secured its safety with as little positive distress as the other. 3
Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up assaults
during the afternoon, but their efforts served chiefly to pre
vent Lee from throwing his whole strength against Hancock. 4
On the morning of May 7th, all was silent in the dense
jungles and uneven space that divided the two armies. All
1 " Go back ! Go back 1 " his soldiers cried, as Lee exposed himself
incautiously : " we will do our duty." Long s Lee, 330.
2 General Micah Jenkins. 3 See Early s Memoirs, 20.
4 2 Grant, c. 50 ; 8 N. & II. c. 14.
492 HISTOKY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
of Lee s army had withdrawn during the night behind their
intrenchments, and showed no disposition to fight again.
Grant, who through these two terrible days had given his
orders with composure and calmness, while staff-officers gal
loped back and forth in intense excitement, many of them
with wild and exaggerated reports of danger, issued orders
to Meade at dawn to prepare this day for a night march to
Spottsylvania Court House, by the left flank. His object
for thus moving was twofold : to prevent Lee from retiring
to Richmond and crushing Butler, who had already advanced
up the James from Fortress Monroe ; also to interpose his
own army, if possible, between Lee and Richmond, or else
force him into an open field. The grand combined move
ment, of which he was watchful, had already begun, and
news reached him, this afternoon, that Sherman was setting
forth against Johnston, while Butler had just taken City
Point. Grant s cool behavior and ready judgment in dan
ger had made a marked impression upon that famous Army
which now experienced his temper in fight for the first time,
and under the severest of ordeals. He listened to whatever
message came to him, gained by a few searching questions
the true situation, and despatched troops with the utmost
speed to sustain the. fight at critical points. 1 Occasionally
during the fight he would ride to important points in com
pany with Meade, but of tener he was found before headquar
ters, sitting upon the stump of a tree, with a lighted cigar
in his mouth and his penknife kept in active use, whittling
sticks as a vent for the inner emotions which he suppressed.
The latter habit he seldom indulged in later battles, but the
cigar was his constant recourse for taciturnity ; for taciturn
he continued, except towards a few intimates, long after the
battles of this war were over. Some men make impression
by an affluence of speech, and some by a meditative silence.
Grant as a soldier thought well and constantly of what was
next to be achieved ; nothing but the aggressive could suit
1 "There was a spur on the heel of every order he sent, relates
one of his staff, " and his subordinates were made to realize that it is
the minutes which control events." 31 Century, 227 (Horace Porter).
1864. NIGHT MARCH TO SPOTTSYLVANIA. 493
his temperament : and, as Sherman has suggested, one reason
why lie succeeded so much better than some who had taken
their turn before him was, that, while they thought so much
about what the enemy would do next, Grant thought all the
time what he was going to do himself. 1
There were features in this battle of the Wilderness
which the annals of warfare have scarcely matched. For
two wearisome days two veteran armies opposed, whose
aggregate strength was near two hundred thousand, fought
like fiends among the horrors of raging forest fires and
exploding ammunition trains, with every obstacle in the
path to a clear progress, and systematic combination impos
sible, in a wilderness, fitly deserving that name, whose out
look was limited, in all directions, by a skirt of forest growth,
almost impenetrable, whose interlacing trees held the smoke
of artillery and shut out sunlight, and whose tangled under
growth of scrub-oak and cedar retarded progress. Ravines
yawned, right and left, and the ruins of forsaken quarries,
where once had been an ill-starred mining industry. Hun
dreds of soldiers were burnt to death in the unchecked con
flagration. 2 Lines had to be established by the pocket
compass, and the battle was guided by sound and touch,
rather than by the sense of sight. Temporary intrench-
in ents of earth and rails, and on the Union side the conven
ient field telegraph, figured in this fight, as they did in all
Grant s later movements. 3
Wagon trains were put in motion for Spottsylvania in
mid-afternoon of May 7th, and soon after dark the Union
columns began their march in the same direction. When
Grant, in the deepening shadows, rode with Meade and their
staffs to take the advance, and it was seen that the line of
inarch pointed towards Richmond instead of Washington,
1 31 Century, 230.
2 More than 17,600 men were lost, during these two days, on the
Union side in killed, wounded, and missing, while of the Confederate
loss, scarcely less severe, no accurate account can be given.
3 4 B. & L. 163, 182; 31 Century, 230, etc. ; 2 Grant, 205-208.
