, AND FOUGHT ITS
WAY INTO THE VERY HEART OF THE ENEMY^S COUNTRY, WHERE IT WAS
LIABLE AT ANY TIME TO RUN INTO A FORCE TEN TIMES ITS STRENGTH,
EXHIBITED A DARING AND ACHIEVED A SUCCESS WHICH MUST EVER
SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO MILITARY STUDENTS OF WHAT CAN BE ACCOM-
PLISHED BY A COMPARATIVELY SMALL MILITARY FORCE PROPERLY DISCI-
PLINED AND COMMANDED.

It was a matter of extreme regret to me that an emergency
should have arisen in which it was thought necessary to take this
battalion from my command, and thus deprive me of its valuable
services.

I BELIEVE THAT ITS SUCCESSFUL MARCH TO ROSALES CAUSED THE
EVACUATION OF BAUTISTA BY AN INSURGENT FORCE SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE
ANY OTHER TROOPS WERE NEAR THERE, AND HAD AS MUCH TO DO WITH
THE DISINTEGRATION OF AGUINALDO's ARMY AS ANY OTHER ONE EVENT.



(if)

At the time this battalion started on its hazardous and daring
march from Humingan to Resales, it was not known how demoralized
Aguinaldo's army was, and SOME THOUGHT THAT BALLANCE HAD GONE

TO DESTRUCTION AND WERE CONSEQUENTLY VERY ANXIOUS ABOUT HIM.
AND ALTHOUGH VERY DESIROUS OF LEARNING THE RESULT OF HIS MARCH,
I HAD NO FEARS, FOR I KNEW HE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL EVEN IF HE
ENCOUNTERED AGUINALDO'S ENTIRE ARMY. I HOPE THE OFFICERS OF
THIS BATTALION WILL RECEIVE THE REWARD WHICH THE VALUABLE
SERVICE THEY HAVE RENDERED TO THEIR COUNTRY HAS EARNED.



Notwithstanding the miserable state of the roads, I moved out
out from San Isidro at 5:30 a. m. on Oct. 27, crossing the Gapan River
near its mouth, and proceeded up the road toward Santa Rosa with
Ballance's battalion.

ADVANCE ON SANTA ROSA.

AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FORWARD MOVEMENT BALLAXCE

WAS IN ADVANCE, having his battalion divided escorting the artillery,
but owing to the delay occasioned by the necessity of repairing bridges
to cross the artillery, he was directed to push on with the advance
guard without the artillery.

The country between San Isidro and Santa Rosa, a distance of
10 miles, is traversed by six deep streams, with perpendicular, bluff
banks. Over the first the Rio Chico de Gapan, a rope ferry had been com-
pleted by Lt. Cakes and his engineer detachment. Bridges were con-
structed over the second and third, under cover of Ballance's column,
using old piers of former bridges. AT THE FOURTH, THE TAMBO

RlVER, A FLOATING BAMBOO BRIDGE WAS CONSTRUCTED BY SOLDIERS OF

BALLANCE'S BATTALION STRIPPED AND WORKING IN WATER 5 to 8 FEET
DEEP. The intrenchments on north side were strong and occupied
by one company of the Manila battalion, BUT BALLANCE'S MEN SENT
THEM FLYING LIKE CHAFF DRIVEN BY A WHIRLWIND.

SKIRMISH AT TAMBO BARRIO.

About a mile beyond the intrenchments on the right bank of the
Tambo River, a company of insurgents were seen hastening toward
the Rio Grande River, presumably to attack the gunboat Laguna de
Bay, which was in the river.

Stone's company engaged them, and finally dispersed them so
effectually that they were never seen again.



70

FIGHT AT TABOATIN RIVER.

Several miles beyond the place where the skirmish in Tambo barrio
took place, the advance guard encountered an outpost of the enemy,
which was driven back across the Taboatin River.

Information was received that the enemy had been reinforced by
the arrival of 1,000 men the evening previous, and had taken up a
position at the crossing of the river, on the opposite bank.

Ballance pushed forward the advance guard along the road until
near where the road crossed the Taboatin River, where a halt was made
to give the flanking command time to reach their position.

