International Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on Forei.

The United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 online

. (page 4 of 10)
Online LibraryInternational Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on ForeiThe United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 → online text (page 4 of 10)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook

So I think the answer to my question is, no, we have to work at
these things. But it is a — so I find the concept of intervening in
failed states, just off the top of my head, as you posed it, to be a
slippery one.

Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your re-
sponse. It is something we are grasping with and grappling with.

You mentioned Washington, D.C. I noticed we just finally placed
the Public Housing Authority, the District of Columbia, in receiver-
ship, and it is a San Franciscan who has the unhappy or coura-
geous task to go and handle it. We will see what happens.

We miss your wisdom and common sense from Washington. I am
glad you are imparting it here today for the whole country. Thank
you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Lantos. Mr. Secretary, on behalf of all of us, I want to ex-
press our deepest appreciation of and respect for you. Since you left
us in Washington you have honed your skills in the happy confines
of Stanford. And, I want to echo my friend's words. We sorely miss
you, and we look forward to having your wise counsel publicly ex-
pressed on all issues.

Mr. Shultz. Thank you. I appreciate your listening to me.

When I was invited to come back to Stanford, they offered me a
chair. I said, I don't want a chair. I want a couch. So I am enjoying
my couch at Stanford.

Mr. Lantos. The subcommittee will be in recess for 5 minutes,
at which time we will begin with the second panel.


Mr. Lantos. The subcommittee will resume.

We are indeed delighted to have three specialists in the field of
international organizations, particularly the U.N., appearing on our
second panel.


Having read the testimony of all three of our distinguished wit-
nesses, I am delighted to put all three prepared statements in the
record where they will appear in toto. And, I will ask our distin-
guished witnesses to summarize their observations.

Our first witness is Professor Ernst B. Haas, Robson Research
Professor of Government at the University of California, Berkeley.
He received his Bachelor's degree from Columbia and his Master's
degree and Ph.D. also from Columbia. He has served with distinc-
tion in U.S. Army Military Intelligence. He has had a range of in-
creasingly more complex and substantive positions in the Depart-
ment of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley.
He was Director of the Institute of International Studies during a
particularly critical phase. He has a range of outstanding publica-
tions, fellowships, grants, and professional activities.

Professor Haas, we are delighted to have you.

If I may ask you to put the microphone right close to you, we
very much look forward to your presentation.


Mr. Haas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Bereuter.
I am honored and flattered to be asked to provide testimony here.
And I will try to keep it as short as I possibly can in the hope of
not repeating the very trenchant things you two gentlemen said
earlier. Although I suspect some of the things I have to say will
respectfully disagree with what Secretary Shultz said a little while

We all know that the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the evolution of strong regional states as well as
the gradual unification of Europe, all of these things have dramati-
cally changed the international security environment, in which the
U.N. functioned for most of its 50 years. But the U.N. will never-
theless undoubtedly still be asked to deal with cases of old fash-
ioned interstate war, though the wars are most likely to occur in
the Balkans, South and Southeast Asia and in Africa. It will still
be asked to interpose truce observers and peacekeeping forces of
the old traditional type between belligerents willing to end the
fighting, as it has done since 1948.

But in the post-cold war environment, it is already being asked
to shoulder quite new and different responsibilities; more new
tasks can be foreseen. And I will enumerate some of them, not to
praise the U.N., but to express a deep fear that the U.N. very soon
will get in far deeper than it should.

I call your attention to the following brand new tasks that have
been wished upon the organization since 1988: Stopping civil wars
in which not all the belligerents are ready to stop fighting; protect-
ing and feeding refugees from civil wars; displacing dictatorships
and protecting fledgling democratic institution; halting egregious
violations of human rights, such as genocide and mass expulsions;
enforcing arms control agreements and regulating the arms trade;
dealing with international environmental threats, in line with an
enhanced notion of what aggression means; and finally, helping to
curb international terrorism, the drug trade and criminal networks.


Not all of these are now on the U.N. agenda, but suggestions are
already being heard from many places that they ought to be. I sub-
mit that the U.N. is in no position now to do all of these things,
at least do them effectively, and that wishing too many new tasks
on it is likely to render ineffective even the older missions which
it is capable of accomplishing quite well.

I submit that we must guard the U.N. from sliding down the
slippery slope of overcommitment in order to increase its effective-
ness in areas where it can be made to function effectively. This re-
quires a different kind of American leadership to build and main-
tain the necessary coalition of like-minded member states.

Which tasks should not be given to the U.N.? In general, the
U.N. should not be asked to take on tasks which are likely to un-
dermine its reputation and credibility, because they are almost im-
possible to see through to a successful conclusion, as Secretary
Shultz warned us also.

