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BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.



KANT'S

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.



CRITIQUE



PURE EEASON,



TKAXSIATKD FBOM THE GEBMAN OF



IMMANUEL KANT.



BY

J. M. D. MEIKLEJOHN.



LONDON : GEORGE BELL AND SONS, YORK STREET,
COVENT GARDEN.

1890.



BACO DE VERULAMIO,

INSTAUEATIO MAGNA-PR^EFATIO.

D NOBIS IPSIS SILEMUS: DE BE AUTEM, QU^l AGITUE, PETIMU8:
UT HOMINES EAM NON OPINIONEM, BED OPUS ESSE COGITENT ;
AC PBO CEBTO HABEANT, NON SflCT^l NOS ALICUJCS, AUT PLAC-
ITI, SED UTILITATIS ET A.MPLITTJDINIS HUMANE FTJNDAMENTA

MOLIBI. DEINDE UT suis COMMODIS ^QUI IN COMMUNE CON-

SULANT ET IPSI IN PABTEM VENIANT. Pfi^TEBEA UT BENB
8PEBENT, NEQUE INSTAUBATIONEM NOSTBAM UT QUIDDAM INFI-
NITUM ET ULTBA MOBTALE FINGANT, ET ANIMO CONCIPIANT ;
QUUM BKVEBA SIT INFINITI BBBOKIS FINIS ET TEBM1NUS LE-
OITIXUS.



CONTENTS.



^ TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE xi

PREFACE TO THE FIBST EDITION OF THE CBTTIQ,TTE xrli

''PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION XXi>

INTRODUCTION.

^ I. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PURE AND EMPIRICAL KNOT-
LEDGE \

II. THE HUMAN INTELLECT, EVEN IN AN ONPHLLOSOPHICAL

STATE, IS IN POSSESSION OF CERTAIN COGNITIONS A PRIORI 2

III. PHILOSOPHY STANDS IN NEED OF A SCIENCE WHICH SHALL

DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITY. PRINCIPLES, AND EXTENT OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI 4

IV. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETI-
CAL JUDGMENTS 7

V. IN ALL THEORETICAL SCIENCES OF REASON, SYNTHETICAL

JUDGMENTS A PRIORI ARE CONTAINED AS PRINCIPLES . . 9

VI. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF PURE REASON 12

VII. IDEA AND DITL<?ION OF A PARTICULAR SCIENCE, UNDT.R THB

NAME OF A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 15

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.

PART FIRST. TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC.

\ 1. Introductory 21

SECT. I. OF SPACE.

2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 23

3. Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space 25

\ 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions 25

SECT. II. OF TIME.

6 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 28

\ 6. Transcendents Exposition of the Conception of Time 29

\ 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions 30

6 8. Elucidation. . , 32



**
I 9.



\ 9. General Remarks on Transcendental ^Esthetic .... . 36



CONTENTS.



PART SECOND. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

INTRODUCTION. IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL Looio.

I. Of Logic in general ............................ 45

II. Of Transcendental Logic ........................ 49

III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and

Dialectic .................................. 50

IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Tran-

scendental Analytic and Dialectic ............ 53

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. FIRST DIVISION.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. 1 : ..................... 64

ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTIONS. 2 .......................... 55

CH^P. I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure

Conceptions of the Understanding.
Introductory. & 3 .................................. 56

SECT. I. Of the Logical use of the Understanding in gene-

ral. 4 ..... ................................. 56

SECT. II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in

Judgments. 5 ............................... 5*

SECT. III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or

Categories. 6 ............................... 62

CHAP. II. OF THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF

THE UNDERSTANDING.
SECT. I. Of the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in ge-

neral. 9 ................................... 71

Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Catego-

ries. 10 .................................... 77

SECT. II. TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CON-

CEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre-
sentations given by Sense. $ 11 .................. . . 80

Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. 612 81
The Principle of the Synthetical Uaity of Apperception is
the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understand-
ing. 13 ...................................... 84

What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. 14 ....... 86

The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective
Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained
therein. 15 .................................... g$

All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as
Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of
them can be united in one Consciousness. 16 ........ 88

Observations. 17 .................................. gg

In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is
the only legitimate use of the Category. 18 .......... 90



CONTENTS.



Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses
in general. 20 .................................. 92

Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible em-
ployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the
Understanding. 23 ............................. 97

Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Under-
standing. 6 23 .................................. 101

Short view of the above Deduction .................... 103

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. BOOK II.

ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES ........................... 103

INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of Judg-

ment in general .................... 104

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTBINE or THE FACULTY or JUDG-
MENT, OB ANALYTIC OF PEINCIPLES.

