tion, which, in fact, they could not well avoid, that
he was being misled by his Ministers, and the atti-
tude of the country misrepresented to him ; even
had they known as well as we do that the Ministers
were only carrying out the orders of the King, they
could not well have said so. Bismarck, however, did
not attempt to conceal the truth ; the address, he
said, touched the King ; the acts complained of were
done in the name of the King ; they were setting
themselves against him. The contest was, who was
to rule in Prussia, the House of Hohenzollern or the
House of Parliament. He was at once accused of
disloyalty ; he was, they said, protecting himself be-
hind the person of the sovereign, but, of course, it
was impossible for him not to do so. The whole
justification for his action was that he was carrying
out the King's orders. What was at the root of the
conflict but the question, whether in the last resort
the will of the King or the majority of the House
should prevail? To have adopted the English prac-
tice, to have refrained from mentioning the King's
1 70 Bismarck. [1862-
name, would have been to adopt the very theory of
the Constitution for which the House was contend-
ing, the English theory that the sovereign has
neither the right of deciding nor responsibility; it
would have been to undermine the monarchical side
of the Constitution which Bismarck was expressly
defending. The King himself never attempted to
avoid the responsibility ; in a public speech he had
already said that the army organisation was his own
work: " It is my own and I am proud of it ; I will
hold firmly to it and carry it through with all my
energy." In his answer to the address from tlie
House, both on this and on later occasions, he ex-
pressly withdrew the assumption that he was not
well informed or that he did not approve of his
Ministers' action.
The address was carried by a majority of 255 to
68 ; the King refused to receive it in person. The
House then proceeded to throw out a Bill for mili-
tary reorganisation which was laid before them ;
they adopted a resolution that they reserved for
later discussion the question, for what part of the
money illegally spent in 1862 they would hold the
Ministry personally responsible. They then pro-
ceeded to the Budget of 1863, and again rejected
the army estimates ; they refused the money asked
for raising the salaries of the ambassadors (Bis-
marck himself, while at St. Petersburg, had suffered
much owing to the insufificiency of his salary, and he
wished to spare his successors a similar inconven-
ience) ; and they brought in Bills for the responsibil-
ity of Ministers, The public attention, however,
1863] The Confiid. 171
was soon directed from these internal matters to
even more serious questions of foreign policy.
At the beginning of February the Poles had once
more risen in revolt against the Russian Govern-
ment. Much sympathy was felt for them in West-
ern Europe. England, France, and Austria joined
in representations and remonstrances to the Czar ;
they expected that Prussia would join them.
Nothing could have been more inconvenient to
Bismarck ; he was at the time fully occupied in ne-
gotiations about German affairs, and he was proba-
bly anxious to bring to a speedy issue the questions
between Prussia and Austria ; it was therefore most
important to him to be on good terms with France
and England, for he would not challenge Austria
unless he was sure that Austria would have no allies ;
now he must quarrel with either Russia or with
France. An insurrection in Poland was, however, a
danger to which everything else must be postponed;
on this his opinion never varied, here there could be
no compromise. He was perfectly open : " The Pol-
ish question is to us a question of life and death,"
he said to Sir Andrew Buchanan. There were two
parties among the Poles ; the one, the extreme
Republican, wished for the institution of an inde-
pendent republic ; the other would be content with
self-government and national institutions under the
Russian Crown ; they were supported by a considera-
ble party in Russia itself. Either party if successful
would not be content with Russian Poland ; they
would demand Posen, they would never rest until
they had gained again the coast of the Baltic and
172 Bisniai^ck. [1862-
deprived Prussia of her eastern provinces. The dan-
ger to Prussia would be greatest, as Bismarck well
knew, if the Poles became reconciled to the . Rus-
sians ; an independent republic on their eastern
frontier would have been dangerous, but Polish
aspirations supported by the Panslavonic party and
the Russian army would have been fatal. Russia
and Poland might be reconciled, Prussia and Poland
never can be. Prussia therefore was obliged to
separate itself from the other Powers ; instead of
sending remonstrances to the Czar, the King wrote
an autograph letter proposing that the two Govern-
ments should take common steps to meet the com-
mon danger ; General von Alvensleben, who took
the letter, at once concluded a convention in which
it was agreed that Prussian and Russian troops
should be allowed to cross the frontier in pursuit of
the insurgents ; at the same time two of the Prus-
sian army corps were mobilised and drawn up along
the Polish frontier.
