was not disinclined to win the popularity that would
accrue to them if they took up the Augustenburg
cause ; after all, Austria would be rather strengthened
than weakened by the establishment of a new Fed-
eral State, which, as all the other smaller Princes,
would probably be inclined to take the Austrian side.
In answer, therefore, to this despatch the Austrians,
throwing aside all attempt at consistency, proposed
vigorously to press the Augustenburg claim. " It is
just what we were going to suggest ourselves," they
said. Bismarck therefore was compelled now, as best
he could, to get out of the difficulty, and, as Austria
had not rejected it, he begins to withdraw the pro-
posal he had himself made. To Bernstorff, his envoy
at the Congress, he writes :

" Austria is endeavouring to establish irrevocably the
candidacy of Augustenburg in order by this means to
render it difficult for Prussia to impose special conditions.
We cannot consent to this. The dynastic questions must
be discussed with special consideration for Prussian in-
terests, and, consequently, other possibilities cannot be
ruled out, until we have negotiated with Augustenburg
and ascertained in what relation to Prussia he intends to
place himself and his country. If the person of August-
enburg meets with more opposition in the Conference
than the project of a division, then let the former drop."

The proposal, however, had to be made ; for once,



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 217

all the German Powers appeared in agreement when
they demanded from the neutrals the recognition of
Augustenburg ; but Bismarck proposed it in such
words as to avoid pledging himself to the legality.
Of course the proposal was rejected by the Danes
and Russians and it was allowed to fall to the ground.
For Bismarck the interest is for the moment diverted
from London to Berlin.

The time had come when Bismarck should defin-
itely decide on the attitude he was to adopt toward
Augustenburg. Hitherto he had avoided committing
himself irrevocably ; it was still open to him either to
adopt him as the Prussian candidate on such condi-
tions as might seem desirable, or to refuse to have any
dealings with him. He had, in fact, kept both plans
open, for it was characteristic of his diplomatic work
that he would generally keep in his mind, and, to
some extent, carry out in action, several different
plans at the same time. If one failed him he could
take up another. In this case he intended, if possi-
ble, to get the Duchies for Prussia ; it was always to
be foreseen that the difficulties might be insurmount-
able; he had therefore to consider the next best
alternative. This would be the creation of a new
State, but one which was bound to Prussia by a spe-
cial and separate treaty. There were many demands,
some of them legitimate, which Prussia was prepared
to make. Bismarck attributed great importance to
the acquisition of Kiel, because he wanted to found
a Prussian navy. Then he was very anxious to
have a canal made across Holstein so that Prussian
vessels could reach the North Sea without passing



2i8 Bismarck. [1863-

the Sound ; and of course he had to consider the
military protection on the north. It would there-
fore be a condition that, whoever was made Duke,
certain military and other privileges should be
granted to Prussia. On this, all through the sum-
mer, negotiations were carried on unofficially be-
tween the Prince of Augustenburg and the Prussian
authorities. We cannot here discuss them in detail,
but the Prince seems to have been quite willing to
acquiesce in these naval and military requirements.
He made several suggestions and objections in de-
tail, and he also pointed out that constitutionally he
could not enter into a valid treaty until after he had
been made Duke and received the assent of the
Estates. I think, however, that no one can doubt
that he was quite loyal to Prussia and really wished
to bring the matter to a satisfactory issue. As might
be expected, he was very cautious in his negotia-
tions with Bismarck, but his letters to the King are
more open. Had Bismarck wished he could at any
time have come to an agreement with the Prince,
but he never gave the opportunity for a serious and
careful discussion on the detailed wording of the con-
ditions. He did not wish to be bound by them, but
he kept the negotiations open in case events occurred
which might compel him to accept this solution.

In his treatment of the question he was, to some
extent, influenced by the personal dislike he always
felt for the Prince.

