that is, must include the north-east of Belgium.

Again no definite agreement was made, but Na-
poleon's favouring neutrality seemed secure. There
was more difficulty with Italy, for here an active
alliance was required, and the Italians still feared
they would be tricked. It was decided to send
Moltke to Florence to arrange affairs there ; this,
however, was unnecessary, for Victor Emmanuel sent
one of his generals, Govone, nominally to gain some
information about the new military inventions ; for
the next three weeks, Govone and Barrel, the Italian
Minister, were engaged in constant discussions as to
the terms of the treaty. Of course the Austrians
were not entirely ignorant of what was going on.
The negotiations with Italy roused among them in-
tense bitterness ; without actually mobilising they




GENERAL VON MOLTKE.



1866] Outbj^eak of War with Attstria. 249

slowly and cautiously made all preliminary arrange-
ments ; a despatch was sent to Berlin accusing the
Prussians of the intention of breaking the Treaty of
Gastein, and another despatch to the German Courts
asking for their assistance. Karolyi waited on Bis-
marck, assured him that their military preparations
were purely defensive, and asked point-blank whether
Prussia proposed to violate the treaty. The answer,
of course, was a simple " No," but according to the
gossip of Berlin, Bismarck added, " You do not
think I should tell you if I did intend to do so."
On March 24th a despatch was sent to the envoys at
all the German Courts drawing their attention to
the Austrian preparations, for which it was said there
was no cause ; in view of this obvious aggression
Prussia must begin to arm. That this was a mere
pretext is shewn by a confidential note of Moltke of
this same date ; in it he states that all the Austrian
preparations up to this time were purely defensive ;
there was as yet no sign of an attempt to take the
offensive. Two days later, a meeting of the Prussian
Council was held and the orders for a partial mobil-
isation of the army were given, though some time
elapsed before they were actually carried out.

Under the constant excitement of these weeks
Bismarck's health again began to break down ; ex-
cept himself, there was in fact scarcely a single
man who desired the war ; the King still seized
every opportunity of preserving the peace ; Eng-
land, as so often, was beginning to make proposals
for mediation ; all the Prussian diplomatists, he com-
plained, were working against his warlike projects,



250 Bismarck. [1865-

He made it clear to the Italians that the result would
depend on them ; if they would not sign a treaty
there would be no war. The great difficulty in ar-
ranging the terms of the treaty was to determine
who should begin. The old suspicion was still there :
each side expected that if they began they would be
deserted by their ally. The suspicion was unjust,
for on both sides there were honourable men. The
treaty was eventually signed on April 9th ; it was to
the effect that if Prussia went to war with Austria
within the next three months, Italy would also at
once declare war ; neither country was to make a
separate peace ; Prussia would continue the war till
Venetia was surrendered. On the very day that this
treaty was signed, Bismarck, in answer to an Austrian
despatch, wrote insisting that he had no intention of
entering on an offensive war against Austria. In
private conversation he was more open ; to Bene-
detti he said : " I have at last succeeded in deter-
mining a King of Prussia to break the intimate
relations of his House with that of Austria, to con-
clude a treaty of alliance with Italy, to accept ar-
rangements with Imperial France ; I am proud of
the result."

Suddenly a fresh impediment appeared : the Aus-
trians, on April i8th, wrote proposing a disarming
on both sides ; the Prussian answer was delayed for
many days ; it was said in Berlin that there was
a difference of opinion between Bismarck and the
King ; Bismarck complained to Benedetti that he
was wavering ; when at last the answer was sent it
was to accept the principle, but Bismarck boasted



1866] OtUbi^eak of War with Austria. 251

that he had accepted it under such conditions that it
could hardly be carried out. The reluctance of the
King to go to war caused him much difficulty ; all
his influence was required ; it is curious to read the
following words which he wrote at this time :

" It is opposed to my feelings, I may say to my faith, to
attempt to use influence or pressure on your paternal
feelings with regard to the decision on peace or war ;
this is a sphere in which, trusting to God alone, I leave
it to your Majesty's heart to steer for the good of the
Fatherland ; my part is prayer, rather than counsel " ;

and then he again lays before the King the insuper-
able arguments in favour of war.

