International Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on Forei.

The United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 online

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Online LibraryInternational Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on ForeiThe United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 → online text (page 8 of 10)
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UN body has determined the existence of serious violations;

* monitoring the observance of limits on the arms trade;

* monitoring allegations of the existence of serious
ecological threats to neighboring states.

Ineffective multilateral intervention is immoral. It leads to
expectations that cannot be fulfilled. The record of earlier
interventions, even those mounted by the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, suggests sharp limits on effectiveness.
This is true especially in situations in which the objectives of
the intervenors are very complexly linked, when a nested set of
objectives makes the attainment of any one hyperdependent on the
attainment of several others. All good things do not often go
together. Any aggregating of methods, contexts and objectives of
intervention that leads down the slippery slope of incalculable and
indefinite involvement is not only inappropriate and unwise, but
also immoral because it misleads victims and compromises the
organization's ability to carry out tasks it does well. Bosnia and
Somalia were mistakes of overaggregation and overcommitment that
should not be repeated.

III. Possible Reforms of UN Ways to Maintain Peace

The suggestions of reform offered here are made without regard
to the immediate political climate reguired to make them
realizable. The suggestions are meant to improve the military
capability for effective multilateral action, the building of the
consensus necessary for authorizing the limited operations
proposed, and the institutional changes that more effective
decision-making seems to reguire.


1. First and foremost, the financial basis for peacekeeping
operations must be solidified. Since, after decades of appeals,
the record of member states in making their allotted payments in
time has not materially improved, thought must be given to
alternative ways of raising revenue. The tax on minerals mined
from the bottom of the sea is not realistic as long as there is no
deep-sea mining. Several alternatives have already been proposed;
they ought to be considered further. One is an airport tax, to be
levied on all departing passengers on international flights at all
airports. Such taxes are charged routinely in many countries now,
though their proceeds do not benefit the UN. Some airports in
developing countries may object that the burden is greater on them
than on airports in developed countries. An alternative would be
a tax on international air tickets to be collected by airlines or
travel agents. Such a tax would be borne largely in developed
countries because they furnish the bulk of international travelers.

2. The Military Staff Committee (or some eguivalent body)
ought to be asked to make contingency plans for the deployment of
troops, in various mission combinations and sizes, in order to
allow enforcement measures that do not rely on the "permissive"
techniques of the past. This involves the earmarking of national
units for international service and the before-need training of
officers in joint operations. It also calls for the creation of
before-need intensive links between the UN the national
intelligence agencies.

I do not propose that the Military Staff Committee assume the
powers of commanding a UN enforcement mission. However, the
Committee ought to designate the commanders of specific operations
after consulting the military staffs of the major contributors to
the force or forces.

3. The Secretary-General ought to be authorized to maintain
panels of officers and other officials who would serve on various
monitoring missions to be authorized in the future, in such task
areas as arms control, ecology watches, observation of elections,
and the protection of human rights. Arrangements for the joint
training of such persons ought to be made, possibly through
national governmental or private organizations.

4 . Traditional peacekeeping operations should be put on a
more institutionalized basis even if their tasks are not expanded
to include the missions ineffectively implemented in Somalia and
Bosnia. Contributing countries ought to be encouraged follow the
example of Canada and the Nordic states in earmarking and training
units for such duty. Moreover, earmarked units ought to train and
conduct exercises jointly before being deployed. Officers ought to
be seconded for training regularly to such agencies as the
International Peace Academy.

5. Such far-reaching innovations cannot be implemented
without a firm consensus among a group of countries that can be
expected to be the core of the participants. It is the major
powers, globally and regionally, who must approve of operations and
contribute disproportionately. This means that countries not now
"in the loop" ought to be persuaded to take a greater interest. It


also means that small countries who have done the bulk of UN
peacekeeping ought to be rewarded with some form of special
representation. Permanent and special representation in the
Security Council is the symbolic recognition of such a special role
in being part of the coalition responsible for world peace. Hence
I propose the following major changes in the composition and
procedure of the Security Council, which will necessitate amending
the Charter:

* Expand the number of permanent members to 12 by adding
Germany, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, India and Egypt to the
present five. Adding these countries will accomplish two things.
It will tie them to the group making major contributions in
personnel, lure them into greater participation by means of greater
recognition as being major powers. It will also provide symbolic
recognition to major regional powers whose support is to be sought
in wooing other small states in their regions to the collective

* Expand the number of non-permanent members to 12 and retain
the present informal system of regional representation. This will
allow the building of larger supporting coalitions drawn from all
parts of the membership and induce some developing countries thus
recognized to make more generous contributions to peacekeeping and
monitoring operations.

