Thomas with troops sufficient to hold Nashville in secure
defence ; but for himself he did not wish to be decoyed away
from Georgia, nor to give up his present advantages for the
sake of making a tedious chase from behind. Hood, he
said, can " turn and twist like a fox, and wear out any army
in pursuit." His wishes gradually prevailed with
r Grant, who had proposed the ruin of Hood s army
first of all ; and, accordingly, by the 2d of November, the
counter aggressive which Sherman was so ardent to com
mence, received at Washington a full and final sanction. 1
Experience had made of Grant s second in command an
admirable general for the initiative, for he adapted opera
tions to occasion and went straight forward to execute them.
Sherman was decidedly original in his treatment of mili
tary problems, quick to perceive a point and to distinguish ;
and much of the ill-temper he aroused among insurgents
by the severity of his methods was allayed by his frank
piquancy in discourse and an evident sincerity of purpose.
With Hood, as also with civic authorities of Atlanta, he
had carried on a vivacious correspondence, not unrelieved
1 2 Sherman, c. 20 ; 2 Grant, c. 59.
1864. SHERMAN S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. 549
by humor of expression, touching the harsh policy lie had
undertaken to pursue. "War is war, and not popularity-
seeking," was his apology when accused of barbarity in
methods towards Confederates ; " if they want peace they and
their relatives must stop the war." He permitted Southern
vehemence to vent itself, and responded with equal warmth
of argument. After all, it was talk like this from clean
handed men, whose courage they respected, who had depre
cated war in the beginning and cherished no political
aspirations, that brought misguided Southern brethren to
their senses. In Sherman s mind at the present time two
ideas were strongly uppermost . one, that his army might
actually subsist in the enemy s country without a base; the
other, that to make this war effective and thorough, rebel
lion must be crippled and ruined to the utmost in military
resources. He relied upon the moral effect he would pro
duce by his intended expedition against the enemy. " If
we can march a well-appointed army right through his
territory," he argued, "it is a demonstration to the world,
foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis
cannot resist." 1
In the middle of November, then, began Sherman s
famous march through Georgia. Thomas had been sent to
Nashville, previously, there to watch and obstruct Beaure-
gard and Hood with an augmented force, large enough to
defend both Tennessee and Kentucky, besides maintaining
the present Union base from the Ohio Biver down to Chat
tanooga. All surplus stores below that point were sent
back to Tennessee. By November 10 all troops that Sher
man designed for his immediate exploit were ordered down
to Atlanta; and two days later railroad and telegraphic
connections with the rear were wholly broken, and his in
vading column stood detached from all friends, dependent
upon its own means of further supply and resources in an
enemy s country. Destroying such depots, machine shops,
foundries, and other buildings at Atlanta as might possibly
be turned to hostile use, and tearing up the railway tracks
1 9 N. & H. 479 ; 2 Sherman, 167.
550 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II
he had now forsaken, Sherman started upon his south
easterly march from Atlanta towards the seacoast on the
morning of November 15, making Milledgeville, the capital
of Georgia, which was about a hundred miles distant, his
first point of destination. His invading column, carefully
purged already of non-combatants and the sick, numbered,
from first to last, about 60,000, as able-bodied and intelli
gent a body of soldiers, as well armed, well equipped, and
well seasoned to endurance, as the world ever saw. Howard
and Slocum, both of them trained and competent generals,
commanded the two wings, with Osterhaus, Blair, Jefferson
C. Davis, and A. S. Williams for their next highest subor
dinates; while Kilpatrick led the cavalry. Artillery and
the wagon trains had been reduced to the smallest practi
cable compass, and were lightly loaded ; each soldier of the
infantry carried on his person forty rounds of ammunition,
with his rations; of rations altogether about twenty days
supply were transported, while beef-cattle were driven along
on the hoof. But the forage carried by this army was scant,
and for keeping up a supply dependence was chiefly placed
upon the invaded country.
