tion at the White House. Here had collected an unusual
throng of those wonder-seeking citizens sure to be on hand
to come in contact with the latest celebrity. Grant, finding
himself on this occasion the lion whose roar was waited for,
swayed, short of stature, into the inner reception room, and
without formal presentation shook hands with the Presi
dent, who recognized and greeted him warmly. After a few
words of conversation between them, Grant was introduced
to Secretary Seward, Mrs. Lincoln, and others, and then
moved under convoy of the first-named into the East Room.
There the pressure of an enthusiastic crowd was so positive
and persistent that the Lieutenant-general was forced amid
their cheers to mount a sofa, blushing with embarrassment,
and shake hands with the gazers of both sexes who rushed
eagerly upon him from all sides for the unwonted privilege.
On the next day, March 9th, at an appointed hour, Grant,
once more at the White House, received formally his com
mission from the President, in presence of the assembled
Cabinet, Halleck and a few invited spectators being also
present. J
With these nervous preliminaries undergone, Grant, who
by this time had found that Washington must of necessity
be his official headquarters, returned West on the 11th, to
arrange for turning over the command there, and to give
directions for his spring campaign; first, however, procuring
the permission, which was readily accorded, to have Sher-
1 8 N. & H. c. 13 ; 2 Grant, 114.
18G4. GRANT S NEW PROMOTION. 481
man advanced to his own late command, and McPlierson to
Sherman s, Logan being placed in charge of McPherson s
corps. For Grant s desires closely pursued the lines of
personal friendship. "You and McPherson, " said he,
gratefully, to Sherman, "are the men to whom, above all
others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success." 1
To Meade, whom he also visited near the Rapidan, just
after receiving his new commission, Grant wisely left the
direct command of the Army of the Potomac; and with
mutual regard each accepted a delicate relation, though
comparative strangers. 2 Halleck, aware that his authority
of general-in-chief was gone, now asked to be relieved of his
duties ; but the President still retained him as a professional
counsellor, or chief-of-staff. With every opportunity of
rising to the rank which Grant now held, this general had
proved a disappointment; most commanders in the field had
resented the critical suggestions he made from his easy
chair, meddling in details; while the President complained
that ever since Pope s defeat Halleck had shrunk from
taking responsibility. 3
Meade s pursuit of Lee, after the battle of Gettysburg, had
been fruitless. The latter, once again in Virginia, evaded
all effort to intercept him at Manassas Gap, and, after
working his way up the Shenandoah Valley, re- 1863
tired once more behind the Rapidan, to repair Juiy-
his shattered strength. Moade, with the p ros i- SRptcmb< r -
dent s approval, gave his own army for the next two months
the rest it greatly needed. When Lee in his chagrin ten
dered his resignation to Jefferson Davis, the latter, with
assurances of undiminished confidence, refused to accept it.
and left him untrammelled in his plans as before. 4 Appre-
1 8 N. & II. 337.
2 It pleased Grant that this general should have suggested the sub
stitution of some comrade more intimate, in his place, and he assured
Meade in response that the thought of a successor had not entered his
mind. 2 Grant, 117.
3 8 N. & H. 335. 4 3 B. & L. 421.
482 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
bending no immediate attack, Lee now granted many fur
loughs and leaves of absence as a reward for good conduct ;
and lie lent Longstreet s corps to Bragg for the exigencies
in Tennessee already narrated, with the intent that it should
be returned him when needed. Now was the time to strike a
blow, in Lincoln s estimation, while there were three Union
men to the enemy s two, for the battle chances. When
reinforcements went West, under Hooker, to strengthen
Chattanooga, the Army of the Potomac was lessened in
October- numbers to about 68,000 men ; but it still some-
November. w hat exceeded in effective strength the opponent
army. Both Meade and Lee now planned taking the offen
sive, but Lee was the earlier, supposing the depletion on his
front greater than it really was. Skilful manoeuvring was
shown by both generals in gaming a position north of the
Rappahannock for another fight; but at Bristoe Station,
on the 14th of October, where A. P. Hill s corps fell upon
Warren and the rear guard of Meade s army, inarching, it
was handsomely repulsed, after a brief and obstinate battle.
