"It was not the snow that saved
Italy, but the valor of her sons."
On the Piave, .Boroevic's forces
crossed to the west side at Zenson.Only
eighteen miles from the sea, on Novem-
ber 13, and took a bridgehead farther
up the stream. When, at the mouth of
the river, Hungarian battalions crossed
the canalized stream and started over
the marshes to the old river-bed,
Piave Vecchia, or Sile. the engineers
opened the flood-gates which had been
built to reclaim land in the delta and to
control the rise of waters in the lagoons
of Venice less than twenty miles away.
Of the conditions after the floods were
let loose on November 15, we have this
account by a correspondent:
T?LOODS DEFEND THE ITALIANS ON THE
-T LOWER PIAVE.
"The water effectively holds the
enemy at most exposed points and for
fifteen miles on the west bank of the
Piave. The flooded area is about
seventy square miles, and the water is
a foot to five feet deep and twelve miles
in width at some points, making the
district impossible of occupation or
movement by enemy troops. The
enemy clings to the west bank at Zen-
son, but is crowded into a small U-
shaped position and relying on batteries
across the river to keep the Italians
back.
"The lower floors of the houses in
such villages as Piave Vecchia are
under water, and the campanili stick
up from the mud-hued level of the
flood like strange immense water
plants; and here in the silence of the
floods the enemy is moving in boats
and squelshing over mud islands.
Peasants, awaiting rescue from the
inundation, see him arrive with feelings
much like those of shipwrecked people
who hail a passing sail and find it is a
pirate craft."
THE AUSTRIANS ATTACK ON THE ASIAGO
PLATEAU.
As December opened, there were
indications on the Asiago Plateau that
HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR
a vigorous Austro-German offensive was
in preparation. On a front of twelve
miles no fewer than 2,000 guns were
massed. General Plumer offered, in
conjunction with the French, to take
over some sectors in the foot-hills; but
the Italian High Command feared the
effect of the cold and snow upon troops
unaccustomed to mountain conditions
and not equipped for them. Therefore,
danger of a break into the plains un-
doubtedly increased."
The anticipated attack on the Asiago
began toward the end of the first week
December. Slowly the Italians
in
yielded position after position, holding
out so long that they sometimes lost
many prisoners at a time. The number
captured by the enemy soon mounted
to 15,000, But he, too, was losing his
BRITISH TROOPS ON THE MARCH ACROSS THE PLAINS OF ITALY
The wise, sound strategic advice of General Plumer and the sense of support furnished by the presence of British
and French troops helped to sustain the spirits of the Italians in their desperate stand at the Piave. The British, in
their march across the historic northern plains, were greeted with enthusiastic demonstrations. They took up
their position on the Montello height, between Montebelluna and the Piave, the first week in December.
the assisting forces were assigned to
the Montello sector, which formed "a
hinge to the whole Italian line." The
aid was much appreciated as a means
of relief for General de Robilant's
army in its too-difficult position. To
keep the sector supplied, boys no more
than eighteen years old had been poured
into the ranks after barely a month of
drill in camp. Such was the sacrifice
the country was offering up.
Yet, "December was an anxious
month," Sir Herbert Plumer says.
"Local attacks grew more frequent
and more severe, and though the
progress made was not great, yet the
thousands. Already, since the be-
ginning of the invasion, he had given
up 150,000 in killed, wounded and
captured.
ALPINI AND BERSAGLIERI FIGHT TO THE
IX LAST MAN.
Both east and west of Brenta,
heights were taken and retaken. "It
was a saturnalia of killing. To realize
what was then happening, you need a
vision of death striding those misty
valleys like a proprietor walking in his
own fields. The hill of the Bersaglieri
was held by front men who had fought
since the offensive in August on the
Bainsizza Plateau. They fought till
781
HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR
fighting availed no longer, and then
fell back, fighting still and attacking
at every opportunity with the bayonet."
These are the words of Perceval Gib-
bon.
As so many times before, Alpini and
Bersaglieri performed unheard-of feats
/ of sheer daring, exhibiting that dash
and spirit which are suggested by the
very mention of their names. How-
ever, by Christmas Day, the prospect
was still unlightened. The enemy had
advanced into the Val Frenzela and
had secured the lower summit of Monte
Tomba. threatening to outflank Monte
Grappa.
THE TIDE TURNS WITH THE END OF THE
YEAR.