Sherman s orders for the march, which were clearly and
concisely written out, showed a purpose to make the region
of Southern insurrection feel heavily the annoyance of his
presence. He directed the march to be as nearly as possible
by parallel and converging roads, so as to threaten different
points at once and keep the foe from concentrating. Instead
of giving his army a general train of supplies, ammunition
and provision wagons were to be divided up among the
different corps and proceed by subdivision behind the several
brigades and regiments. Each separate column was to start
habitually at seven in the morning and make an average
march of fifteen miles a day. Liberal forage upon the
country traversed was not only allowed, but enjoined ; and
parties duly organized were to gather up meat, provisions,
and whatever other edible supplies might be needful, keep
ing their wagons well loaded. Corps commanders, wher
ever they found their progress molested, were permitted to
destroy mills and houses; while horses, mules, and wagons
1804. SHERMAN S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. 551
they might freely appropriate for military needs, preferring
to discriminate against the rich. Negroes who were able-
bodied and serviceable might be taken along, if they so
desired; but the promiscuous and wanton pillage or destruc
tion of private property was forbidden.
On the 16th of November, Sherman, with his personal
staff following the advance, rode out of Atlanta, leaving
that city smouldering and demolished, with black smoke
hanging in canopy over its roofs like a pall. Wrecked
engines, bent and twisted rails, this army left behind; but
scenes more exhilarating opened upon the vision as the
forest screen was passed : for it was a day of perfect sun
shine and the autumnal air felt bracing and delicious. A
mysterious sense of distant exploit and adventure seemed
to pervade the whole column, and the soldiers of the Union,
singing in chorus as they swung along, by corps and divi
sions, to the martial strain of their bands, cast with rollick
ing delight the load of responsibility upon their immediate
superiors, which these, with equal zest, shifted in turn upon
the chief commander. In this livery mood the progress went
on from day to day, Sherman making up his own nightly
couch with the rest, among abundant pine boughs, which
served for ample repose and shelter. Closing up the ranks
by day, whenever they marched through a town, the color-
bearers of a detachment would unfurl their flags and the
bands strike up patriotic airs ; the white inhabitants, in spite
of disloyal feeling, gathering inquisitively at doors and win
dows to see the sight, while negroes of every shade of com
plexion, male and female, young and old, went simply frantic
in the ecstasy of joy, clustering about the horses of the high
officers as though to welcome a saviour, hugging the banners
borne, and shouting, praying, and pouring out fervent
thanks. For the people long in darkness here, now saw a
great light, and it was comprehended far and wide, through
means mysterious, that slavery or freedom was an issue of
this long war, and that success on the Union side would
give this race deliverance. 1
1 2 Sherman, cs. 20, 21 ; 4 13. & L. G88, 689.
552 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
With skirmishers thrown out in advance, flankers busy, and
forage parties gathering their supplies abundantly from the
rich planters grounds, Milledgeville was reached on the 23d
of November; its legislature, after having passed an act for
levying Georgia s population in the mass, fleeing with the
governor and State officers in dire confusion. For a day
Sherman quartered at the governor s mansion, and some of
Slocum s soldiers, who held a mock assembly at the State
House, repealed, with pretended gravity, Georgia s ordi
nance of secession. From Georgia s capital the horde of
invaders next shaped their progress towards Savannah and
the seacoast. Sherman s orders to forage liberally on the
country, each individual soldier was inclined to apply for
himself, but the column was kept as closely as possible to
the literal injunction, which was no easy matter. Being in
an enemy s country, and without supplies except such as
the country afforded, invaders had of course to appropriate
largely. They swarmed like an army of locusts, seeking
whatever could be eaten by man or beast. Sherman s " bum
mers," so called, collected their loads with surprising skill
and speed, when detailed for the various commands. Their
captures comprised cattle, sheep, poultry, with bacon and
cornmeal, often molasses, and sometimes coffee or other
small rations. They would start out on foot in the morn
ing, and return, by night, mounted on strange horses or
mules ; but whatever they took was turned over to the com
missaries for general use, and the next day they left on foot,
to return at sunset mounted once more. Many racy anec
dotes are related of these men and their pillaging exploits,
of which a large part, probably, are unfounded. 1
On the 10th of December, Sherman s column reached the
outer defences of Savannah, and all that now barred its way
to the seacoast was a formidable work on the Ogeechee
River, known as Fort McAllister. In this vicinity
December. J .
the scraps and remnants 01 an opposing force of
some ten thousand had already collected under Hardee s
ccmmand, which included some Georgia militia, not very
1 2 Grant, c. 59 ; 2 Sherman, c. 21.