The convention soon became known and it is easy
to imagine the indignation with which the Prussian
people and the House of Representatives heard of
what their Government had done. The feeling was
akin to that which would have prevailed in America
had the President offered his help to the Spanish
Government to suppress the insurrection in Cuba.
The answers to questions were unsatisfactory, and
on February 26th Heinrich von Sybel rose to move
that the interests of Prussia required absolute neu-
trality. It was indeed evident that Bismarck's ac-
tion had completely isolated Prussia ; except the
1863] The Conflict. 1 73
Czar, she had now not a single friend in Europe and
scarcely a friend in Germany, Bismarck began his
answer by the taunt that the tendency to enthusi-
asm for foreign nationalities, even when their ob-
jects could only be realised at the cost of one's own
country, was a political disease unfortunately limited
to Germany. It was, however, an unjust taunt, for
no one had done more than Sybel himself in his his-
torical work to point out the necessity, though he
recognised the injustice, of the part Prussia had
taken in the partition of Poland ; nobody had
painted so convincingly as he had, the political and
social demoralisation of Poland. Bismarck then
dwelt on the want of patriotism in the House, which
in the middle of complicated negotiations did not
scruple to embarrass their own Government. " No
English House of Commons," he said, "would have
acted as they did," a statement to which we cannot
assent ; an English Opposition would have acted ex-
actly as the majority of the Prussian Parliament did.
When a Minister is in agreement with the House on
the general principles of policy, then indeed there
rests on them the obligation not to embarrass the
Government by constant interpolation with regard
to each diplomatic step ; self-restraint must be exer-
cised, confidence shewn. This was not the case here ;
the House had every reason to believe that the ob-
jects of Bismarck were completely opposed to what
they wished ; they could not be expected to repose
confidence in him. They used this, as every other
opportunity, to attempt to get rid of him.
The question of Poland is one on which Bismarck
1 74 Bismarck. [1862-
never altered his attitude. His first public expression
of opinion on foreign affairs was an attack on the
Polish policy of the Prussian Government in 1848.
" No one then," he wrote, " could doubt that an independ-
ent Poland would be the irreconcilable enemy of Prussia
and would remain so till they had conquered the mouth
of the Vistula and every Polish-speaking village in West
and East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia."
Forty years later one of the last of his great speeches
in the Reichstag was devoted to attacking the Polish
sympathies of the Catholic party in Prussia. He
was never tired of laughing at the characteristic
German romanticism which was so enthusiastic for
the welfare of other nations. He recalled the memo-
ries of his boyhood when, after the rebellion of 1831,
Polish refugees were received in every German town
with honours and enthusiasm greater than those paid
to the men who had fought for Germany, when
German children would sing Polish national airs as
though they were their own.
Nothing shews the change which he has been able
to bring about in German thought better than the
attitude of the nation towards Poland. In the old
days the Germans recollected only that the partition
of Poland had been a great crime ; it was their hope
and determination that they might be able to make
amends for it. In those days the Poles were to be
found in every country in Europe, foremost in fight-
ing on the barricades ; they helped the Germans to
fight for their liberty, and the Germans were to help
them to recover independence. In 1848, Mieroslawski
1863]
The Conflict. 175
had been carried like a triumphant hero through the
streets of Berlin ; the Baden rebels put themselves
under the leadership of a Pole, and it was a Pole
who commanded the Viennese in their resistance to
the Austrian army ; a Pole led the Italians to dis-
aster on the field of Novara. At a time when poets
still were political leaders, and the memory and in-
fluence of Byron had not been effaced, there was
scarcely a German poet, Platen, Uhland, Heine, who
had not stirred up the enthusiasm for Poland. It
was against this attitude of mind that Bismarck had
to struggle and he has done so successfully. He has
taught that it is the duty of Germany to use all the
power of the State for crushing and destroying the
Polish language and nationality ; the Poles in Prussia
are to become Prussian, as those in Russia have to
become Russian. A hundred years ago the Polish
State was destroyed ; now the language and the
nation must cease to exist.
