About four thousand soldiers were thus diligently employed,
until 011 the 8th of March a sudden rise of the Mississippi
broke a dam at the upper end and the water rushed through
the excavation to interrupt and hinder. Moreover, the
course of this canal being in a direction almost perpendicu
lar to the bluffs on the east side of the river, the enemy, on
discovering what was being done, planted a strong battery
to rake the work and drive out Grant s dredgers ; and hence
this enterprise was abandoned, a confessed failure. 2 Soon
after commencing this canal Grant caused a channel to be
cut, besides, from the Mississippi into Lake Providence;
and still another from that river into Coldwater, by way
of Yazoo Pass. The possibility presented by the former
enterprise, of which McPherson took charge, was that of
connecting a series of bayous by a waterway, through which
transports might find their way into the Washita and Eed
rivers, and thence down the Mississippi to cooperate with
Banks at Port Hudson. By the latter scheme it was pro
posed at first simply to reach the Yazoo for a small foray
upon the enemy s transports, but a larger enterprise grew
out of it, in an expedition by one of McPherson s divisions,
under cover of Porter s gunboats, which Sherman reenforced.
This expedition failed, more from ignorance of what would
sufficiently clear this Yazoc route, than from any imprac
ticability in the route itself; and in course of a delay,
through finding difficulties and then sending back for the
1 By General T. Williams, when in June Farragut from below and
a fleet from above threatened Vicksburg.
2 1 Grant, 446, 447 ; 24 W. R. pt. 1, 44.
1803. WINTER SCHEMES BEFORE ViCKSBURG. 379
means of removing them, the foe gained time to prevent
farther progress, and Grant recalled the expedition when
within a few hundred yards of opening up the Yazoo to
unobstructed passage. Admiral Porter s fleet came into
imminent peril while groping through this waterway, but
Sherman by a romantic night march came to the rescue. 1
By the end of March, all these schemes came to an end, as
also did a fourth which was spoiled by the recession of the
river. 2 A long, wet, and dreary winter, almost unparalleled
here for its flood, came to an end with nothing to show but
apparent failure. Grant s troops had scarcely found dry
ground through the rainy season on which to pitch their
tents ; and while fruitlessly digging they had fought off the
turbid flood which threatened to drown them there. Mala
rial fever, measles, and smallpox broke out, which only the
perfection of Grant s medical and hospital staff kept from
spreading into an epidemic. Now was this commander s
planet buried in the cloud; and just upon the eve of one of
his grandest enterprises, the clamor for his removal grew so
strong as to penetrate the inmost administration circles.
Visitors at camp about this time went home with dismal
stories to relate, and Northern newspapers came back to the
soldiers with those stories exaggerated and editorial specu
lations upon the next probable commander. Kosecrans
seemed the favorite of these Western journalists, some of
whom denounced Grant in the bitterest terms, accusing him
of intemperance and utter stupidity. Grant took no steps
to answer these complaints, nor to fraternize with the press
and divulge his plans, but he continued to do his best. 3 He
certainly had not idled, like some other generals, but sought
work for himself and those under him as the best preventive
of despondency. All this had impressed the President,
1 24 W. R. pt. 1, 45 ; 7 N. & H. c. 6 ; 1 Grant, c. 31 ; 1 Sherman,
c. 13.
2 1 Grant, 457.
3 " Every one has his superstitions. One of mine is that in positions
of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his
ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or
the use of influence to change his position." 1 Grant, 459.
380 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
who stood by him, as also did Halleck, saying he should
have his chance. 1 Yet such were the doubts and complaints
lodged at Washington from various parts of the country,
that Stanton sent out a confidential agent to Grant s head
quarters, to report progress from time to time and to study
this general closely. 2
At last the saffron flood subsided, the roads which crossed
this difficult peninsula behind river bulwarks began to
appear; and at Milliken s Bend Grant massed his troops
from distant points preparatory to a departure which was to
crown this tedious and tiresome campaign with entire suc
cess. Sherman, whose busy brain had revolved the various
chances, now pressed upon Grant the resumption of Novem
ber s movement, by taking his main army to the rear of
Vicksburg by way of Memphis, while the fleet and a minor
land force threatened the heights from the front. 3 Grant
A rfi had framed, however, a plan of his own ; and read
ing his comrade s letter in silence, he made no
comment, called no council of war, but quietly and steadily
pursued a course which he had been maturing all winter.
