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Immanuel Kant.

Immanuel Kant's Critique of pure reason (Volume 2)

. (page 38 of 49)

and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, of which
logic knows nothing as to its existence, is thus at least
the problem of a systematical representation of the
existing diversity of powers. The logical principle of
reason requires us to produce this unity as far as pos-
sible, and the more we find that manifestations of one or
the other power are identical, the more probable does
it become that they are only different expressions of
one and the same power which, relatively speaking,
may be called their fundamental power. The same
is done with the others.

These relatively fundamental powers must again
be compared with each other, in order, if possible, by .
discovering their harmony, to bring them nearer to
one only radical, that is, absolute fundamental power.
Such a unity however is only an hypothesis of reason.
It is not maintained that such a unity must really
exist, but only that we must look for it in the
interest of reason, that is, for the establishment of
certain principles for the various rules supplied to
us by experience, and thus introduce syste- [p. 650]
matical Unity into our knowledge.

If, however, we watch the transcendental use of
the understanding, we find that the idea of a funda-
mental power is not only meant as a problem, and for
hypothetical use, but claims for itself objective reality,



558 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

postulating the systematical unity of the diverse
powers of a substance, and thus establishing an apo-
dictic principle of reason. For, without even having
tested the harmony of those diverse powers, nay, even
if failing to discover it, after repeated experiments,
we still suppose that such a unity exists, and this
not only, as in our example, on account of the unity
of the substance, but even in cases where very many,
though to a certain degree homogeneous, powers are
seen, as in matter in general. Here too, reason pre-
supposes a systematical unity of diverse powers, be-
cause particular laws of nature are subject to more
general laws, and parsimony in principles is not only
considered as an economical rule of reason, but as
an essential law of nature.

And indeed, it is difficult to understand, how a logical
principle by which reason demands the unity of rules
can exist without a transcendental principle, by which
. such a systematical unity is admitted as inherent in
the objects themselves, and as a priori necessary. For
how could reason in its logical application [p. 651]
presume to treat the diversity of powers which we
see in nature, as simply a disguised unity, and to
deduce it, as far as possible, from some fundamental
power, if it were open to reason to admit equally
the diversity of all powers and to look upon the
systematical unity in their derivation as contrary to
nature 1 In doing this reason would run counter to
its own destination, and propose as its aim an idea
contrary to the constitution of nature. Nor could
we say that reason had previously, according to its
principles, deduced that unity from the contingent



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 559

character of nature, because this law of reason, com-
pelling her to look for unity, is necessary, and without
it we should have no reason at all, and, in the absence
of reason, no coherent use of the understanding, and, in
the absence of that, no sufficient test of empirical truth ;
on which account we must admit the systematical
unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary.

We find this transcendental presupposition con-
cealed in the cleverest way in the principles of
philosophers, though they are not aware of it, nor
have confessed it to themselves. That all the di-
versities of particular things do not exclude identity
of species, that the various species must be treated
as different determinations (varieties) of a few [p. 652]
genera, and these again of still higher genera ; that
therefore we ought to look for a certain systematical
unity of all possible empirical concepts, as derivable
from higher and more general concepts, this is a
rule of the schools or a logical principle without
which no use of the understanding would be possible ;
for we can only conclude the particular from the
general, if the general qualities of things form the
foundation on which the particular rests.

That, however, there exists in nature such a unity,
is only a supposition of the philosophers, embodied in
their well known scholastic rule, ' entia prseter ne-
cessitatem non esse multiplicanda,' 'beginnings or
principles should not be multiplied beyond necessity.'
It is implied in this, that the nature of things itself
offers material for the postulated unity of reason,
and that the apparent infinite variety ought not to
prevent us from supposing behind it the existence



560 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

of unity in fundamental properties, from which all
diversity is derived by mere determination only.
That unity, though it is an idea only, has been at
all times so zealously pursued, that there was more
ground for moderating than for encouraging the
desire for it. It was something when chemists
succeeded in reducing all salts to two genera, namely,
acids and alkalies ; but they tried to consider even
this distinction as a variety only, or as a different
manifestation of one and the same funda- [p. 653]
mental element. Different kinds of earths (the mate-
rial of stones and even of metals) have been reduced
gradually to three, at last to two ; but not content
with this, chemists cannot get rid of the idea that
there is behind those varieties but one genus, nay,
that there may be even a common principle for the
earths and the salts. It might be supposed that this
is only an economical trick of reason, for the purpose
of saving itself trouble, and a purely hypothetical
attempt which, if successful, would impart by that
very unity a certain amount of probability to the
presupposed principle of explanation. Such a selfish
purpose, however, can easily be distinguished from
the idea according to which we all presuppose that
this unity of reason agrees with nature, and that in
this case reason does not beg but bids, although we
may be quite unable, as yet, to determine the limits
of that unity.