It is a natural result of the predominance of
Prussia in Germany. The enthusiasm for Poland
was not unnatural when the centre of gravity of
Germany was still far towards the West. Germany
could be great, prosperous, and happy, even if a re-
vived Poland spread to the shores of the Baltic, but
Prussia would then cease to exist and Bismarck has
taught the Germans to feel as Prussians.
The danger during these weeks was real ; Napo-
leon proposed that Austria, England, and France
should present identical notes to Prussia remonstrat-
ing with and threatening her. Lord Russell refused ;
it was, as Bismarck said in later years, only the
1 76 Bismarck. [1862-
friendly disposition of Lord Russell to Germany
which saved Prussia from this danger. Bismarck's
own position was very insecure ; but he withstood
this attack as he did all others, though few knew at
what expense to his nerves and health ; he used to
attribute the frequent illnesses of his later years to
the constant anxiety of these months ; he had a
very nervous temperament, self-control was difificult
to him, and we must remember that all the time
when he was defending the King's Government
against this public criticism he had to maintain him-
self against those who at Court were attempting to
undermine his influence with the King.
He had, however, secured the firm friendship
of Russia. When he was in St. Petersburg he had
gained the regard of the Czar ; now to this personal
feeling was added a great debt of gratitude. What
a contrast between the action of Austria and Prus-
sia ! The late Czar had saved Austria from dissolu-
tion, and what had been the reward ? Opposition in
the East, and now Austria in the Polish affair was
again supporting the Western Powers. On the other
hand Prussia, and Prussia alone, it was which had
saved Russia from the active intervention of France
and England. Napoleon had proposed that a land-
ing should he made in Lithuania in order to effect
a junction with the Poles; Bismarck had immedi-
ately declared that if this were done he should re-
gard it as a declaration of war against Prussia. So
deep was the indignation of Alexander that he wrote
himself to the King of Prussia, proposing an alliance
and a joint attack on France and Austria. It must
1863] The Conflict. 177
have been a great temptation to Bismarck, but he
now shewed the prudence which was his great char-
acteristic as a diplomatist ; he feared that in a war of
this kind the brunt would fall upon Prussia, and that
when peace was made the control of negotiations
would be with the Czar. He wished for war with
Austria, but he was determined that when war came
he should have the arrangement of the terms of
peace. On his advice the King refused the offer.
The bitterness of the feeling created by these de-
bates on Poland threatened to make it impossible
for Ministers any longer to attend in the House ;
Bismarck did his part in increasing it.
You ask me," he said, " why, if we disagree with you,
we do not dissolve ; it is that we wish the country to
have an opportunity of becoming thoroughly acquainted
with you."
He was tired and angry when during one of these
sittings he writes to Motley :
" I am obliged to listen to particularly tasteless speeches
out of the mouths of uncommonly childish and excited
politicians, and I have therefore a moment of unwilling
leisure which I cannot use better than in giving you. news
of my welfare. I never thought that in my riper years I
should be obliged to carry on such an unworthy trade as
that of a Parliamentary Minister. As envoy, although
an official, I still had the feeling of being a gentleman ;
as [Parliamentary] Minister one is a helot. I have come
down in the world, and hardly know how.
" April 1 8th. I wrote as far as this yesterday, then
the sitting came to an end ; five hours' Chamber until
three o'clock ; one hour's report to his Majesty ; three
1 78 Bismarck. [1865-
hours at an incredibly dull dinner, old important Whigs ;
then two hours' work ; finally, a supper with a colleague,
who would have been hurt if I had slighted his fish.
