of the world or an absolute space outside the real world,
which is impossible. I have nothing to say against the
latter part of this opinion, as held by the philosophers
of the school of Leibniz. Space is only the form of ex-
ternal intuition, and not a real object that could be
perceived externally, nor is it a correlate of pheno-
mena, but the form itself of phenomena. Space,
therefore, cannot exist absolutely (by itself) as a
determination in the existence of things, because it
is no object, but only the form of possible objects.
Although therefore things, as phenomenal, may deter-
mine space, that is, impart reality to one or other of
its predicates (quantity and relation), space, as some-
thing existing by itself, cannot determine the reality
of things in regard to space or form, because it is
nothing real in itself. Although space therefore
(whether full or empty *) may be limited by pheno-
mena, phenomena cannot be limited by empty [p. 433]
space outside them. The same applies to time. But,
granting all this, it cannot be denied that we should
be driven to admit these two monsters, empty space

1 It is easily seen that what we wish to say is that empty space,
so far as limited by phenomena, that is, space within the world, does
not at least contradict transcendental principles, and may he ad-
mitted, therefore, so far as they are concerned, though by this its
possibility is not asserted.



374 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis,
successive states cannot have elapsed up to any given
(the present) moment, and that the world therefore
must have a beginning.

With regard to the second part of the thesis, the
difficulty of an endless and yet past series does not
exist ; for the manifold of a world, infinite in exten-
sion, is given at one and the same time. But, in order
to conceive the totality of such a multitude of things,
as we cannot appeal to those limits which in intuition
produce that totality by themselves, we must render
an account of our concept, which in our case cannot
proceed from the whole to the determined multitude
of the parts, but has to demonstrate the possibility
of a whole by the successive synthesis of the parts.
As such a synthesis would constitute a series that
would never be completed, it is impossible to conceive
a totality either before it, or through it. For the
concept of totality itself is in this case the represent-
ation of a completed synthesis of parts, and such a
completion, and therefore its concept also, is impos-
sible.



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 375

Antithesis,
outside, and empty time before the world, if we
assumed a limit of the world, whether in space or
time.

For as to the plea by which people try to escape
from the conclusion, that if the world has limits in
time or space, the infinite void would determine the
existence of real things, so far as their dimensions
are concerned, it is really no more than a covered
attempt at putting some unknown intelligible world
in the place of our sensuous world, and an existence
in general, which presupposes no other condition in the
world, in the place of a first beginning (an existence
preceded by a time of non-existence), and boundaries
of the universe in place of the limits of extension,
thus getting rid of time and space. But we have to
deal here with the mundus phxnomenon and its
quantity, and we could not ignore the conditions of
sensibility, without destroying its very essence. The
world of sense, if it is limited, lies necessarily within
the infinite void. If we ignore this, and with it,
space in general, as an a priori condition of the pos-
sibility of phenomena, the whole world of sense
vanishes, which alone forms the object of our enquiry.
The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the general
concept of any world, which takes no account of any
of the conditions of intuition, and which therefore
admits of no synthetical proposition, whether affir-
mative or negative.



376 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis.



[p. 434] THE ANTINOMY

SECOND CONFLICT OF THE
Thesis.
Every compound substance in the world consists
of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the
simple, or what is composed of it.

Proof.

For let us assume that compound substances did
not consist of simple parts, then, if all composition is
removed in thought, there would be no compound
part, and (as no simple parts are admitted) no simple
part either, that is, there would remain nothing, and
there would therefore be no substance at all. Either,
therefore, we cannot possibly remove all composition
in thought, or, after its removal, there must remain
something that exists without composition, that is
the simple. In the former case the compound could
not itself consist of substances (because with them
composition is only an accidental relation of sub-
stances, which substances, as permanent beings, must
subsist without it). As this contradicts the [p. 43 6 ]
supposition, there remains only the second view,
namely, that the substantial compounds in the world
consist of simple parts.

It follows as an immediate consequence that all
the things in the world are simple beings, that their
composition is only an external condition, and that,
though we are unable to remove these elementary



TKANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. T>77

Antithesis.



OF PUKE KEASON. [p. 435]

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

Antithesis.

No compound thing in the world consists of simple
parts, and there exists nowhere in the world any-
thing simple.

Proof.

Assume that a compound thing, a substance, con-
sists of simple parts. Then as all external relation,
and therefore all composition of substances also, is
possible in space only, it follows that space must
consist of as many parts as the parts of the compound
that occupies the space. Space, however, does not
consist of simple parts, but of spaces. Every part of
a compound, therefore, must occupy a space. Now
the absolutely primary parts of every compound are
simple. It follows therefore that the simple occupies
a space. But as everything real, which occupies a
space, contains a manifold, the parts of which are by
the side of each other, and which therefore is com-
pounded, and compounded not of accidents (for these
could not exist by the side of each other, without a
substance), but of substances, it would follow that the
simple is a substantial compound, which is self-con-
tradictory.