CHAP. I. Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Un-

derstanding .................................. 107

CHAP. II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding ____ 112

SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING.
SECT. I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical

Judgments ............................ 115

SECT. II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical

Judgments ............................ 117

SECT. III. Systematic Representations of all Synthetical

Principles of the Pure Understanding ...... 120

I. Axioms of Intuition ........................ 122

II. Anticipations of Perception ........ . ....... 125

III. Analogies of Experience ................ 132

A. First Analogy. Principle of the Permanence
ofSubstance ............................ 136

B. Second Analogy. Principle of the Succession

of Time ................................ Ui

C. Third Analogy. Principle of Co-existence .. 166
IV. The Postulates of Empirical Thought ........ 161

Refutation of Idealism ...................... 166

General Remark on the System of Principles ............ 174

CHAP. III. Of the Ground of the division of all objects into Phe-

nomena and Noumena .......................... 178

APPENDIX. Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the
Conceptions of Reflection from the Confusion of
the Transcendental with the Empirical use of
the Understanding ........................ 190

Remark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of
Reflection ................................ 194



viii CONTENTS.

Pag*

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC SECOND DIVISION.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.

I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance 209

II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Ap-
pearance . ,

A. OF REASON IN GENERAL 212

B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON 214

C. OF THE PUKE USE OF REASON 216

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I.

OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASOW 219

SECT. I. Of Ideas in General 221

SECT. II. Of Transcendental Ideas 225

SECT. III. System of Transcendental Ideas 233

BOOK II. OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OP PURE

REASON . 237

CHAP I. OF THE PARALOGISMS OP PUBB REASON 237

Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub-
stantiality or Permanence of the Soul 245

Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralo-
gism 251

General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psy-
chology to Cosmology 253

CHAP. II. THE ANTINOMY OF PUBB REASON 255

' SECT. I. System of Cosmological Ideas 256

SECT. II. Antithetic of Pure Reason 263

First Antinomy 266

Second Antinomy 271

Third Antinomy 278

Fourth Antinomy 284

SECT. III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-Contra-

dictions 290

SECT. IV. Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of
presenting a Solution of its Transcendental

Problems 298

SECT. V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems

presented in the four Transcendental Ideas . . . 303
SECT. VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution

of Pure Cosmological Dialectic 307

SECT. VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmologica A Problems . . 310
SECT. VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation

to the Cosmological Ideas 316

SBCT. IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle
of Reason, with regard to the Cosmological
Ideas .221



CONTENTS. IX

Page
1. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the

Composition of Phenomena in the Universe 322

II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of

the Division of a Whole given in Intuition 325

Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcen-
dental Mathematical Ideas and Introductory to the

Solution of the Dynamical Ideas 328

III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality
of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their

Causes 33C

Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Uni-
versal Law of Natural Necessity 333

Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom
in Harmony with the universal Law of Natural

Necessity 335

IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality

of the Dependence of Phaenomenal Existences .... 345
Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure
Reason 349

CHAP, in. THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON.

SECT. I. Of the Ideal in General 350

SECT. II. Of the Transcendental Ideal 352

SECT. III. Of the Arguments Employed by Speculative Reason

in Proof of the Existence or a Supreme Being 359
SBCT. IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the

Existence of God 364

SBCI. V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of

the Existence of God 370

PC tection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illu-
sion in all Transcendental Arguments for the

Existence of a Necessary Being 377

SECT. VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological

Proof 381

SECT. VII. -Critique :f all Theology based upon Speculative

Principles of Reason 387

Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pare

Reason 394

Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of
Human Reason . , 4 1C



TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD 431

CHAP. I. THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON 432

SECT. I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dog-
matism 439

SECT. II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics 449

SECT. III. The Discipline of Pure Reason iu Hypothesis 467

SECT. IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs 47 f>



X CONTENTS.

Page

CHAP. II. THE CANON OF PUKE REASON 482

SECT. I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason * 483

SECT. IL Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter-
mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure

Reason 487

SECT. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 496

CHAP. in. THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON 503

CHAP. IV. THE HISTORY OF PUBE REASON . .515



TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.



1 1 HE following translation has been undertaken with the hope
of rendering Kant's JLritik der reinen Vernunft intelligible to
the English student.

The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator
of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was
a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after
nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his
own system. But the Horatian rule of

Verba praevisam rem non invita sequentur,

will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex-
pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a
great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what
could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a
few. The main statement in his sentences is often over-
laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ;
and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great
difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages
which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses
sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with
a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course
of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant,
as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve



Xii TRANSLATOR^ PREFACE.

years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it
He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits,
and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcinigs-
berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso-
phy, and to enounce ideas that were entirely to revolutionise
European thought. On the other hand, there are many
excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often
as precise and forcible as his thought; and, in some of
his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and
powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs
pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so
violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter-
mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy
of comprehension.

