leon's death was brought to him, this was the first
incident in their long connection which came into his
mind.
Intercourse with Paris was slow and uncertain ; the
telegraph wires were often cut by the Bohemian
peasants ; some time must elapse before an answer
came. In the meanwhile, as the army steadily ad-
vanced towards the Austrian capital, Bismarck had
to consider the terms of peace he would be willing to
accept. He had to think not only of what he would
wish, but of what it was possible to acquire. He
wrote to his wife at this time :
" We are getting on well. If we are not extreme in
our claims and do not imagine that we have conquered
the world, we shall obtain a peace that is worth having.
But we are as easily intoxicated as we are discouraged,
and I have the thankless task of pouring water into the
foaming wine and of pointing out that we are not alone
in Europe, but have three neighbours."
Of the three neighbours there was little to fear
from England. With the death of Lord Palmerston,
English policy had entered on a new phase; the tra-
ditions of Pitt and Canning were forgotten ; England
no longer aimed at being the arbitress of Europe;
the leaders of both parties agreed that unless her
1866] The Co7iquest of Germany. 265
own interests were immediately affected, England
would not interfere in Continental matters. The
internal organisation of Germany did not appear to
concern her; she was the first to recognise the new
principle that the relations of the German States to
one another were to be settled by the Germans
themselves, and to extend to Germany that doctrine
of non-intervention which she had applied to Spain
and Itsely.
Neither France nor Russia would be so accommo-
dating ; France, we have already seen, had begun to
interfere, Russia would probably do so ; if they
came to some agreement they would demand a con-
gress ; and, as a matter of fact, a few days later the
Czar proposed a congress, both in Paris and in Lon-
don. Of all issues this was the one which Bismarck
dreaded most. A war with France he would have
disliked, but at the worst he was not afraid of it.
But he did not wish that the terms of peace he pro-
posed to dictate should be subjected to the criticism
and revision of the European Powers, nor to un-
dergo the fate which fell on Russia twelve years
later. Had the congress, however, been supported
by Russia and France he must have accepted it.
It is for this reason that he was so ready to meet
the wishes of France, for if Napoleon once entered
into separate and private negotiations, then what-
ever the result of them might be, he could not join
with the other Powers in common action.
With regard to the terms of peace, it was obvious
that Schleswig-Holstein would now be Prussian; it
could scarcely be doubted that there must be a
266 Bismarck. [I866
reform in the Confederation, which would be re-
organised under the hegemony of Prussia, and that
Austria would be excluded from ail participation in
German affairs. It might, in fact, be anticipated
that the very great successes of Prussia would en-
able her to carry out the programme of 1849, ^"^
to unite the whole of Germany in a close union.
This, however, was not what Bismarck intended ;
for him the unity of Germany was a matter of
secondary importance; what he desired was com-
plete control over the north. In this he was going
â– back to the sound and true principles of Prussian
policy ; he, as nearly all other Prussian statesmen,
looked on the line of the Main as a real division.
He, therefore, on the 9th of July, wrote to Goltz,
explaining the ideas he had of the terms on which
peace might be concluded.
''The essential thing," he said, was that they
should get control over North Germany in some
form or other.
" I use the term North German Confederation without
any hesitation, because I consider that if the necessary
consolidation of the Federation is to be made certain it
will be at present impossible to include South Germany
in it. The present moment is very favourable for giving
our new creation just that delimitation which will secure
it a firm union."
The question remained, what form the Union should
take. On this he writes : " Your Excellency must
have the same impression as myself, that public
opinion in- our country demands the incorporation
1866] The Conquest of Germany. 267
of Hanover, Saxony, and Schleswig." He adds that
this would undoubtedly be the best solution of the
matter for all concerned, if it could be effected with-
out the cession of other Prussian territory, but he
did not himself consider the difference between a
satisfactory system of reform and the acquisition of
these territories sufficient to justify him in risking
the fate of the whole monarchy. It was the same
alternative which had presented itself to him about
Schleswig-Holstein ; now, as then, annexation was
what he aimed at, and he was not the man easily to
reconcile himself to a less favourable solution. At
the same time that he wrote this letter he sent
orders that Falkenstein should quickly occupy all
the territory north of the Main.