This, subject to the possible issue of his canal experiment,
was to move his army below Vicksburg by land, and from
that approach conduct operations.
The naval fleet was essential to the success and even to
the hazard of such an enterprise; and happily, Porter,
when sounded, was found at once favorable to the project.
Under the latter s direction steamers were selected and pre
pared for running the long batteries, the fleet lying all this
time on the east side of the Mississippi, above the mouth of
the Yazoo, concealed by dense intervening forests. Bales
of hay and cotton and sacks of grain were used to protect
the boilers of these steamers in the difficult passage pro
jected and to conceal their engine fires from view. By the
16th of April Porter was ready to proceed on his hazardous
1 7 N. & H. c. 6.
2 Charles A. Dana. See McClure, November, 1897.
3 This plan he embodied in a letter which suggested that the corps
commanders should be called into council.
1863. VICKSBURG DEFENCES PASSED. 381
trip and emulate the prowess of Farragut, who had passed
and repassed these heights the preceding summer, before the
river fell, when trying to induce Halleck to cooperate by
land before Vicksburg s defences were formidable. 1 Indeed,
within a few weeks a gunboat, under Colonel Ellet of the
marines, had dropped down the river by Porter s order, fol
lowed presently by another, and both vessels ran the present
gauntlet of Vicksburg successfully, Farragut himself cross
ing from below the works of Port Hudson for operations at
the lied lliver. All this meant much to one of Porter s
sanguine temperament. By night, with a fleet of seven
ironclads in advance, his vessels swung into the stream and
glided through dark shadows towards the height whose
outline was as yet quite hidden. The flagship Benton led,
Porter in person commanding, while three river transports,
which towed barges filled with fuel, brought up the rear
of the naval vessels, with a gunboat for final escort. All
at once, after an alarm shot from one of the batteries, a
terrific cannonade burst forth from Vicksburg heights, light
ing up the river far and wide, and sending the rumbling
echoes for miles in either direction. Cheap houses and
heaps of combustibles were set on fire to illuminate and
expose the location of these night intruders. Porter s fleet
ran up close under the blazing bluffs, delivering broad
sides, and then escaped one by one under cover of the
smoke and tumult into the darkness far beyond. Little
real damage was done them, though they were for two hours
under heavy fire; but one steam transport was set in flames
by the explosion of a shell and burned to the water s edge. 2
Porter s success was so perfect that six other transports,
with numerous barges of hay, corn, and provisions, Avere sent
past the batteries, a few nights later, with scarcely any loss ;
so that stores and boats abounded below for transporting the
army across the river. 3
1 About June 20-28, 18G2. See 3 B. & L. 483, 551-500; supra,
p. 180.
* 1 Sherman, 345 ; 3 B. & L. 485.
3 7 N. & H. c. G ; 1 Grant, c. 32 ; 1 Sherman, 345.
382 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
Already, on the 29th of March, G-rant had sent McCier-
nand, with his corps of four divisions, downward to New
Carthage, by the muddy roads skirting the river bank,
assisted at the overflowed places by boats, rafts, and impro
vised bridges. An unexpected breach in the levees near
the terminus made a circuitous march needful in that
wretched country. On the 20th of April McPherson s
column was also despatched, Sherman s being ordered to
follow, after a boisterous feint towards Haines Bluff to
distract the enemy s attention. By the 24th Grant s head
quarters were with his advance, which, five days later,
occupied a point opposite Grand Gulf, far below Vicksburg.
Porter s fleet in the river bombarded that stronghold with
eight gunboats. For more than five hours the attack was
kept up, while Grant watched the engagement from a
tug, with ten thousand soldiers near him in transports,
ready to attempt a landing. The gunboats drew oif early
in the afternoon, having failed of success; but, changing
his tactics, Grant promptly marched his troops to a point of
dry ground three miles below, where Porter rejoined him
with transports and gunboats, having run the Grand Gulf
batteries by night. A landing was effected upon the east
bank of the Mississippi early on the 30th, at a place called
Bruinsburg, from which, it was found, a good road led to
Port Gibson, about twelve miles distant. Without opposi
tion McClernand s troops were conveyed across, and those
of McPherson followed closely. Despatching orders to
Sherman to desist from his Haines Bluff attack, and follow
at once with his corps, Grant put his army in instant motion
for the rear of Vicksburg, convinced that his enterprise was
more than half won, now that a lodgement was gained on
the eastern side. He had passed the previous night in
issuing minute and elaborate orders, written with his own
hand, for rations, protection of the rear, and the like details,
and now, hastening forward at daybreak with McClernand s
advance, he reached Port Gibson at night, where a Con
federate force was drawn up to dispute his passage. 1
1 24 W. R. pt. 1, 32. See 7 N. & H. c. 6 ; 1 Grant, c. 34.