What was the cause of this enmity ? There was
nothing in the Prince's character to justify it ; he was
a modestj honourable, and educa,ted man ; though



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 219

deficient in practical ability, he had at a very critical
time announced his claims to a decision and main-
tained them with resolution. Bismarck, who in pri-
vate life was always able to do justice to his enemies,
recognised this: "I should have acted in just the
same way myself had I been in your place," he said.
He always himself said that his distrust of the
Prince was caused by his dislike of the men whom
the latter relied upon for advice. He was too closely
connected with the Progressive party. He had
surrounded himself with a kind of ministry, consist-
ing chiefly of men who, though by birth inhabitants
of the Duchies, had for some years been living at
Gotha under the protection of the Duke of Coburg.
They were strong Liberals and belonged to that
party in Germany of which the Court of Coburg was
the centre, who maintained a close connection with
the Crown Prince, and who undoubtedly were look-
ing forward to the time when the Crown Prince
would become King of Prussia, Bismarck would be
dismissed, and their party would come into offlce.
This is probably quite sufficient reason to explain
Bismarck's personal dislike of Augustenburg, though
it is probable that he laid more stress on this aspect
of the matter than he otherwise would have done,
for he hoped thereby to prejudice the King against
the Prince ; as long as the King recognised Augusten-
burg's claims, his own hands would be tied in the
attempt to win the Duchies for Prussia.

He had, as we have seen, had a short interview
with the Prince at the end of the previous year ;
now a new meeting was arranged, avowedly to dis-



2 20 Bismarck.



[1863-



cuss the conditions which Prussia would require if
she supported the Prince. The Crown Prince, who
was very anxious to help his friend, persuaded him
to go to Berlin and if possible come to some clear
understanding with the King and Bismarck. Au-
gustenburg was reluctant to take this step. Loyal
as he was to Prussia he much distrusted Bismarck.
He feared that if he unreservedly placed his cause in
Prussia's hands, Bismarck would in some way betray
him. The position he took up was perfectly con-
sistent. He was, by hereditary right, reigning Duke ;
he only wished to be left alone with the Duchies ;
he knew that if he was, they would at once recognise
him and he would enter into government. In order
to win his dominions, he had required the help of
Germany ; it was comparatively indifferent to him
whether the help came from Prussia, Austria, or the
Federation. But he quite understood that Prussia
must have some recompense for the help it had given.
What he had to fear was that, if he entered into any
separate and secret engagements with Prussia, he
would thereby lose the support he enjoyed in the
rest of Germany, and that then Bismarck would find
some excuse not to carry out his promises, so that
at the end he would be left entirely without support.
We know that his suspicions were unfounded, for
Bismarck was not the man in this way to desert any-
one who had entered into an agreement with him,
but Augustenburg could not know this and had
every reason for distrusting Bismarck, who was his
avowed enemy.

On the 30th of May, the Prince, with many mis-



1864]



Schlesww-Holstein. 2 2 1



givings, came to Berlin. The evening of the next
day he had a long interview with Bismarck ; it began
about nine o'clock and lasted till after midnight.
There is no doubt that this interview was decisive
against his chances. From that time Bismarck was
determined that under no circumstances should he
succeed, and we shall see that when Bismarck wished
for anything he usually attained it. We would gladly,
therefore, know exactly what happened ; both Bis-
marck and the Prince have given accounts of what
took place, but unfortunately they differ on very
important points, and no one else was present at the
interview. It is clear that the Prince throughout, for
the reasons we have named, observed great reserve.
It would undoubtedly have been wiser of him openly
to place himself entirely in Bismarck's hands, to
throw himself on the generosity of Prussia, and to
agree to the terms which Bismarck offered. Why
he did not do this we have explained. The con-
versation chiefly turned on the Prussian demands
for the harbour of Kiel and certain other concessions ;
the Prince expressed himself quite willing to grant
most of what was required, but he could not enter
into any formal treaty without the consent of the Es-
tates of the Duchies. When he left the room he
seems to have been fairly satisfied with what had
been said. If so he deceived himself grievously.
Scarcely had he gone (it was already midnight) when
Bismarck sent off despatches to St. Petersburg, Paris,
and London, explaining that he was not inclined to
support Augustenburg any longer, and instructing
the Ambassadors to act accordingly.