This morning, I had hardly breakfasted, before Karolyi
was sitting opposite to me ; he was followed without in-
terruption by Denmark, England, Portugal, Russia,
France, whose Ambassador I was obliged to remind at
one o'clock that it was time for me to go to the House
of phrases. I am sitting again in the latter ; hear people
talk nonsense, and end my letter. All these people have
agreed to approve our treaties with Belgium, in spite of
which twenty speakers scold each other with the greatest
vehemence, as if each wished to make an end of the
other ; they are not agreed about the motives which
make them unanimous, hence, alas ! a regular German
squabble about the Emperor's beard ; querelle d' Alle-
ma7id. You Anglo-Saxon Yankees have something of
the same kind also. . . . Your battles are bloody ;
ours wordy ; these chatterers really cannot govern Prus-
sia. I must bring some opposition to bear against them ;
they have too little wit and too much self-complacency —
stupid and audacious. Stupid, in all its meanings, is not
the right word ; considered individually, these people
are sometimes very clever, generally educated — the regu-
lation German university culture ; but of politics, be-
yond the interests of their own church tower, they know
as little as we knew as students, and even less ; as far as
external politics go, they are also, taken separately, like
children. In all other questions they become childish
as soon as they stand together in corpore. In the mass
stupid, individually intelligent."
Recalling these days, Bismarck .said in later years:
" I shall never forget how I had every morning to
1863]
The Conflict. 179
receive the visit of Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English
Ambassador, and Talleyrand, the representative of
France, who made hell hot for me over the inexcusable
leanings of Prussian policy towards Russia, and held
threatening language towards us, and then at midday I
had the pleasure of hearing in the Prussian Parliament
pretty much the same arguments and attacks which in
the morning the foreign Ambassadors had made against
me."
Of course the language used in the House weak-
ened his influence abroad, and the foreign Govern-
ments shewed more insistence when they found out
that the Prussian Parliament supported their de-
mands. It was noticed with satisfaction in the
English Parliament that the nation had dissociated
itself from the mean and disgraceful policy of the
Government.
At last personal friction reached such a point that
the session had to be closed. In order to under-
stand the cause of this we must remember that in
Prussia the Ministers are not necessarily members of
either House ; they enjoy, however, by the Consti-
tution, the right of attending the debates and may
at any time demand to be heard ; they do not sit in
the House among the other members, but on a
raised bench to the right of the President, facing the
members. They have not, therefore, any feeling of
esprit de corps as members of the assembly ; Bis-
marck and his colleagues when they addressed the
House spoke not as members, not as the representa-
tives of even a small minority, but as strangers, as
the representatives of a rival and hostile authority ;
1 80 Bismarck.
[1862-
it is this which alone explains the almost unanimous
opposition to him ; he was the opponent not of one
party in the House but of the Parliament itself and
of every other Parliament. In the course of a debate
he came into conflict with the Chair ; the President
pointed out that some of his remarks had nothing
to do with the subject ; Bismarck at once protested :
" I cannot allow the President the right to a discip-
linary interruption in my speech. I have not the
honour of being a member of this assembly ; I have
not helped to vote your standing orders; I have not
joined in electing the President ; I am not subject
to the disciplinary power of the Chamber. The
authority of the President ends at this barrier. I
have one superior only, his Majesty the King."
This led to a sharp passage with the President, who
maintained that his power extended as far as the
four walls ; he could not indeed withdraw the right
of speech from a Minister, but could interrupt him.
Bismarck at once repeated word for word the ob-
noxious passage of his speech. The President
threatened, if he did so again, to close the sitting;
Bismarck practically gave way ; " I cannot," he said,
" prevent the President adjourning the House ; what
I have said twice I need not repeat a third time " ;
and the debate continued without further interrup-
tion. A few weeks later a similar scene occurred,
but this time it was not Bismarck but Roon, and
Roon had not the same quick feeling for Parlia-
mentary form ; Bismarck had defied the President
up to the extreme point where his legal powers
went, Roon passed beyond them. The President
1863] The Confiict. i8i
wished to interrupt the Minister; Roon refused to
stop speaking ; the President rang his belL " When
I interrupt the Minister," he said, " he must be
silent. For that purpose I use my bell, and, if the
Minister does not obey, I must have my hat brought
me." When the Chairman put on his hat the House
would be adjourned. Roon answered, " I do not
mind if the President has his hat brought ; accord-
ing to the Constitution I can speak if I wish, and no
one has the right to interrupt me." After a few
more angry words on either side, as Roon continued
to dispute the right of the President, the latter rose
from his seat and asked for his hat, which he placed
on his head. All the members rose and the House
was adjourned. Unfortunately the hat handed to
him was not his own ; it was much too large and
completely covered his head and face, so that the
strain of the situation was relieved by loud laughter.