1863. LODGEMENT GAINED BELOW. 383
The hopeless nature of most experiments of the preced
ing winter, at the same time that each in turn was tried,
had convinced Grant s foe that he was in earnest and not
easily disheartened. 1 A cavalry raid under General Grierson
one of the most famous of the kind during this whole
war had confirmed Grant in the belief that all the able-
bodied of the South had by this time been pressed to the
borders, leaving the Confederacy within a hollow shell.
Starting simultaneously with Porter s passage of the Vicks-
burg batteries, Grierson, with his seventeen hundred men,
a regiment of whom were detached for special duty, rode
through the whole State of Mississippi, tearing up rail
ways and telegraph poles, destroying military factories, and
spreading terror and dismay, until, as the new month
opened, he brought .up at Baton Rouge, below Port Hud
son. 2 Pemberton, whose headquarters were still at Jackson,
had been much distracted by this, and by Sherman s recent
feint in the Yazoo. He had, while more confident, sent
troops away to aid Bragg in Tennessee, and these he asked
in vain to have returned to him. No cavalry were at hand
to give him clear knowledge of Grant s movements, and
before he could tell which was the real attack and which
the diversion, Grant and Porter had perfected their joint
arrangements and passed below Grand Gulf. There was
no great disparity of opposing forces, but Pemberton could
not concentrate his scattered soldiery to withstand the hero
who now poured forth his compact forces like a torrent
from the unexpected quarter. While yet bewildered, Pem
berton had, on the 23d of April, warned his commandant
at Vicksburg to be ready to direct troops to the left. But
while he watched Sherman s imposing move in one direc
tion, he heard alarming news in the other from Grand Gulf,
and hurriedly ordered brigades from Vicksburg and Port
Hudson to that vicinity.
General Bowen s 8,000 men, including such reenforce-
ments as could reach him, made, May 1st, before Port Gib
son, a gallant stand ; but all in vain, for the Union column
1 3 B. & L. 485. 2 7 N. & H. 163.
384 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
outnumbered them by more than two to one, McPherson
coming up in season to support the advance. 1
The broken Confederate line now dispersing, to
re-form at the Big Black River, Grand Gulf was evacu
ated in confusion, and Porter at once took possession. Into
this town and beyond dashed McClernand s corps the next
morning, until arrested in progress at the forks of Bayou
Pierce, where the foe on its retreat had burnt the bridges.
Rebuilding them in hot haste, or else fording and flounder
ing in the water in their eagerness to get over, this corps
pushed on through the 3d, reinforcements arriving all
day ; and with a skirmish here and there, and the capture
of prisoners, drove the enemy to a point over the Big Black
fifteen miles northeast of Port Gibson. Here McPher
son followed the Confederates so clos-e that he seized the
bridge before they had time to fire it on their flight, and
took firm possession. At this point, with the aid of the
ferry-boat, a detachment was sent across several miles north
on the road to Vicksburg. Grant, meanwhile, with a cav
alry escort, rode on the 3d to Grand Gulf, now in naval
possession, Porter himself having started farther downward
to aid Farragut at the mouth of the Red River. Grant s
blows had fallen so hard and so fast that the enemy had
been unable to remove his heavy guns, and the works were
found on inspection much more formidable than they had
seemed from the river. 2
Grant, like other generals of our war, planned movements
which, from some obstacle unforeseen, could not work out
as intended ; but his preeminence appeared in the fertility
of his resources and the ease and quickness with which he
adapted himself to a new situation, while holding tena
ciously to the main purpose. He did not in extremity call
councils of war, of whom it is proverbial that they advise
and never fight, but with impassive courage he would
vary and modify, when needful, and still press on. All
this inspired the men and officers under him. Hitherto he
had intended to secure Grand Gulf as his base of supplies,
1 7 N. & H. c. 7. 2 1 Grant, c. 34 ; 7 N. & H. c. 7.