If there existed among phenomena so great a
diversity, not of form, for in this they may be similar,
but of contents, that even the sharpest human under-
standing could not, by a comparison of the one with



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 56 1

;he other, discover the slightest similarity among
:hem (a case which is quite conceivable), the logical
aw of genera would have no existence at all, [p. 654]
;here would be no concept of genus, nor any general
concept, nay, no understanding at all, considering
:hat the understanding has to do with concepts only.
The logical principle of genera presupposes, therefore,-
1 transcendental one, if it is to be applied to nature,
that is, to all objects presented to our senses. Ac-
3ording to it, in the manifoldness of a possible experi-
ance, some homogeneousness is necessarily supposed
(although it may be impossible to determine its degree
1 priori), because without it, no empirical concepts,
ind consequently no experience, would be possible.

The logical principle of genera, which postulates
identity, is balanced by another principle, namely, that
of species, which requires manifoldness and diversity
in things, in spite of their agreement as belonging
to the same genus, and which prescribes to the under-
standing that it should pay no less attention to the one
than to the other. This principle, depending on acute
observation or on the faculty of distinction, checks the
generalising flights of fancy, and reason thus exhibits
a twofold and conflicting interest, namely, on the one
hand, the interest in the extent (generality) of genera,
on the other hand the interest in the contents (dis-
tinction) of the manifoldness of species. In the
former case the understanding thinks more under
its concepts, in the latter, more in its concepts.
This distinction shows itself in the different [p. 655]
manner of thought among students of nature, some
of them (who are pre-eminently speculative), being

vol. 11. o



562 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

almost averse to heterogeneousness, and always
intent on the unity of genera ; while others, pre-
eminently empirical, are constantly striving to divide
nature into so much variety that one might lose
almost all hope of being able to distribute its" phe-
nomena according to general principles.

This latter tendency of thought is likewise based
on a logical principle which aims at the systematical
completeness of all knowledge, so that, beginning .
with the genus and descending to the manifold that
may be contained in it, we try to impart extension to
our system, as we tried to impart unity to it, when
ascending to a genus. For if we only know the
sphere of a concept which determines a genus, we
can no more judge how far its subdivision may be
carried than we can judge how far the divisibility
of matter may be carried, by knowing the space, it oc-
cupies. Hence every genus require species, and these
again sub-species, and as none even of these sub-species
is without a sphere (extent as conceptus commu-
nis), reason in its utmost extension requires that no
species or sub-species should in itself be considered
as the lowest. Every species is always a concept
containing that only which is common to different
things, and as it cannot be completely determined, it
cannot be directly referred to an individual, [p. 656]
but must always comprehend other concepts, that is,
sub-species. This principle of specification might be
expressed by entium varietates non temere esse mi-
nuendas.

It is easily seen that this logical law also would
be without meaning and incapable of application,



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 563

unless it were founded on a transcendental law of
specification which, though it cannot demand a real
infinity of variety in things that are to become our
objects (for this would not be justified by the logical
principle, which only asserts the indeterminability of
the logical sphere with regard to a possible division),
yet imposes on the understanding the duty of looking
for sub-species under every species, and for smaller
varieties for every variety. If there were no lower
concepts, there could not be higher concepts. Now
the understanding knows all that it knows by con-
cepts only, and hence, however far it may carry the
division, never by means of intuition alone, but again
and again by lower concepts. In order to know
phenomena in their complete determination (which is
possible by the understanding only) it is necessary
to carry on without stopping the specification of its
concepts and always to proceed to still remaining
differences or varieties of which abstraction had been
made in forming the concept of the species, and still
more in forming that of the genus.

Nor can this law of specification have been [p. 657]
derived from experience, which can never give so far-
reaching a prospect. Empirical specification very
soon comes to a standstill in the distinction of the
manifold, unless it is led by the antecedent transcen-
dental law of specification, as a principle of reason, and
impelled to look for and to conjecture still differences,
even where they do not appear to the senses. That
absorbent earths are of different kinds (chalk and
muriatic earths) could only be discovered by an ante-
cedent rule of reason, which required the understand-

002



564 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

ing to look for diversity, because it presupposed such
wealth in nature as to feel justified in anticipating
such diversity. For it is only under a presupposition
of a diversity in nature, and under the condition that
its objects should be homogeneous, that we have un-
derstanding, because it is this very diversity of all
that can be comprehended under a concept which
constitutes the use of that concept, and the occupa-
tion of the understanding.

Reason thus prepares the field for the understand-
ing

1st. Through the principle of the homogeneousness
of the manifold, as arranged under higher genera.