After this the Ministers refused to attend the House
unless they received an assurance that the President
no longer claimed disciplinary authority over them ;
a series of memoranda were exchanged between the
House and the Ministry ; the actual point in dispute
was really a very small one ; it is not even clear that
there was any difference of opinion ; everyone ac-
knowledged that the Ministers might make as many
speeches as they liked, and that the Chairman could
not require them to stop speaking. The only
question was whether he might interrupt them in
order to make any remarks himself; but neither
side was prepared to come to an understanding.
The King, to whom the House appealed, supported
182 Bismarck.
[1862-
the Ministry, and a few days later the House was
prorogued. The second session was over.
Three days later, by Royal proclamation, a series
of ordinances was published creating very stringent
regulations for the control of the Press ; they gave
the police the right of forbidding a newspaper to
appear for no other reason except disapproval of its
general tendency. It was a power more extreme
than in the worst days of the Carlsbad decrees had
ever been claimed by any German Government.
The ordinances were based on a clause in the Con-
stitution which gave the Government at times of
crisis, if Parliament were not sitting, the power of
making special regulations for the government of the
Press. The reference to the Constitution seemed
almost an insult ; the kind of crisis which was meant
was obviously a period of civil war or invasion ; it
seemed as though the Government had taken the
first pretext for proroguing Parliament to be able to
avail themselves of this clause. The ordinances
reminded men of those of Charles X. ; surely, they
said, this was the beginning of a reign of violence.
The struggle was now no longer confined to Par-
liament. Parliament indeed was clearly impotent ;
all that could be done by speeches and votes and
addresses had been done and had failed ; the King
still supported the Ministry. It was now the time
for the people at large ; the natural leaders were the
corporations of the large towns ; the Liberal policy
of the Prussian Government had given them con-
siderable independence ; they were elected by the
people, and in nearly every town there was a large
1863] The Conflict. 183
majority opposed to the Government. Headed by
the capital, they began a series of addresses to the
King ; pubhc meetings were organised ; at Cologne
a great festival was arranged to welcome Sybel and
the other representatives from the Rhine. It was
more serious that in so monarchical a country the
discontent with the personal action of the King found
public expression. The Crown Prince was at this time
on a tour of military inspection in East Prussia ; town
after town refused the ordinary loyal addresses ; they
would not welcome him or take part in the usual
ceremonies; the ordinary loyal addresses to the
King and other members of the Royal Family were
refused. It was no longer a conflict between the
Ministry and the Parliament, but between the King
and the country.
Suddenly the country learned that the Crown
Prince himself, the Heir Apparent to the throne, was
on their side. He had always disliked Bismarck; he
was offended by the brusqueness of his manner. He
disliked the genial and careless bonhonimie with
which Bismarck, who hated affectation, discussed
the most serious subjects; he had opposed his ap-
pointment, and he now held a position towards his
father's Government similar to that which ten years
before his father had held towards his own brother.
He was much influenced by his English relations,
and the opinion of the English Court was strongly
unfavourable to Bismarck. Hitherto the Crown
Prince had refrained from any public active oppo-
sition ; he had, however, not been asked his opinion
concerning the Press ordinances, nor had he even
184 Bismarck. [I862-
received an invitation to the council at which they
were passed. Bitterly offended at this slight upon
himself, seriously alarmed lest the action of the
Government might even endanger the dynasty, on
his entry into Danzig he took occasion to dissociate
himself from the action of the Government. He had
not, he said, been asked; he had known nothing
about it ; he was not responsible. The words were
few and they were moderate, but they served to
shew the whole of Germany what hitherto only those