International Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on Forei.

The United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 online

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approaches that should be taken as the U.N. attempts to adjust to
the rapidly changing political milieu within which all nations find
themselves.

U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has agreed to serve as
honorary chair of U.N. 50, San Francisco, and will be a major par-
ticipant in several of the events.

We will keep you posted on all of these events as they develop
over the next few months. In addition to the formal commemorative
events such as the signing reenactment and receptions and dinners
with honored guests and speakers, there will be much more.
Events planned include an interfaith service at Grace Cathedral in-
cluding all the world's great religions; a gathering of Nobel Peace
Prize winners to lend their wisdom to the future of the United Na-
tions; a United Nations archive including the original U.N. charter;
a special performance by the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra; gath-
erings of various governmental organizations instrumental to the
formation of the U.N., such as Rotary International and the Com-
mission on Global Governance.



47

Not only will U.N. 50 provide inspiration and new insights about
the U.N., but San Francisco will also do its best to see that visitors
enjoy their leisure time. We are sitting with greater cultural diver-
sity than anywhere in world, with more ethnic groups, race, and
nationalities represented that any of the world's great cities. More
than 100 languages are spoken here.

This diversity will be highlighted as our various ethnic neighbor-
hoods become involved in U.N. 50 and there is no end to the diver-
sity of entertainment, food and other enjoyments that San Fran-
cisco has to offer from our provincial perspective. San Francisco
has what the U.N. seeks to bring about worldwide, people of all
cultures and nationalities living together in peace, cooperation, and
mutual respect.

We believe the eves of the world will be on us when we com-
memorate the U.N. s historic founding, honor its 50-year quest for
peace, and examine its future. As we commemorate the serious
mission of the U.N., we will also celebrate the diversity of the
world's people and become mutually inspired as we rededicate our-
selves to the dream of world peace.

In addition to this excerpt from the Mayor's letter, the U.N. 50
Committee wanted me to make it very clear to you that they un-
derstand that your committee is interested particularly in focusing
on the new era in which the cold war — in which cold war concerns
have largely been replaced by a different set of security issues such
as fragmentation of nation states and resulting ethnic problems,
migration spurred by systemic poverty and depletion of natural re-
sources.

That is why the city's commemoration of the 50th anniversary of
the signing of the charter will include a number of substantive fo-
rums as well as city-wide cultural celebration.

I might add that most of the Bay Area's educational institu-
tions — University of San Francisco, Berkeley, Stanford and many
others are involved in the forming of various sorts of studies to do
just this sort of thing.

Mr. Lantos. I want to thank you, Mr. Sellards. I want to thank
the Mayor for his statement. Let me just say, and I think I speak
for my good friend, that this subcommittee on a bipartisan basis,
stands ready to assist in any way we can in the celebrations here
in San Francisco.

I want to thank our panelists. I want to thank Congresswoman
Pelosi for joining us in the earlier part of this hearing; the Sec-
retary of State, Mr. Shultz; and our staff. Since term limits are not
yet in effect, we look forward to a similar hearing at the end of the
second 50 years of the U.N.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



APPENDIX



GEORGE P. SHULTZ



George P. Shultz was sworn in on July 16, 1982 as the 60th U.S. Secretary of
State and served until January 20, 1989.

Mr. Shultz graduated from Princeton University in 1942, receiving a B.A. degree
in Economics. That year he joined the U.S. Marine Corps and served through 1945. In
1949, Mr. Shultz earned a PhD. degree in Industrial Economics from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. He taught at M.LT. from 1948 to 1957, taking a year's leave of
absence in 1955 to serve as a senior staff economist on the President's Council of
Economic Advisors during the Administration of President Eisenhower.

In 1957, Mr. Shultz was appointed Professor of Industrial Relations at the
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. He was named Dean of the
Graduate School of Business in 1962. From 1968 to 1969, Mr. Shultz was a Fellow at the
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford.

