about the Court had known, that the Crown Prince
was to be counted among the opponents of the
Government.
An incident followed a few days later which could
only serve to increase the breach. After his speech
at Danzig, the Crown Prince had offered to surren-
der all his official positions ; the King had not re-
quired this of him, but had strictly ordered him
not again to come into opposition to his Govern-
ment. The Crown Prince had promised obedience,
but continued his private protests against "these
rude and insolent Ministers." The letters on both
sides had been affectionate and dignified. A few
days later, however, the Berlin correspondent of
the Times was enabled to publish the contents of
them. It is not known who was to blame for this
very serious breach of confidence; but the publica-
tion must have been brought about by someone very
closely connected with the Crown Prince ; suspicion
was naturally directed towards the Court of Coburg.
It was not the last time that the confidence of the
Crown Prince was to be abused in a similar manner,
1863] The Confiict. 185
The event naturally much increased Bismarck's dis-
like to the entourage of the Prince. There was in-
deed a considerable number of men, half men of
letters, half politicians, who were glad to play a part
by attaching themselves to a Liberal Prince ; they
did not scruple to call in the help of the Press of the
foreign countries, especially of England, and use its
influence for the decision of Prussian affairs. Unfor-
tunately their connections were largely with Eng-
land ; they had a great admiration for English
liberty, and they were often known as the English
party. This want of discretion, which afterwards
caused a strong prejudice against them in Germany,
was used to create a prejudice also against England.
People in Germany confused with the English na-
tion, which was supremely indifferent to Continental
affairs, the opinions of a few writers who were nearly
always German. For many years after this, the rela-
tions between Bismarck and the Crown Prince were
very distant, and the breach was to be increased by the
very decided line which the Crown Prince afterwards
took with regard to the Schleswig-Holstein affair.
The event shewed that Bismarck knew well the
country with which he was dealing ; the Press ordi-
nances were not actually illegal, they were strictly
enforced ; many papers were warned, others were
suppressed ; the majority at once changed their tone
and moderated their expression of hostility to the
Government. In England, under similar circum-
stances, a host of scurrilous pamphlets have always
appeared ; the Prussian police were too prompt for
this to be possible. The King refused to receive the
1 86 Bismarck.
[1862-
addresses ; an order from the Home Office forbade
town councils to discuss political matters ; a Burger-
meister who disregarded the order was suspended
from his office ; public meetings were suppressed.
These measures were successful ; the discontent re-
mained and increased, but there was no disorder and
there were no riots. Great courage was required to
defy public opinion, but with courage it could be
defied with as much impunity as that of the Parlia-
ment. Englishmen at the time asked why the peo-
ple did not refuse to pay the taxes ; the answer is
easy : there would have been no legal justification
for this, for though, until the estimates had been
passed, the Ministers were not legally enabled to
spend a farthing of public money, the taxes could
still be levied ; they were not voted annually ; once
imposed, they continued until a law was passed
withdrawing them. The situation, in fact, was this,
that the Ministry were obliged to collect the money
though they were not authorised in spending it. To
this we must add that the country was very prosper-
ous ; the revenue was constantly increasing ; there
was no distress. The socialist agitation which was
just beginning was directed not against the Govern-
ment but against society ; Lassalle found more sym.-
pathy in Bismarck than he did with the Liberal
leaders. He publicly exhorted his followers to sup-
port the Monarchy against these miserable Bour-
geois, as he called the Liberals. Except on the one
ground of the constitutional conflict, the country
was well governed ; there was no other interference
with liberty of thought or action,
1863] The Conflict. 187
Moreover, there was a general feeling that things
could not last long ; the Liberals believed that the
future was with them ; time itself would bring re-
venge. At the worst they would wait till the death
of the King ; he was already nearly seventy years of
age ; the political difficulties had much injured his
health. When he was gone, then with the Crown
Prince the constitutional cause would triumph.
How different was the future to be! Year after
year the conflict continued. Each year the House \J
was summoned and the Budget laid before it ; each
year the House rejected the Budget ; they threw
out Government measures, they refused the loans,
and they addressed the King to dismiss his Ministers.