Lee came up after the fight was over and listened in silence
to Hill s explanation of the disaster, as they rode among the
slain. "Well, well," he sadly said, "bury these poor men,
and let us say no more about it." l This ended the present
Confederate advance, for Lee had no heart to repeat the
risks of Gettysburg by attacking Meade s army in full
position. He turned back gloomily, on the 18th of October,
towards the line of the Rappahannock, and from Centreville
Meade with speed and vigor took up in his turn the pursuit.
The Rappahannock crossed, a spirited encounter on the
7 th of November took place at Kelly s Ford; but Lee,
retiring the next day, drew together his army behind the
Rapidan and the pursuers halted. In course of a fortnight,
Meade conceived a brilliant and daring plan for resuming
the aggressive. Over the lower fords of the Rapidan, which
were quite unguarded, he proposed throwing his army, and,
turning the enemy s right, attack his works in reverse. But,
unluckily, bad weather damaged the effort ; not to add the
1 Cooke s Lee, 355.
1803. ME ABE S CAMPAIGN AGAINST LEE. 488
bewildered lead of an elderly officer whom Meade had indis
creetly placed in charge. Five days were thus lost, and
by the 28th, when Meade s whole army was brought into
position in front of Mine Run, the Confederate heights
beyond the brook and brushwood were seen bristling all
over with defences which Lee had hastily constructed.
Meade ordered an attack for the dawn of the 30th ; but
Warren, who like himself was an accomplished engineer,
induced him to make a careful inspection, and the two
agreed that the risks of an assault were too great to
encounter. Meade countermanded the attack, withdrew his
troops prudently and in safety, and the two hostile armies
went into winter quarters. 1
On several occasions after Lee left Gettysburg, opportu
nities for the Union army seem to have been missed; but
impartial critics will agree that the fault had not been due
so much to Meade s want of vigilance, as to the failure of
others in carrying out his plans and intentions. Warren
gained personal prestige in these futile movements ; but
with Reynolds dead, Hancock wounded, Hooker removed,
and Meade himself promoted, the several corps of the
Potomac army had of late lost heavily in fighting stim
ulus. 2
Civilian though he knew himself, our President had given
the most ardent heed to all the military movements that
went on at the seat of war. Not wise in such a sense as to
l>e free from occasional error, his military wisdom grew with
military experience, and no personal pride of opinion could
pervert his judgment. From Halleck, as an expert close at
hand, he derived much technical instruction in the art of
war ; and with the political responsibilities of war already
his, the military, besides, had been saddled heavily upon
him. But Lincoln gained in philosophic temper, while so
1 8 N. & IT. c. 9 ; 4 B. & L. 81, etc.
- S N. & II. 2f>2. As to Kilpatrick s cavalry raid to Richmond and
Ulric Dahlgreu s death, see 4 B. & L. 95.
484 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
many of his commanders disappointed him, perceiving that
war took time, whether fought under one general or another ;
yet he considered and reconsidered what ought to be done to
improve campaign methods upon general principle. " My
last attempt upon Richmond," he wrote about two months
after the battle of Gettysburg, " was to get McClellan, when
he was nearer there than the enemy, to run in ahead of him.
Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the
Potomac to make Lee s army, and not Richmond, its objec
tive point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and
hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing
by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched
lines into a fortified city." l Here, perhaps unaware of it,
he came to the point of view which Grant at the West had
assumed and acted upon in his highly successful operations,
to make the capture of an enemy, rather than a place, the
first concern.
The President had declined to order an attack where one
so trustworthy as Meade felt doubtful about making it, and
to that excellent commander he showed throughout a patient
deference. Still more strongly did he now incline to give
Grant, whose busy persistency he had long admired, a full
choice of plans ; and he divested himself of onerous bur
dens he had borne so long for helping out generals less
secure in his own or the country s confidence. Through
storm and sunshine, Grant had won his way to consummate
rank by consummate merit. Hence the new Lieutenant-
general was allowed to form in secrecy his own plans for the
coming campaign; he communicated them neither to the
President, nor to the Secretary of War, nor to Halleck.
Grant asked, when he received his commission, what was
expected of him. Lincoln replied that the country wanted
him to do what other Union generals had not been fortunate
in doing take Richmond. "This I can do," rejoined
Grant without hesitation, " if I have the troops ; " and the
President assured him they should be forthcoming. What
Grant actually proposed doing the President did not wish
1 29 W. R. pt. 2, 207 ; 8 N. & H. 236.