Ballance moved one of his companies, under cover of the growing
rice and the grass and bushes, in skirmish line opposite the position of
the enemy, the men crawling through the mud and water until within
comparatively a few yards from the trenches across the river.

The enemy were taken by surprise, as they did not know we were
so near, but soon recovered and replied very vigorously from behind
their intrenchments. Our men, by filling their magazines, were able
to keep up such a continuous fire that THE ENEMY BECAME AFRAID TO

RAISE THEIR HEADS ABOVE THE INTRENCHMENTS, BUT PLACED THE GUNS
ON THE CREST OF THE PARAPET ABOVE THEIR HEADS AND POINTED THEM
IN OUR DIRECTION AND PULLED THE TRIGGERS.

The enemy's fire soon slackened, but it was necessary to drive them
from the trenches, but, as it was impracticable to cross the river in
front of the works, PART OF BALLANCE'S BATTALION MOVED UP THE

RIVER ABOUT A HALF MILE WHERE A PLACE WAS FOUND THAT COULD
BE CROSSED. THIS WAS DONE BY WADING, SWIMMING, AND PADDLING
OVER ON BAMBOO POLES BY THOSE WHO COULD NOT SWIM.

Enemy lost 13 killed and 26 wounded. PART OF BALLANGERS BAT-
TALION SWAM THE RIVER AND CROSSED ON BAMBOO RAFTS HURRIEDLY

CONSTRUCTED. The battery with guns dismounted was rafted across
by men swimming and towing, first crossing a carriage and then a
gun. The infantry who could swim towed their comrades who could
not swim over on bamboo rafts, and all pushed on into Santa Rosa
4 miles distant, . . . The magnificent, fearless and rapid work of
all the officers and soldiers of my command engaged in the action, and

ESPECIALLY THE SPLENDID FIRE DISCIPLINE EXHIBITED BY BALLANCE'S

BATTALION, and Scott's battery at close range, INSPIRED ME WITH



71

FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE BELIEF THAT WITH THE OFFICERS OF HIGH
ABILITY AND THESE TRAINED SOLDIERS WHO ENJOYED A DASH INTO THE
JAWS OF DEATH AS A RECOMPENSE FOR A FORCED MARCH THROUGH
SLOUGHS OF DESPOND WHICH WOULD HAVE BARRED CHRISTIAN'S PROGRESS
IN HIS PILGRIMAGE, I COULD DEFEAT, SMASH, OR SCATTER ALL FORCES
AGUINALDO AND HIS GENERALS COULD CONCENTRATE AT ANY GIVEN
POINT TO DEFEAT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF MY OBJECT.

THE CLOTHING OF EVERY OFFICER AND ENLISTED MAN IN TH1.
COMMAND WAS NOT ONLY SOAKED WITH WATER, BUT ALSO COVERED

WITH MUD. . . .

THIS MARCH OF TEN MILES, INCLUDING 7 MILES OF FIGHTING,
BRIDGING, RAFTING AND SWIMMING NUMEROUS DIFFICULT STREAMS,
AND WITH THE DEPRESSING INFLUENCE OF HOT TROPICAL SUNS, ENDING
IN THE DEFEAT, ROUT AND TOTAL DEMORALIZATION OF THE ENEMY,
ESTABLISHED SUPREME MILITARY CONFIDENCE BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS

AND BETWEEN OFFICERS AND MEN, which in turn begets self-confidence ;
and these two properties in trained soldiers insures success in all
carefully planned battles where success is possible and has been
determined on.

CAPTURE OF CABANATUAN.

The next point to be taken was Cabanatuan. ... It also con-
tained an arsenal for the manufacture of ammunition. ON THE 3OTH
BALLANCE MOVED FORWARD, DROVE OUT THE ENEMY, AND CAPTURED
CABANATUAN. . . . Ballance is very anxious to have 10 pack ponies
to each company. All his officers agree that they can leave the wagons
for five days with 10 pack ponies to a company. With Batson's scouts,
Ballance's battalion. Scott's battery, and three squadrons cavalry,
I could cut loose from train at San Jose and _ occupy the towns of
Tayug and San Nicolas.