Then, on December 30, the French
left, supported by British batteries,
cleared the summit and slopes of Monte
Tomba, taking i ,500 Austrian prisoners.
With this success, the tide seemed to
turn. The hills were aiding their de-
fenders, at last, for wild storms had
broken out. The Piave was rushing,
swollen to a width of 1 ,000 yards or
more in places, its waters icy and for-
bidding. In spite of the peril of wad-
ing or crossing on rafts, volunteers never
were lacking for the raids that were
made, from time to time upon the east
bank. Before, the first fortnight of the
new year was gone, Zenson bridgehead
had been retaken by the Duke of
Aosta, and the Austrians driven back
across the river.
Step by step, hour by hour, the Teu-
ton forces lost ground and the Italian
positions became less cramped. The
counter-offensive was marked by some
signal successes, as when on January
27, Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele were
both taken and held and more than
1,500 prisoners captured; while, the
next day, an attack on Monte di Val
Bella resulted in carrying the summit
and added over a thousand more
Austrian prisoners.
Since the hope of getting down on to
the Venetian plains had been frustrated,
Ludendorff began to withdraw German
troops for use on other battle-fronts
where they . were needed. In the
Austrian command a change was made,
when, about January 21, 1918, General
782
Boroevic succeeded the Archduke Eu-
gene as head of the entire front against
Italy an appointment which was con-
sidered "merely a sop thrown to the
Slav element of Austria-Hungary."
THE NAVY HELPS IN THE DEFENSE OF
VENICE.
On the side of the Allies there was
increasing harmony and understand-
ing. When British and French batter-
ies were working in conjunction with
those of Italy, an Italian Staff officer
declared: "At last we have realized
unity of command right in the face of
enemy fire." But the Italians them-
selves bore the chief burden of the
fighting. "The Italian Army could
not only resist that had been shown
by the wonderful stand after the long
retreat but could already hit back
hard and retake from the enemy very
strong positions which had been in' his
hands for over a month. The recovery
from the long trial was very quick; and
it was of special significance that the
brigade which took Col del Rosso and
held it against all the furious counter-
attacks of the Austrians was the
Sassari Brigade, which had belonged
to the Second Army and come through
the worst of the great retreat."
In following the efforts of the Alpini,
Bersaglieri, Infantry, Cavalry, and
Arditi, we must not lose sight of the
equally necessary and heroic part
played by the Navy in the defense of
Venice. The spirit of its men was mani-
fested as soon as news of the Austro-
German invasion reached them in the
naval bases. Almost with one accord
they asked to be transferred to the
infantry and allowed to go to the front.
As many as could be spared had their
requests granted; but there was plenty
of work to be done on the water. All
through the retreat, the right flank of
the army was protected by marines
along canals and rivers. "Platoons
of marines stood in the mud behind
guns corroded by the inundations,
holding back entire companies of enemy
troops for days and nights without
the possibility of obtaining relief or
food. Some of the gurf crews dragged
not only the mounts and the guns by
hand across very swampy ground, with
VENICE, WHERE ROMANCE AND BEAUTY ABIDE
Venice, whose islands offered a refuge from Attila and his Huns in 452 A.D., is a land of blue waters, radiant skies,
flashing colors and lilting songs. She has picturesque, romantic charm, and encloses a store of artistic treasure.
With her industries hard hit by the war, she made a patriotic and heroic readjustment. Then came the invasion, and
the fair city waited silent, almost deserted, while her defenders strove for her safety.
FOR THE PROTECTION OF VENICE, THE BELOVED CITY
HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR
the water up to their knees, but also
the munition cases, without taking
time for sleeping or eating." Sub-
marine chasers ran up into the rivers
to disperse Austrian patrols. Hydro-
planes bombed bridges. And aviators
were tireless in making bombing and
observation flights and keeping the
different sections of the army informed
of one another's movements.
''pHE GULF OF VENICE PROTECTED BY
1 MINEFIELDS.
Two weeks after Monfalcone and
Grado had been abandoned, "the work
of forming the principal ring of defense
around the city of the Doges was confi-
ded to the machine gunners of the navy."
As, fifteen hundred years earlier, fugi-
tives from the terrors of Attila's inva-
sion had taken refuge in the marshes
and founded there the city, Venice,
again the safety of the Venetian people
depended partly upon the waters.