Mr. Shultz served in the Administration of President Nixon as Secretary of Labor
for eighteen months from 1969 to June 1970, at which time he was appointed the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget He became Secretary of the Treasury in May
1972, serving until May 1974. During that period Mr. Shultz served also as Chairman of
the Council on Economic Policy. As Chairman of the East- West Trade Policy
Committee, Mr. Shultz traveled to Moscow in 1973 and negotiated a series of trade
protocols with the Soviet Union. He also represented the U.S. at the Tokyo meeting on
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

From 1974 until his appointment as Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz was President
and a Director of Bechtel Group, Inc. During this period Mr. Shultz also served part time
on the faculty of Stanford University.

Prior to his appointment as Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz was Chairman of
President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board. Mr. Shultz was awarded the Medal
of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor, on January 19, 1989.

In January 1989, Mr. Shultz rejoined Stanford University as Professor of
International Economics at the Graduate School of Business and Distinguished Fellow at
the Hoover Institution.

Mr. Shultz's publications include: Turmoil and Triumhh: Mv Years As Secretary
of State (1993V Economic P olicy Bevond the Headline* (19781. Workers and Wages in
ihc Urban Labor Market (1970), Guidelines. Informal Controls, and the Market Place
(1966). Strategics for the Displaced Worker (1966V Management Organization and the
Computer (I960), Labor Proble ms: Cases and Readings (1953), The Dynamics of a
Labor Market (1951), Pressures on Wage Decisions (1950).

Mr. Shultz holds honorary degrees from Notre Dame, Loyola, Pennsylvania,
Rochester, Princeton, Carnegie-Mellon, CUNY, Yeshiva, Northwestern, Tel Aviv, the
Weizmann Institute of Science, Baruch College of New York, and the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem.

Mr. Shultz was bom in New York City on December 13, 1920 and spent his
childhood in Englewood, New Jersey. He is married to the former Helena M. O'Brien of
Nashua, New Hampshire. They have five children.



HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, Ca&fornu 94305-6010




(49)



50

ERNST B. HAAS

Robson Research Professor of Government, UC Berkeley
Curriculum Vitae

Born: March 31, 1924, Frankfurt (Main), Germany. U.S. citizen since 1943.

Married: Hildegarde Vogel, 1945. Children: Peter Michael (b. 1955)

Education : B.S., Columbia University (1948)

M.A., Columbia University (1950)

Ph.D., Columbia University (1952) in Public Law and Government

Also attended University of Chicago, 1942-43
U.S. Army, Military Intelligence Service, 1943-46

Career Teaching and Research Assistant, University of Chicago, 1950-51

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Political Science



Instructor,


1951-53


Assistant Professor,


1953-58


Associate Professor,


1958-62


Professor,


1962-


Institute of International Studies




Associate Director,


1965-67


Acting Director,


1967-68


Director,


1969-73



Resear ch: International relations theory with emphasis on the concepts and process of

international integration. Special interest in the United Nations and its specialized
agencies and regional organizations in Europe and Latin America.

Principal Investigator. "Studies in International Integration" (1965-74);
"Studies on International Scientific and Technological Regimes" (1974-79);
Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

Fellowships and Grants :

Research has been supported by the Rockefeller Foundation (1956-63; 1974-79);
Social Science Research Council (1955-56; 1960-61; 1963-65); and
Institute of International Studies (1960-70).

Honors : Member, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1960-1977

Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Member, Committee on International Organization,
3ocial Science Research Council (1963-68)
Guggenheim Fellow, 1973-74.

Professional Activities :

Consultant to many publishers and several foundations

Consultant to International Social Science Association

Contributor to Encyclopedia Americana,

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences

Consultant, U.S. Department of State, until 1970

American Political Science Association. Member of its Council (1962)

and its Committee on Professional Ethics (1968-71)

Task Force on International Institutions, Murphy Commission, 1975

Board of Editors, International Oreanization : Chairman, 1977-78

Various consulting editorships

Consultant Urvi'ed Nations. 1981, 1984

Consultant , Qmrission on (Tlhhal Governance, 1993



51

HOW TO KEEP THE UNITED NATIONS FROM SLIDING DOWN THE
SLIPPERY SLOPE OF INEFFECTIVENESS



Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

U. S. House of Representatives by Ernst B. Haas,

Robson Research Professor of Government,

University of California, Berkeley. October 24, 1994



Major suggestions for reforms in United Nations
tasks, institutions and procedures are listed on pp.
12-17.