Let us not suppose that this letter was but a cun-
ning device to win the consent of the King. In
these words more than in anything else we see his
deepest feelings and his truest character, Bismarck
was no Napoleon ; he had determined that war was
necessary, but he did not go to the terrible arbitra-
ment with a light heart. He was not a man who
from personal ambition would order thousands of
men to go to their death or bring his country to
ruin. It was his strength that he never forgot that
he was working, not for himself, but for others. Be-
hind the far-sighted plotter and the keen intriguer
there always remained the primitive honesty of his
younger years. He may at times have complained of
the difficulties which arose from the reluctance of the
King to follow his advice, but he himself felt that
it was a source of strength to him that he had to ex-
plain, justify, and recommend his policy to the King.



252 Bismarck.



[1865-



All anxiety was, however, removed by news which
came the next day. A report was spread through-
out the papers that Italy had begun to mobihse, and
that a band of Garibaldians had crossed the frontier.
The report seems to have been untrue. How it
originated we know not ; when Roon heard of it he
exclaimed, " Now the Italians are arming, the Aus-
trians cannot disarm." He was right. The Austrian
Government sent a message to Berlin that they
would withdraw part of their northern army from
Bohemia, but must at once put the whole of their
southern army on a war footing. Prussia refused to
accept this plea, and the order for the mobilisation
of the Prussian army went out.

As soon as Austria had begun to mobilise, war was
inevitable ; the state of the finances of the Empire
would not permit them to maintain their army on a
war footing for any time. None the less, another
six weeks were to elapse before hostilities began.

We have seen how throughout these complications
Bismarck had desired, if he fought Austria, to fight,
not for the sake of the Duchies, but for a reform of
the German Confederation.

In March he had said to the Italians that the Hol-
stein question was not enough to warrant a declara-
tion of war. Prussia intended to bring forward the
reform of the Confederation. This would take sev-
eral months. He hoped that among other advan-
tages, he would have at least Bavaria on his side ;
for the kind of proposal he had in his mind, though
at this time he seems to have had no clear plan, was
some arrangement by which the whole of the north



18661 Outbreak of War with Austria. 253

of Germany should be closely united to Prussia, and
the southern States formed in a separate union with
Bavaria at the head. He had always pointed out,
even when he was at Frankfort, that Bavaria was a
natural ally of Prussia. In a great war the consider-
able army of Bavaria would not be unimportant.

At the beginning of April Bismarck instructed^
Savigny, his envoy at the Diet, to propose the con-
sideration of a reform in the Constitution. The pro-
posal he made was quite unexpected. No details
were mentioned as to changes in the relations of the
Princes, but a Parliament elected by universal suf-
frage and direct elections was to be chosen, to help
in the management of common German affairs. It
is impossible to exaggerate the bewilderment and
astonishment with which this proposal was greeted.
Here was the man who had risen into power as the
champion of monarchical government, as the enemy
of Parliaments and Democracy, voluntarily taking up
the extreme demand of the German Radicals. It
must be remembered that universal suffrage was at
this time regarded not as a mere scheme of voting,
— it was a principle ; it was the cardinal principle of
the Revolution ; it meant the sovereignty of the
people. It was the basis of the French Republic of
1848, it had been incorporated in the German Con-
stitution of 1849, and this was one of the reasons
why the King of Prussia had refused then to accept
that Constitution. The proposal was universally
condemned. Bismarck had perhaps hoped to win
the Liberals ; if so, he was disappointed ; their con-
fidence could not be gained by this sudden and



254 Bismarck. [1865-

amazing change — they distrusted him all the more ;
" a Government that, despising the laws of its own
country, comes forward with plans for Confederate
reform, cannot have the confidence of the German
people," was the verdict of the National party. The
Moderate Liberals, men like Sybel, had always been
opposed to universal suffrage ; even the English
statesmen were alarmed ; it was two years before
Disraeli made his leap in the dark, and here was the
Prussian statesman making a far bolder leap in a
country not yet accustomed to the natural working
of representative institutions. He did not gain the
adhesion of the Liberals, and he lost the confidence
of his old friends. Napoleon alone expressed his
pleasure that the institutions of the two countries
should become so like one another.