The second proposition of the antithesis, that there
exists nowhere in the world anything simple, is not
intended to mean more than that the exist- [p. 437]



37 '8 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis,
substances from their state of composition and isolate
them, reason must conceive them as the first subjects
of all composition, and therefore, antecedently to it,
as simple beings.



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 379

Antithesis,
ence of the absolutely simple cannot be proved from
any experience or perception, whether external or
internal, and that the absolutely simple is a mere
idea, the objective reality of which can never be
shown in any possible experience, so that in the
explanation of phenomena it is without any appli-
cation or object. For, if we assumed that an object
of this transcendental idea might be found in expe-
rience, the empirical intuition of some one object
would have to be such as to contain absolutely nothing
manifold by the side of each other, and combined to
a unity. But as, from our not being conscious of
such a manifold, we cannot form any valid conclusion
as to the entire impossibility of it in any objective
intuition, and as without this no absolute simplicity
can be established, it follows that such simplicity
cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever.
As therefore an absolutely simple object can never be
given in any possible experience, while the world of
sense must be looked upon as the sum total of all
possible experience, it follows that nothing simple
exists in it.

This second part of the antithesis goes far beyond
the first, which only banished the simple from the
intuition of the composite, while the second drives it
out of the whole of nature. Hence we could not
attempt to prove it out of the concept of any given
object of external intuition (of the compound), but
from its relation to a possible experience in general.



380 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis.



[p. 438] OBSEKVATIONS ON THE

I.

On the Thesis.

If I speak of a whole as necessarily consisting of
separate parts, I understand by it a substantial
whole, as a real compound, that is, that contingent
unity of the manifold, which, given as separate (at
least in thought) is brought into a mutual connection,
and thus constitutes one whole. We ought not to
call space a compositum, but a totum, because in it
its parts are possible only in the whole, and not the
whole by its parts. It might therefore be called a
compositum ideate, but not reale. But this is an un-
necessary distinction. As space is no compound of
substances, not even of real accidents, nothing re-
mains of it, if I remove all composition in it, not
even the point, for a point is possible only as the
limit of a space, and therefore of a compound, [p. 440]
Space and time do not therefore consist of simple
parts. What belongs only to the condition of a sub-
stance, even though it possesses quantity (as, for
instance, change) does not consist of the simple ; that
is to say, a certain degree of change does not arise
through the accumulation of many simple changes.
We can infer the simple from the compound in self-
subsisting objects only. Accidents of a state, however,
are not self-subsisting. The proof of the necessity of
the simple, as the component part of all that is sub-
stantially composite, can only be injured, if it is ex-



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 38 1

Antithesis.

SECOND ANTINOMY. [p. 439]

n.

On the Antithesis.

Against the theory of the infinite divisibility of
matter, the proof of which is mathematical only,
objections have been raised by the Monadists, which
become suspicious by their declining to admit the
clearest mathematical proofs as founded on a true in-
sight into the quality of space, space being the formal
condition of the possibility of all matter, but treating
them only as conclusions derived from abstract but
arbitrary concepts, which ought not to be applied to
real things. But how is it possible to conceive a dif-
ferent kind of intuition from that given in the original
intuition of space, and how can its determinations a
priori not apply to everything, since it becomes
possible only by its filling that space % If we were
to listen to them, we should have to admit, beside
the mathematical point, which is simple, but no part,
but only the limit of a space, other physical points,
simple likewise, but possessing this privilege that, as
parts of space, they are able, by mere aggregation,
to fill space. Without repeating here the many
clear refutations of this absurdity, it being quite
futile to attempt to reason away by purely discur-
sive concepts the evidence of mathematics, I only
remark, that if philosophy in this case seems to play
tricks with mathematics, it does so because [p. 441]
it forgets that in this discussion we are concerned



382 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis,
tended too far, and applied to all compounds without
distinction, as has often been the case.

I am, however, speaking here of the simple only
so far as it is necessarily given in the composite,
which can be dissolved into the former, as its com-
ponent parts. The true meaning of the word [p. 442]
Monas (as used by Leibniz), should refer to that
simple only, which is given immediately as simple
substance (in self-consciousness), and not as an element
of the composite, in which case it is better called an
Atomus l . As I wish to prove the existence of simple
substances, as the elements of the composite only, I
might call the thesis 2 of the second antinomy tran-
scendental Atomistic. But as this word has long been
used - as the name of a particular explanation of
material phenomena (moleculse) and presupposes,
therefore, empirical concepts, it will be better to call
it the dialectic principle of monadology.