I. Changes in the Environment of International Security
since the End of the Cold War

Though the vagaries of world politics are still with us
despite the end of the cold war, the overall environment in which
UN operations designed to maintain the peace take place has changed
enormously. A variety of novel tasks has been delegated to the UN,
tasks which previously had been accomplished by member states or
had not been on the international agenda. The chief novelty is the
emergence of civil wars as the main threat to peace. Before
discussing these it is well to evaluate security tasks
traditionally assumed by the UN because the continued performance
of such tasks may well be endangered if the organization is now
asked to assume new burdens it is unable to shoulder effectively.

Traditionally, the UN was often asked to moderate interstate
disputes by purely pacific means — fact-finding, mediation,
conciliation — either by the Security Council, a committee of the
General Assembly, or increasingly the Secretary-General; generally,
such efforts were not successful. Traditionally, the UN was also
called upon to stop interstate wars — restrain and punish
aggression — if peaceful settlement failed. Thus force was
successfully used in Korea and against Irag; economic sanctions
short of military force were voted against South Africa and
Rhodesia, both instances of intervention in what was then still



52

considered "domestic" affairs. Full-scale sanctions, voted under
chapter 7 of the Charter, always accomplished what the UN demanded.
But their success was due to "permissive enforcement" — the
delegation of voluntary enforcement authority to a coalition of
member states led by the U. S. — not obligatory UN operations
launched in conformity with Charter rules under the authority of
the Military Staff Committee. That committee was deadlocked
because of the cold war and remains inoperative because of U. S.
reluctance to place American troops under UN authority.

In a piece of creative statesmanship, "peacekeeping" was
invented in 1956 by Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to separate belligerents in a
war when both parties consented and seemed ready to quit fighting,
but did not trust each other. The more limited practice of UN
truce supervision and observation had been invented in 1948. Both
have been practiced with enormous success ever since: in Kashmir,
the various Arab-Israeli conflicts, Cyprus, and in two Iran-Iraq
wars. These practices were successfully imitated by the
Organization of American States (Dominican Republic, Soccer war)
and the Organization of African Unity (Chad, Algeria-Morocco war).

Since the end of the cold war peacekeeping was enhanced to
cover the termination of civil wars and was successfully used in
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique and Croatia. It was used
"preemptively" in Macedonia. Less than totally successful
peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Western Sahara, Somalia,
Angola, Bosnia and Rwanda should make us pause: perhaps
intervention in civil war is not an appropriate UN task after all.

In the post-cold war international security environment civil
rather than interstate wars have been the main cause of conflict
and suffering. As the UN Charter does not give the organization
jurisdiction over such conflicts, their actual domination of the
current UN security agenda represents a brand-new and dangerous
development. Matters of essentially domestic concern, including
the form of governance , the observance of human rights , famine
relief, and local administration, have become part of the mandate
of peacekeeping forces and may also manifest themselves in future
acts of military enforcement, UN-run or permissive. The current
international security agenda looks like this in terms of new tasks
already given to UN forces:

* stopping civil wars and disarming the parties where NOT all
the belligerents were ready to end the fighting (Angola,
Cambodia, Liberia, Western Sahara, Somalia, Rwanda);

* protecting and feeding civilian populations (in some of the
above civil conflicts and in Bosnia);

* establishing democratic institutions (Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Haiti, Angola, Mozambique);

* halting genocide and mass expulsions (Bosnia, Rwanda);

* enforcing arms control agreements (Iraq, Cambodia).

To these we add some more novel tasks which might easily evolve
soon, and have already been suggested by reformers of the UN,
though there are no actual examples of them as yet:

* monitoring the observation of basic human rights in



53

situations in which violations had been discovered by UN
bodies;

* monitoring the observance of environmental regulations in
situations in which international ecological disaster is
possible;

* monitor international arms control agreements and undertake
surgical strikes in case of particularly egregious
violations; similar activities might be undertaken if an
international agreement regulating the arms trade were to
come into being;

* help curb international terrorism, the drug trade and
criminal networks.

IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT IF THE UN WERE TO BE SADDLED
WITH ALL, OR EVEN MOST, OF THESE RESPONSIBILITIES IT WOULD RAPIDLY
SLIDE DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF INEFFECTIVENESS, AND THEREBY BRING
DISCREDIT EVEN ON THE TASKS IT NOW CARRIES OUT EFFECTIVELY.
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has eloquently argued that
because in the modern context of international interdependence,
everything interacts and conditions everything else, the ensemble
of problems ought to be under UN jurisdiction. Because economic
deprivation influences domestic conflict, domestic conflict may
erupt into civil war, the persecution of minorities, mass
expulsions and even genocide. Should therefore economic
development become part of the definition of international security
under the sway of the Security Council? Clearly, faulty economic
planning can lead to ecological disasters which may trigger
international conflict. Should therefore be the environment be put
on the Security Council's agenda? A non -linear or even a nested
interdependence among issues surely exists. If its existence were
made the occasion for a massive and very inclusive redefinition of
collective security the very functioning of the UN would be put in
jeopardy. Very wise beings from other galaxies might be able to
plan and implement such holistic programs, but not our generation
of fallible policy-makers.

Why not? A holistic approach to post-cold war international
security matters would demand a very wide consensus on what
constitutes justifiable multilateral intervention in the domestic
affairs of nations. The Bosnian case clearly shows how difficult
it is to get agreement on what outside agencies ought to be able to
do, as the Somali case did earlier. Obviously the belligerents
disagree since each sees outside intervention only as helping or
hindering its own cause. But the intervening states and
organizations do not agree either. They quarrel over the mission
of the peacekeeping forces , over the dangers to which the troops
should be exposed (should they be expected to suffer normal
casualties or not?), over the means of warfare to be employed. As
the lack of consensus between the UN and NATO shows, the
intervening agencies also may disagree over the seriousness of
truce violations and over the best means to prevent their
recurrence. Nor do the intervening powers always see eye to eye
over the outcome which the intervention is to achieve: peace,



54

justice, retribution, reconciliation? Striving for justice and
retribution is likely to make impossible the attainment of
reconciliation and peace.

In addition to lack of substantive consensus, holistic
peacekeeping is likely to suffer from lack of material support.
While over half of all UN members have contributed truce observers
and peacekeepers at some time, the core of the reliable support has
come from a few countries: Canada, the four Nordic nations,
Austria, Ireland, Fiji, India, Pakistan, Netherlands. France and
Britain have disproportionately contributed to a few operations.
Russia, Germany and Japan are only now making cautious, tiny
contributions; China has declined to associate itself with any UN
operations. Long periods are reguired to find troops for
authorized operations and bring them to the troublespots. There is
no training of potential observers and peacekeeping forces except
by the semi-official International Peace Academy for seconded
national personnel. Very few countries — none of the permanent
members of the Security Council — have earmarked or trained
personnel for UN service. There are no multilateral military
exercises of the kind familiar in NATO.

More serious still, it appears as if the main contributors of
peacekeeping forces are not prepared to accept casualties as
something to be expected. On the first sign of danger to its
personnel, Japan limited the deployment its forces in Cambodia and
Rwanda. The U. S. proved unwilling to defend the UN mission in
Somalia when casualties were suffered; British forces in Bosnia are
risk-averse. Member states, particularly the U. S., continue to be
very lax in paying their financial contributions for peacekeeping.
These conditions do not justify any optimism about the UN's living
up to the enhanced security task suggested by the post-cold war.
world.

II. An Improved but Modest UN Task

The post-cold war emergence of civil wars as the main threats
to peace, of course, does not mean that the danger of old-fashioned
interstate conflict has disappeared. Hence we must first think
about the ability of the UN in continuing to meet this kind of
threat to world peace. Are enforcement practices and traditional
peacekeeping still adeguate?