We have noted how the Lower Piave
had been flooded. The whole region
of the northern shore of the Venetian
Gulf was inundated and protected by
mine fields. The Gulf, therefore, was
converted into an isolated sea. Secret
channels in the bottom of the lagoons
were known to none but war pilots,
who alone could safely navigate even
the smallest boats there. Moving about
among the marshy islands, a great
fleet of floating batteries furnished a
strong defense. An eyewitness gives
the following account of these batteries:
"Each is camouflaged to represent
a tiny island, a garden patch, or a house
boat. Floating on the glass-like sur-
face of the lagoons, the guns fire a few
shots and then change position
making it utterly impossible for the
enemy to locate them. The entire
auxiliary service of supplying this
floating army has been adapted to
meet the lagoon warfare. Munition
dumps are on boats, constantly moved
about to prevent the enemy spotting
them. Gondolas and motor boats re-
place the automobile supply lorries
customary in land warfare. Instead of
motor ambulances, motor boats carry
off dead and wounded. Hydro-aero-
planes replace ordinary fighting air-
craft."
784
THE DARING EXPLOIT OF LIEUTENANT
RIZZO.
There were, besides, stationary land
batteries and armed ships of all sizes,
including huge flat-bottomed British
monitors carrying the largest guns.
Swift little armored motor boats darted
about, "the cavalry of the marshes,"
running up to the very trenches, where
the enemy lines bordered a river, and
attacking companies that attempted
to cross the lagoons.
On the night of December 9, 1917,
when the invasion was still swinging on,
a spirited exploit was performed by
Lieutenant Rizzo, of the Italian Navy.
With two small launches he approached
Trieste Harbor, which was carefully
shut in by a network of steel wire
studded with mines. In defiance of the
danger from explosion, in case a jar
should set off the mines, Lieutenant
Rizzo and his men cut the wire cables
that held the structure to the piers,
until the "cobweb of metal and ex-
plosives" dropped down to the sands.
Then they ran their boats into the
harbor near the great vessels, Monarch
and Wien, and launched their torpe-
does. Both ships were injured, the
Wien fatally, so that she sank to the
bottom. The Italian launches escaped
miraculously through a storm of shrap-
nel and gunfire, under the brilliant
illumination of searchlights and burst-
ing shells, while the Austrians sought
to discover whence the attack had come.
SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES OF THE GREAT
DISASTER.
When, under an unusual, sudden
strain, a man's physical system suffers
collapse, the breakdown is often reason-
ably accounted for by the discovery of
a "complication" of disorders or cir-
cumstances. The same reasonable ex-
planation applies to national catas-
trophes, although, in the immediate
shock and confusion, this fact may be
overlooked. So, for Italy's "Capo-
retto" there are reasons, military,
economic, moral, and personal. The
one most patent, and therefore most
emphasized, at the moment, was the
local break in morale, which in itself
was due to a complex and intricate
tangle of causes. The Russian failure,
HISTORY OF .THE WORLD WAR
the consequent spread of Bolshevist
tenets, the unsatisfied demands of
Socialists and pacifists, the exhaustion
of mind and body resulting from months
of terrible war conditions without relief
or refreshment, these are a few of the
threads that wove the web to entangle
unwary feet.
When we get close enough to see the
military situation, the disaster is even
more accountable. With General
Capello's command, the Second Army,
' blow is that the Italian positions were
those suitable for offensive movements,
such as the army had been developing
along the eastern front, rather than for
defense. The foremost lines were far
the strongest and the guns had been
pushed far forward. When the first lines
were put under sudden bombardment
and weakened by clouds from shells of
asphyxiating and mustard gas, then
attacked during an unexpected lull in
the artillery storm, there was not a
A DARING NIGHT EXPLOIT IN THE HARBOR OF TRIESTE
Arrived at Trieste in torpedo boats on the night of December 9-10, 1917, Luigi Rizzo and some of his men
made their way in on motor scouts, cut the mined wire entanglements and approached the vessels, Monarch
and Wien, discharging torpedoes which sank the Wien and damaged the Monarch. Austrian search-lights
swept the skies for air raiders while the seamen crept in unperceived. They escaped to their base in safety.
several times too large for one officer's
efficient control, and its 4th Corps,
poorly trained and filled up from new
drafts, in a sector far removed from
the commander's field of action, there
was difficulty enough, had General
Capello himself been able to direct
affairs. But his illness had left control
in the hands of General Montuori, who
was unacquainted with the region.