494 HISTOEY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
the delight of his soldiery broke out in long and vociferous
cheers ; for at last it seemed as if the bloody struggle under
disadvantages was over, and that a fair and open fight would
conquer the fruits of a triumphant campaign. 1 But this
deception passed, as did that of Lee on the other side, who
imagined from the easterly bearing of these wagon trains
that Grant meant to retreat across the E-appahannock after
the former fashion, and so shifted his own right towards
Fredericksburg to intercept. Lee found, on the morning of
the 8th, that Grant was neither vanquished nor retreating,
while Grant, who had hoped to pass round Lee s right wing
towards Richmond, beheld, before night, the whole Confed
erate army massing upon the hills a mile north and east of
Spottsylvania, directly in his front, to dispute his passage.
Accident gave to Lee his timely information, and accident
(to apply Grant s comment) decides often the fate of war
fare. It seems that Longstreet s corps, now under the com
mand of R. H. Anderson, had been ordered to move in
the morning to Spottsylvania, instead of which he had
marched thither the night before : not hindered by the
Union cavalry as he might hrve been, because of some in
advertent change made by Meade in Sheridan s orders.
Having given Lee the alarm, Anderson intrenched himself
immediately across the froi_ o^ Warren, who led the Union
advance. Here again wer tc pographical difficulties for the
aggressive. Warren assailed but was repulsed 5 then, gather
ing up his strength, he assail ^ { second time with hie whole
corps, and gained a front position, where he intrenched,
driving the enemy back some distance. Anxious to crush
Anderson before Lee could reenforce him, Grant despatched
Sedgwick to Warren s support ; but it was late in the day
before these forces united, and, with inadequate time to
prepare, the effort failed. 2 Hill s corps, now commanded by
Early and moving by the very road Grant s army had taken,
1 A drum corps struck up the camp-meeting tune, " Ain t I glad I m
out of the wilderness."
2 Grant has regretted that his march from the Wilderness had not
placed Hancock, with his superb fighting capacity, in the lead.
1864. FIGHT AT SPOTTSYLVANIA. 495
came upon Hancock in the rear, and hindered the latter
from reaching Spottsylvania that day. Each adversary
passed the night in strengthening his position. 1
On May 9th Hancock went into place on Warren s right.
Beyond the work of posting and intrenching, little was done
that day by either army, except that sharpshooters and
skirmishers interchanged a brisk fire, in the course of which,
during the morning, Sedgwick was killed, an officer of the
highest merit, brave, modest, and intelligent. To the com
mand of his corps succeeded General Horatio G. Wright.
This 6th corps had been posted on the left, with Burnside
upon the extreme left of the line. Hancock, at the other
end, faced the left flank of Lee s army, though separated
from it and from the rest of Meade s army by the Po river,
which he had now crossed. For the Mattapony river in this
region is formed by the junction of four streams, ingeniously
styled the Mat, the Ta, the Po, and the Ny ; and Spottsyl
vania was on the ridge which divides the Ny and the Po,
the two northernmost of these narrow streams, where they
flow easterly, in deep current, a few miles apart. Hancock,
during the night, had built three bridges over the Po to pro
tect his rear, and Lee had to reenforce correspondingly at
that extreme. On the Confederate side intrenchments de
fended by Anderson, Ewell, and Early, in order, with their
respective forces, stretched from left to right in an irregular
semicircle inclosing the town, while a bold salient jutted
out a mile to the north. Aside from the two abrupt streams,
not easily crossed without bridges, the country hereabout,
heavily timbered except for occasional clearings, served
well for a defensive fight ; and Lee s works, which he made
exceedingly strong, gave him a more than fourfold strength,
in the opinion of good observers, provided he could man well
his intrenchments. 2 Yet Grant, with numbers in his favor,
meant to fight Lee whenever chance offered, rather than
turn aside, or, worse still, retrace his course. On the latter
point he was almost superstitious. " I shall take no back
ward steps " was his present despatch to Halleck.
1 2 Grant, 215. 2 Humphreys, cited 8 N. & H. 376.