* Change the formula for authorizing enforcement, peacekeeping
and monitoring operations by abolishing the unanimity rule and
substituting therefore a weighted voting rule similar to that used
in the International Monetary Fund (or the Council of the European
Union?). Such a rule would weight countries, by population, GNP,
and military capability, such that the U. S. would emerge with the
largest number of votes. A vote authorizing an operation would
need some minimum of the total number of votes, perhaps 75 or 80%.
(The rule for authorizing the issuing of SDRs comes to mind). The
U. S. would then be able to block a decision by itself, or in
coalition with a few non-permanent members; but a very substantial
coalition would be necessary to authorize an operation. Weights
ought to be calculated so that a combination no larger than four
permanent members (other than the U. S.) plus four non-permanent
ones would be able to block a decision.

* Add to the Security Council's standing committees a new body
made up countries who have contributed to more than half of all UN
peacekeeping and truce observation operations. This body would be
consulted whenever a new operation is being contemplated, thus
giving them kind of enhanced status and symbolic recognition that
is likely to reenforce their extraordinary support for the UN.

Why should any country consent to give up its veto? Why would
the u. S.? Such an act of self-abnegation is conceivable only if
the decisionmakers realize that not to do so incurs long-range
costs even less pleasant than losing influence in the short run.
The u. S. finds itself in the schizophrenic position of wishing to
lead in the maintenance of international security without paying
much in terms of money or casualties; the interventionist and the
isolationist impulses coexist and inhibit a clear course. One
solution is to share leadership with like-minded nations. But
sharing implies an act of self-abnegation. Moreover, without an
American moral initiative none of the other permanent members is
likely to surrender its veto.


The Law Center
University of Southern California



Lion B*nwtli Proftnor af La*
and Inltrnalionol Relations






October 24, 1994

Because of changes in the global order, the United Nations must reevaluate both its
founding assumptions and its accepted operational routines and traditions. Besides facing new
opportunities and new problems, the UN may also be finding that effective response to
emergencies may be impossible without the cooperation and support of other organizations and of
specific member states having special capabilities On a reading of the provisions of the Charter,
an uninformed observer could reach the false conclusion that the UN is able to respond on its own
motion to international emergencies In fact, practical considerations have forced the UN to seek
the cooperation and support of specialized international organizations and critically powerful
member states

In general, we should all support cooperation between international institutions in pursuit
of shared goals Unfortunately, the process of cooperation forces compromises that may place
important values under pressure. As the United Nations responds to crises, both its goals and its
actions are structured to serve important international values. By remaining attentive to those
goals, the UN preserves it most valuable asset: the perceived legitimacy of its undertakings If the
UN finds that adequate responses to crises have become impossible without the involvement of
other international institutions, it may find that it must tailor its responses to the requirements of
those cooperating organizations. The goals and procedures of those organizations will constrain
the possible options Some will claim that the United Nations, an international organization
having a general membership, has become subservient to the special interests of a small group of
states or a single powerful state While such an imbalance serves the near term interests of the
powerful minority, the long term cost of such situations to the credibility of the United Nations
cannot be ignored by any concerned with preserving the option of collective international action.

International efforts to cope with conflict in the former Yugoslavia show many of the
problems In attempting to adjust to the necessity for cooperation in responding to Bosnia, the


United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have faced particular
difficulties in making adjustments On a number of recent occasions, NATO officials have
formally announced the willingness of the organization to assist the UN in peacekeeping and
peace enforcement operations In Bosnia, NATO has undertaken air operations to implement a
"no-fly" zone, to provide air support for peacekeeping forces, and to enforce weapons exclusion
zones in designated areas NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) have conducted joint
naval operations to enforce trade sanctions Because the United Nations lacked the military
capabilities necessary to accomplish the ends dictated by the Security Council, NATO's
undertakings have proved critical to the credibility of the UN mission in Bosnia. However,
NATO and the UN have differed radically on the mechanisms for implementing the tasks
delegated to the alliance Recent press reports have portrayed the continuing difficulties
encountered in establishing policy for the enforcement of weapons exclusion zones through
NATO air strikes, demonstrating the marked differences between the cultures of NATO and the
UN when questions involving the use of force are at issue.

Similar questions are raised when the special capabilities of powerful states provide the
only means for responding to emergencies In those situations, the willingness of the particular
state to become involved can determine whether any facade of "international" response is
possible When that willingness is perceived to grow from special historical interests, the
legitimacy of the action may be questioned, raising doubts about the credibility of the UN as an
arbiter of international involvement in domestic conflicts. Cases involving Rwanda, Russia, and
Haiti come to mind as examples.