It is important to notice the date at which this
letter was sent. It shews us that these proposals
were Bismarck's own. Attempts have often been
made since to suggest that the policy of annexation
was not his, but was forced on him by the King, or
by the military powers, or by the nation. This was
not the case. He appeals indeed to public opinion,
but public opinion, had it been asked, would really
have demanded, not the dethronement of the Kings
of Hanover and Saxony, but the unity of all Ger-
many ; and we know that Bismarck would never
pursue what he thought a dangerous policy sim-
ply because public opinion demanded it. It has also
been said that the dethronement of the King of Han-
over was the natural result of the obstinacy of him-
self and his advisers, and his folly in going to Vienna
to appeal there to the help of the Austrian Emperor.
268 Bismarck. [1866
This also is not true. We find that Bismarck has
determined on this policy some days before the King
had left Thuringia. This, like all he did, was the
deliberate result of the consideration : What would
tend most to the growth of Prussian power? He
had to consider three alternatives : that these States
should be compelled to come into a union with Prus-
sia on the terms that the Princes should hand over
the command of their forces to the Prussian King,
but he knew that the King of Hanover would never
consent to this, and probably the King of Saxbny
would also refuse ; he might also require the reigning
Kings to abdicate in place of their sons ; or he might
leave them with considerable freedom, but cripple
their power by taking away part of their territory.
These solutions seemed to him undesirable because
they would leave dynasties, who would naturally be
hostile, jealous, and suspicious, with the control of
large powers of government. Surely it would be
better, safer, and wiser to sweep them away alto-
gether. It may be objected that there was no ground
in justice for so doing. This is true, and Bismarck
has never pretended that there was. He has left it
to the writers of the Prussian Press to justify an
action which was based purely on policy, by the pre-
tence that it was the due recompense of the crimes
of the rival dynasties.
Sybel says that Bismarck determined on these
terms because they were those which would be most
acceptable to France; that he would have preferred
at once to secure the unity of the whole of Germany,
but that from his knowledge of French thought and
1866] The Conquest of Geinnany. 269
French character he foresaw that this would be pos-
sible only after another war, and he did not wish to
risk the whole. So far as our information goes, it is
against this hypothesis ; it is rather true to say that
he used the danger of French interference as a means
of persuading the King to adopt a policy which was
naturally repugnant to him. It is true that these
terms would be agreeable to Napoleon. It would
appear in France and in Europe as if it was French
power which had persuaded Prussia to stop at the
Main and to spare Austria ; Bismarck did not mind
that, because what was pleasant to France was con-
venient to him. He knew also that the proposal to
annex the conquered territories would be very agree-
able to Napoleon ; the dethronement of old-estab-
lished dynasties might be regarded as a delicate
compliment to the principles he had always main-
tained and to the traditional policy of his house. If,
however, we wish to find Bismarck's own motives, we
must remember that before the war broke out he had
in his mind some such division of Germany ; he
knew that it would be impossible at once to unite
the whole in a firm union. If Bavaria were to be in-
cluded in the new Confederation they would lose in
harmony what they gained in extent. As he said
in his drastic way :
"We cannot use these Ultramontanes, and we must
not swallow more than we can digest. We will not fall
into the blunder of Piedmont, which has been more weak-
ened than strengthened by the annexation of Naples."
Of course he could not express this openly, and
270 Bismarck. [1866
even now German writers obscure the thought, for in
Germany, as in Italy, the desire for unity was so
powerful that it was difficult to pardon any statesman
who did not take the most immediate path to this
result. It was fortunate for Germany that Bismarck
was strong enough not to do so, for the Confedera-
tion of the north could be founded and confirmed
before the Catholic and hostile south was included.
The prize was in his hands ; he deliberately refused to
pick it up.