General Capello under the press of
unusual circumstances resumed his re-
sponsibility before he was considered
fit to "carry on."
THE ITALIAN POSITIONS NOT SUITED FOR
DEFENSE.
Another condition that explains what
happened under the Austro-German
firmly held "battle position" behind
them -for support. Worse than all else,
enemy troops, masquerading in Italian
uniforms, carried out a "collective
deception. "
"It was Italy's misfortune to be
attacked at the time of her weakness and
at the place where she was weakest."
More astonishing than the retreat was
the immediate rally after such an ex-
perience. That the spirit of the army
as a whole was far from being demor-
alized had ample demonstration before
the year was over. And now, behind
the army stood firmer walls of support
than before, due to a newly aroused
spirit in government and in people
even in the Allied command.
CAPTIVE BUT UNDISMAYED
French colonial troops awaiting roll-call in the German prison camp at Zossen, south of Berlin. The troops of the
Fatherland had full proof of their valor in the recapture of Forts Douaumont and Vaux, and in the second battle of
the Aisne when they flung themselves against the machine-gun-infested slopes of the Craonne plateau. Ruschin
RUSSIANS IN FRANCE
In 1916 a contingent of Russians were transported to France by the Trans-Siberian railway. A Russian brigade
under General Lochwitsky was stationed in front of Courcy in the battle of the Aisne, and its members were burn-
ing to inspire by their conduct their liberated countrymen, and show what Russians could achieve when properly
disciplined and led. In a day of fierce fighting they took all their objectives. French Official
786
Photo Yanduk
M. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU
Premier of France, 1917-20
Russians in France in 1917
CHAPTER XLVIII
On the French Front in 1917
'"THE Allied offensive in 1916 had
^ nowhere achieved decision. Ger-
man attack at Verdun had held the
French; British gains on the Somme
had been limited to a depth of six or
seven miles on a narrow front; Italy's
blow at Gorizia had fallen short; and
Russia's campaign after initial vic-
tories had broken down. In the win-
ter, the High Command took counsel
and decided upon a further general
attack co-ordinated upon all fronts.
THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF SURVEYS
THE SITUATION.
The enemy, facing the situation
squarely, took stock of assets and
liabilities and made wise provision to
anticipate the offensive and thus se-
cure even to a limited degree the
initiative. He knew that as an ally
Austria was failing, that he could rely
upon Bulgaria only in the Balkans and
upon Turkey merely in the east. On
the other hand, he sensed the growing
weakness of Russia, perceived the
widening cracks in the framework of
the mighty colossus whose shadow had
hitherto darkened the fortunes of the
Central Powers and he determined
to profit by its fall. Until Russia were
out of action, Italy might safely be
left, for the German Staff felt she was
too much under the influence of Eng-
land to make a separate peace, even
if she were defeated. On the Western
Front a difficult problem had to be
faced.
ITHDRAWAL TO THE LINE OF DEFENSE
VV ALREADY PREPARED.
The fierce conflict on the Somme had
left the Germans with an awkward
salient in their line. It was urgently
necessary for them to improve their
position or run the risk of being en-
veloped by the Allies. An attack
against the enemy at the point where
he had broken through was the most
obvious remedy, but the German Chief
of Staff could not venture a great
offensive in the Somme region at a time
when he knew attacks were imminent
on other parts of the Western and
Eastern fronts. There remained only
the alternative of withdrawal, and
Hindenburg decided to adopt this
expedient and transfer his line of de-
fense which had been pushed in at
Peronne at one point and bulged out
to the west of Bapaume, Roye and
Noyon, at others to the chord position
Arras, St. Quentin, Soissons. The
retreat was a great blow to the German
army, to the people at home, to their
allies abroad. For the time, until its
soundness as a strategical manoeuvre
was borne in upon them by bitter
experience, it seemed a great triumph
for the British and French, who has-
tened to exploit it for propagandist
purposes.