1863. MARCH INTO MISSISSIPPI. 385
send McClernand s corps to Banks, whose department em
braced Louisiana, and, effecting a junction with the latter,
make against Port Hudson and Vicksburg a combined cam
paign, reducing first the lower and less formidable fortress. 1
But now, as Grant s Memoirs relate, the news from Banks
forced upon him a different plan, for that general sent
him word that he could not reach Port Hudson before the
10th of May, and then with only an aggregate of twelve
thousand men. To wait was injurious, for the added
strength of his enemy would have counterbalanced all gain
in numbers to his present force. 2 Vicksburg, Grant now
confessed to himself, must be his task, and his alone; and,
resolving to cut loose from his present base, press upon
Vicksburg s rear, and invest or capture that place, he pro
ceeded to act with equal promptness. But to onlookers
this campaign shone forth as continuous in design, without
a break from the beginning.
In thus relinquishing the Mississippi as a base, Grant
had to demonstrate a new rule of war, of which most army
men were sceptical. Even Sherman, who afterwards, 011
his famous march through Georgia with twice the present
army, ignored bases of food other than the surrounding
region might furnish, expressed some anxiety from the Big
Black, where he had now arrived. Grant s confident response
showed that he meant to lose no time in constructing roads
from Grand Gulf, to transport what the troops might live
upon. 3 His forecast was vindicated by results, in the present
instance. Beef, mutton, poultry, and forage were found in
abundance; bread product, too, from the mills; only that
troops nearest such supply had the advantage until a new
base was established on the Yazoo, above Vicksburg.
While issuing at Grand Gulf his marching orders, with
1 1 Grant, 491 ; 7 N. & H. c. 7 ; 24 W. R. pt. 1, 49. And see
Dana s private letter of April 13, McClure, December, 1897.
2 Another consideration may possibly have been that Banks in
cooperation would have outranked him and taken command.
3 "What I do expect," he wrote, "is to get up what rations of
hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the
balance. 1 1 Grant, 492.
386 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
an astonishing grasp of minutiae as well as the chief matters,
Grant lost not a moment in pushing on, when Sherman s
corps had joined his column. On the morning of May 7th,
his army, in high health and spirits, broke camp, cutting
loose from the navy, and moved northward in good order ;
McPhersoii held the right towards Jackson, while McCler-
nand and Sherman with the left and centre moved 011 the
line of the Big Black River, nearly abreast, keeping a strict
watch upon ferries to prevent a surprise. Cavalry recon
noitred in advance, to cover these movements and find out
the roads. Early in the fifth day s progress, McPherson, on
the 12th, met at Raymond brigades of the enemy under
Gregg and Walker, and after a sharp action drove and dis
persed them. 1 Grant, who was with Sherman, some seven
miles west, on hearing of this engagement, and learning
besides that reinforcements were reaching the capital of
Mississippi, now modified his march so as to bring both
Sherman and McClernand upon the right, while McPherson
pursued his rapid course. From Raymond, McPherson
pushed to the north, occupying the railroad town of Clinton,
and interposing his corps between Johnston and Pemberton ;
while Sherman, with alertness, took the direct route towards
Jackson, arriving south of the town, in a pouring rain, on
the morning of the 14th, just as McPherson arrived on the
north side. Here, after a severe fight, in which Confed
erates, hastily collected, tried in vain to resist this enthu
siastic phalanx, wedged within supporting distance between
their two wings, the enemy fled, scattering in every direc
tion. Grant rode to the State House, followed by Sherman
and McPherson, the latter of whom, having borne the burden
of the battle, hoisted over that building the stars and stripes.
Grant slept, at night, in the room that Johnston, the Confed
erate chief, was said to have occupied the night before.
Not to rest, however, upon such honors, Grant now ordered
McPherson to march back on the Clinton road and join
McClernand, while Sherman remained a day longer, to tear
up railroad tracks and destroy establishments which had
*24 W. R. pt. 1, 50.