Supposing, however, that, after all, France would
not accept the terms he suggested — during the anx-
ious days which passed, this contingency was often
before him. It was not till the 14th that Goltz
was able to send him any decisive information, for
the very good reason that Napoleon had not until
then made up his own mind. Bismarck's anxiety
was increased by the arrival of Benedetti. He had
received instructions to follow the King, and, after
undergoing the discomfort of a hasty journey in the
rear of the Prussian army, reached headquarters on
the loth at Zwittau. He was taken straight to Bis-
marck's room although it was far on into the night.
He found him sitting in a deserted house, writing,
with a large revolver by his side ; for as Roon com-
plains, even during the campaign Bismarck would not
give up his old custom of working all night and sleep-
ing till midday or later. Bismarck received the French
Ambassador with his wonted cordiality and the con-
versation was prolonged till three or four o'clock in
the morning, and continued on the following days.
Bismarck hoped that he had com.e with full powers
18661 The Conquest of Germany. 271
to treat, or at least with full information on the in-
tentions of his Government ; that was not the case ;
he had no instructions except to use his influence to
persuade Prussia to moderation ; Napoleon was far
too much divided in his own mind to be able to tell
him anything further. Bismarck with his usual frank-
ness explained what he wished, laying much stress on
the annexations in North Germany ; Benedetti, so
little did he follow Napoleon's thought, protested
warmly against this. " We are not," he said, " in the
times of Frederick the Great." Bismarck then tried
to probe him on other matters ; as before, he assumed
that Napoleon's support and good-will were not to
be had for nothing. He took it as a matter of course
that if France was friendly to Prussia, she would re-
quire some recompense. He had already instructed
Goltz to enquire what non-German compensation
would be asked ; he was much disturbed when Ben-
edetti met his overtures with silence ; he feared that
Napoleon had some other plan. Benedetti in his
report writes :
" Without any encouragement on my part, he attempted
to prove to me that the defeat of Austria permitted
France and Prussia to modify their territorial limits and
to solve the greater part of the difficulties which con-
tinued to menace the peace of Europe. I reminded him
that there were treaties and that the war which he desired
to prevent would be the first result of a policy of this kind.
M. de Bismarck answered that I misunderstood him, that
France and Prussia united and resolved to rectify their
respective countries, binding themselves by solemn en-
gagements henceforth to regulate together these ques-
272 Bzsmai^ck. [I866
tions, need not fear any armed resistance either from
England or from Russia."
What was Bismarck's motive in making these sug-
gestions and enquiries? German writers generally
take the view that he was not serious in his proposal,
that he was deliberately playing with Napoleon,
that he wished to secure from him some compro-
mising document which he might then be able, as,
in fact, was to happen, to use against him. They
seem to find some pleasure in admiring him in the
part of Agent provocateur. Perhaps we may inter-
pret his thought rather differently. We have often
seen that it was not his practice to lay down a clear
and definite course of action, but he met each crisis
/as it occurred. The immediate necessity was to
y secure the friendship of France ; believing, as he did,
that in politics no one acted simply on principle or
out of friendship, he assumed that Napoleon, who
had control of the situation, would not give his sup-
port unless he had the promise of some important
recompense. The natural thing for him, as he
always preferred plain dealing, was to ask straight
out what the Emperor wanted. When the answer
came, then fresh questions would arise ; if it was of
such a kind that Bismarck would be able to accept
it, a formal treaty between the two States might be
made ; if it was more than Bismarck was willing to
grant, then there would be an opportunity for pro-
longing negotiations with France, and haggling over
smaller points, and he would be able to come to
some agreement with Austria quickly. If he could
not come to any agreement with France, and war
1866] The Conquest of Germany. 273
were to break out, he would always have this advan-
tage, that he would be able to make it appear that
the cause of war arose not in the want of moderation
of Prussia, but in the illegitimate claims of France.
Finally he had this to consider, that so long as
France was discussing terms with him, there was no
danger of their accepting the Russian proposal for
a congress. Probably the one contingency which
did not occur to him was that which, in fact, was
nearest to the truth, namely, that Napoleon did not
care much for any recompense, and that he had not
seriously considered what he ought to demand.
He was, however, prepared for the case that
France should not be accommodating. He deter-
mined to enter on separate negotiations with Austria.
