public. France could not resume the initiative without
fresh troops ; Mexican guerillas cut off connection with the
seacoast, and the situation of the invading army became
1 The whole dealing of France with Mexico had tended to force a
rupture. A random shot fired in the streets of its capital was magni
fied into the attempted assassination of Saligny, the French minister.
While the treaty of London was under consideration, a Mexican
ambassador sought an interview at Paris with the French government,
and tendered overtures for an amicable adjustment. Thouvenel inter
rupted him rudely : " We will not allow any explanation. We have
given our orders in concert with England ; and you will know through
our minister and our admiral what are the demands of France."
When, after arriving in Mexico, the allies made up their ultimatum
together, Spain s claims were found indisputable, and England s were
based upon liquidated matters ; but those of France were beyond all
reason or proportion. Twelve million dollars in the mass were
demanded by way of a general indemnity, besides the face value of
discredited bonds bought as worthless. When the allies protested
against such estimates, the reply was that "each nation is the sole
umpire of its demands." In the correspondence between the Powers
which followed, Earl Russell declared it impossible that claims so
excessive could have been made with the hope of being entertained
266 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR, CHAP. I.
perilous. In Europe these gloomy news strengthened the
impression that this foolhardy enterprise would be aban
doned. Not such was Napoleon s intention. He deter
mined to send reenforcements, and asked of his legislative
corps an additional credit of fifteen million francs, which
was voted. General Forey, a soldier of blood and iron,
inexorable as fate and ambitious of a marshalship, was
appointed to the chief command and invested with full
power for war or diplomacy. Upon arriving at Vera Cruz,
he proclaimed that the object of his Emperor was to liberate
the Mexican people, and then allow them to select freely
their form of government. Almonte s puppet show was
closed. With nattering courtesy Forey ordered the flag of
Mexico to be replaced over the custom-house where he
landed, and he artfully gained the submission of a conserva
tive element in the country. Before November had ended,
over 35,000 French reenforcements had landed on the Gulf
coast, and Forey, taking up the line of march for Puebla.,
proclaimed that France would persevere in the work under
taken. 1
The famous autograph letter of Napoleon to Forey,
written before the latter left France, throws strong light
upon his designs in America. 2 The plan of establishing a
strong government of the Latin race in Mexico, to counter
poise our great Republic, that government to be, if pos
sible, a monarchy of his own placing, is herein set forth
in unmistakable terms. It is not for the interests of France,
argues the Emperor, that the United States should seize all
the Mexican Gulf, and thence command the Antilles, as well
as South America, and dispense the products of the New
World. "If, on the other hand, Mexico maintains her
independence and the integrity of her territory, if a stable
government be there constituted with the assistance of
France, we shall have restored to the Latin race on the
other side of the Atlantic all its strength aftfl its prestige;
we shall have guaranteed security to our West India colonies
1 Mexican Affairs, 18G3, 194, 341.
2 July 3d, 1862 ; Mexican Affairs, 1865, 190.
1862. NAPOLEON S DESIGNS IN MEXICO. 267
and to those of Spain; we shall have established our friendly
influence in the centre of America; and that influence, by
creating immense markets for our commerce, will procure
us the raw materials indispensable for our manufactures." 1
Such was the brilliant picture conjured up by a mind far
penetrating, and yet from its absorption in schemes of gilded
unrealities most prone to be led astray. This document is
perhaps the most positive extant of Napoleon s ultimate
plans, such as he seldom reduced to plain writing or suffered
to be divulged.
The new conquest of Mexico was thus the primary object
of the Emperor s policy 011 this continent, the dismember
ment of the American Union being secondary, yet most
essential. So far, as this country was concerned, France
(to use the language of her ministers) waited on events.
Suspicion was aroused early at Washington, and the progress
of French designs on this distant border carefully watched.
As early as September, 1861, Dayton at Paris had been in
structed to ascertain Napoleon s intentions and to acquaint
him with our express desire that Mexico should remain
independent. To this Thouvenel, then Minister of Foreign
Affairs, replied with emphasis, that France and England
meant merely to realize their money debts. 2 The same
assurances were given repeatedly, as Dayton s despatches
show, while the triple alliance lasted. The Emperor had
no desire, it was said, to interfere in any way with the
internal government of Mexico. Even when reinforcements
under Forey were sent forward, so earnest was the French
government in disclaiming sinister designs, that no issue
1 Ib. That such a project had occupied his mind before our Civil
War, see 6 N. & H. 34.