On Nov. 6th I published the following order:

Cabanatuan, P. I., Nov 6, 1899.
FIELD ORDERS.

No. 7.

i . This command will prepare immediately for a move to the
front. All surplus weight and articles must be discarded from man,
animal and wheel transportation.



72
2.. Order of march for tomorrow :



3. Battalion Twenty-second Infantry, Captain Ballance com-
manding.

*****

By the command of Brigadier General Young.



A courier was dispatched to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilder, in charge
of my headquarters at San Quintin, with the following instructions :

Send orders to Colonel Parker at Humingan to hurry up Chase,
if he has arrived there, and to send forward Batson with Macabebes
as soon as Ballance arrives. Direct Parker to leave two guns moun-
tain battery with Ballance to hold Humingan. . . .

That night, Ballance, in Humingan, was ordered to march next
day to Resales with his battalion and two guns.



CAPTURE OF ROSALES.

On the 1 3th I directed Ballance to leave Humingan with his
battalion and two pieces of artillery for Resales, with the intention
of getting in rear of Aguinaldo, clearing the road, capturing Resales,
and uniting in the attack on Urdaneta, where it was reported there
were 2,000 insurgents.

Ballance encountered the insurgents at several points and routed
them, found the bridges damaged, which he repaired. At the Matablan
River the enemy was encountered. He had destroyed the bridge, and
from opposite bank disputed the passage of the river. A flank attack
caused him to retreat to Resales, which place was captured that even-
ing, the enemy leaving at one end as Ballance entered the other.

He captured here a large amount of insurgent stores, rice, stamped
writing paper, printing paper, seven wooden boxes of postage stamps,
uniforms, underwear, etc., and a great many of the official records,
of the insurgent government.

Ballance constructed a raft and ferried his troops across the Agno,
which was at the time a raging torrent, having had an unusual rise
on account of the constant rains.

At Villasis he received an order from me to proceed to Binalonan.
On his road thither, in passing through Urdaneta, he was received
by the people with a band of music amid great rejoicing and the
ringing of bells.



I remained with my staff and orderlies at Asingan until Batson's
column reached there, and sent him by way of Urdaneta to Yillasis
to connect with Ballance at Rosales.



The promise of a rich money reward secured two native couriers,
who started at 1 1 p. m. to communicate orders to Ballance and Batson.
The following dispatch was sent :

"Lieutenant-Colonel Wessells, Tayug: ... I have sent dis-
patches tonight ordering Batson from Villasis to Binalonan, also Bal-
lance, if he is there.



. . . Ballance, with battalion Twenty-second Infantry, was
detained at San Fabian, by whose order or for what purpose was
unknown to me.

**

The endurance of the men of my command surpasses the belief
of a non-participant, and is beyond any ever encountered by an Ameri-
can army.

It traveled over miles of road which were always wet and muddy,
sometimes only a few inches deep, at other places two feet, sometimes
covered with a little water, at others waist deep, and at others the
bed of a torrent ; wading, swimming, rafting and bridging innumerable
streams, torrents, rivers and lagoons ; poorly clad and shod and
generally hungry. My command subsisted on a ration from which,
after leaving Arayat, all vegetable portions had been eliminated and
from which, after leaving San Isidro, half the meat and bread ration
was taken away. After leaving San Jose, all issues of rations ceased
and the men had to live on what they could find in the country, ( which
had been largely desolated by the insurgents) supplemented by such
parts of the ration as they could obtain from time to time, until they
got to San Fabian.



The officers and soldiers of my command are entitled to the highest
and best substantial recognition that it is possible to give to men who
who have given to their country's cause the best that is in them,
regardless of life, health, food and shelter.

They clung to the main purpose for which the campaign was
inaugurated and pursued the course laid out for them with a tenacity
of purpose and a physical endurance which I think far exceeded the
highest expectation or belief of their country, as they certainly did
of their general.



74

I thank them all sincerely for their loyalty, cheerfulness under the
most trying conditions imaginable, and their devotion to duty, with-
out which all my efforts would have been of little avail.