As he could not do this directly, he let it be known
at Vienna by way of St. Petersburg that he was
willing to negotiate terms of peace. At Brunn,
where he was living, he opened up a new channel of
intercourse. An Austrian nobleman, who was well
disposed towards Prussia, undertook an unofficial
mission, and announced to the Emperor the terms
on which Prussia would make peace. They were
extraordinarily lenient, namely, that, with the excep-
tion of Venetia, the territory of Austria should
remain intact, that no war indemnity should be
expected, that the Main should form the boundary
of Prussian ambition, that South Germany should
be left free, and might enter into close connection
with Austria if it chose ; the only condition was that
no intervention or mediation of France should be
allowed. If the negotiations with France were suc-
18
2 74 Bismarck. tl866
cessful, then the French and Prussian armies united
would bid defiance to the world. If those with
France failed, then he hoped to bring about an
understanding with Austria ; the two great Powers
would divide Germany between them, but present
a united front to all outsiders. If both negotiations
broke down, he would be reduced to a third and more
terrible alternative : against a union of France and of
Austria he would put himself at the head of the
German national movement ; he would adopt the
programme of 1849 ! ^^ would appeal to the Revolu-
tion ; he would stir up rebellion in Hungary; he
would encourage the Italians to deliver a thrust into
the very heart of the Austrian Monarchy ; and,
while Austria was destroyed by internal dissensions,
he would meet the French invasion at the head of
a united army of the other German States.
After all, however, Napoleon withdrew his oppo-
sition. It was represented to him that he had not
the military force to carry out his new programme ;
Italy refused to desert Prussia or even to receive
Venetia from the hands of France ; Prince Napoleon
warned his cousin against undoing the work of his
lifetime. The Emperor himself, broken in health
and racked by pain, confessed that his action of July
5th had been a mistake ; he apologised to Goltz
for his proclamation ; he asked only that Prussia
should be moderate in her demands ; the one thing
was that the unity of Germany should be avoided, if
only in appearance. This, we have seen, was Bis-
marck's own view. Napoleon accepted the terms
which Goltz proposed, but asked only that the King-
1866] The Conquest of Germany. 2 75
dom of Saxony should be spared ; if this was done,
he would not only adopt, he would recommend
them. An agreement was quickly come to. Bene-
detti went on to Vienna ; he and Gramont had little
dif^culty in persuading the Emperor to agree to
terms of peace by which the whole loss of the war
would fall not upon him, not even upon his only
active and faithful ally, the King of Saxony, but on
those other States who had refused to join them-
selves to either party. What a triumph was it of
Bismarck's skill that the addition of 4,000,000 sub-
jects to the Prussian Crown and complete dominion
over Northern Germany should appear, not as the
demand which, as a ruthless conqueror, he enforced
on his helpless enemies, but as the solution of all
difificulties which was recommended to him in reward
for his moderation by the ruler of France !
On the 23d of July an armistice was agreed on,
and a conference was held at Nikolsburg to arrange
the preliminaries of peace. There was no delay. In
olden days Bismarck had shewn how he was able to
prolong negotiations year after year when it was
convenient to him that they should come to no con-
clusion ; now he hurried through in three days the
discussion by which the whole future of Germany
and Europe were to be determined. When all were
agreed on the main points, difificulties on details
were easily overcome. It remained only to procure
the assent of the King. Here again, as so often be-
fore, Bismarck met with most serious resistance.
He drew up a careful memorandum which he pre-
sented to the monarch, pressing on him in the very
276 Bismarck. [1866
strongest terms the acceptance of these conditions.
Up to the last moment, however, there seems to
have been a great rekictance ; Sybel represents the
difficulties as rising from the immoderate demands
of the military party at Court ; they were not pre-
pared, after so great a victory, to leave Austria with
undiminished territory ; they wished at least to
have part of Austrian Silesia. This account seems
misleading. It was not that the King wanted more
than Bismarck had desired ; he wanted his acquisi-
tion of territory to come in a different way. He
was not reconciled to the dethronement of the King
of Hanover ; he wished to take part of Hanover,
part of Saxony, part of Bavaria, and something from
Darmstadt ; to his simple and honest mind it seemed
unjust that those who had been his bitterest enemies
should be treated with the greatest consideration.