True, if the U.N. were more like a world government and if we
could count on the unflagging commitment of the more important
members to its resolutions, a less cautious policy might be possible.
But these preconditions are not being met now, nor will they, I
think, in the foreseeable future.

The U.N. should not be asked to stop civil wars or engage in hu-
manitarian relief in the midst of civil wars. It should not be ex-
pected to impose democratic rule where that rule had never existed
before. In short, many of the tasks assumed since 1988 are likely
to lead to the slippery slope of disrepute. That is the negative case.

Speaking positively, which kind of tasks, other than traditional
peacekeeping and fighting interstate aggression, ought to be given
to the U.N.? Facilities ought to be set up and a consensus should
be sought to enable the U.N. to do the following:

Monitor the implementation of basic human rights once other
U.N. bodies have found serious violations; monitor alleged viola-
tions of all arms control agreements, similar to the existing powers
of the International Atomic Energy Agency; monitor future agree-
ments limiting the arms trade; punish violators of such agreements
with surgical strikes; prevent genocide with massive troop deploy-
ments; monitor and conciliate environmental disputes.

But most of these things cannot be effectively accomplished with
the present U.N. Therefore, we ought to undertake certain institu-
tional reforms needed for improved task performance, and here is
where I begin to differ from what we heard from Secretary Shultz.

Enhanced peace maintenance calls for the creation of a standing
rapid deployment force made up of previously earmarked national
contingents which have trained together. Such a force ought to
number two or three brigades, have its own airlift and air cover ca-
pacity. The task also demands a corps of international inspectors,
civilian inspectors, backed up with an intelligence capacity.

The inspectors ought to be an autonomous U.N. unit, but the in-
telligence function might well rely on national means. In general,
even the fulfillment of the traditional collective enforcement tasks
require a sharply upgraded mechanism of advance planning and
training, in order to give the U.N. the competence it now admit-
tedly lacks.


That suggests that serious consideration be given to the activa-
tion of the military staff committee of the Security Council, as in-
deed has been suggested by some of the other permanent members
of the Security Council.

The alternative for collective measures against aggression is
what Secretary Shultz suggested. That alternative is the continued
reliance on the de facto delegation of enforcement to the few coun-
tries willing to do that, that is to say, primarily the* United States.

I consider this method unreliable because I suspect that the
United States is not going to be willing to pursue indefinitely an
open-ended enforcement function on behalf of the world commu-

For traditional peacekeeping, the U.N. stumbles from one episode
to another, by way of inspired improvisation, although it lacks, as
Secretary Shultz said, the machinery for doing better, all the while,
panhandling for the funds required. We ought to do better than

How to do better? First of all, a more stable consensus favoring
a more modest but increased U.N. task has to be built. The United
States has an enormous stake in the U.N.'s successfully fulfilling
the traditional and the novel tasks in the realm of security, be-
cause in many cases the alternative would be a unilateral rather
than a multilateral response, for which the American will cannot
be taken for granted.

On the other hand, the U.S. military, as we know, is reluctant
to shoulder the burdens here suggested and unwilling to delegate
authority over large numbers of troops to non-American command-
ers, even though within the NATO context, we seem to be quite
willing to do that.

Substituting multilateral for unilateral procedures and forces to
meet the needs of a civilized and humane future world word re-
quires a coalition inside the U.N. of powerful states committed to
these objectives and responsive to American leadership.

The core leadership function consists of the United States paying
its own overdue bills in the U.N. Secondarily, it calls for the kind
of diplomatic-military concert that could reanimate the military
staff committee and yet reassure American military leaders. This
calls for a much heavier reliance on military forces furnished by
Russia, Germany, Japan, India, Nigeria in Africa, and Brazil in
Latin America, than has been true heretofore, in addition to the
French and British forces occasionally seconded to the U.N. It is
idle to count on a serious Chinese commitment to these tasks.

It therefore ought to be the policy of the United States to build
a massive peacekeeping coalition with staying power. Armed forces
of the countries mentioned are mostly wealthy enough to pay for
their own services. More than money, what these nations need is
the official recognition that as nations they are part of the global
peacekeeping coalition.

The most effective way to recognize the symbolic and political im-
portance of this promotion to global responsibility is to enlarge the
Security Council by adding the countries mentioned as permanent

However, to enlarge the Council without giving the new members
the veto is to create two classes of permanent members. To give


them the veto is to condemn the Council to ineffectiveness. There-
fore, we must change the present voting formula from big power
unanimity to a form of weighted and qualified majority voting in
which the United States would retain the kind of blocking veto it
now has in the International Monetary Fund, but would require
the support of some of the other large countries in order to author-
ize a U.N. operation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Haas' biography and statement appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Professor Haas.

We have a number of questions, but we want to go on to Profes-
sor Smith, who is one of our nation's recognized authorities on the
United Nations.