2 And yet at this time, as appears from a despatch of Thouvenel,
dated October llth, 1801, he was urging upon Earl Russell the Em
peror s preconceived desire to set up Maximilian in Mexico. Mexican
Affairs, 1865, 170. And in this despatch the likelihood of a final
rupture of the American Union aids the argument.
HISTORY OF THE ^IVIL WAR. CHAP. I.
could fairly be made without raising an issue of veracity.
"If we must err at all," wrote Seward in consequence, "it
is safest to err on the side of sincere faith." The situation
of Lincoln s administration was truly perplexing. Prudence
forbade a foreign war while domestic insurrection was so
all-absorbing for suppression; and in Mexico, besides, the
Juarez government had not yet shown such proof of skill
or resources as to encourage the hope that our open inter
ference in its behalf would result favorably. The only
true course, therefore, was to watch the situation for our
selves and discreetly bide our time. France was plainly
informed that the sympathies of this Union were with
Mexico; that we believed no monarchical government
founded by European intervention would have any prospect
of security or permanency; that we were opposed to all
schemes which threatened to overthrow Juarez and the
Mexican republic; but that, in reliance on these repeated
assurances of the Emperor, we should pursue a policy of
strict neutrality until change and a notice to the contrary. 1
We may, now understand why Louis Napoleon was so
anxious to become pacificator in the struggle between North
and South. That ill-favored apparition of a friendly medi
ation, which stalked upon the stage at intervals, as if
to intimidate the United States into compliance, was part
of his Mexican drama. Preoccupied by dazzling designs on
this continent, the Emperor became excessively anxious for
some settlement of the American conflict other than by the
full reestablishment of constitutional authority. His offi
cious services were first tendered just after belliger
ent rights had been accorded to the South. Next,
in October, 1862, he invited England and Eussia to join
him in exerting an influence with the two belligerents of
America for a six months armistice; but both
powers declined to sanction such a step. 2 Failing
1 Mexican Affairs, 1862, 216, etc. ; ib. 1863, 530, etc. And see 6 N.
& H. c. 2.
1 Sse 6 N. & H. 63-67. In Spencer Walpole s Lord John Russell,
344, it is related that this Secretary proposed in October, 1861,
1862. NAPOLEON PROPOSES MEDIATION. 269
in that triple alliance, he made direct overtures to the Lin
coln government through his ministers, deploring this devas
tating strife, and proposing that commissioners should be
appointed from the contending sections to ascertain whether
separation was an extreme to be no longer avoided. 1 This
last proposal, which under all circumstances was a covert
threat, reached Washington in February, and at a dark
period of the war. Seward s despatch in reply, 1863
one of the best State papers of the Civil War, met February-
the insidious offer with dignity, good temper, and March<
unshaken courage; it positively declined all mediation at
once and forever. Congress, too, declared before adjourn
ment, by large majorities in each branch, that foreign inter
vention was unreasonable and inadmissible, and that any
further attempt in such direction would be regarded as an
unfriendly act. 2
England might well have won our gratitude for discour
aging Napoleon s darker projects. The insincerity and
self-delusion of the Emperor were apprehended by the
Palmerston ministry. But downright surliness and pride
in this quarter forbade the growth of a kindly sentiment,
and the day of reckoning came. Disinterested by com
parison, and bound to the United States by the strongest
what peremptory summons to North and South to make up their
quarrel ; but that Lord Palmerston disapproved such a course. In
September, 1802, Lord Palmerston acceded ; but colleagues in the
Cabinet restrained the two, and the next month this proposal from the
Emperor was rejected.
1 Drouyn de 1 IIuys to Mercier, January 9th, 1863. "The senti
ment to which we have yielded is too sincere for indifference to find a
place in our thoughts, and that we should cease to be painfully affected
whilst the war continues to rage." Yet humane sentiment had not
prevented the Emperor from despatching Forey to pour ruin and
desolation into Mexico. And see 6 N. & H. c. 4.