1864. PLANS FOR A GRAND CAMPAIGN. 485
to know, nor was the route to be chosen discussed or even
mentioned, between them. 1 But before the new leader took
the field, Lincoln was particularly pleased to learn that his
design was to bring the whole numerical strength of Union
armies, East and West, so superior to that of the South when
combined, into one simultaneous and concerted movement. 2
Grant, on the 26th of March, having now returned finally
from the West, took up his headquarters at Culpeper Court
House, close by the Army of the Potomac, and prepared for
the grand campaign. His main purpose was tu mass and
move at the same time against the two great Confederate
armies in the field, that of Lee in his immediate lb( . 4 _
front, and that of Joseph E. Johnston, in Dalton, March-
Georgia, opposed to whom, at Chattanooga, was A nl
Sherman, Grant s second in command and Western successor,
to whom he chiefly looked for cooperation. Sherman was
to bear from Chattanooga, making Johnston s army and
Atlanta his objective points; he was to penetrate the
interior of the Confederacy as far as possible and inflict all
possible damage upon its war resources, but the mode of
operation was left largely to his discretion. Grant chose
the most difficult task for himself; to conquer and capture
Lee s army was his prime object, with the fall of Kichmond
as its necessary result, and he thought it better to fight this
wary antagonist outside his stronghold than within it. In
aid of Sherman, Banks was to finish up his remote Red
River expedition, and operate against Mobile ; while to
assist his own immediate movements, Gillmore was to join
Butler at Fortress Monroe, with ten thousand men, and the
two generals were to advance by the James River against
Richmond and Petersburg. Sigel, who now commanded in
the Shenandoah valley with an increased force and a long
line of railroad to protect, was to advance from Harper s
Ferry, or at least cover the North from invasion ; helping
1 8 N. & H. 343 ; 2 Grant, 123. Grant relates that the President
submitted a plan in Virginia concerning which the general might do as
he pleased ; and that he listened, but ignored it. Ib.
2 8 N. & H. 348,
486 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
thus the fighting elsewhere if he conld not fight himself. 1
But Banks, as it turned out, could not return in time from
his other enterprise, and 40,000 veterans were lost to the
present campaign in consequence; and Sigel s assistance,
too, proved disappointing. As for the route to be taken in
Virginia, Grant reserved his decision until just before the
march commenced, and then concluded to engage Lee boldly
in front and pound his army to pieces before he could re
treat. For attempting, at least, such an enterprise, he had
good reason. 2
At the West, the advancement of Sherman and Mc-
Pherson was cheerfully acquiesced in by the other high
generals of that department. Sheridan, the hero of Mis
sionary Ridge, was summoned eastward at Grant s request
to direct the cavalry branch of the Army of the Potomac.
That army was now reorganized thoroughly and reduced to
three corps : the 2d, commanded by the brave Hancock, who
had now recovered from his wounds; the 5th, which the
well-dressed Warren led with gallantry, and the 6th, under
the tried and trusted Sedgwick. Burnside, with his 9th
corps, received at first an independent command at
Annapolis, there to await emergencies; but finding thip
arrangement unsuitable, Grant blended later his force of
20,000 strong with that of Meade at the front. Towards
Meade personally Grant showed the utmost delicacy, not
meaning to inflict the pain he himself had been made to
suffer when marching under Halleck in a similar relation.
All directions for the Army of the Potomac he issued to
Meade to execute; he established his own headquarters
so near, when he could, as to make formal orders unneces
sary. 3 Combining all the armies of the Union, henceforth,
as one intelligent whole, no longer to operate so separately
and independently of one another as to yield longer to
the South its advantage of depleting at one point for
1 " If he can t skin, himself, he can hold a leg while some one else
skins," wrote Grant, using a Western metaphor which he gained from
the President in conversation. 2 Grant, 132, 143.
2 8 N. & H. c. 14 ; 2 Grant, c. 47. 3 2 Grant, 118.
GRANT READY TO MOVE, 487
reenforcing at another, Grant viewed his Army of the
Potomac as the centre of united operations, that of the
Mississippi Valley under Sherman as the right wing, and
Butler s Army of the James as the left wing; all remaining
troops of the Union to the southward constituting a reserve
force in the enemy s rear, to be moved in subordination. 1
Under a system framed so clear and simple, and preparing
without a moment s waste of time, while organizing at
the front rather than in Washington, the new general-in-
chief, without boast, bustle, or pretence of any kind, an
nounced himself all ready by the last of April to begin
the new campaign.