1864. CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH. 553
eager to fight, and openly objecting to be marched beyond
the limits of their own State. 1 Indeed, the most frantic,
official fulminations, both civil and military, to "assail the
invader in front, flank, and rear, " had produced but meagre
response. Richard Taylor, who now joined Hardee from
the far West, bringing no troops to assist, agreed with him
that Savannah ought to be abandoned in time sufficient for
escaping, so as to make another united stand in South
Carolina. Fort McAllister fell speedily before the assault
of Hazen s division of the 15th corps, on the evening of
December 13. This triumph enabled Sherman to place his
right wing at once upon impregnable ground, as he desired,
and opened full connection with the Union fleet, which had
lain waiting below, expectantly, at Ossabaw Sound, with
supplies of food and clothing and an immense mail for this
army.
Hampered, as it seemed, in his movements, by despatches
from Grant, which now reached him, to the effect that ves
sels were on their way to transport him and the bulk of his
command to Virginia, Sherman submitted other proposals
of his own, and then, to lose no time, sent Hardee, on the
17th, a summons for Savannah s surrender. The answer
was a calm refusal, and preparations followed to break his
lines at once or else besiege the city. But on the night of
the 20th-21st, Hardee stole away, as he had planned, inarch
ing his whole garrison over a pontoon bridge and causeway
into South Carolina. The inundated rice fields both aided
his escape and hindered a pursuit ; he had destroyed already
at Savannah his ironclads and the navy yard; yet the city
itself, with heavy guns and ammunition, and twenty-five
thousand bales of cotton, was no contemptible prke for a
conquest so surprisingly easy. As a Christmas gift to the
President, Sherman, in a sprightly and appropriate despatch,
presented Savannah, on the 22d of December, and the spon
taneous praise of the nation, which reached him for this
crown to his splendid campaign and the year s arduous
work, was grateful to his feelings. But still more grateful
i 4 B. & L. 666.
554 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II.
was the revocation, which now came, of his orders to pro
ceed northward by sea; and he was left entirely to his own
discretion, in the matter of his further movements. 1
Sherman s plan, which he had worked out during the
march, was, after reducing Savannah, to continue his inland
advance through the Carolinas and their respective capitals,
Columbia and Raleigh, thence to cooperate finally with
Grant in the rear of Richmond. He meant, as hitherto, to
gather forage and provisions as he advanced, and march
after a similar fashion. " My aim," so he afterwards wrote,
" was to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to follow
them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread
us." His march to the sea had developed in a sense as a
means to such an end so as to be, in fact, one stage in
the direction of Richmond, rather than that solitary and
anomalous enterprise which popular interest inclines to
regard it. In Georgia, however, came the first grand test
of his pungent experiment; there such a march had to be
met and frustrated, or this rebellion was put, like one smote
on the hinder parts, to perpetual shame. There was a stroke
of military genius in this whole devastating enterprise, and
whatever incidental pillage may have attended its course,
the moral effect, as apprehended, was great upon friend and
foe. At last, the bosom of the Confederacy was plainly
bared, and its heart was shown to be beating feebly in its
last pulsations.
Sherman s whole Southern progress, presently to be re
sumed, supplies to posterity the most picturesque and
peculiar military campaign of the Civil War, and that
which, at the least proportional sacrifice to the Union cause,
secured the amplest results. Its success stamped its leader
and originator as the second great Union commander of the
whole conflict in point of merit some have thought the
first, but this cannot be conceded. No general could have
been more happily placed for his fame than Grant himself
had here placed him, far from those circles of public and
political influence which Sherman could never fairly esteem
1 9 N. & H. c. 20 ; 2 Sherman, cs. 21, 22.
1864. SHERMAN S MILITARY TRAITS. 555
nor judiciously cope with; freely and trustfully left to his
own devices by a general-in-chief whom he loved as a friend
and respected, and favored most liberally by a President
and administration that perceived him to be loyal, frank,
and capable. Nature and circumstances, like the stars in
their courses, seemed to fight for him in this his final cam
paign. For Sherman s breadth was not equal to his in
tensity, though his military intuition lit up like lightning
and his strictly professional attainments were very sound.