The sessions, however, were very short; that of 1864
lasted only a few weeks.
Each year Bismarck's open contempt for -the Par-
liament and their unqualified hatred of him increased. J/'''^
The people still continued to support their represent-
atives. The cities still continued to withhold their
loyal addresses to the King. With each year, how-
ever, the Government gained confidence. It was
easy to see that the final result would depend on
the success of the Government in external affairs.
To these we must now turn,
English opinion at that time was unanimously
opposed to the King; it is difficult even now to /^
judge the issue. It was natural for Englishmen to
sympathise with those who wished to imitate them.
Their pride was pleased when they found the ablest
Parliamentary leaders, the most learned historians
and keenest jurists desirous to assimilate the institu-
1 88 Bis77ta7'-ck. [1862^
tions of Prussia to those which existed in England. It
is just this which ought to make us pause. What do
we think of pohticians who try to introduce among
us the institutions and the faults of foreign countries ?
" Why will not the King of Prussia be content
with the position which the Queen of England holds,
or the King of the Belgians, — then all his unpopular-
ity would be gone ? " was a question asked at the time
by an English writer. We may ask, on the other
hand, why should the King of Prussia sacrifice his
power and prerogative ? The question is really as
absurd as it would be to ask, why is not an English
Parliament content with the power enjoyed by the
Prussian Parliament? It was a commonplace of the
time, that the continued conflict shewed a want of
statesmanship ; so it did, if it is statesmanship always
to court popularity and always to surrender one's
cause when one believes it to be right, even at the
risk of ruining one's country. It must be remem-
bered that through all these years the existence of
Prussia was at stake. If the Prussian Government
insisted on the necessity for a large and efficient
army, they were accused of reckless militarism.
People forgot that the Prussian Monarchy could no
more maintain itself without a large army than the
British Empire could without a large navy. In all
the secret diplomatic negotiations of the time, the
dismemberment of Prussia was a policy to be con-
sidered. France wished to acquire part of the left
bank of the Rhine, Austria had never quite given .up
hope of regaining part of Silesia; it was not fifty
years since Prussia had acquired half the kingdom
1863J The Conflict. 189
of Saxony ; might not a hostile coaHtion restore this
territory ? And then the philanthropy of England
and the intrigues of France were still considering
the possibility of a revived Poland, but in Poland
would have to be included part of the territory
which Prussia had acquired.
It is often said that from this conflict must be
dated the great growth of militarism in Europe ; it
is to the victory of the King and Bismarck that we
are to attribute the wars which followed and the
immense armaments which since then have been \/
built up in Europe. To a certain extent, of course,
this is true, though it is not clear that the presence
of these immense armies is an unmixed evil. It
is, however, only half the truth ; the Prussian Gov-
ernment was not solely responsible. It was not
they who began arming, it was not they who first
broke the peace which had been maintained in
Europe since 18 15. Their fault seems to have been,
not that they armed first, but that when they put '^
their hand to the work, they did it better than other
nations. If they are exposed to any criticism in the
matter, it must rather be this, that the Government
of the late King had unduly neglected the army ;
they began to prepare not too soon but almost too
late. It was in Austria in 1848 that the new mili-
tary dominion began ; Austria was supported by
Russia and imitated by France ; Prussia, surrounded
by these empires, each at least double herself in
population, was compelled to arm in self-defence.
By not doing so sooner she had incurred the dis-
grace of Olmiitz ; her whole policy had been weak
190 Bismarck. [1862-
and vacillating, because the Government was fright-
ened at stirring up a conflict in which they would
almost certainly be defeated. 4,
There is one other matter with regard to the con-
flict so far as regards Bismarck personally. We
must always remember that he was not responsible
for it. It had originated at a time when he was
Wabsent from Germany, and had very little influence
on the conduct of affairs. Had he been Minister
two years before, there probably would have been
no conflict at all. The responsibility for it lies
partly with the leaders of the Liberal party, whc, as
we know from memoirs that have since been pub-
lished, were acting against their own convictions, in
opposing the military demands of the Government,
for they feared that otherwise the party would not
follow them. Much of the responsibility also rests
^ Avith the Ministry of the neiv era; they had mis-
managed affairs ; the mismanagement arose from
the want of union among them, for the Liberal
majority were in many matters opposed to the King
and the throne. It was this want of cordial co-
operation in the Ministry which led to the great
blunder by which the Minister of War acted in a
way which seemed to be, and in fact was, a breach
of an engagement made by the Minister of Finance.