2 Globe, 186:3, 1497, 1541; Am. Cycl. 1862, 738-740; 6 N. & H.
c. 4. Napoleon, thus rebuffed, left the subject, but he was soon seen
informing leaders of the secession cause in Parliament that he was
ready to recognize the Soutli if Great Britain took the first step.
270 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR CHAP. I.
natural ligaments, Great Britain chose, nevertheless, to
make herself the most conspicuous among European nations
that expected and desired the downfall of the great Re
public. Confederate cruisers found shelter in her colonial
ports, while other nations excluded them. The influential
of the British press subserved secession interests ; blockade-
running was almost altogether a British diversion, with
risks taken by British insurance companies; British capi
talists invested in the Southern loans ; British agents in the
United States served as Confederate agents and emissaries;
British merchants supplied to the Confederate army ammu
nition and supplies. 1 And more than all this, Great Britain s
isle was for two years the naval base of Confederate opera
tions. Privateering Southern cruisers, built and equipped
to all intents in British ports, and manned with British gun
ners, issued forth one by one, and roamed the ocean at large
to prey upon the merchant marine of the Union, seldom
anchoring in a Southern harbor, since blockade sealed up
approach, and never bringing in their captures for regular
judicial proceedings. Whether in all this the Palmerston
ministry was actuated by feelings positively hostile to the
United States, and not rather by mere heedlessness to
results, supposing a breach irreparable, one need not now
inquire; but it stood convicted, years later, of neglect, at
the least, to enforce even the neutrality proclaimed. " The
British nation sympathizes with the insurgents," wrote
Seward in August, 1862; "the British government either
sympathizes or allows itself to seem to sympathize with
them." But under all circumstances, our ministers abroad
were, like the old Roman generals, charged, even when
defeated, " never to despair of the Republic;" 2 and Minister
Adams, with a vigilance that never slept, collected and pre
served facts which in time brought reparation.
Repeatedly in early 1862 did Minister Adams inform
Earl Russell that an armed steamer, known as the Oreto,
was preparing to sail from Liverpool to make war upon, the
commerce of the United States. The British Secretary in-
i 3 Seward, cs. C, 7. 2 3 Seward, 123, 145.
1862. CONFEDERATE CRUISERS BUILT. 271
sisted, upon perfunctory reports made to him, that the
vessel in question was an innocent trading vessel, not
withstanding its true destination was of common
notoriety. Permitted to sail, this vessel arrived
at Nassau, where, taking on board her Confederate com
mander, she proceeded, as the Florida, upon her career of
devastation under the flag of the Confederacy. 1 At Liver
pool, that haven of cupidity for the Southern cause, 2 a
breach still more palpable was committed the same year.
A vessel, known first by her dock number of "290," was in
process of construction and outfit under circumstances which
left no doubt of her intended mission, an ostensible owner
being Laird, a member of Parliament who had made him
self conspicuous as an advocate of the Confederate cause.
Minister Adams brought these facts to the notice of Earl
Russell on the 23d of June; but here, too, upon a report of
British officials, it was decided that there was not sufficient
proof to warrant the vessel s detention. Unable to secure
the attention of .the government, Adams next adduced the
testimony which our consul at Liverpool had gathered with
great fulness of detail, but still it was insisted that no
prima facie case had been made out. Undaunted by rebuffs,
our minister still plied the Foreign Office with proofs of
the most convincing character, adding on the 24th of July
the written opinion of an eminent English barrister, which
last made, probably, more impression than all the testimony
together. 3 But the law officers of the crown dallied, as did
also the ministry, and before the latter could receive report
advising a detention, the "290," which had left her moor
ings and anchored in the* Mersey, sailed away without
register or clearance beyond all reach of the futile injunctions
1 6 N. & II. c. 3 ; > Seward, c. 17.
2 Here Bulloch, the Confederate agent, disbursed millions for vessels
and supplies. Davis, 240.
3 " It appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement
of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which, if not enforced on this occasion,
is little better than a dead letter." (Mr. Collier.) See 2 Walpole s
Russell, 353-355. "There was no secrecy about the building of the
Alabama," says Jefferson Davis. Davis, 241.