He graduated with honors from Harvard College. Later, he re-
ceived his law degree from Harvard Law School and operated in
the private sector. He is a distinguished attorney; and since 1980,
Professor Smith has taught at the University of Southern Califor-
nia's Law Center.

I should mention he also had distinguished congressional service
as an adviser to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He is a member
of the Council on Foreign Relations and has a very distinguished
list of publications — the most recent of which is "The United Na-
tions in a New World Order."

We are delighted to have you, Professor Smith.


Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Bereuter.

I have to admit that I took great pleasure in being on this side
of the table as opposed to being behind the members, a position to
which I have grown accustomed.

I have a statement which you have agreed put into the record.
I would like to make a few very brief, very precise points to allow
to us move on to the question period.

I have looked into a pattern of discussion and debate that has
arisen in the context of the United Nations, to do with the reliance
on regional organizations. Within the past month, the Secretary
General has addressed a working group on relationships between
the United Nations and regional organizations, and there seemed
to be an implicit assumption that many of the capabilities that the
U.N. currently lacks in accomplishing the ends that it pursues can
be provided by reliance on regional organizations.

Activities, particularly in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace en-
forcement, these problems can be involved in relying on organiza-
tion like NATO and other regional organizations, although there
are few that are like NATO, but other regional organizations able
to provide the capabilities that the U.N. lacks.

My concern is that there is an assumption that these organiza-
tions, by participating in what Secretary Shultz correctly pointed
out as a process, will simply facilitate that process but not alter it.

I am concerned that unless the U.N. maintains the capability to
decide what principles and values it will pursue, the principles and
values of those regional organizations with which it becomes in-


volved may determine and undermine the values we get from Unit-
ed Nations participation.

Let me take a couple of recent examples. Particularly looking at
the case of NATO in the former Yugoslavia, and the difficulties in-
volved, as Secretary Shultz pointed out, in bringing force to bear
in the former Yugoslavia. If you read the reports that have come
from the United Nations and have been published in the press, you
begin to see there are two different cultures involved.

NATO's culture is a military culture that requires a defined task
and the freedom for military officers to decide how best to pursue
that task. The U.N. is a diplomatic organization which at each
stage wants to have the option to negotiate about what should
occur next.

There is a clash of cultures that has been evident over the last
year. Each time there has been a claimed need for NATO force to
be applied, the U.N. officials on the ground, in Yugoslavia have
said, let's wait, let's talk, let's see what we can do, let's see what
we can negotiate.

And in the most recent instance NATO force was applied against
an empty Serb tank. That begins to be quite a ridiculous propo-
sition. So there is a clash of cultures that happens each time the
U.N. tries to use force through another regional organization.

The U.N. may be correctly positioned to pursue the diplomatic
approach. I do not criticize the U.N. for pursuing that approach.
But it is necessary for us to understand that these two approaches
do not necessarily work together.

There are other questions that could be asked. The U.S. applica-
tion of the criteria of PDD-25 in the context of Rwanda is seen by
some as an imposition of U.S. standards on the United Nations'
choice to become involved even though the United States was not
putting forces at risk in that situation. There were some represent-
atives who were vehemently opposed to the application of these
constraints where U.S. forces were not involved.

There are questions also raised by the precedent of France be-
coming involved in Rwanda with U.N. approval and with regard to
Russia in the context of Georgia. To the extent that there are Rus-
sian interests involved with Abkhazian independence. A question
can be raised as to whether the U.N., by implicitly authorizing the
Russian involvement, may be seen as an advocate of the Russian
position. By calling on capable states or capable organizations, a
risky situation created for the United Nations. The U.N. risks los-
ing the objectivity, legitimacy and credibility that are the core val-
ues that the U.N. can bring to bear in a situation.

One other minor point. This is one that, having served the Sen-
ate during debates of the War Powers Resolution while ships were
being escorted in the Persian Gulf, I am a bit loathe to raise, but
I think it should be mentioned. To the extent that we understand
the points that Secretary Shultz makes about the relationship be-
tween force and diplomacy, we recognize that there must be a very
subtle connection and interaction between the two.

To the extent that certain scholars and some Members of Con-
gress believe that prior authorization of the use of force is constitu-
tionally required, we frustrate the ability to put together very sub-
tle relationships between force and diplomacy.


If we applied those purported constitutional constraints in the
context of collective action, which we may well do because U.S.
forces are likely to be involved in collective action, we then frus-
trate the international community's ability to pursue these rela-

I have written in other places that we should find much, much
more flexible and effective ways of involving the Congress at very
early and ongoing levels in consideration of the use of force and the
relationship Toetween force and diplomacy. I would be concerned
about a formal requirement of prior congressional approval.

Thank you.