496 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
Lee had weakened the rest of his line to meet Hancock s
threatening movement towards his rear, and of this Grant
resolved to take advantage, 011 the morning of the 10th, by
striking strongly in front. Accordingly he ordered an at
tack made on Lee s centre by the corps of Warren and
Wright, Hancock to bring his force north of the Po and
command the whole assaulting force. Burnside meanwhile
was to move forward and threaten in force on Lee s extreme
right, and, if he found a good chance, attack with vigor in
cooperation. This day was notable for successes almost, but
not altogether, achieved. When Hancock drew back his
divisions to the north of the Po, Barlow s division, isolated
at the south, was twice attacked by the Confederates with
great fury; but Barlow crossed the stream in admirable
order, receiving and inflicting heavy loss. Hancock s new
position did not compensate for the loss of the old one.
Wright formed a storming party of twelve regiments, and
placed Colonel Upton in command. At four in the after
noon the assault was ordered; Warren and Wright, with
Mott s division of Hancock s corps, moving simultaneously.
Warren was repulsed with heavy loss and Mott s attack
failed; but Upton s storming party, which projected far
beyond, poured over the Confederate parapet, and swept
through the outer defences, carrying everything, with pris
oners and guns, to the second line of intreiichments. The
supporting troops, however, under Mott were roughly used,
and slow in reaching the place. Grant, to relieve Upton,
ordered a renewal of the assault with Hancock s corps, but
after another rush, and a gallant one. the prize had to be
relinquished about nightfall. Upton, badly wounded, was
promoted to brigadier on the field, and was brought up to
receive the personal thanks and compliments of the Lieu
tenant-general. Burnside, on the Union left wing, com
pletely turned Lee s right while these other movements went
on ; but as neither he nor Grant was conscious of the ad
vantage gained, Burnside at night received orders to connect
closer with Wright, and that advantage was lost. 1
1 8 N. & H. c. 15 ; 2 Grant, c. 52 ; 31 Ceiitury, 350, etc.
1864. SPOTTSYLVANIA BATTLE RENEWED. 497
Both armies rested on the llth of May, and the only
firing occurred in course of a reconnoissance which Grant
now ordered to find out whether any point could be broken
in his adversary s line. Shortly after breakfast the Lieu
tenant-general wrote on his field table the despatch, con
veyed to Halleck, wherein occurred that famous phrase,
" I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all sum
mer, " a purpose, by the way, which he found himself
compelled to modify. 1 While cheerfully commenting in
this letter upon the results already gained, and asking
for heavy reinforcements as something " very encouraging
to the men," he frankly owned his frightful losses in
killed, wounded, and missing. But he reckoned the
opposing loss as much greater, and believed Lee s army
gave signs of wavering. 2 It was not in such sanguine,
nor even such respectful, strain, that McOlellan had couched
nis requests from the Peninsula at a crisis ; and what Grant
wished, the authorities sought readily to give him. While
maturing plans for conquering, our general-in-chief had
kept a close lookout to see that Lee was not detaching
troops for crushing Butler or Sheridan, each of whom was
now operating towards Richmond. On the same day came
good news from both, which Grant promptly transmitted
to Meade and Burn side.
For himself, the day s result was to discover more
definitely the character of the salient before Lee s de
fence which Upton had assaulted so gallantly. It was
in the shape of a V with a flattened apex. The ground
in front sloped down toward the Union position, thickly
wooded for the most part, but with a moderate clearing
just in front of this apex. Grant issued orders this after
noon for a movement thither under cover of the night,
to be followed by an assault the next morning. As usual,
he trusted Hancock most of all for the hard fighting ; but
1 Grant sent this letter by the hand of Congressman Washburne,
who had accompanied him thus far on the march, and now returned
to Washington. 31 Century, 353.
2 2 Grant, 226.