272 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. I.
sent out to stop her. And thus, when rechristened, did
the Alabama, under Raphael Semmes, once an officer of the
American navy, launch out on her career of robbery and
destruction, a unique one in the annals of civilized war
fare, to receive a better name than piracy; for as no port
existed into which Semmes could carry a prize, he destroyed
every defenceless merchant vessel he could overhaul which
sailed under the national flag he had been taught to protect,
despoiling it of whatever portable articles he could take on
board, and maltreating crew and passengers at his own
arbitrary pleasure. 1
It is unfair to contend, as did Earl Russell with apathy,
that a nation cannot go behind the letter of its law to enforce
belligerent neutrality. The whole essence of international
obligation lies, not in written text, but in the just and con
siderate spirit to avoid offence to other sovereignties. It
is the duty of a neutral nation to honorably uphold its good
faith against the efforts of all ill-disposed and partisan in
habitants within the realm; and even though the statute
should itself be inadequate, so that conviction might not
follow, prompt legal prosecution will vindicate the public
faith and check individual wrong. 2 The relief to this pic
ture of stolid indifference was in the grand treaty between
Great Britain and the United States for joint extirpation
of the African slave-trade. 3 It was an omen of encourage
ment through the darkest days of our national peril, that
whenever freedom for the oppressed became a positive issue,
British philanthropy would come to our aid and offset aris
tocratic enmity. 4
Russia, as we have said, was* the real European power
1 6 N. & H. c. 3 ; 3 Seward, c. 17. See p. 138.
2 Earl Russell himself conceded that he saw no reason why Parlia
ment should be called upon to amend an act which in his opinion was
sufficient already. 6 N. & H. c. 3.
3 Supra, p. 219.
4 Of this joint compact, which gave the death-blow to the vilest
traffic of the century, Seward was justly proud. "If I have done
nothing else worthy of self-congratulation," he wrote home, "I deem
this treaty sufficient to have lived for." 3 Seward, 85.
1862. FRIENDSHIP OF RUSSIA. 273
that befriended the United States with strong effect, and
the Czar throughout this weary struggle remained our con
stant friend. 1 When Cameron reached St. Petersburg, early
in the summer of 1862, he found many proofs of cordial
sympathy. Alexander held with him a long and earnest
conversation, seeming plain and unostentatious in discourse,
and sincere without affectation. He frankly declared that
his sympathies had always been cordially with the United
States; that he was very anxious our nation should suffer
no decrease of power or influence; that he regarded Ameri
can and Russian interests as in many respects identical, and
hoped to draw the two nations into closer communication. 2
The blockade of the Southern coast was by this time so
effective that its stringency was severely felt in France and
England. Welles, our Secretary of the Navy, though some
what ancient and unprepossessing in personal appearance,
was wise and strong in performing his task, and ably
assisted. 3 New vessels were equipped every month, to
keep up the patrol, painted not black and white, the old
hues, but a dull bluish drab, so that blockade-runners
could less easily catch sight of them. In England, most
especially, government interference was sought upon every
possible pretext; at one time the blockade was complained
of as inefficient and unworthy of British respect; at another,
as too efficient, because some British ship or subject had
fallen a prey to American vigilance; now was pressed the
cotton famine, which made mills idle, and then the imag
ined barbarity of obstructing Charleston harbor. Yet,
despite all pressure, the French Emperor refrained from
the severest comments expected of him in the speech to his
Legislative Corps; while Earl Russell, in the debates of
Parliament, when motions were pressed for Confederate
1 Supra, p. 117. 2 3 Seward, 49.
3 " Welles was a curious-looking man, 1 writes Dana ; " he wore a
wig which was parted in the middle, the hair falling down on each
side ; and it was from his peculiar appearance, I have always thought,
that the idea that he was an old fogy originated." McClure, April,
1898.
274 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. I.
recognition and mediation, advocated fair play to the United
States Government in its efforts for restored supremacy.
Meanwhile, though all in vain, our Washington adminis
tration urged Great Britain and France to withdraw their
hasty belligerent recognition, inasmuch as neutrality and
the abuses of neutrality were the source of ceaseless mis
chief and irritation. 1
SECTION XIV.
THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION.