There was, indeed, ample reason for distrust ; uni-
versal suffrage meant not only Democracy, — it was
the foundation on which Napoleon had built his
Empire ; he had shewn that the voice of the people
might become the instrument of despotism. All the
old suspicions were aroused ; people began to see
fresh meaning in these constant visits to France ;
Napoleon had found an apt pupil not only in foreign
but in internal matters. It could mean nothing
more than the institution of a democratic monarchy ;
this was Bonapartism ; it seemed to be the achieve-
ment of that change which, years ago, Gerlach had
foreboded. No wonder the King of Hanover began
to feel his crown less steady on his head.

What was the truth in the matter? What were
the motives which influenced Bismarck? The ex-



1866] Outbreak of War with Austria. 255

planation he gave was probably the true one : by
universal suffrage he hoped to attain a Conservative
and nnonarchical assembly ; he appealed from the
educated and Liberal -middle classes to the peasants
and artisans. We remember how often he had told
the Prussian House of Commons that they were not
the true representatives of the people.

" Direct election and universal suffrage I consider to be
greater guarantees of Conservative action than any arti-
ficial electoral law ; the artificial systeni of indirect elec-
tion and elections by classes is a much more dangerous
one in a country of monarchical traditions and loyal
patriotism. Universal suffrage, doing away as it does
with the influence of the Liberal bourgeoisie, leads to
monarchical elections."

There was in his mind a vague ideal, the ideal of a
king, the father of his country, supported by the
masses of the people. He had a genuine inter-
est in the welfare of the poorest ; he thought he
would find in them more gratitude and confidence
than in the middle classes. We know that he was
wrong ; universal suffrage in Germany was to make
possible the Social Democrats and Ultramontanes ;
it was to give the Parliamentary power into the
hands of an opponent far more dangerous than the
Liberals of the Prussian Assembly. Probably no
one had more responsibility for this measure than
the brilliant founder of the Socialist party. Bis-
marck had watched with interest the career of Las-
salle ; he had seen with admiration his power of
organisation ; he felt that here was a man who in



256 Bismarck. [1865-

internal affairs and in the management of the people
had something of the skill and courage which he
himself had in foreign affairs. He was a great dema-
gogue, and Bismarck had already learnt that a man
who aimed at being not only a diplomatist, but a
statesman and a ruler, must have something of the
demagogic art. From Lassalle he could learn much.
We have letters written two years before this in
which Lassalle, obviously referring to some previous
conversation, says : " Above all, I accuse myself of
having forgotten yesterday to impress upon you that
the right of being elected must be given to all Ger-
mans. This is an immense means of power; the
moral conquest of Germany." Obviously there had
been a long discussion, in which Lassalle had per-
suaded the Minister to adopt universal suffrage.
The letters continue with reference to the machinery
of the elections, and means of preventing abstention
from the poll, for which Lassalle professes to have
found a magic charm.

One other remark we must make : this measure,
as later events were to prove, was in some ways
characteristic of all Bismarck's internal policy. Roon
once complained of his strokes of genius, his unfore-
seen decisions. In foreign policy, bold and decisive
as he could be, he was also cautious and prudent ;
to this he owes his success ; he could strike when
the time came, but he never did so unless he had
tested the situation in every way ; he never be-
gan a war unless he was sure to win, and he left
nothing to chance or good fortune. In internal
affairs he was less prudent ; he did not know his



1866] Outbreak of War zvith Austria. 257

ground so well, and he exaggerated his own influ-
ence. Moreover, in giving up the simpler Conserva-
tive policy of his younger years, he became an
opportunist ; he would introduce important measures
in order to secure the support of a party, even
though he might thereby be sacrificing the interests
of his country to a temporary emergency. He really \
applied to home affairs the habits he had learned in
diplomacy ; there every alliance is temporary ; when
the occasion of it has passed by, it ceases, and leaves
no permanent effect. He tried to govern Germany
by a series of political alliances ; but the alliance of
the Government with a party can never be barren ;
the laws to which it gives birth remain. Bismarck
sometimes thought more of the advantage of the
alliance than of the permanent effect of the laws.