222 Bismarck. [1863-

Not content with this he at once brought forward
an alternative candidate. Among the many claim-
ants to the Duchies had been the Duke of Olden-
burg and the Czar, who both belonged to the same
branch of the family. The Czar had, at the end of
May, transferred his claims to the Duke, and Bis-
marck now wrote to St. Petersburg that he would
also be prepared to support him. We must not sup-
pose that in doing this he had the slightest intention
of allowing the Duke to be successful. He gained,
however, a double advantage. First of all he pleased
the Czar and prevented any dif^culties from Russia;
secondly, the very fact of a rival candidate coming
forward would indefinitely postpone any settlement.
So long as Augustenburg was the only German candi-
date there was always the danger, as at the Congress
of London, that he might suddenly be installed and
Bismarck be unable to prevent it. If, however, the
Duke of Oldenburg came forward, Bismarck would
at once take up the position that, as there were
rival claimants, a proper legal verdict must be ob-
tained and that Prussia could not act so unjustly
as to prejudice the decision by extending her sup-
port to either. It was not necessary for anyone to
know that he himself had induced the Duke of
Oldenburg to revive his claim.

At the same time he took other steps to frustrate
Augustenburg's hopes ; he caused the statement to
be published in the Prussian papers that during the
conversation of May 31st the Prince had said that
he had never asked the Prussians for help, and that
he could have got on very well without them. It



1864] Schleswig-Holstein. 223

was just the sort of thing which would strongly
prejudice the King against him, and Bismarck was
very anxious to destroy the influence which the
Prince still had with the King and with many other
Prussians. At that time, and always later, the Prince
denied that he had said anything of the kind. Even
if, in the course of a long conversation, he had said
anything which might have been interpreted to
mean this, it was a great breach of confidence to
publish these words from a private discussion taken
out of their context. The Prussian Press received
the word, and for years to come did not cease to
pour out its venom against the Prince. This action
of Bismarck's seemed quite to justify the apprehen-
sion with which the Prince had gone to Berlin.

It is not necessary to look for any far-fetched ex-
planation of Bismarck's action ; the simplest is the
most probable. He had not arranged the interview
with any intention of entrapping Augustenburg ; he
had really been doubtful whether, after all, it might
not be wiser to accept the Prince and make a separ-
ate treaty with him. All depended on his personal
character and the attitude he adopted towards Prus-
sia. Bismarck, who had great confidence in his own
judgment of mankind, regarded a personal interview
as the best means of coming to a conclusion ; the
( result of it was that he felt it impossible to rely on
the Prince, who, instead of being open, positive, and
ready to do business, was reserved, hesitating, dis-
trustful, and critical. Bismarck had given him his
chance ; he had failed to seize it. Instead of being a
grateful client he was a mere obstacle in the road of



2 24 Bismarck. [1863-

Prussian greatness, and had to be swept away.
Against him all the resources of diplomacy were
now directed. His influence must be destroyed, but
not by force, for his strength came from his very
weakness ; the task was to undermine the regard
which the German people had for him and their en-
thusiasm for his cause — work to be properly assigned
to the Prussian Press.

The Conference in London separated at the end
of June without coming to any conclusion ; it had,
however, enabled Bismarck formally to dissociate
himself from the former Treaty of London, and
henceforward he had a free hand in his dealings
with Denmark.

Another brilliant feat of arms, the transference of
the Prussian troops across the sea to the island of
Alsen, completed the war. Denmark had to capit-
ulate, and the terms of peace, which were ultimately
decided at Vienna, were that Schleswig, Holstein,
and also Lauenburg should be given up. Christian
transferred to the Emperor of Austria and the King
of Prussia all the rights which he possessed. As to
Lauenburg the matter was simple — the authority of
the King of Denmark over this Duchy was undis-
puted ; as to Schleswig-Holstein all the old ques-
tions still continued ; the King had transferred his
rights, but what were his rights ? He could only
grant that which belonged to him ; if the Prince of
Augustenburg was Duke, then the King of Den-
mark could not confer another man's throne. There
was, however, this difference : hitherto the question
had been a European one, but since the London



1864]



Schleswig-Holstein.



225



Congress no other State had any claim to interfere.
The disputed succession of the Duchies must be set-
tled between Austria and Prussia. It was a special
clause in the terms of peace that it should be decided
by agreement between them and not referred to the
Diet.




CHAPTER IX.

THE TREATY OF GASTEIN.
1 864- 1 865.