**

Very respectfully,

(Signed) S. B. M. YOUNG,

Brigadier-General, U. S. A.
EXHIBIT 32.

MAJOR GENERAL (LATER LIEUT. GENERAL) MACARTHUR'S LETTER TO
BOARD FOR EXAMINING OFFICERS, COMMENDING CAPTAIN BAL-
LANCE FOR "HlS ENERGY AND GOOD CONDUCT/'

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.

Bautista, P. I. January 19, 1900.
President Board for Examining Officers for Promotion,

Manila, P. I.
Sir:

Captain John G. Ballance, 22d U. S. Infantry, has served with
great distinction and marked efficiency since his arrival in Luzon.
He has been mentioned in letters and reports on several occasions,
especially with reference to the fights at Malinta on March 26th,
1899, at Matamo October ist, and near Arayat on October 4th 1899

HlS ENERGY AND GOOD CONDUCT ENTITLE HIM TO THE HIGHEST
POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING HIS FITNESS FOR PROMOTION.

I therefore take great pleasure in making the foregoing statement
for consideration by the Board in Captain Ballance 's approaching exami-
nation for promotion.

Very respectfully,
(Signed) ARTHUR MACARTHUR,

Major General, U.S. Vols.
EXHIBIT 33.

MAJOR GENERAL LAWTON'S REPORT OF AN EXPEDITION TO THE PROVINCES
NORTH OF MANILA FROM SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1899, COM-
MENDING "THE SUPERB HEROISM, THE INDOMITABLE WILL AND
UNSURPASSED CAPACITY OF THAT SPLENDID OFFICER, CAPTAIN BAL-
LANCE/' PUBLISHED IN REPORT OF SECRETARY OF WAR, YEAR 1900,
VOL. I, PART 6, PAGE 6, ET SEQ.

Headquarters, First Div., 8th Army Corps,

Manila, P. I. April 5, 1900.
The Adjutant-General,

Department of the Pacific & Eighth Army Corps.
Sir: I have the honor to state that in consequence of the death
of Major General H. W. Lawton, and pursuant to the instructions of



75

the chief of staff of the Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army
Corps, it becomes my duty to prepare and submit the report of the
operations of that part of the First Division, Eighth Army Corps,
participating in what is known as the Northern Expedition, which
was successfully concluded in December last.

After consultation with Major General Otis, the then department
commander, and in pursuance of his instructions, verbal and written,
the following outline plan of operations was decided upon to be carried
out by the troops belonging to the command of General Lawton.

First. By vigorous and rapid movements of the available troops
to take and hold the Rio Grande de la Pampanga line from San Luis
to San Isidro; thence north along said river as far as Cabanatuan,
and thence along the base of the mountains north to the Rio Agno,
near Taytig; and by thus covering all roads and trails to the east
prevent the escape of the enemy from the line of the railroad in that
direction.

Second. By prearrangement, a junction to be made as expedi-
tiously as possible at or near Tayug with a co-operating column from
the sea coast, and thus attain the rear of the enemy's principal forces
and cut off all chances of escape to the north and northeast. These
movements, if successful, would, in conjunction with others in the
south, result in the destruction of the enemy's army and the capture
of their capital, and would end the insurrection in northern Luzon.

Such is the general outline of the plan adopted, leaving the
appropriate details as to his command to be carried out within the
discretion of General Lawton, the division commander.

*

The troops for this expedition rendezvoused at San Fernando de
Pampanga, on the railroad, in the latter part of September and the
first part of October, 1890, under the immediate command of Brig.
Gen. S. B. M. Young. U.S.V., who had been so assigned.

As these movements and resulting engagements were mainly con-
ducted under the immediate command of General Young, the full
magnitude of their importance in execution and their splendid results
under almost insurmountable difficulties can best lx? understood by
reference to his clear and comprehensive report. ( Exhibit B.)

The immediate objective was Arayat, on the Pampanga River.



76

On October 12 Capt. J. G. Ballance reported to General Young


1 2 3 4 6 8 9 10 11 12 13

Online LibraryHoldridge Ozro CollinsThe military record of John Green Ballance → online text (page 6 of 13)