Even after this there was still delay ; there were
the usual abortive attempts at a congress, which, as in
1859, broke down through the refusal of Austria to
give way. There were dark intrigues of Napoleon,
who even at the last moment attempted to divert the
Italians from their Prussian alliance. In Germany
there was extreme indignation against the man who
was forcing his country into a fratricidal war. Bis-
marck had often received threatening letters ; now
an attempt was made on his life; as he was walking
along Unter den Linden a young man approached
and fired several shots at him. He was seized by
Bismarck, and that night put an end to his own life
in prison. He was a South German who wished to
save his country from the horrors of civil war.
Moltke, now that all was prepared, was anxious to



258 Bismarck. [1866

begin. Bismarck still hesitated ; he was so cautious
that he would not take the first step. At last the
final provocation came, as he hoped it would, from
Austria. He knew that if he waited long enough
they would take the initiative. They proposed to
summon the Estates of Holstein, and at the same
time brought the question of the Duchies before the
Diet. Bismarck declared that this was a breach of
the Treaty of Gastein, and that that agreement was
therefore void ; Prussian troops were ordered to
enter Holstein. Austria appealed for protection to
the Diet, and moved that the Federal forces should
be mobilised. The motion was carried by nine votes
to seven. The Prussian Envoy then rose and de-
clared that this was a breach of the Federal law ;
Prussia withdrew from the Federation and declared
war on all those States which had supported Austria.
Hanover and Hesse had to the end attempted to
maintain neutrality, but this Bismarck would not
allow ; they Were given the alternative of alliance
with Prussia or disarmament. The result was that,
when war began, the whole of Germany, except the
small northern States, was opposed to Prussia. " I
have no ally but the Duke of Mecklenburg and
Mazzini," said the King.




^(^^^^)^



CHAPTER XI.

THE CONQUEST OF GERMANY.
1866.



BISMARCK had no part in the management of
the army. This the King always kept in his
own hands. He was himself Commander-in-
Chief, and on all military questions he took the ad-
vice of his Minister of War and the chief of the staff.
When his power and influence in the State were
greatest, Bismarck's authority always ceased as soon
as technical and military matters arose for consider-
ation. He often chafed at this limitation and even
in a campaign was eager to offer his advice ; there
was soldier's blood in his veins, and he would have
liked himself to bear arms in the war. At least he
was able to be present on the field of battle with the
King and witness part of the campaign.

With the King he left Berlin on June 30th to join
the army in Bohemia. Already the news had come
of the capitulation of the Hanoverians ; the whole of
North-West Germany had been conquered in a week
and the Prussian flank was secure. The effect of
these victories was soon seen : his unpopularity was

259



26o Bismarck.



[1866



wiped out in blood. Night by night as the bulletins
arrived, crowds collected to cheer and applaud the
Minister.

The King and his suite reached the army on July
1st ; they were just in time to be present at the
decisive battle. At midnight on July 2d it was
known that the Austrians were preparing to give
battle near Koniggratz with the Elbe in their rear.
Early the next morning the King with Bismarck,
Roon, and Moltke rode out and took up their posi-
tions on the hill of Dub, whence they could view
what was to be the decisive battle in the history of
Germany. Here, after the lapse of more than a
hundred years, they were completing the work which
Frederick the Great had begun. The battle was
long and doubtful. The army of Prince Frederick
Charles attacked the Austrian division under the
eyes of the King, but could make no advance against
their powerful artillery. They had to wait till the
Crown Prince, who was many miles away, could come
up and attack the right flank of the Austrians.
Hour after hour went by and the Crown Prince did
not come ; if he delayed longer the attack would
fail and the Prussians be defeated. We can easily
imagine what must have been Bismarck's thoughts
during this crisis. On the result depended his posi-
tion, his reputation, perhaps his life ; into those few
hours was concentrated the struggle to which he
had devoted so much of his lifetime, and yet he was
quite helpless. Success or failure did not depend on
him. It is the crudest trial to the statesman that
he must see his best plans undone by the mistakes



1866] The Conquest of Germany. 261

of the generals. Bismarck often looked with anxiety
at Moltke's face to see whether he could read in it
the result of the battle. The King, too, was getting
nervous. Bismarck at last could stand it no longer ;
he rode up to Moltke, took out a cigar case, and
offered it to the General ; Moltke looked at the
cigars carefully and took the best ; " then I knew we
were all right," said Bismarck in telling this story.
It was after two when at last the cannon of the
Crown Prince's army came into action, and the
Austrian army, attacked on two sides, was
overthrown.