Skill and experience had by this time brought tin;
efficiency of the War Department to a maximum, in all
its bureaus, for providing men and supplies, and Grant s
will and temperament, unobtrusive but strong, made all
officials zealous to help him out. Not a symptom of jealous
interference or quarrel was manifest, such as had hindered
operations under most predecessors ; and Grant declared
himself amazed at the readiness with which all that he
asked for had been yielded by the government without
asking even an explanation. The President, on the last day
of April, sent the Lieutenant-general a kind letter, express
ing his entire satisfaction up to the present date, and
bidding him a loving farewell. "The particulars of your
plan," he wrote unreservedly, "I neither know nor seek
to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and pleased
with this, T wish not to obtrude any constraints or re
straints upon you. If there is anything wanting which is
within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it.
And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God
sustain you. " 2
Punctual at the time proposed the week before, Grant s
army of the centre started May 4th, soon after midnight,
1 2 Grant, 127.
2 For this letter and Grant s modest and appropriate reply, see 8
N. & II. ;355.
488 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
upon that campaign for Richmond which, without turning
back, was to be the last and victorious one, though
long, devious, and interrupted, and strewn with
many a bloody sacrifice. Ten days rations, with forage and
ammunition, were taken in wagons, beef-cattle being driven
along to be butchered as wanted. Three days rations, in
addition, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were borne upon
the person of each soldier. Like McClellan, two years
before, Grant went forth with a host which outnumbered its
adversary by about two to one, 1 and in effective strength
he had not far from 120,000. Leaving Culpeper and that
Hoe of intrenchments north of the Rapidan which had so
long confronted an enemy unmolested, Sheridan, Hancock,
and Warren, with their respective commands, crossed the
river upon bridges placed in the darkness of the night, and
on the 5th of May the Army of the Potomac had fairly
reached Chancellorsville, with a march stolen upon the
enemy, so Grant believed, like that of Hooker a year
before. Another day would take his forces through the
dark and tangled Wilderness, with its gloomy woods, into
more open ground south and west of it. But this ad
vance was not to be made unchallenged. For, rapidly as
Grant was moving, Lee moved to counteract with equal en
ergy and decision when he learned that his foe had passed
the Rapidan. He knew every foot of the ground here.
Treating the Wilderness as in itself a cover to him, he
threw forward Swell s corps by the turnpike and A. P. Hill s
by the plank road, making such despatch that by nightfall
of the 4th they were halfway through this fearful forest,
ready to strike the next morning. Lee buoyantly relied
upon putting Grant to the same stress as that of Hooker,
the year before, and then driving him with still greater
success. Now ensued, on the oth and 6th of May, a bloody
and determined struggle for the mastery ; " more desperate
fighting," wrote Grant afterwards, "has not been witnessed
1 See 4 B. & L. 182, 184, which gives Grant s effective strength
as 118,000, and Lee s as not less than 61,000. Cf. 8 N. & H. 352 ; also
31 Century, 218-220, which computes Lee s strength as about 75,000.
And cf. supra, pp. 191, IDG.
1864. BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 489
on this continent." 1 At the close of the second day s
slaughter the opposing armies stood relatively in strength
about as at first; but the decisive gain and the only one
was on the Union side, in having crossed the Rappahannock
River in perfect safety, with integrity unimpaired. Inferior
in number as were the Confederates here engaged, they had
for advantage, to counterbalance, a strong natural barrier in
the jungles of scrub forest growth almost impenetrable to
Grant s infantry. Lee fought, too, upon interior lines in
his own native and friendly State, where he had scarcely
yet lost a battle.