With reverses in the field and European unfriendliness
to dishearten this administration, the autumn elections of
1862 showed, as a new source of discouragement, that the
tide of popular support in loyal States was re
ceding. The strongest Kepublican States, such
as Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts, and Michigan, showed
majorities greatly reduced, while elsewhere the opposition
elected numerous candidates. In New York, where a State
executive was to be chosen, Horatio Seymour, a former
governor and a rural Democrat of great influence, carried
the polls against General James S. Wadsworth by a majority
of about ten thousand. In New Jersey, too, a governor was
chosen by the opposition. For Representatives in the next
Congress, the Republicans lost twenty-five districts in New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania alone; in the President s own
State of Illinois, opponents chosen to, the next House out
numbered his friends by more than two to one. Yet, for
tunately, a working majority was promised in both branches
of the succeeding Congress, with the Senate still strongly
Republican. 2
The causes of such temporary reaction were not far to
seek. The people murmured in their discouragement over
ill success, as did the Israelites of old in the wilderness.
Weariness of military inaction and failure, impatience for
1 3 Sewarcl, cs. 6-9, passim; 25 Harper, 563, etc.
2 26 Harper ; 7 N. & H. 361.
1862. ADVERSE ELECTIONS IN AUTUMN. 275
victories, discontent growing out of these hot disputes over
the merits of leading generals, bitterness over the arbitrary
civil arrests and other extreme measures, dissatisfaction
with Congress and its harsh and costly legislation, with accu
mulating taxes, irredeemable paper money, and the turmoil
of conservative and radical opinion to subdivide the domi
nant force that conducted the war, all this, to say nothing
of that desire for change inherent in free government, found
popular expression at the polls. Prominent among sucli
causes of dissension was, of course, the President s eman
cipation edict, but lately issued and prospective still in its
proclaimed operation; and such antagonism did this provoke
among men loyal to the cause of Union, that it seemed as
though, unretracted, this new policy would indeed unite
the South and divide the North. But the surges of dis
satisfaction which now came rolling in, spent their force
against this steadfast administration in one political shock,
to disperse in spray. Democrats had of late been strongly
induced to recombine for party advantage. Even sturdy
war Democrats were disposed to rebuke the dominant set
for perverting, as they deemed it, a lawful war for the
Union into an unlawful one for the negro. Yet thousands
fighting in the field, democratic by former affiliation, were
drawing toward Lincoln s new policy, as they faced a prac
tical problem and felt that nothing short of carrying the
citadel of slavery would bring this stubborn contest to a
close; while thousands more, of that former faith, who
were identified with the civil service, or influential as good
citizens, sustained the new course of affairs unfaltering.
This forced stubborn Democrats who engineered for politi
cal success, to combine all elements of party opposition,
even to foes latent and lurking, who, as trucklers from
habit, demanding peace at any price, were now styled
"copperheads " l by those who battled for reunion, as it was
or as it should be.
Again the flags were seen streaming at the two wings of
the Capitol, as Congress reassembled on Monday, December
1 From the venomous American snake which bore that name.
276 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. I.
1st, for a final session, which closed on the 4th of March
following.
Not a sign of retreat or hesitation because of these ad
verse elections could be traced in the President s message.
Neither vigorous war, nor freedom under his proc
lamation of September 22d, was to be stayed or
hindered in consequence. But with his usual clear logic,
and more than his usual warmth and pathos of expression,
Lincoln pressed the necessity of keeping still this physical
expanse of country the abode of one country and of one
homogeneous people. Slavery, he argued, was the cause
of this present conflict; without it rebellion could never
have begun and could not now continue. Some believed
slavery to be right, and that it should be extended ; others
held the contrary; but it was easier to settle the issue by
law as friends than by treaty as aliens. Hence lie recom
mended that Congress should propose to the legislatures of
the several States a constitutional amendment embracing
three articles : (1) providing public compensation for every
slave State which should abolish local slavery before the
year 1900 ; (2) securing freedom to all slaves who during
the rebellion had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of
war, with compensation, however, to loyal owners; (3) au
thorizing Congress to colonize free colored persons with
their consent in some other country. With this just offer
of indemnity, he believed the war would end sooner and