1 As Rosenkranz remarks, atomus is here intentionally used by
Kant as a masculine, to distinguish it from the atomon, translated
by scholastic philosophers as inseparable, indiscernible, simplex, &c,
while with the Greek philosophers atomus is feminine.

2 Antithesis is a misprint.



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 383

Antithesis,
with phenomena only, and their conditions. Here,
however, it is not enough to find for the pure concept
of the composite the concept of the simple, but we
must find for the intuition of the composite (matter)
the intuition of the simple ; and this, according to the
laws of sensibility, and therefore with reference to
the objects of the senses, is totally impossible. Though
it may be true, therefore, with regard to a whole, con-
sisting of substances, which is conceived by the pure
understanding only, that before its composition there
must be the simple, this does not apply to the totum
substantiate phenomenon which, as an empirical in-
tuition in space, carries with it the necessary condition
that no part of it is simple, because no part of space
is simple. The monadists, however, have been clever
enough to try to escape from this difficulty, by not
admitting space as a condition of the possibility of
the objects of external intuition (bodies), but by ad-
mitting these and the dynamical relation of substances
in general as the condition of the possibility of space.
But we have no concept of bodies, except as pheno-
mena, and, as such, they presuppose space as the
necessary condition of the possibility of all external
phenomena. The argument of the monadists, there-
fore, is futile, and has been sufficiently answered in
the transcendental ^Esthetic. If bodies were things
by themselves, then, and then only, the argument of
the monadists would be valid.

The second dialectical assertion possesses [p. 443]
this peculiarity, that it is opposed by a dogmatical
assertion which, among all sophistical assertions, is
the only one which undertakes to prove palpably in



384 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis.



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 385

Antithesis,
an object of experience the reality of that which we
counted before as belonging only to transcendental
ideas, namely the absolute simplicity of a substance,
I mean the assertion that the object of the
internal sense, or the thinking I, is an absolutely
simple substance. Without entering upon this ques-
tion (as it has been fully discussed before), I only
remark, that if something is conceived as an object
only, without adding any synthetical determination
of its intuition (and this is the case in the bare re-
presentation of the I), it would no doubt be impos-
sible that anything manifold or composite could be
perceived in such a representation. Besides, as the
predicates through which I conceive this object, are
only intuitions of the internal sense, nothing can
occur in them to prove a manifold (one by the side of
another), and therefore a real composition. It follows,
therefore, from the nature of self-consciousness that,
as the thinking subject is at the same time its own
object, it cannot divide itself (though it might divide
its inherent determinations); for in regard to itself
every object is absolute unity. Nevertheless, when
this subject is looked up externally, as an object of
intuition, it would most likely exhibit some kind of
composition as a phenomenon, and it must always be
looked upon in this light, if we wish to know whether
its manifold constituent elements are by the side of
each other or not.



vol. II. c c



386 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis.

[p. 444] THE ANTINOMY

THIRD CONFLICT OF THE
Thesis.
Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not
the only causality from which all the phenomena of
the world can be deduced. In order to account for
these phenomena it is necessary also to admit
another causality, that of freedom.

Proof.

Let us assume that there is no other causality but
that according to the laws of nature. In that case
everything that takes place, presupposes an anterior
state, on which it follows inevitably according to a
rule. But that anterior state must itself be some-
thing which has taken place (which has come to be
in time, and did not exist before), because, if it had
always existed, its effect too would not have only
just arisen, but have existed always. The causality,
therefore, of a cause, through which something takes
place, is itself an event, which again, according to the
law of nature, presupposes an anterior state and its
causality, and this again an anterior state, and so on.
If, therefore, everything takes place according to
mere laws of nature, there will always be a [p. 446]
secondary only, but never a primary beginning, and
therefore no completeness of the series, on the side
of successive causes. But the law of nature consists
in this, that nothing takes place without a cause
sufficiently determined a priori. Therefore the pro-



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 387

Antithesis.

OF PUKE KEASON. [p. 445]

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

Antithesis.
There is no freedom, but everything in the world
takes place entirely according to the laws of nature.

Proof.

If we admit that there is freedom, in the tran-
scendental sense, as a particular kind of causality,
according to which the events in the world could
take place, that is a faculty of absolutely originating
a state, and with it a series of consequences, it would
follow that not only a series would have its absolute
beginning through this spontaneity, but the deter-
mination of that spontaneity itself to produce the
series, that is, the causality, would have an absolute
beginning, nothing preceding it by which this act is
determined according to permanent laws. Every
beginning of an act, however, presupposes a state in
which the cause is not yet active, and a dynamically
primary beginning of an act presupposes a state which
has no causal connection with the preceding state of
that cause, that is, in no wise follows from it. Tran-
scendental freedom is therefore opposed to the law of
causality, and represents such a connection [p. 447]
of successive states of effective causes, that no unity
of experience is possible with it. It is therefore an
empty fiction of the mind, and not to be met with in
any experience.