"This time the brave grenadiers have saved us,"
said Roon. It was true ; but for the army which he
and the King had made, all the genius of Moltke
and Bismarck would have been unavailing.

" Our men deserve to be kissed," wrote Bismarck to
his wife. " Every man is brave to the death, quiet,
obedient ; with empty stomachs, wet clothes, little sleep,
the soles of their boots falling off, they are friendly to-
wards everyone ; there is no plundering and burning ;
they pay what they are able, though they have mouldy
bread to eat. There must exist a depth of piety in our
common soldier or all this could not be."

Bismarck might well be proud of this practical
illustration which was given of that which he so often
in older days maintained. This was a true comment
on the pictures of the loyalty of the Prussian people
and the simple faith of the German peasants, which
from his place in Parliament he had opposed to the
new sceptical teaching of the Liberals. As soon as
he was able he went about among the wounded ; as



262 Bismarck.



[1866



he once said, the King of Prussia was accustomed to
look into the eyes of wounded men on the field of
battle and therefore would never venture on an un-
just or unnecessary war, and in this Bismarck felt as
the King. He writes home for cigars for distribut-
ing among the wounded. Personally he endured
something of the hardships of campaigning, for in
the miserable Bohemian villages there was little food
and shelter to be had. He composed himself to
sleep, as best he could, on a dung-heap by the
roadside, until he was roused by the Prince of
Mecklenburg, who had found more acceptable
quarters.

It was not for long that this life, which was to him
almost a welcome reminiscence of his sporting days,
could continue. Diplomatic cares soon fell upon
him.

Not two days had passed since the great battle,
when a telegram from Napoleon was placed in the
King's hands informing him that Austria had re-
quested France's mediation, that Venetia had been
surrendered to France, and inviting the King to
conclude an armistice. Immediately afterwards came
the news that the surrender of Venetia to France
had been published in the Moniteiir.

If this meant anything, it meant that Napoleon
intended to stop the further progress of the Prussian
army, to rescue Austria, and to dictate the terms of
peace ; it could not be doubted that he would be
prepared to support his mediation by arms, and in a
few days they might expect to hear that the French
corps were being stationed on the frontier.



1866] The Conq2iest of Germany. 263

What was to be done? Bismarck neither doubted
nor hesitated ; it was impossible to refuse French
mediation. West Germany was almost undefended,
the whole of the southern States were still uncon-
quered ; however imperfect the French military
preparations might be, it was impossible to run such
a risk. At his advice the King at once sent a
courteous answer accepting the French proposal.
He was more disposed to this because in doing so he
really bound himself to nothing. He accepted the
principle of French mediation ; but he was still free
to discuss and refuse the special terms which might
be offered. He said that he was willing to accept an
armistice, but it was only on condition that the pre-
liminaries of peace were settled before hostilities,
ceased, and to them the King could not agree except
after consultation with the King of Italy. It was a
friendly answer, which cost nothing, and meanwhile
the army continued to advance. An Austrian re-
quest for an armistice was refused ; Vienna was now
the goal ; Napoleon, if he wished to stop them, must
take the next move, must explain the terms of peace
he wished to secure, and shew by what measures he
was prepared to enforce them.

By his prompt action, Bismarck, who knew Napo-
leon well, hoped to escape the threatened danger.
We shall see with what address he used the situation,
so that the vacillation of France became to him more
useful than even her faithful friendship would have
been, for now he felt himself free from all ties of
gratitude. Whatever services France might do to
Prussia she could henceforth look to hini for no vol-



264 Bismarck. [I866

untary recompense. Napoleon had deceived him ;
he would henceforward have no scruples in deceiving
Napoleon. He had entered on the war relying on
the friendship and neutrality of France; at the first
crisis this had failed him ; he never forgot and he
never forgave ; years later, when the news of Napo-