He was liked by those who served under him, down to the
humblest private, for he was easily approached and would
say the right word for the occasion, at the same time that
he repelled too easy familiarity. He bore hardships with
the humblest on this campaign, making no parade of rank
or dignity. He would ride from one corps to another,
acknowledging salutations on the way as though too hurried
to waste time over etiquette; his uniform coat wide open
at the throat, and displaying a loose black cravat and linen
collar; and his common foot-gear consisted of low shoes
and a single spur. He understood his officers and their
individual traits, and detailed them with a discretion that
made all feel that his eye was on them. 1 His interesting
Memoirs show that he had a lively power of description,
a strong imagination, and the gift of stating forcibly what
he truly felt.
To make Sherman s triumph complete, however, on this
march, it was needful to defeat the large army which Beau-
regard and Hood massed in his rear at the time he left
Atlanta. That army, instead of pursuing, aided effectually
his progress by concentrating all effort for resistance in the
opposite direction. Beauregard, who had hurried to Macon
to confer about opposing Sherman on the march, gave little;
more than his rhetoric to relieve Georgia from invasion,
and returned to Corinth, solely intent upon his counter-
One of the gravest responsibilities of this war
i 4 B. & L. 671.
556 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II
rested consequently upon Thomas, whom Sherman had left
confidently behind at Nashville, to command all the reserves
of the department, which aggregated, after various gains
and losses, about 55,000 men of all arms, including corps
under Schofield and D. S. Stanley, for the chief reliance.
Hood s army, on the other side, had now, by the most
strenuous exertions, been brought up to its fullest strength,
so as to comprise infantry corps variously estimated from
40,000 to 45,000, to which were added 10,000 cavalry under
Forrest; so that the opposing armies were pretty fairly
matched.
When November opened, Hood occupied Tuscumbia, a
town on the south bank of the Tennessee River, located
in northern Alabama. There, after nearly a fort-
November. !,,,. J
night s discussion with Beauregard, it was fully
resolved that Hood should leave Sherman unmolested and
invade Tennessee. On the 13th of November, the day after
Sherman had severed his last communications with Thomas,
Hood moved across the river to Florence, where Forrest
reported to him; and, almost simultaneously with Sher
man s setting-out from Atlanta, on the 15th, towards one
point of the compass, Hood s army faced the other, taking
up eagerly its march towards Nashville, as an offset, on the
21st. "Victory in Tennessee will relieve Georgia," was
Beauregard s assuring telegram to Howell Cobb, when the
latter reported the destructive advance of Sherman, now
fully developed; and, once and again, this Confederate
commander, who kept headquarters at Corinth, charged
Hood to push rapidly upon his aggressive. Regardless of
snow, sleet, and rain, weather far different from what
Sherman was now encountering, Hood moved with alacrity
towards Columbia, a midway point; progressing so rapidly,
indeed, that he would have cut off Schofield from that town,
had not the latter, whom Thomas sent from Nashville to
intercept the Confederate approach, arrived there first, after
a toilsome night march, by the morning of the 24th.
Balked, therefore, in his first effort, Hood next meant to
proceed by the right flank, crossing the river some distance
above Columbia, thence to assail Schofield s line of com-
1864. BATTLE OF FRANKLIN. 557
munications at Spring Hill. Bridging the river during the
night of the 28th, and crossing at daybreak to lead his own
flanking column, he started forth for a new and daring
exploit, in emulation of Stonewall Jackson s example; but
again he failed, for Stanley, Schofield s next in command,
had been sent to anticipate and oppose such a move, and,
after a tough conflict, on the 29th, for possession of Spring
Hill and the Franklin turnpike, which the Union forces
held firmly by good fighting, aided by their excellent artil
lery, Hood and his generals had to encamp for the night,
with the grand stroke missed. Schotield, already convinced
that the main Confederate army purposed marching upon
his rear and cutting him off from Nashville, withdrew from
Columbia after sunset, and pushed his solid force for the
town of Franklin, marching all night with heavy trains and
artillery past Hood s sleeping army. The head of his
column reached Franklin, by the turnpike, on the 30th,
shortly before sunrise, the main body arriving during the
forenoon. 1
On this 30th of November followed the battle of Franklin,
which Hood forced, with violence, in furious desperation,
bitterly vexed by his earlier discomfiture, and angry with
his principal generals, whom he loaded with reproach and
adjurations, for their failure to succeed the day before.