After the U S announced that it would vet future uses of military coercion under the
standards applicable in Presidential Decision Directive 25, the crisis in Rwanda provided the first
application of the standards Approval of a UN resolution was delayed to the dismay of some
states In the interim, significant loss of life occurred, causing some to argue that the unilateral
imposition of the U S standards frustrated a multilateral response. Later, when France, a state
with historical connections in the region, offered to intervene, its offer was accepted by the
Security Council in spite of the contention by some of the combatants that French motives were
biased In these two cases, international response was tailored to permit the approval or
participation of a powerful state Similar arguments could be raised about Russian involvements
in conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. Although some contend that Russian peacekeeping
operations provide support for selected factions in service to historical imperialistic objectives,
recent statements by US officials have suggested the appropriateness of Russian initiatives
assuming review by the United Nations. Finally, although action against the Haitian junta had
received approval in principle by the Security Council in advance of U. S. military operations, the
factors announced in immediate justification of the operation highlighted particular American
concerns that needed to be met Again, some might argue that the UN provided a fig leaf for
action in the interests of a single state or a small group of states.

Obviously, the United Nations Charter was drafted with these considerations in mind. It
was assumed that the agreement of powerful states would be the sine qua non of any multilateral


action, that belief stood as the source of the veto power in the Security Council. In reality,
multilateral action will always depend on the assent of particular states having political, military,
financial or geographic advantages for responding to the particular crisis at hand. My concern is
that the changing nature of international conflicts, turning from interstate to intrastate violence,
creates particular risks for the viability of the United Nations as a potential arbiter of legitimate
and neutral multilateral responses As individual states undertake initiatives that have been
sanctioned by the Security Council, and as NATO undertakes peacekeeping or peace enforcement
operations, the United Nations may lose any ability to play an authoritative and unbiased role in
responding to international crises. To the extent that this ability of the UN has value, explicit
standards for the involvement of individual states and international organizations in UN actions
are required

I would like to raise one final thought. The question of war powers has been raised with
regard to the recent U S military operation in Haiti. Presidents have consistently argued that the
constitutional war power did not preclude executive action without prior approval by the
legislative branch The evolution of events in Haiti provided a textbook example of the use of the
imminent threat of force to supplement urgent diplomatic action. If prior congressional approval
had been required in this instance, the successful outcome may not have been possible. If
peacekeeping and peace enforcement are to play a major role in contemporary foreign relations, a
role that may prove more prominent than traditional full-scale warmaking, then even more reason
exists for the reconsideration of reliable procedures for coordination and cooperation between the
branches on questions involving the war power.



Lion Binwtll ProfttMor of Lay
and International Rttattont

The Law Center
University of Southern California



Edwin M Smith, the Leon Benwell Professor of Law and International Relations, graduated with
honors from Harvard College, later receiving his J D from Harvard Law School. After Litigating for three
years with Rosenfeld, Meyer and Susman in Beverly Hills, California, Smith spent one year m Seattle as a
regional attorney for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Since 1980, Smith has taught
at the Law Center of the University of Southern California. Named an International Affairs Fellow of the
Council on Foreign Relations, he served during 1987-1988 as Special Counsel for Foreign Policy to Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York During 1991-1992, he was Visiting Professor of Law at the
University of Pennsylvania

Smith is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, currently participating on the Advisory
Selection Committee for the International Affairs Program. Having served on the Executive Council and the
Nominating Committee of the American Society of International Law, Smith is now chair of the
International Organizations Interest Group. He is presently a member of the Executive Committee of the
Board of Directors of the Academic Council on the United Nations System and a member of the National
Council of the United Nations Association of the United States Smith participates on the Membership Task
Force of the Pacific Council on International Policy He has also served as a member of the Advisory
Committee of the Asia Foundation's Council on Asian Pacific Affairs He has been invited to join the State
Department's Advisory Panel on International Law He has also served as a consultant to the Ford
Foundation's Program on International Law and Organizations.

Smith participated in the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Collective Involvement in
Internal Conflicts and the Study Group for the Carnegie Endowment's Project on Self-Determination. A
member of the Council on Foreign Relations NATO/European Community Briefing Delegation in May,
1 992, he has subsequently lectured on cooperation between United Nations and NATO in peacekeeping at
Umversidad Juan Carlos III in Madrid, Yale University, the Claremont-McKenna Colleges, International
Studies Association Annual Meeting in Acapuko, Mexico and the 1994 U. S. -Japan-Canada Trilateral
Conference on International Law in Tokyo, Japan. He has spoken on economic sanctions at the Liberal
Party Conference in Vancouver, Canada, the United Nations Secretariat in New York and at Stanley
Foundation conferences at Airlie, Virginia and Annapolis, Maryland. He has served twice as co-chair of the
Workshop on International Organization, sponsored by the American Society of International Law, the
Academic Council on the United Nations System, and the Ford Foundation.