We have, therefore, nothing but nature, in which
c c 2



388 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis,
position that all causality is possible according to
the laws of nature only, contradicts itself, if taken in
unlimited generality, and it is impossible, therefore,
to admit that causality as the only one.

We must therefore admit another causality, through
which something takes place, without its cause being
further determined according to necessary laws by a
preceding cause, that is an absolute spontaneity of
causes, by which a series of phenomena, proceeding
according to natural laws, begins by itself ; we must
consequently admit transcendental freedom, without
which, even in the course of nature, the succession
of phenomena on the side of causes, can never be
perfect.



[p. 448] OBSERVATIONS ON THE

I.

On the Thesis.
The transcendental idea of freedom is far from
forming the whole content of the psychological con-
cept of that name, which is chiefly empirical, but
only that of the absolute spontaneity of action,
as the real ground of imputability ; it is, however,



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 389

Antithesis,
we must try to find the connection and order of cos-
mical events. Freedom (independence) from the laws
of nature is no doubt a deliverance from restraint, but
also from the guidance of all rules. For we cannot
say that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of free-
dom may enter into the causality of the course of
the world, because, if determined by laws, it would
not be freedom, but nothing else but nature. Nature,
therefore, and transcendental freedom differ from
each other like legality and lawlessness. The former,
no doubt, imposes upon the understanding the diffi-
cult task of looking higher and higher for the origin
of events in the series of causes, because their caus-
ality is always conditioned. In return for this, how-
ever, it promises a complete and well-ordered unity
of experience ; while, on the other side, the fiction of
freedom promises, no doubt, to the enquiring mind,
rest in the chain of causes, leading him up to an un-
conditioned causality, which begins to act by itself,
but which, as it is blind itself, tears the thread of
rules by which alone a complete and coherent experi-
ence is possible.

THIRD ANTINOMY. [p. 449]

II.

On the Antithesis.
He who stands up for the omnipotence of nature
(transcendental physiocracy), in opposition to the doc-
trine of freedom, would defend his position against the
sophistical conclusions of that doctrine in the following
manner. If you do not admit something mathematically



390 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Thesis.

the real stone of offence in the eyes of philosophy, which
finds its unsurmountable difficulties in admitting this
kind of unconditioned causality. That element in the
question of the freedom of the will, which has always
so much embarrassed speculative reason, is therefore in
reality transcendental only, and refers merely to the
question whether we must admit a faculty of spontane-
ously originating a series of successive things or states.
How such a faculty is possible need not be answered,
because, with regard to the causality, according to
the laws of nature also, we must be satisfied to know
a priori that such a causality has to be admitted,
though we can in no wise understand the possibility
how, through one existence, the existence of another
is given, but must for that purpose appeal to ex-
perience alone. The necessity of a first beginning
of a series of phenomena from freedom has been
proved so far only as it is necessary in order to
comprehend an origin of the world, while all suc-
cessive states may be regarded as a result in succession
according to mere laws of nature. But as [p. 45]
thus the faculty of originating a series in time by
itself has been proved, though by no means under-
stood, it is now permitted also to admit, within the
course of the world, different series, beginning by them-
selves, with regard to their causality, and to attribute
to their substances a faculty of acting with freedom.
But we must not allow ourselves to be troubled by a
misapprehension, namely that, as every successive
series in the world can have only a relatively primary
beginning, some other state of things always pre-
ceding in the world, therefore no absolutely primary



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 39 I

Antithesis.
the first in the world with reference to time, there is
no necessity why you should look for something dynami-
cally the first with reference to causality. Who has
told you to invent an absolutely first state of the world,
and with it an absolute beginning of the gradually
progressing series of phenomena, and this solely for
the sake of giving to your imagination something to
rest on, and to set limits to unlimited nature ? As
substances have always existed in the world, or as
the unity of experience renders at least such a sup-
position necessary, there is no difficulty in assuming
that a change of their states, that is, a series of their
changes, has always existed, so that there is no
necessity for looking for a first beginning either
mathematically or dynamically. It is true we can-
not render the possibility of such an infinite descent
comprehensible without the first member to which
everything else is subsequent. But, if for this reason
you reject this riddle of nature, you will feel your-
selves constrained to reject many synthetical funda-
mental properties (natural forces), which you cannot
comprehend any more, nay, the very possibility
of change in general would be full of [p. 45 1]
difficulties. For if you did not know from ex-
perience that change exists, you would never be
able to conceive a priori how such a constant suc-
cession of being and not being is possible.

And, even if the transcendental faculty of freedom
might somehow be conceded, to start the changes
of the world, such faculty would at all events have
to be outside the world, though it would always
remain a bold assumption to admit, outside the sum



392 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.