It was the old difficulty which Bismarck had met
with in dealing with Schleswig-Holstein : the King
had much regard for the rights of other Princes.
This time, however, Bismarck, we are surprised to
learn, had the influential support of the Crown
Prince ; the scruples which he had felt as regards
Schleswig-Holstein did not apply to Hanover. He
was sent in to his father ; the interview lasted two
hours ; what passed we do not know ; he came out
exhausted and wearied with the long struggle, but
the King had given in, and the policy of Bismarck
triumphed. The preliminaries of Nikolsburg were
signed, and two days afterwards were ratified, for
Bismarck pressed on the arrangements with feverish
impetuosity.
1866] The Conquest of Gei^many. 277
He had good reason to do so ; he had just received
intelligence that the Emperor of Russia was making
an official demand for a congress and fresh news had
come from France. On the 25th Benedetti had
again come to him and had sounded him with regard
to the recompense which France might receive. On
the 26th, just as Bismarck was going to the final sit-
ting of the Conference, the French Ambassador again
called on him, this time to lay before him a despatch
in which Drouyn de Lhuys stated that he had not
wished to impede the negotiations with Austria, but
would now observe that the French sanction to
the Prussian annexations presupposed a fair indem-
nification to France, and that the Emperor would
confer with Prussia concerning this as soon as his
role of mediator was at an end. What madness this
was ! As soon as the role of mediator was at an
end, as soon as peace was arranged with Austria, the
one means which France had for compelling the ac-
quiescence of Prussia was lost.
What had happened was this : Napoleon had, in
conversation with Goltz, refused to consider the ques-
tion of compensation : it was not worth while, he said ;
the gain of a few square miles of territory would not
be of any use. He therefore, when he still might
have procured them, made no conditions. Drouyn
de Lhuys, however, who had disapproved of the
whole of the Emperor's policy, still remained in
office ; he still wished, as he well might wish, to
strengthen France in view of the great increase of
Prussian power. He, therefore, on the 21st again
approached Napoleon and laid before him a des-
278 Bismarck. [1866
patch in which he brought up the question of com-
pensation. He was encouraged to this course by the
reports which Benedetti had sent of his conversa-
tions with Bismarck ; it was clear that Bismarck ex-
pected some demand ; he had almost asked that it
should be made. " We wish to avoid any injury to
the balance of power," Goltz had said ; " we will
either moderate our demands or discuss those of
France." It appeared absurd not to accept this
offer. Napoleon was still reluctant to do so, but he
was in a paroxysm of pain. " Leave me in peace,"
was his only answer to his Minister's request, and
the Minister took it as an assent.
Bismarck, when Benedetti informed him of the de-
mand that was to be made, at once answered that he
was quite ready to consider the proposal. Bene-
detti then suggested that it would probably concern
certain strips of territory on the left bank of the
Rhine ; on this, Bismarck stopped him : " Do not
make any official announcements of that kind to me
to-day." He went away, the Conference was con-
cluded, the preliminaries were signed and ratified.
France had been too late, and when the demand
was renewed Bismarck was able to adopt a very
different tone.
Let us complete the history of these celebrated
negotiations.
The discussion which had been broken off so
suddenly at Nikolsburg was continued at Berlin ;
during the interval the matter had been further dis-
cussed in Paris, and it had been determined firmly
to demand compensation. Benedetti had warned
18661 The Conquest of Germany. 279
the Government that Bismarck would not surrender
any German territory ; it was no good even asking
for this, unless the demand was supported by urgent
and threatening language. The result of the con-
siderations was that he was instructed categorically
to require the surrender to France of the Palatinate
and Mayence. Benedetti undertook the task with
some reluctance ; in order to avoid being present at
the explosion of anger which he might expect, he
addressed the demand to Bismarck on August 5th,
by letter. Two days he waited for an answer, but
received none ; on the evening of the 7th, he himself
called on the Count, and a long discussion took place.
Bismarck adopted a tone of indignation : " The whole