Grant, on the early morning of the 5th, had lingered at
the Rapidan to hasten Burnside s crossing and place him
in position, when news reached him that the enemy was
approaching. Meade s headquarters being now at Old Wil
derness tavern, he hastened thither and prepared to take
the initiative, as he had meant to do whenever Lee could be
drawn out from his intrenchments. Warren s corps in the
advance, which had felt the enemy about sunrise, Grant
ordere^ to assault, with that of Sedgwick divided so as to
reenforc- on either side. Hancock was next directed to sup
port Getty of Sedgwick s corps on the left, who fought hand
somely. Warren, about noon, commenced the action, his
troops plunging into the dense and difficult thicket, where
they wer^ soon lost to sight of their generals and of one
another, while, unseen and secreted, the foe delivered his
murderous fire, detecting their whereabouts by the noise of
their footsteps. But, for all their disadvantage, Griffin led
gallantly on the turnpike against the Confederate Ewell,
until Early s division on the latter side interposed a check.
Neither contestant could follow up a real advantage gained ;
and with Sheridan s cavalry holding in check superior num
bers at another point, while Hancock and Hill fought one
another stubbornly from late in the afternoon to nightfall,
the first stubborn day of scattered and sanguinary skir
mishes came to an end. 2
1 2 Grant, 204.
2 One of Birney sbest officers, General Alexander Hays, an esteemed
490 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
Grant gave orders to renew promptly the fight at five the
next morning, so as to get the start of Longstreet, who was
known to be on his way with twelve thousand men to join
Hill s right, and for whom Lee waited. Hancock, with half
the army of the Potomac, including Wadsworth s fresh divi
sion, confronted Hill consequently on one side ; Sedgwick
and Warren opposed Ewell on the other ; while Burnside,
whose divisions were now coming up by a rapid forced
march, was ordered to fill the gap between, and pierce, if
possible, the enemy s centre. The fighting recommenced
promptly, as directed, on both wings. Wright of Sedg-
wick s corps engaged E well s left on the turnpike with great
vigor, but was presently hindered ; and Warren could not
dislodge the foe from the intrenched lines in that vicinity.
Hancock, however, at first made better progress against the
Confederate right. Not knowing by what road Longstreet
would approach, and diverting some of his force for contin
gent needs, he made, nevertheless, so prodigious an assault
upon Hill s right, in course of the forenoon, with Wadsworth
to assist him, that the Confederate column was forced down
the plank road in confusion, a mile or more, and except for
the screen of the forest, would most likely have been put to
disastrous flight. 1 But Hancock s own ranks were so torn
and disordered by this fierce charge through the underbrush,
that the only discernible gain was in procuring an advanced
position ; and upon that position came Longstreet, cool and
imperturbable, about noon, his fresh battalions inspiring
Hill s disheartened troops to turn back with new courage
in their company. Burnside s progress, meanwhile, through
the woods towards Hancock s support had been too toilsome
and slow for rendering a corresponding service. When the
combined Southern corps, under Longstreet s lead, their
approach undiscovered in the woods until within a few
hundred yards, struck in succession Birney s and Mott s
tired divisions of Hancock s advance, the latter were swept
comrade of Grant in younger days, was killed ; and on the Confederate
side Generals John M. Jones and Leroy A. Stafford.
1 Cf. 2 Grant, 107 ; Long s Lee, 330.
1864. BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 491
back with slaughter. Hancock made other hurried disposi
tions in vain to hold the ground he had gained, and had to
recede with his whole line to the morning position, which
was strongly intrenched. During this retreat, and while
endeavoring to rally his men, Wadsworth fell mortally
wounded, his gray hairs crimsoned with blood. And here,
too, Longstreet met nearly the fate which had befallen
Jackson, a year before, in the same dense woods, for he and
his staff were fired upon by Confederates, who mistook
them for Union cavalry as they rode to reconnoitre. Not by
death, this time, but by a disabling wound, was a prominent
Southern general removed from the scene, and Lee had to
replace the loss by leading a furious attack in person. 1
Besides Longstreet s loss for many weeks, that mistaken
volley cost the Confederate cause a brigadier who rode in
Longstreet s company. 2
Lee s impetuous assault upon Hancock s intrenched line
was made about four in the afternoon. It was repulsed
after a heavy firing, in course of which the woods and part
of the Union breastworks caught fire and burned badly.
At one moment a Confederate force would plant its colors
amidst the flames ; at another, it was driven from the rude
rampart with heavy loss. The day closed with a sharp
demonstration by Early s column upon Sedgwick s right,
which yielded several hundred Union prisoners, among
whom were two brigadiers. But the mishap was less seri
ous than it promised at first ; for Sedgwick held strongly
his line of defence, and when night came the one main army