Smith's recent writings include The United Nations in a New World Order (co-authored with
Michael G Schechter), Changing Conceptions and Institutional Adaptation in Keith Krausc and Andy
Knight, eds , The United Nations in the Twenty-First Century (forthcoming); NATO and the
European Community: Troubled Transitions, USC LAW 2-1 1 (Fall 1992), The United Nations: Meeting the
Challenges of the Post-Cold War World, 87th Annual Proceedings of THE American Society OF
International Law 268-272, 77ie Need for Effective Multilateral Sanctions, 86th Annual Proceedings
OF the American Society of International Law 303-308; Understanding Dynamic Obligations
International Arms Control Agreements, 64 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Law Review 1549(1991), 77ie "Just
War" and its Aftermath, Los ANGELES Lawyer (May, 1991); and Unilateralism or Multilateralism: The
US. The UN and the Iraq Crisis, Los ANGELES Lawyer (November, 1990).






Tad Daley has spent 15 years enrolled in various university degree
programs, a figure currently being examined by the authorities at the
Guiness Book of World Records. He is often accused of being a "perpetual
student," and is repeatedly asked by his family when he is going to get a
"real job." Tad has:

* a Bachelor's degree in Political Science
from Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois,

* a Master's degree in International Affairs
from the University of Southampton in England
(where he was a Rotary Foundation Graduate Fellow),

* a Law degree from the University of Illinois
(where he specialized in international law),

* and he expects soon to receive his
Ph.D. in Public Policy Analysis from the
RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies
in Santa Monica, California.

People say many things about Tad Daley, but "uneducated" is not one of them.

After receiving his law degree Tad worked as an attorney in Atlanta for
two years, and then embarked upon the work/study Ph.D. program in policy
studies at The RAND Corporation, the only one of its kind in the world.
He specializes in both Russian foreign policy and United Nations affairs
in his work for the International Policy Department at RAND, and he has
published a number of articles in both areas.

Tad is presently serving as the Executive Director of a new activist
citizens initiative, The Campaign for a New United Nations Charter. He
will argue today that although many of the structures of global governance
enacted in the United Nations Charter of 1945 remain relevant and vital,
taken as a whole they will not be adequate to meet the great global
challenges of the dawning new millennium. Moreover, those structures of
global governance are profoundly undemocratic, at a time when democracy is
purportedly the only legitimate mechanism for the governance of human
affairs. As a consequence, he will argue, in 1995 the international
community ought to activate Article 109 of the UN Charter, and initiate a
process that will lead in this decade to convening a "World Summit for a
New UN Charter."


Congressional Testimony


i ISv I ARTICLE 109 1 vS|


Tad Daley,
Executive Director,

The Campaign for a New United Nations Charter


U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on International Security,

International Organizations and Human Rights


Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me to testify before this special
hearing of your Subcommittee. I want to commend you for convening this hearing both
today, on the 49th anniversary of the enactment of the United Nations Charter, and here, in
San Francisco, the city where the framers of the United Nations Charter designed the global
structures to address the global challenges of the post-Second World War world. I can think
of no more appropriate time or place to begin considering what kinds of global structures
will be most appropriate for the dramatically different global challenges of the world of the
21st century.

I have brought along with me today my prepared statement, which I will summarize,
a copy of our nascent Campaign's "Citizens Petition to convene a World Summit for a New
UN Charter," and our nascent list of endorsements for it as it stands on UN Day 1994. If the
call for such a world summit becomes a significant voice in the policy debate during the
United Nations 50th anniversary year in 1995, these first two dozen "prominent signatories"
will stand among the first individuals who took an early stand on this issue, and really helped
get the idea off the ground. I respectfully request that these materials be included in the

I will speak today about three topics:

• Restructuring the UN Security Council and democratizing global

• Developing a standing volunteer world army for the enforcement of world law.

• Activating Article 109 of the UN Charter, to convene some kind of a
comprehensive UN Charter review conference before the end of this century.



An important debate is clearly taking place today about this question: "Who should sit
on the United Nations Security Council?" The five permanent Security Council members —
Britain, France, China, Russia, and the United States — were, of course, the five leading

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Online LibraryInternational Organizations United States. Congress. House. Committee on ForeiThe United Nations at fifty : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 24, 1994 → online text (page 8 of 10)