1863. JOHNSTON AND PEMBERTON. 387
made this capital a centre for the South of military sup
plies. 1
Johnston s military capacity, though very great, did not
shine here as in his other campaigns ; but we should observe
that he was placed in command of a long and weak line,
confronting both Grant and Rosecrans, and without such
reinforcements as he deemed indispensable. The complaint,
indeed, was great that the Richmond government lavished
all upon Lee, nor even was the Arkansas army transferred
hither, as Johnston desired. Still suffering, moreover, from
his wound received at Fair Oaks, when despatched hither,
he reached Jackson on the 13th, after an exhausting four
days journey undertaken from his sick-room. How little
real confidence he and President Davis felt for one another
is shown by their bitter comments interchanged in later
life. 2 Pemberton had left the State capital by the time
Johnston arrived, and before a connection could be formed
between forces quite seriously separated. Already had Pres
ident Davis in alarm besought the Governor of Mississippi
to get out every man and boy in the State, capable of aiding,
whether mounted or on foot, and with whatever weapon
might be at hand. 3
Comprehending Grant s real objective, the enemy massed
before the Vicksburg approaches in desperate array. But
the impulse of invasion was by this time too strong for such
ill-organized resistance. Grant, learning of the junction in
tended at his rear, had turned his troops westward so as to
be beforehand. McClernand s corps, placed thereby in the
lead, marched to Champion s Hill, where, May 16th, it was
forced into an engagement, on finding Pemberton posted
there in strong array. McPherson came upon the field near
noon, and a battle, which had begun in skirmishing, was
fought about four hours in deadly earnest. This was the
1 7 N. & IT. c. 7 ; 1 Grant, c. 35.
t Davis, 333 ; 3 B. & L. 477, etc.
3 Davis, 331.
388 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
hardest fought battle of Grant s present progress. Of the
Confederate forces finally routed, Loring, Bowen, and Ste
venson held command at the wings and centre. 1 Loring s
troops were cut off from the retreating army, and never
reached Vicksburg again. Pemberton, with his remnant,
fell back that night to the Big Black Kiver, his troops keep
ing up the flight until midnight, and many of them, doubt
less, returning to their homes. 2
Assured now of a position between Johnston and Pember-
ton, which made their junction impossible, Grant, before
sunrise of the 17th, renewed a pursuit which had lasted the
previous day until after dark, and overtook the foe at an
early hour in front of a bridge over the Big Black Kiver.
Here a sharp action took place, the Confederates being
posted at the east bank within a long line of rifle-pits,
which were defended by a bayou. They presented, upon
the approach, a strong position ; but Grant, perceiving that
the rifle-pits could be flanked under cover of the river bank,
deployed accordingly, and after a brilliant assault the enemy
was routed. From the west bank fled other Confederates in
a panic to the defences of Vicksburg, burning their bridge
behind, and leaving those on the east side who could not
escape by swimming to be made prisoners. 3 The pursuers
quickly built new bridges, three in number, with lumber,
cotton bales, and trees partly severed, and early on the 18th,
within twenty-four hours of the fight, Grant s troops passed
over the river.
Sherman, in the meantime, on leaving Jackson, had
1 24 W. R. pt. 2, 167. The Union loss was 2441, mostly in killed
and wounded ; that of the Confederates was 3624, of whom 2195
were prisoners. The foe left on the field 24 pieces of artillery. 7 N.
& H. 192. Pemberton had not obeyed Johnston s orders, sent with a
view to making a junction elsewhere ; and Davis seems to have been
intent upon saving Vicksburg, while Johnston wished rather to save
Pemberton s army. 3 B. & L. 487.
2 1 Grant, c. 35.
8 " But for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I
have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so
closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around Vicksburg."
1 Grant, 526 ; 7 N. & H. c. 7.
1863. PEMBERTON DRIVEN TO VICKSBURG. 389
marched towards Vicksburg by an upper road, reaching
Bridgeport, a few miles farther up, and crossing the Big
Black by night on a rubber pontoon bridge. There Grant
joined him in person, and the two, sitting together on a log,
watched the troops passing over on that light and swaying
structure, the whole scene illumined r ith fires of pitch-pine.
Sherman s corps, once more in advance, and holding the
right for all operations remaining, resumed the march to
Vicksburg on the 18th, accompanied by Grant, and throwing
skirmishers forward. By dark Blair s division had closed
ii]) against Vickiburg s defences, which were found strong
and well manned, ctnd Sherman sent another division down
the bluffs to the right, so as to connect with the fleet and
gain a new base of supplies by way of the Yazoo, as Grant
anxiously desired. All that night McPherson s troops were
arriving by the main Jackson road, and McClernand s by
another at the left and near the railway. Grant s three
corps were now posted close to the defensive works of
Vicksburg, and occupied three roads, one to the north, one
to the east, and one to the south-east of that city. 1