[Mr. Smith's biography and statement appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Professor Smith. We do have
some questions for you as well, particularly with respect to your
very sophisticated analysis of the clash of cultures between a mili-
tary alliance, such as NATO, and an international body such as the
United Nations, and how this clash can be worked out without
paralyzing the effectiveness of the operation itself.

I usually summarize by biographical sketches, but our next wit-
ness' biography is so well done that I take the liberty of reading
the opening paragraph.

Mr. Tad Daley is the Executive Director for the Campaign for a
New United Nations Charter. He has spent 15 years enrolled in
various university degree programs, a figure currently being exam-
ined by the authorities at the Guiness Book of World Records. He
is often accused of being a perpetual student and is repeatedly
asked by his family when he is going to get a real job.

He received a Bachelor's degree in Political Science from Knox
College in Illinois and a Master's degree in International Affairs
from the University of Southampton in England, where he was a
Rotary Foundation Graduate Fellow. He is soon to receive his
Ph.D. in Public Policy Analysis from the Rand Graduate School of
Policy Studies in Santa Monica, California; and he has a law de-
gree from the University of Illinois, where he specialized in inter-
national law.

He presently serves as the executive director of a newly created
activist citizen's initiative that is campaigning for a new United
Nations Charter.

I read your full presentation with great interest. As all the oth-
ers, it will be entered in the record in toto.

You may proceed any way you choose.


Mr. DALKY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

When I told my father I was going to be testifying before your
committee, he said the same thing: When are you going to finish
your Ph.D. and get a real job?

I am really delighted to have this opportunity to testify before
you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Bereuter. Really an imagi-
native idea, having a hearing in this city where the United Nations
Charter was framed.

84-790 0-95


I will summarize my prepared statement, which addresses three
topics: First, restructuring the Security Council and democratizing
global decisionmaking; second, developing a standing volunteer
world army for the enforcement of world law; and third, activating
Article 109 of the U.N. Charter, to convene some kind of a com-
prehensive U.N. Charter review conference, perhaps right here in
San Francisco again.

Mr. Chairman, everyone seems to agree that Japan and Ger-
many must become permanent members of the Security Council.
Many also argue that a place, as we have heard today, must be
found for regional powers such as India, Brazil, and Nigeria.

In my view, Mr. Chairman, before we address the question of
who deserves a seat on the U.N. Security Council, we need to ask
whether our global political organization for the world of the 21st
century should be centered around a great power Security Council
at all. This is not self-evident to me.

The San Francisco Charter was designed in the 1940's primarily
to prevent another Adolf Hitler from launching a great power war.
That charter itself inherited the idea of great power collective secu-
rity from the Concert of Europe, established in 1815, to prevent an-
other Napoleon Bonaparte from threatening international security.

The danger of repeating the mistakes of the 1930's is not the
greatest danger facing the human community as we approach the
21st century. Moreover, the mechanism of global decisionmaking
enacted in the San Francisco Charter is profoundly undemocratic —
at a time when democracy is purportedly the only legitimate mech-
anism for the governance of human affairs.

If we believe that democracy is the optimal form of governance,
then I believe we must aspire toward it at all levels of governance.
Some will maintain that any democratization of the U.N. Security
Council will inhibit decisive action at the U.N. I find this argument
difficult to understand by people who profess to believe in democ-
racy. At all other levels, human communities maintain democratic
decisionmaking structures. I don't know that there is something
fundamentally different about a global decisionmaking structure.

If decisive action, if that is our primary value, maybe we should
reduce the Security Council's permanent members from five to one.
Maybe we should abolish the U.S. Congress, and turn over all
American policymaking to the President. That would clearly make
for more decisive action.

But we have this belief, this value that democratic decisionmak-
ing, although difficult, still in most arenas of governance in the late
20th century, we consider its benefits to exceed its costs. And
today, more and more people around the world are beginning to
argue that in the global arena, the benefits of democracy will ex-
ceed the costs as well.

As Tatsuro Kunigi, former Assistant Secretary General of the
U.N., now a distinguished scholar has argued, if all we do next
year is to add Germany, Japan, and some regional powers to the
Security Council, that would actually reinforce this undemocratic
nature of the Charter, and "would run counter to the distinct and
increasingly broad current around the world calling for global de-


There are ideas out there for democratizing decisionmaking at
the global level that go well beyond the Security Council restruc-
turing. Professor Haas mentioned one of them, weighted voting. A
well-known idea called the "Binding Triad" weighted voting method
would pursue only global policy decisions approved by most of the
countries, most of the people, and most of those paying the bills in
the world. That would certainly give the United States of America
a substantial voice.

There are other, more visionary ideas. Like the idea of some kind
of U.N. House of Representatives, where we would continue to have

1 2 4 6 7 8 9 10

Online LibraryInternational Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on ForeiThe United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 → online text (page 4 of 10)