A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it
been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present.
But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint-
ance with the German language, and still less with his subject.
A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between
the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only
interpreting medium has been the dictionary.

Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard
one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time,
illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent,
it has been his lot to be either unappreciated, misappre-
hended, or entirely neglected. Dugald Stewart did not
understand his system of philosophy as he had no proper
opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Nitsch *
and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English
philosophical public; Richardson and Hay wood "traduced"

* A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles
By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1796.

WilHch's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, 8vo. 1798.



TBINSLATOB'S PBEFACE. XU .

him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr.
Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely
of a selection of sentences from his own translation : a
mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject
more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there
is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to
be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting
Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics." All are
written by men who either took no pains to understand
Kant, or were incapable of understanding him.*

The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS.
translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by
Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise it, as he had
perceived it to be incorrect. After having laboured through
about eighty pages, I found, from the numerous errors and
inaccuracies pervading it, that hardly one-fifth of the original
MS. remained. I, therefore, laid it entirely aside, and com-
menced de novo. These eighty pages I did not cancel, be-
cause the careful examination which they had undergone,
made them, as I believed, not an unworthy representation of
the author.

* It is curious to observe, in all the English works written spe-
cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a
moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may
be considering, in his own words. Kitsch and Willich, who professed
to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators ; Haywood, even in
his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of " Beck's Principles
of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator's
Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated his
Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The same is the
case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises," (2 vols. 8vo.
London, 1798.) This person has written a preface to each of the volumes,
and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's
works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there
as bis own ; few being then able to detect the plagiarism.



riv

The second edition of the Kritik, from which all the sub-
sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed
in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main-
tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the
second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the
second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the
second a Verschlimmbesserung of the first; and that the
changes made by Kant, "in the weakness of old age," have
rendered it a " self- contradictory and mutilated work." I am
not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho-
penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet,
and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted
whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced
him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition,
whether fear could have induced a man of his character to
retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he
expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455
460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would
surrender what he believed to be truth, at the outcry of preju-
diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the " sacred doctrines
of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains,
less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition.
And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of
greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers,
however learned and profound.

No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of
Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain
errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But
the common editions, as well those printed during, as after
Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third
edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with
errors, at once misleading and annoying. Rosenkranz haa

* Of the present translation.



TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. Tt

made a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the
accuracy of which cannot be doubted.

It may be necessary to mention that it has been found
requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre-
sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im-
possible to translate the Kritik with the aid of the philoso-
phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new
expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim
pared detorta. Such is the verb intuit e for anschauen ; the
manifold in intuition has also been employed for das Manniff-
faltige der Anschauung, by which Kant designates the varied
contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology
has the merit of being precise and consistent.

Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to
the possibility of metaphysics whatever his estimate of the
utility of such discussions, the valua of Kant's work, as an
instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If
the present translation contribute in the least to the ad-
vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation
of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator
will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and
long-protracted labour.

J. M. D. M.



PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TION.-0 7 *1.)



HUMAN reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon
to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are
presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, jis
they transcend every faculty of the mind.

It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It
begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the
field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are,
at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles
it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever
higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers
that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete,
because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and
thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles
which transcend the region of experience, while they are
regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into
confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the
presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis-
cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the
limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The
arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysig.

Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and,
if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far
as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title
of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap con-
tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn
and forsaken, like Hecuba,

" Modo maxima rerum,
Tot generis, natisque potens . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inops."*

At first, her government, under the administration of the
* Ovid, Metamorphoses.



XVU1 PKEFACE TO THE FTRST EDITIOTT.

dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative
continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her
empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the
reign of anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who
hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living,
attacked from time to time those who had organised them-
selves into civil communities. But their number was, very
happily, small ; a-nd thus they could not entirely put a stop to
the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices,
although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the
hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the
legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of
the human understanding that of the celebrated Locke. But
it was found that, although it was affirmed that this so-called
queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than
that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily
brought suspicion on her claims, as this genealogy was
incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims
to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell hnolc jntp
the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again
Became obnoxious to the contempt froinwhich efforts had been
made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the
general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns
nought but weariness and complete indifferentism the mother
of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same
time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and
reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion,
obscurity, and disuse from ill- directed effort.

For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such
inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they
may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular
style and by changes on the language of the schools, un
avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions,
which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At
the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world
of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which
we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that
well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not
the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the

We very often hear compluints of the shallowness of the present age,



PEEFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. Xll

age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory



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