BISMARCK always looked back with peculiar
pleasure on the negotiations which were con-
cluded by the Peace of Vienna. His conduct
of the affair had in fact been masterly ; he had suc-
ceeded in permanently severing the Duchies from
Denmark ; he had done this without allowing foreign
nations the opportunity for interfering ; he had main-
tained a close alliance with Austria ; he had pleased
and flattered the Emperors of Russia and France.
What perhaps gave him most satisfaction was that,
though the result had been what the whole of the
German nation desired, he had brought it about
by means which were universally condemned, and
the rescue of the Duchies had been a severe defeat
to the Democratic and National party.

With the Peace a new stage begins ; the Duchies
had been transferred to the Allied Powers ; how
were they now to be disposed of? We have seen
that Bismarck desired to acquire them for Prussia ;
if it were absolutely necessary, he would accept an

226



1864] The Treaty of Gastein. 227

arrangement which would leave them to be ruled by
another Prince, provided very extensive rights were
given to Prussia. He would acquiesce in this arrange-
ment if annexation would involve a war with one of
the European Powers. If, however, a Duke of Schles-
wig-Holstein was to be created he was determined
that it should not be the Prince of Augustenburg,
whom he distrusted and disliked. The real object
of his diplomacy must be to get the Duchies offered
to Prussia ; it was, however, very improbable, as the
Czar once said to him, that this would happen.

He wished for annexation, but he wished to have
it peacefully ; he had not forgotten his own resolu-
tion to have a war with Austria, but he did not wish
to make the Duchies the occasion of a war. Austria,
however, refused to assent to annexation unless the
King of Prussia would give her a corresponding in-
crease of territory ; this the King positively refused.
It was an unchangeable principle with him that he
would not surrender a single village from the Prus-
sian Monarchy ; his pride revolted from the idea of
bartering old provinces for new. If Austria would
not offer the Duchies to Prussia, neither would the
Diet ; the majority remained loyal to Augustenburg.
The people of the Duchies were equally determined
in their opposition to the scheme ; attempts were
made by Bismarck's friends and agents to get up a
petition to incorporate them with Prussia, but they
always failed. Even the Prussian people were not
really very anxious for this acquisition, and it required
two years of constant writing in the inspired Press to
bring them into such a state of mind that they would



2 28 Bisma7^ck. [1864-

believe that it was, I will not say the most honour-
able, but the most desirable solution. The King him-
self hesitated. It was true that ever since the taking
of the Diippel the lust of conquest had been aroused
in his mind ; he had visited the place where so many
Prussian soldiers had laid down their lives ; and it was
a natural feeling if he wished that the country they
had conquered should belong to their own State. On
the other hand, he still felt that the rights of August-
enburg could not be neglected.; when he discussed
the matter with the Emperor of Austria and the sub-
ject of annexation was raised, he remained silent and
was ill at ease.

If Bismarck was to get his way, he must first of all
convince the King ; this done, an opportunity might
be found. There was one man who was prepared to
offer him the Duchies, and that man was Napoleon. It
is instructive to notice that as soon as the negotiations
at Vienna had been concluded, Bismarck went to
spend a few weeks at his old holiday resort of Biarritz.
He took the opportunity of having some conversation
with both the Emperor and his Ministers.

He required rest and change after the prolonged
anxieties of the two years ; at no place did he find it
so well as in the south of France :

" It seems like a dream to be here again," he writes to
his wife. " I am already quite well, and would be quite
cheerful if I only knew that all was well with you.
The life I lead at Berlin is a kind of penal servitude,
when I think of my independent life abroad." Sea-
bathing, expeditions across the frontier, and sport
passed three weeks. " I have not for a long time found



1865] The Treaty of Gastezn. 229

myself in such comfortable conditions, and yet the evil
habit of work has rooted itself so deeply in my nature,
that I feel some disquiet of conscience at my laziness. I
almost long for the Wilhelmstrasse, at least if my dear
ones were there."

On the 25th he left "dear Biarritz" for Paris,
where he found plenty of politics awaiting him ;
here he had another of those interviews with Napo-
leon and his Ministers on which so much depended,
and then he went back to his labours at Berlin.