498 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
Burnside he also directed to attack simultaneously on
the left of the salient, sending two staff-officers to im
press him to be vigorous. Hancock s corps made a difficult
night march, groping its way through mud and forest
gloom in the midst of a drenching rain, and gaining but
little rest after reaching its destination. The morning of
the 12th opened foggy, which delayed the start over a
rising ground, heavily wooded, still to be traversed. But
reckless of difficulties, his troops pressed quickly on
without firing a gun, and when within close range of the
enemy s line rushed upon the looming breastworks with
rousing cheers. Barlow and Birney were over the parapet
almost at the same instant, and a desperate hand-to-hand
fight took place, with clubbed muskets, in the scant space
within. A whole division of E well s corps was at once
captured, Johnson, the division commander, and one of
his brigadiers, being of the number; and Hancock,
though checked in progress by another strong line which
stretched across the base of this salient, a mile away,
held the captured apex firmly in reverse, turning its
guns upon his foe. Lee hastened reinforcements on
every hand, with the most strenuous effort, to dislodge
or resist, and round this "bloody angle" 1 raged all day
a furious fight which did not wholly cease until three
the next morning. Lee massed heavily on the broken
point of his line, five times assailing with great violence,
but failing to dislodge the Union troops from their new
position. 2 Large trees were cut down by the flying
missiles, logs and fence-rails shattered into splinters ;
soldiers planted opposing flags at intervals against one
another; prisoners were pulled over the breastworks on
one side or the other, and stabs inflicted through the
chinks underneath by bayonet-thrusts. Here lay dead
corpses piled so thick that the trenches had to be cleared
1 Sometimes recalled as " Hell s half -acre."
2 He rode about on his spirited gray horse, and so exposed himself
personally that his men were afraid he would be shot. 4 B. & L.
243.
1864. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA. 499
of them more than once. Grant, who passed from wing
to wing all day long on the Union side, giving directions,
called up speedily the reserves under Warren and Wright ;
the latter, though wounded while advancing, kept long the
field, and his corps gave Hancock a splendid support ; but
the former found Anderson so strongly posted in his front
that he thought it imprudent to attack, until Grant repeated
his orders with strong emphasis, whereupon Warren fought
and failed, incurring his chief s displeasure. Burnside, on
the left, accomplished positively but little, though negatively
very much, in keeping Lee from reenforcing his centre from
that quarter ; once he penetrated the angle, but he could
not hold his own against the fresh troops of Early s
corps which hastened to the breach. Lee at night took
a position in rear of his former one, and there intrenched
himself; while Grant, from the field, at sunset, reported his
eighth day of battle closed with not an organization, nor
even a company, lost. To the latter, Lee s situation seemed
"the last ditch;" but "the enemy are obstinate," he was
forced to admit. Full twenty hours of constant fighting
had been endured there by many of the troops on both
sides. 1
Following these eight days battles, Grant wrote to the
Secretary of War recommending for promotion those whose
gallantry had most impressed him. Meade he wished to
rank with Sherman as his two fittest subordinates for large
commands ; and for Hancock, Wright, Gibbon, Humphreys,
Upton, and Carroll, he desired an advance in their several
grades. Meade s position, it is seen, was a somewhat
anomalous one, in view of the constant presence of his
general-in-chief ; and having, withal, a somewhat irascible
1 2 Grant, c. 53 ; 8 N. & H. c. 15 ; 31 Century, 354-358 ; 4 B. & L.
118, 170, etc. The Union loss at Spottsylvania is reckoned at 18,399
in killed, wounded, and missing; which is 1,000 more than in the
Wilderness battles. The Confederate loss can only be conjectured,
as it was never reported, but Grant considered it about the same
as his own. See 4 B. & L. 182.
500 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
temper, this officer would offend others of high rank
who came in contact with him. 1 Grant, whom all the
army respected for his grave and calm temper, was urged
to make a change that would bring him closer to these
corps commanders and unite responsibilities ; but he pre
ferred to leave things as they were. For Meade he had
found capable and wholly deferential ; both met continually
on the field, and the present arrangement relieved the chief
of many details, enabling him better to mature his general
plans. To this view of the situation Grant mainly adhered,
and the two officers kept together in perfect harmony for
the rest of the war. But the general-in-chief concluded
to give a closer personal direction to his campaign, and
with that end in view he soon assigned Burnside s corps
to the Army of the Potomac, placing Burns ide under
Meade s command. This gave better unity to operations,
and reduced his correspondence. No one praised Grant s
order more than Burnside himself, and his readiness to
serve under a junior in rank, who had been only a division
general when he himself commanded this army, affords
strong proof of his unselfish spirit. 2
After burying his dead, Grant, on the 14th of May,
advanced his line to the east of Spottsylvania, and as Lee
moved in the night to cover this new front, Hancock was
ordered from his late position. Other tactical changes
followed ; but with five days of almost incessant rain the
roads by the 16th proved miry and impassable and hostili
ties had to wait. Under such conditions, tramping for
merely a few miles becomes intensely difficult, tents and
clothing get saturated with water, cooking fails for want of
dry wood, and soldiers the most buoyant grow gloomy and
dispirited. Very few reinforcements had arrived when
on the 18th, after a profitless assault at the salient where
Hancock had won the only positive success of the campaign,
Grant learned ill news from his other armies. Sigel had
been badly defeated at New Market and was retreating
through the Shenandoah Valley towards Harper s Ferry ;