787
HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR
Retreat began on March 16, 1917,
and left in its wake a devastated and
shell-scarred wilderness where rivers
had been dammed to flood wide areas,
where towns and villages lay in black-
ened heaps, where spectral shapes
stood that once were trees, and where
silence replaced the peaceful murmur
of a smiling countryside. The British
and French followed slowly for all rail-
ways, roads and bridges had been
obliterated, and there was fighting
with rear-guards until the fluid line
crystallized into shape once more. By
the first week in April, German dis-
positions in the new Siegfried (or
Hindenburg) Line were complete and
commanders could appreciate the fore-
sight which had engineered such a
great strategic "stand to," which,
although it abandoned the initiative to
the enemy for the time being, gave
favorable local conditions and short-
ened the line in a way that made it
possible to build up strong reserves.
TT THERE AND WHAT WAS THIS NEW HIN-
VV DENBURG LINE.
The new line hung like a cable be-
tween Vimy ridge and the Craonne
plateau. In making it, the Germans,
profiting from experience in earlier
battles, had departed from their old
pattern of defenses. "In future,"
writes the veteran Marshal von Hin-
denburg, so closely associated with its
conception, "our defensive positions
were no longer to consist of single lines
and strong points but of a network of
lines and groups of strong points. In
the deep zones thus formed we did not
intend to dispose our troops on a rigid
and continuous front but in a complex
system of nuclei and distributed in
breadth and depth. The defender had
to keep his forces mobile to avoid the
destructive effects of the enemy fire
during the period of artillery prepara-
tion, as well as voluntarily to abandon
any parts of the line which could no
longer be held, and then to recover by a
counter-attack all the points which
were essential to the maintenance of
the whole position. These principles
applied in detail as in general.
"We thus met the devastating effects
of the enemy artillery and trench-
788
mortar fire and their surprise infantry
attacks with more and more deeply dis-
tributed defensive lines and the mo-
bility of our force. At the same time
we developed the principle of saving
men in the forward lines by increasing
the number of our machine guns and
so economizing troops." In the maze
of these deep lines before the many-
angled fire of machine guns French
attack was to experience tragic check
at the Craonne plateau.
THE BRITISH AGREE TO FOLLOW FRENCH
DIRECTION.
In the Allied plan of attack a plan
considerably modified by the Hinden-
burg retreat it was arranged that
combined British and French attacks
should be made on the two pivots of the
new German position. Thus, British
operations against Arras on a lesser
front .were to be preparatory to more
decisive operations by the French
against the Craonne plateau, to be
begun a little later on, and in the sub-
sequent stages of which the British
were to co-operate. If this combined
offensive did not produce the full
effects hoped for, it was arranged that
the British should shift their attack to
the Flanders area, and the French
should lend their aid where it was most
needed. To achieve such co-ordination,
unity in command was essential and
for the first time in the history of the
war the British commander consented
to place himself under a French gen-
eralissimo, Nivelle of Verdun fame.
Sir Douglas Haig reserved to himself,
however, the right of deciding when to
break off his own action.
Nivelle's appointment to succeed
Joffre, in preference to Petain and Foch,
had in it something of surprise. That
he was an advocate of decisive action
appealed to a more or less war-weary
France, faint-hearted over the "nib-
bling" methods of Joffre, and the
"limited objectives" of the Somme
and Verdun fields. He was more popu-
lar than Petain whose coldness and
sarcasm made enemies among his
equals, readier with a colossal scheme
than Foch, at this-. time believed ex-
hausted after a series of great actions.
His war record was a distinguished one:
HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR
at the Battle of the Aisne in Septem- 'pHE BRITISH BEGIN WITH GAINS AROUND
her, 1914, he had saved a portion of -* ARRAS -
the VII Corps from destruction; at The first storm in the West broke
Verdun from command of the III just after the beginning of spring. On
Corps he had passed to the command April 9, British attack at Arras gave
of the Verdun army and had recov- signal for the opening of the great
ered considerable ground by the end of offensive. For days masses of artillery
and trench-mortars pounded
the enemy's lines and then the
infantry moved forward with
considerable success. The high-
water mark was reached, April
14, when Sir Douglas Haig, but
for his agreement with Nivelle,
would have broken off the
fight, but the French offensive
had already begun and begun
badly and the British were
forced to continue fighting at
a disadvantage to relieve the
pressure upon the French army.
The French line from Soissons
to west of Rheims faced enemy
positions of extraordinary diffi-
culty as attested by the fact
that since the first struggle on
the Aisne heights in September,
1914, little had changed in the
sector. In the Hindenburg
retreat only a short alteration
of the line north-east of
Soissons had been made. The
first section of the front from
Vauxaillon to Troyon, perhaps