At that time he was not prepared to break with
Austria, and he still hoped that some peaceful means
of acquisition might be found, as he wrote some
months later to Goltz, " We have not got all the
good we can from the Austrian alliance." Prussia
had the distinct advantage that she was more truly
in possession of the Duchies than Austria. This
possession would more and more guarantee its own
continuance ; it was improbable that any Power
would undertake an offensive war to expel her. On
the whole, therefore, Bismarck seems to have wished
for the present to leave things as they were; gradu-
ally to increase the hold of Prussia on the Duchies,
and wait until they fell of themselves into his hands.
In pursuit of this policy it was necessary, however,
to expel all other claimants, and this could not be
done without the consent of Austria ; this produced
a cause of friction between the two great Powers
which made it impossible to maintain the co-do-
minium.

There were in Holstein the Confederate troops
who had gone there a year ago and had never been



230 Bismarck. [1864-

withdrawn ; Augustenburg was still living at Kiel
with his phantom Court ; and then there were the
Austrian soldiers, Prussia's own allies. One after
another they had to be removed. Bismarck dealt
first with the Confederate troops.

He had, as indeed he always was careful to have,
the strict letter of the law on his side ; he pointed
out that as the execution had been directed against
the government of Christian, and Christian had
ceased to have any authority, the execution itself
must ipso facto cease ; he therefore wrote asking
Austria to join in a demand to Saxony and Han-
over ; he was prepared, if the States refused, to ex-
pel their troops by force. Hanover — for the King
strongly disliked Augustenburg — at once acquiesced ;
Saxony refused. Bismarck began to make military
preparations ; the Saxons began to arm ; the Crown
treasures were taken from Dresden to Konigstein.
Would Austria support Saxony or Prussia ? For
some days the question was in debate ; at last Aus-
tria determined to support a motion at the Diet de-
claring the execution ended. It was carried by
eight votes to seven, and the Saxons had to obey.
The troops on their return home refused to march
across Prussian territory; and from this time Beust
and the King of Saxony must be reckoned among
the determined and irreconcilable enemies of Bis-
marck.

The first of the rivals was removed ; there re-
mained Austria and the Prince.

Just at this time a change of Ministry had taken
place in Austria ; Rechberg, who had kept up the



1865] The Treaty of Gastein. 231

alliance, was removed, and the anti-Prussian party
came to the front. It was, therefore, no longer so
easy to deal with the Prince, for he had a new and
vigorous ally in Austria. Mensdorf, the new Min-
ister, proposed in a series of lengthy despatches his
solution of the question ; it was that the rights of
the two Powers should be transferred to Augusten-
burg, and that Schleswig-Holstein should be estab-
lished as an independent Confederate State. The
Austrian position was from this time clearly defined,
and it was in favour of that policy to which Bis-
marck would never consent. It remained for him to
propose an alternative. Prussia, he said, could only
allow the new State to be created on condition that
large rights were given to Prussia ; what these were
would require consideration ; he must consult the
different departments. This took time, and every
month's delay was so much gain for Prussia ; it was
not till February, 1865, that Bismarck was able to
present his demands, which were, that Kiel should
be a Prussian port, Rendsburg a Prussian fortress ;
that the canal was to be made by Prussia and be-
long to Prussia, the management of the post and
telegraph service to be Prussian and also the rail-
ways ; the army was to be not only organised on the
Prussian system but actually incorporated with the
Prussian army, so that the soldiers would take
the oath of allegiance not to their own Duke but to
the King of Prussia. The Duchies were to join the
Prussian Customs' Union and assimilate their sys-
tem of finance with that of Prussia. The proposals
were so drawn up that it would be impossible for



232 Bzs7narck. [1864-

Austria to support, or for the Prince of Augusten-
burg to accept them. They were, in fact, as Bis-
marck himself told the Crown Prince, not meant to
be accepted. " I would rather dig potatoes than be
a reigning Prince under such conditions," said one
of the Austrian Ministers. When they were offi-
cially presented, Karolyi was instructed to meet them
with an unhesitating negative, and all discussion on
them ceased.

Prussia and Austria had both proposed their solu-
tion ; each State even refused to consider the sug-