Had Bismarck been in authority at the time, we
can hardly doubt that he would have found some
way of effecting a compromise between the Govern-
ment and the leaders of the Moderate Liberal party.
At least no blame attached to him for what had
happened. Still less can we afford him anything
1863]
The Conflict.
191
but the highest commendation, that, when the King ,/
had got into an absolutely untenable position, he
came forward, and at the risk of his reputation, his
future, perhaps his life, stood by his side.
CHAPTER VIII.
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
1 863-1 864.
WE have seen that the result of the conflict
would eventually depend upon the man-
agement of foreign affairs. Bismarck be-
fore his appointment had always said that the
Government could only gain freedom at home by a
more vigorous policy abroad. He was now in a
position to follow the policy he desired. The conflict
made him indispensable to the King ; if he retired,
the King would have to surrender to the House.
This was always present to his mind and enabled
him to keep his influence against all his enemies, who
throughout the spring" had used every effort to un-
dermine his authority with the King.
There were many who thought that he deliberately
maintained the friction in order to make himself
indispensable, and in truth his relations to the Par-
liament had this advantage, that there was no use in
attempting to take into consideration their wishes.
Had he been supported by a friendly House he would
192
1863] Schlesivig-Holstein. 193
have had to justify his policy, perhaps to modify it ;
as it was, since they were sure to refuse supplies
whatever he did, one or two more votes of censure
were a matter of indifference to him, and he went on
his own way directing the diplomacy of the country
with as sure and firm a hand as though no Parliament
existed.
In the autumn he had the first opportunity for
shewing how great his influence already was. Dur-
ing the summer holidays, he was in almost constant
attendance on the King, who as usual had gone to
Gastein for a cure. Perhaps he did not venture to
leave the King, but he often complained of the new
conditions in which his life was passed ; he wished
to be back with his wife and children in Pomerania.
He writes to his wife from Baden : " I wish that some
intrigue would necessitate another Ministry, so that
I might honourably turn my back on this basin of
ink and live quietly in the country. The restlessness
of this life is unbearable ; for ten weeks I have been
doing clerk's work at an inn — it is no life for an hon-
est country gentleman."
At the end of July, a proposal came from the Em-
peror of Austria which, but for Bismarck's firmness,
might have had very far-reaching results. The Em-
peror had visited the King and discussed with him
proposals for the reform of the Confederation. He
explained an Austrian plan for the reform which was
so much needed, and asked the King if he would
join in an assembly of all the German Princes to
discuss the plan. The King for many reasons re-
fused ; nevertheless two days afterwards formal invit-
13
194 Bismarck. [1863-
ations were sent out to all the Princes and to the
Burgomasters of the free cities, inviting them to a
Congress which was to meet at Frankfort. All the
other Princes accepted, and the Congress met on the
15th of August. The Emperor presided in person,
and he hoped to be able to persuade them to adopt
his proposals, which would be very favourable for
Austria. It was, however, apparent that without the
presence of the King of Prussia the Congress would
come to no result ; it was therefore determined to
send a special deputation to invite him to recon-
sider his refusal. The King had the day before
moved from Karlsbad to Baden and was therefore in
the immediate neighbourhood of Frankfort. It was
very difficult for him not to accept this special invi-
tation. " How can I refuse," he said, " when thirty
Princes invite me and they send the message by a
King!"
Personally he wished to go, though he agreed with
Bismarck that it would be wiser to stay away ; all
his relations pressed him to go. It would have
been pleasant for once to meet in friendly conclave
all his fellow Princes. Bismarck, however, was de-
termined that it should not be. He also had gone
to Baden-Baden ; the King consulted him before
sending the answer. After a long and exhausting
struggle, Bismarck gained his point and a refusal
was sent. He had threatened to resign if his advice
were not taken. As soon as the letter was sealed
and despatched, Bismarck turned to a tray with
glasses which stood on the table and smashed them
in pieces. " Are you ill ? " asked a friend who was
EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.