Enforcement measures under chapters 7 and 8 of the Charter
have never been institutionalized or subjected to any standard
operating procedures. On each occasion when such measures were
authorized by the Security Council (or the General Assembly under
the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution) actual operations were
delegated to a coalition of members willing and able to undertake
them. Enforcement was "permissive", not obligatory. In point of
fact, the United States, each time it received authority from the
UN to undertake military operations, would, in all likelihood,
have intervened unilaterally in any case. The UN provided a
figleaf for American policy.

This practice will not suffice in a future of increased
interdependence in which the membership calls for new multilateral



55

tasks and wants the UN to act in a manner in which it does more
than merely front for its most powerful member. If the U. S.
wishes to lead, but not so steadily and continuously as to have to
shoulder all the new burdens all the time, it has no choice but to
seek a more institutionalized multilateral military capability to
enforce Security Council decisions. Only by creating such
institutionalized practices, and animate them with a standing
coalition of potential "enforcers", can leadership be combined with
sharp limits on American contributions in human, financial and
material resources.

Traditional peacekeeping is a truly multilateral enterprise,
though it too is poorly institutionalized and suffers from too much
ad hoc improvisation. The increasing difficulties experienced by
the Secretary-General and staffing and mounting the many new
peacekeeping and truce observation missions is proof that the
system needs improvements. It too depends overly on the
willingness of a few countries to make it work, and on coalitions
of supporting states that vary with the occasion. But despite
these difficulties, peacekeeping and truce observation have been
extremely effective IF AND WHEN the peacekeepers and observers were
not burdened with tasks other than separating and monitoring
belligerents who had already come to the conclusion that further
fighting was not desirable. Things get very much more complicated
when peacekeepers are asked to disarm uncooperative militias,
impose limits on violence the parties are bound to disobey, feed
and house refugees who are being attacked or courted by the same
militias, capture war criminals, and dislodge dictators so as to
install democratic politicians. THESE ENHANCED TASKS HAVE SO FAR
NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFULLY ANYWHERE. If peacekeeping is to
be retained as a valuable multilateral tool for protecting
international security it should not be expanded into areas where
it is bound to fail. Why threaten its future viability, even if
its reach is more limited than enthusiasts for multilateral action
demand?

Intervention in civil wars and in situations involving the
displacement of a non-democratic government also runs* up against
the lack of consensus on what constitutes justifiable multilateral
intervention. Perhaps there is an emerging global norm that only
democratic governments are to be considered legitimate, but one
cannot be sure about this. In the meantime we ought to remember
that transitions to democracy are especially difficult to manage by
outsiders. Unless there is a large, patient and committed domestic
constituency that tolerates the participatory politics of constant
compromise and bargaining no amount of UN intervention will help.
There are many kinds of democracies; they do not all respond
positively to outside intervention. The monitoring of elections
is not enough to assure the implantation of democratic procedures;
yet that is mostly what multilateral intervention amounts to after
the demise of the authoritarian regime.

Since the danger of failed intervention is at least as great
as the likelihood of success, I urge that acts of enforcement and
peacekeeping be confined to these situations:



56

* to prevent and punish aggression by one state against
another;

* intervene in a civil war only to reimpose peace terms on the
party that has reneged on earlier agreements, provided the
earlier agreement had resulted from UN mediation or

conciliation;

* to enforce violations of international agreements banning
the possession, manufacture or trade of weapons of mass
destruction;

* to prevent genocide;

* to protect an established democratic polity from
antidemocratic armed challenges, but not to protect a
dubious or fictitious one;

* protecting refugee camps under the administration of other
UN bodies, or UN-affiliated NGOs.

So much for the use of force. Good arguments can be made for
the use of non-coercive but still intrusive multilateral measures
for the achievement of other UN objectives. These would still
constitute justifiable intervention. The following situations come
to mind:

* monitoring the observance of basic human rights after a


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Online LibraryInternational Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on ForeiThe United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 → online text (page 7 of 10)