His invectives stung them to new effort, and, with im
petuous assault, they rushed upon the Union lines, like
wild Indians, at early four o clock, just as Schofield s weary
soldiers had flung themselves down for a little repose behind
their breastworks, here hastily built. Two fresh brigades
of Wagner, who had fought well the day before, had been
posted outside by Schofield, with instructions to baffle and
retire in case of attack; but they lingered imprudently to
fight, and now came rushing over the parapets, while the
enemy enveloped rather than pursued them. The Union
troops inside, bewildered and half awake, could not resist
the overwhelming Confederate force thrown suddenly upon
them with immediate success ; and a large breach was made
1 10 N. & II. c. 1.
558 HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. CHAP. II,
in the centre of Schofield s breastworks, into which a supe
rior force of the enemy was nearly wedged with irreparable
effect, when Stanley, with Opdycke s brigade and other
troops at hand to help him, closed the gap quickly, and with
a rally Hood s fierce onset was repelled. All along the lino,
however, and through this whole day, assault after assault
was made by the Confederate army upon Schofield s line
with a steadily diminishing success; and the sun went down
upon a bloody and fruitless battle, desperately fought and
frightfully destructive of human life for the assailants, who
lost by nearly three to one, and were much demoralized by
their eventual failure. Hood was a daring and courageous
fighter, and could make others fight under him. Sitting on
horseback, a little way behind his lines, he had despatched
his almost frantic orders, again and again, to " drive the
Yankees into the river." But he had not that constraining
judgment which accepts repulse upon sufficient trial, and at
all times economizes military strength. In this severe
encounter, Cox, on the Union side, commanded under
Sehofield s orders in the thick of the fight, splendidly per
forming his duty on the south side of the river, where this
battle was mainly fought; for Stanley was wounded early
in the day, and Schofield himself mainly occupied with
bridging and posting, so as to resume his march towards
Nashville, on the north side. 1
Hood s shattering failure before Franklin gave Schofield
the full opportunity he needed to move all troops and sup
plies to Nashville, as Thomas, from headquarters, now
directed him to do. While the battle of that day went on,
Forrest and his cavalry had been checked by Wilson at the
river, so that the Union army fell back unmolested. On
arriving at Nashville, Schofield took a position already se
lected for his command upon the left; the 4th corps,
under Wood, held the centre; and A. J. Smith, with
his strong 16th corps, arriving most opportunely, was
1 10 N. & H. c. 1, citing Cox ; 4 B. & L. 440, etc. From Hon.
Thomas Speed of Kentucky the author has received important details
of this battle.
1864. THOMAS AT NASHVILLE. 559
posted at the right, with his flank resting on the Cumber
land, just below the city. Hood, as if impelled to adverse
fate by some evil demon, followed Schofield rashly to Nash
ville and settled down for another fight, bold and visionary
to the last, and trusting for his final fame and success to
the chapter of accidents. He formed his line of battle in
front of that city on the 2d of December, assigning S. D. Lee,
with his corps, to the centre, across the pike towards Frank
lin, while Stewart and Cheatham occupied the respective
wings. Forrest, on the 5th, he detached, with an infantry
division, upon a distant expedition to Murfreesboro, to
invest and capture its garrison, then under Rousseau s com
mand. That expedition failed, and, as a result of this
diversion, Forrest remained too far away from Nashville to
be recalled thither when most needed by the Confederate
forces.
While Hood was strengthening his intrenchments, wait
ing, or rather hoping, for reinforcements from Texas and
good news from Forrest, neither of which ever came, the
unflinching Thomas, behind the ramparts of Nashville, was
preparing, without a moment s haste or impatience, not only
to give Hood battle, but to give it in such measure as to
overwhelm that adversary with utter disaster. Sherman
chose well when selecting a general for this responsible and
isolated command, and his confidence was not misplaced.
The lion-hearted Thomas was the officer of all others to
break and dissipate the frothy vehemence of Hood rushing
recklessly to his fate. He had won fame already as the
" rock of Chickamauga "; and his steadiness of purpose and