1864] Schleswig-Holstem. 195
in the room. " No," was the answer ; " I was, but I
am better now. I felt I must break something."
So much were his nerves affected by the struggle.
The Congress went on without the representative
of Prussia. The Kings and Princes discussed the
proposals in secret session. They enjoyed this un-
accustomed freedom ; for the first time they had
been able to discuss the affairs of their own country
without the intervention of their Ministers. The
Ministers had, of course, come to Frankfort, but
they found themselves excluded from all participa-
tion in affairs. With what admiration and jealousy
must they have looked on Bismarck, but there was
none of them who had done for his Prince what Bis-
marck had for the King of Prussia.
Perhaps it was his intention at once to press for-
ward the struggle with Austria for supremacy in
Germany. If so, he was to be disappointed. A new
difficulty was now appearing in the diplomatic
world: the Schleswig-Holstein question, which had
been so long slumbering, broke out into open fire,
and nearly three years were to pass before Bismarck
was able to resume the policy on which he had
determined. Men often speak as though he were
responsible for the outbreak of this difficulty and
the war which followed ; that was far from being
the case ; it interrupted his plans as much as did the
Polish question. We shall have to see with what
ingenuity he gained for his country an advantage
from what appeared at first to be a most incon-
venient situation.
\Ve must shortly explain the origin of this ques-
196 Bismarck. [1863-
tion, the most complicated that has ever occupied
European diplomacy.
The Duchy of Holstein had been part of the Ger-
man Empire ; for many hundreds of years the Duke
of Holstein had also been King of Denmark ; the
connection at first had been a purely personal union ;
it was, however, complicated by the existence of the
Duchy of Schleswig. Schleswig was outside the
Confederation, as it had been outside the German
Empire, and had in old days been a fief of the King-
dom of Denmark. The nobles of Holstein had,
however, gradually succeeded in extending German
influence and the German language into Schleswig,
so that this Duchy had become more than half
German. Schleswig and Holstein were also joined
together by very old customs, which were, it is said,
founded on charters given by the Kings of Den-
mark ; it was claimed that the two Duchies were
always to be ruled by the same man, and also that
they were to be kept quite distinct from the King-
dom of Denmark. These charters are not undis-
puted, but in this case, as so often happens in
politics, the popular belief in the existence of a right
was to be more important than the legal question
whether the right really existed.
The trouble began about 1 830. There was a
double question, the question of constitution and
the question of inheritance. The Danes, desirous
to consolidate the Monarchy, had neglected the
rights of the old local Estates in the Duchies ; this
led to an agitation and a conflict. It was a struggle
for the maintenance of local privileges against the
1864] Schleswig-Holstein. i(^y
Monarchy in Copenhagen. Moreover, a vigorous
democratic party had arisen in Denmark ; their ob-
ject was to incorporate the whole of Schleswig in
the Danish Monarchy ; they did not care what hap-
pened to Holstein. This party were called the
Eider Danes, for they wished Denmark to be ex-
tended to the Eider. Against this proposed separa-
tion of the two Duchies violent protests were raised,
and in 1848 a rebellion broke out. This was the re-
bellion which had been supported in that year by
Prussia, and it had the universal sympathy of every-
one in Germany, Princes and people alike.