1 See 2 Grant, 538. 2 2 Grant, 235 ; 31 Century, 486, 498.
1864. FLANK MOVEMENT SOUTHEASTERLY. 501
Butler had been driven from Drewry s Bluff, though still in
possession of the road to Petersburg ; while Banks had been
worsted in far Louisiana. Sigel was at once relieved, upon
Grant s suggestion, and Hunter assigned to his place ; Canby
was sent to supersede Banks. Our Lieutenant-general lost
no time in useless regrets for ill success, but resolved upon
still bolder movements for the troops under his immediate
direction. Sitting at his field desk once more, with the
weather more promising, he wrote an order for a general
movement by the left flank southeasterly towards Richmond,
to begin the next night. He also sent to Washington, ask
ing that the navy might aid him in changing his depot
of supplies to Port Royal on the Rappahannock. 1 His im
mediate army was now to operate in a new and unfamiliar
country, with broad roads and well-tilled fields, but with
neither guide nor map to show unerringly the way, towards
McClellan s old Peninsula region and the James River base.
Male non-combatants were hardly seen on his entire route,
even the blacks having been sent away. When setting
forth, Grant reduced his trains by sending back to Wash
ington more than a hundred pieces of artillery, and before
reaching the James River he had reduced that arm of the
service still further, convinced that his cannon here were
more than he could bring into effective fight. 2
Lee, in the afternoon of the 19th, made an unavailing
effort to turn the Union right ; and General Robert 0. Tyler
sustained the shock so handsomely, with raw troops just
arrived, that Hancock s veterans easily made the repulse
complete. Grant waited another day, hoping that Lee
would draw out of his works and fight in the open field, but
the delay was unavailing. On the night of the 20th, then,
began the new movement by the left flank, with Hancock
constantly in advance and separated from the rest, as a lure
to Lee ; but the latter hung off persistently, intrenching
while he intercepted approach, and his attack of the 19th
was the last initiative in force that he ever ventured to
make, for by this time he dreaded his new opponent.
1 31 Century, 490, etc. ; 2 Grant, c. 53. 2 2 Grant, 241.
502 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
In this manner, though not without harassing rights, of
which Hancock s corps in the lead bore with strained nerves
the larger share, Grant s army crossed brilliantly the North
Anna Elver by detachments, but recrossed as Lee s ma
noeuvres compelled it to do, bearing farther to the left,
crossed at Hanover Town the Pamunkey, about twenty
miles from Richmond, and then, changing the base to
White House, McClellan s old depot, reached, by the close
of May, Cold Harbor, near the Chickahominy River, about
halfway between Hanover Town and Richmond. Here
heavy skirmishing showed the two armies of North and
South face to face once more, not far from where they had
faced two years before ; and Grant s objective point, like
McClellan s before him, was now the James River, below
Richmond s defence. 1
Grant never clearly explained why he changed that line
of attack upon which he had purposed fighting "all sum
mer." To turn backward from an enterprise, we have seen,
was not in him ; while misgivings, when he felt them, he
concealed from others. McClellan s vindication, in after
years, insisted upon the circumstance that this shifted base
to the James, which brought ultimate triumph to the Union
arms, was what he himself had wished, and Government
denied him. But the mood in which the present change
was made, besides the attendant conditions, were so differ
ent that no safe parallel can be drawn. Grant s despatches
all the while were as buoyant and confident as possible;
and this went very far towards keeping the good will of his
Government. " Lee s army is already whipped," he wrote
on the 26th ; " I may be mistaken, but I feel that our
success is already assured." 2 We may question, however,
whether at heart he felt so sanguine. His Virginia cam
paign had been planned with the idea of a cooperation up
the James and in the rear of Richmond, and when that
1 8 N. & H. c. 15 ; 31 Century, 500, 714 ; 2 Grant, c. 54.
2 2 Grant, 253.
1804. BASE CHANGED TO JAMES KIVER. 503
cooperation went badly, it wac natural that he should wish