2ndly. Through the principle of the variety of the
homogeneous in lower species ; to which,

3rdly, it adds a law of the affinity of all concepts,
which requires a continual transition from every
species to every other species, by a gradual [p. 658]
increase of diversity. We may call these the prin-
ciples of homogeneousness, of specification, and of con-
tinuity of forms. The last arises from the union of
the two former, after both in ascending to higher
genera, and in descending to lower species, the sys-
tematical connection in the idea has been completed;
so that all diversities are related to each other, be-
cause springing from one highest genus, through all
degrees of a more and more extended determination.

We may represent to ourselves the systematical
unity under these three logical principles, in the
following manner. Every concept may be regarded
as a point which, as the standpoint of the spectator,
has its own horizon, enclosing a number of things



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 565

:hat may be represented, and, as it were, surveyed
from that point. Within that horizon, an infinite
lumber of points must exist, each of which has again
its own narrower horizon ; that is, every species con-
tains sub-species, according to the principle of specifi-
3ation, and the logical horizon consists of smaller
horizons (sub-species only) but not of points, which
possess no extent (individuals). But for all these
different horizons, that is genera, determined by as
many concepts, a common horizon may be imagined,
in which they may all be surveyed, as from a common
centre. This would be the higher genus, while [p. 659]
the highest genus would be the universal and true
horizon, determined from the standpoint of the highest
concept, and comprehending all variety as genera,
species, and sub-species.

That highest standpoint is reached by the law of
homogeneousness, and all the lower standpoints in
their greatest variety, by the law of specification. As
in this way there is no void in the whole extent of
all possible concepts, and as nothing can be met with
outside it, there arises from the presupposition of
that universal horizon and its complete division, the
principle of non datur vacuum formarum. According
to this principle there are no different original and
first genera, as it were isolated and separated from
each other (by an intervening void), but all diverse
genera are divisions only of one supreme and general
genus. From that principle springs its immediate
consequence, datur continuum formarum ; that is, all
the diversities of species touch each other and admit
of no transition from one to another per saltum, but



566 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

only by small degrees of difference, by which from
one we arrive at the other. In one word, there are
neither species nor sub-species, which (in the view of
reason) are the nearest possible to each other, but there
always remain possible intermediate species, differing
from the first and the second by smaller degrees [p. 660]
than those by which these differ from each other.

The first law, therefore, keeps us from admitting
an extravagant variety of different original genera,
and recommends attention to homogeneousness. The
second, on the contrary, checks that tendency to
unity, and prescribes distinction of sub-species before
applying any general concept to individuals. The
third unites both, by prescribing, even with the utmost
variety, homogeneousness, through the gradual tran-
sition from the one species to another: thus indi-
cating a kind of relationship of the different branches,
as having all sprung from the same stem.

This logical law, however, of the continuum speci-
erum (formarum logicarum) presupposes a transcen-
dental law (lex continui in natura), without which
the understanding would only be misled by following,
it may be, a path contrary to nature. That law must
therefore rest on purely transcendental, and not on
empirical grounds. For in the latter case, it would
come later than the systems, while in fact the
systematical character of our knowledge of nature is
produced by it. Nor are these laws intended only
for tests to be carried out experimentally by their
aid, although such a connection, if it is found [p. 661]
in nature, forms a powerful argument in support of
that unity which was conceived as hypothetical



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 567

only. These laws have therefore a certain utility
in this respect also, yet it is easily seen that they
regard the parsimony of causes, the manifoldness of
effects, and an affinity between the parts of nature
arising from thence, as both rational and natural, so
that these principles carry their recommendation
direct, and not only as aids towards a proper method
of studying nature.

It is easy to see, however, that this continuity of
forms is a mere idea, and that no object corresponding
to it can be pointed out in experience, not only be-
cause the species in nature are actually divided, and
must form, each by itself, a quantum discretum, while,
if the gradual progression of their affinity were con-
tinuous, nature would contain a real infinity of inter-
mediate links between every two given species, which
is impossible ; but also, because we cannot make any
definite empirical use of that law, considering that
not the smallest criterion of affinity is indicated by it
to tell us how and how far we ought to seek for
grades of affinity, it telling us only that we ought
to seek for them.