The question of constitution was complicated by
one of succession. The male line of the Royal House
which ruled in Denmark was dying out ; according
to a law introduced in 1660, descendants of the fe-
male branch might succeed in the Kingdom. This
law had proba.bly never been legally enacted for the
Duchies ; in Schleswig and Holstein the old Salic
law prevailed. In the ordinary course of things, on
the~death of Frederick VH., who had succeeded in
1847, the long connection between Holstein and
Denmark would cease. Would, however, Schleswig
go with Holstein or with Denmark ? Every Schles-
wig-Holsteiner and every German declared that the
two Duchies must remain for ever " unvertheilt " ;
the majority of the Danes determined, whatever the
law might be, that they would keep Schleswig, which
had once been Danish. The King took a different
line ; he wished to maintain all the possessions in his
House, and that the same man should succeed both
in the Kingdom and the Duchies. There was no
198 Bzsma7'-ck. [1863-
authority qualified to decide the legal question ; and
therefore the question of right was sure to become
one of power. At first, strange as it may seem, the
power was on the side of the Danes. Germany was
weak and disunited, the Prussian troops who had
been sent to help the rebellion were withdrawn, and
the surrender of Olmiitz was fatal to the inhabitants
of the Duchies. The whole question was brought
before a European Congress which met at London.
The integrity of the Danish Monarchy was declared
to be a European interest ; and the Congress of the
Powers presumed to determine who should succeed
to the ducal and royal power. They chose Christian
of Glucksburg, and all the Powers pledged them-
selves to recognise him as ruler over all the domin-
ions of the King of Denmark.
Prussia and Austria were among the Powers who
signed the Treaty of London, but the Diet of Frank-
fort was not bound by it. At the same time, Den-
mark had entered into certain engagements pledging
itself to preserve the separation between Schleswig-
Holstein and Denmark, and also not to oppress the
German people in Schleswig. The Danes did not
keep their engagement ; despising the Germans,
they renewed the old policy, attempted to drive
back the German language, and introduced new laws
which were inconsistent with the local privileges of
Holstein and Schleswig. The Holstein Estates ap-
pealed for protection to the Diet. The Germans
protested, but the Danes were obstinate. As years
went on, the excitement of the Germans grew ; they
believed, and justly believed, that it was a matter of
1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 199
honour to defend the rights of the Duchies. Schles-
wig-Holstein was the symbol of German weakness
and disgrace, and in defence of them the national
enthusiasm was again roused.
With this popular enthusiasm Bismarck had no
sympathy ; and he had no interest for the cause of /
Schleswig-Holstein. He had originally considered \y/
the inhabitants merely as rebels against their lawful
sovereign. He had learnt at Frankfort sufficient to
make this indifferent to him, but he still regarded
them as foreigners and looked on their claims merely
from the point of view of Prussian interests. Both
his sympathy and his reason led him in fact rather
to take the Danish side. " The maintenance of
Denmark is in our interest," he wrote in 1857, t>ut
Denmark could only continue to exist if it were
ruled, more or less arbitrarily, with provincial Estates
as it has been for the last hundred years ; and in
another letter : " We have no reason to desire that the
Holsteiners should live very happily under their
Duke, for if they do they will no longer be interested
in Prussia, and under certain circumstances their
interest may be very useful to us. It is important
that, however just their cause may be, Prussia should
act with great prudence." He recognised that if
the complaints of the Duchies led again to a war
between Germany and Denmark all the loss would
fall on Prussia ; the coast of Prussia was exposed to
the attacks of the Danish fleet. If the war was suc-
cessful, the result would be to strengthen the Diet
and the Federal Constitution ; and, as we know, that
was the last thing which Bismarck desired ; if it
200 Bismarck.
[1863-
failed, the disgrace and the blame would fall upon
Prussia.
The only thing which would have induced him
warmly to take up the cause was the prospect of
winning the Duchies for Prussia, but of that there
seemed little hope.
So long, therefore, as he remained at Frankfort, he
had endeavoured to keep the peace, and he continued
this policy after he became Minister. The greater
number of the German States wished to carry out
a Federal execution in Holstein ; he tried to
avert this and warmly gave his support to Lord
Russell in his attempt to settle the question by Eng-
lish mediation. His efforts, however, were unavail-
ing, for the Danish Government, presuming on the
weakness of Germany, continued their provocative
action. On March 30, 1863, a new Constitution was
proclaimed, completely severing Holstein from the
rest of the Monarchy. The Holstein Estates had
not been consulted and appealed to the Diet for
protection ; the law of the Federation enabled the
Diet in a case like this to occupy the territory of the
offending sovereign in order to compel him to rule
according to the Constitution. The national German