If we now arrange these principles of systematical
unity in the order required for their empirical [p. 662]
employment, they might stand thus : manifoldness,
variety, and unity, each of them as ideas taken in
the highest degree of their completeness. Reason
presupposes the knowledge of the understanding in
its direct relation to experience, and by her ideas
aims at a unity which goes far beyond the possibility
of experience. The affinity of the manifold, in spite
of its diversity, under one principle of unity, refers



568 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

not only to things, but even more to the qualities and
powers of things. Thus if, for example, our imperfect
experience represents to us the orbits of the planets as
circular, and we find deviations from that course, we.
look for them in that which is able to change the
circle according to a fixed law, through infinite inter-
vening degrees, into one of these deviating courses;
that is, we suppose that the movements of the planets
which are not circular will approximate more or less
to the properties of a circle, and thus are led on to
the ellipse. The comets display a still greater devi-
ation in their courses, because, so far as our experience
goes, they do not return in a circle, and we then con-
jecture a parabolic course which, at all events, is
allied to the ellipse, and if its longer axis is widely
extended, cannot be distinguished from it in [p. 663]
our observations. We thus arrive, under the guidance
of these principles, at a unity of the different genera
or kinds in the forms of these orbits, and, proceeding
still further, at a unity of the cause of all the laws of
their movements, namely, gravitation. Here we take
our stand and extend our conquests, trying to explain
all varieties and seeming deviations from those rules
from the same principle, nay, adding more than ex-
perience can ever affirm, namely, imaginary hyperbolic
courses of comets, constructed according to the rules
of affinity, in which courses these heavenly bodies
may entirely leave our solar system, and, moving from
sun to sun, unite in their course the most distant
parts of a universe unlimited to our minds, but yet
held together by one and the same moving power.
What is most remarkable in these principles, and



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 569

is, in fact, their chief interest for us is, that they
seem to be transcendental, and, although containing
mere ideas for the guidance of the empirical use of
reason, ideas which our reason can only follow as it
were asymptotically, that is, approximately and with-
out our reaching them, they nevertheless possess, as
synthetical propositions a priori, an objective, though
an undefined validity, serving as a rule for possible
experience, nay, as heuristic principles in the elabora-
tion of experience. With all this a transcen- [p. 664]
dental deduction of them cannot be produced, and is,
in fact, as we have proved before, always impossible
with regard to ideas.

In the transcendental Analytic we distinguished
the dynamical principles of the understanding, as
purely regulative principles of the intuition, from the
mathematical, which, in regard to intuition, are con-
stitutive. In spite of this, these dynamical laws are
constitutive with regard to experience, because they
render the concepts, without which there can be no
experience, a priori possible. The principles of pure
reason, however, cannot be constitutive, even with re-
ference to empirical concepts, because we cannot assign
to them any corresponding schema of sensibility;
they cannot, consequently, have any object in concreto.
If, then, I give up an empirical use of them as con-
stitutive principles, how can I yet secure to them a
regulative employment, and with it some objective
validity, and what can be the meaning of it %

The understanding forms an object for reason in
the same manner as sensibility for the understanding.
It is the proper business of reason to render the



57 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

unity of all possible empirical acts of the understand-
ing systematical, in the same manner as the under-
standing connects the manifold of phenomena by con-
cepts, and brings it under empirical laws. The acts
of the understanding, however, without the schemata
of sensibility, are undefined, and in the same manner
the unity of reason is in itself undefined with [p. 665]
reference to the conditions under which, and the
extent to which the understanding may connect its
concepts systematically. But although no schema
of intuition can be discovered for the perfect systema-
tical unity of all the concepts of the understanding,
it is possible and necessary that there should be an
analogon of such a schema, and this is the idea of the
maximum of a division, and the combination of the
knowledge of the understanding under one single prin-
ciple. It is quite possible to form a definite thought
of what is greatest and absolutely complete, when all
restrictive conditions that lead to an undefined mani-
foldness have been omitted. In this sense the idea
of reason forms an analogon of the schema of sensi-
bility, but with this difference, that the application
of the concepts of the understanding to the schema of
reason is not a knowledge of the object itself, as in the
case of the application of the categories to sensuous
schemata, but only a rule or principle for the syste-
matical unity in the whole use of the understanding.
Now, as every principle which fixes, a priori, a perfect
unity of its use for the understanding is valid, though
indirectly only, for the object of experience also, it
follows that the principles of pure reason have ob-
jective reality with reference to that object also, not,



TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 571

however, in order to determine anything therein, but
only in order to indicate the procedure by which the
empirical and definite use of the understanding may
throughout remain in complete harmony with [p. 666]
itself, by being brought into connection, as much as
possible, with the principle of systematical unity, and
being deduced from it.

I call all subjective principles which are derived,
not from the quality of an object, but from the in-
terest which reason takes in a certain possible per-
fection of our knowledge of an object, maxims of
reason. Thus there are maxims of speculative reason,
which rest entirely on its speculative interest, though
they may seem to be objective principles.

When purely regulative principles are taken for
constitutive, they may become contradictory, as ob-
jective principles. If, however, they are taken for
maxims only, there is no real contradiction, but it is
only the different interest of reason which causes
different modes of thought. In reality, reason has
one interest only, and the conflict of its maxims arises
only from a difference and a mutual limitation of the
methods, in which that interest is to be satisfied.

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