a small paragraph, even a question of punctuation, with
two and twenty Governments, if at last we have agreed
on that as it here lies before us, then gentlemen who
have experienced little of all these struggles, and know
nothing of the official proceedings which have gone be-
1867] The North German Confederation. 311
fore, come forward in a manner which I can only com-
pare to that of a man who throws a stone at m};- window
without knowing where I stand. He knows not where
he hits me, he knows not what business he impedes."
He compared himself v/ith Hotspur when after the
battle he met the courtier who came to demand his
prisoners, and when wounded and tired from the
fight had to hear a long lecture over instruments of
slaughter and internal wounds.
The debates were continued for two months with
much spirit and ability; again and again a majority
of the Parliament voted amendments against which
Bismarck had spoken. When they had completed
the revision of the Constitution, these had again to
be referred to the separate Governments. Forty
were adopted ; on two only Bismarck informed the
Parliament that their proposals could not be accepted.
One of these was the arrangements for the army
Budget ; so soon did a fresh conflict on this matter
threaten. A compromise was agreed upon ; in con-
sideration of the immediate danger (it was just the
time when a war with France regarding Luxemburg
appeared imminent), the House voted the money re-
quired for the army for the next four years ; in 1 87 1
a new arrangement would have to be made, but for
this time the Government was able to maintain
the army at the strength which they wished for. The
other matter was of less immediate importance : the
majority of the House had voted that members of
the Parliament should receive payment for their serv-
ices, Bismarck had spoken strongly against this ;
312 Bismarck. [1866-
now he made it a question of confidence, and warned
them that the Governments would not accept it. The
House had no alternative except to withdraw their
vote.
The Constitution as finally agreed on exists to this
day as that of the German Empire. Notwithstand-
ing the evil forebodings made at the time, it has
worked well for over thirty years.
From the moment that the new State had been
created and the new Constitution adopted, a great
change took place in Bismarck's public position. He
was no longer merely the first and ablest servant of
the Prussian King; he was no longer one in the dis-
tinguished series of Prussian Ministers. His position
was — let us recognise it clearly — greater than that
of the King and Emperor, for he was truly the
Father of the State : it was his will which had cre-
ated and his brain which had devised it ; he watched
over it with the affection of a father for his son ; none
quite understood it but himself ; he alone could au-
thoritatively expound the laws of the Constitution.
A criticism of it was an attack upon himself ; opposi-
tion to him was scarcely to be distinguished from
treason to the State. Is it not inevitable that as
years went on we should find an increasing intoler-
ance of all rivals, who wished to alter what he had
made, or to take his place as captain of his ship, and
at the same time a most careful and strict regard for
the loyal fulfilment of the law and spirit of the Con-
stitution? From this time all other interests are laid
aside, his whole life is absorbed in the prosperity of
Germany.
1867] The North German Confederation. 313
Of course Germany did not at once settle down
to political rest ; there were many difficulties to be
overcome on which we cannot enter here. The most
serious arose from the regulation of the affairs in the
conquered provinces, and especially in the Kingdom
of Hanover. The annexation to Prussia was very un-
popular among all classes except the tradesmen and
middle classes of the towns. The Hanoverian depu-
ties to both the Prussian Parliament and the Parlia-
ment of the North German Confederation on principle
opposed all measures of the Government. The
King himself, though in exile, kept up a close con-
nection with his former subjects. There were long
negotiations regarding his private property. At last
it was agreed that this should be paid over to him.
The King, however, used the money for organising
a Legion to be used when the time came against
Prussia ; it was therefore necessary to cease paying
him funds which could be used for this purpose.
This is the origin of the notorious Welfenfond. The
money was to be appropriated for secret service
and especially for purposes of the Press. The party
of the Guelphs, of course, maintained a bitter feud
against the Government in their papers. Bismarck,
who had had ample experience of this kind of war-
fare, met them on their own ground.
He defended this proposal by drawing attention
to one of the weaknesses of Germany. What other
country, he asked, was there where a defeated party
would look forward to the help of foreign armies?
" There are unfortunately," he said, " many Corio-
lani in Germany, only the Volsgi ?ire wanting ; if
314 Bismarck. [1867
they found their Volsci they would soon be un-
masked." Everyone knew that the Volsci from over
the Rhine would not be slow to come when the
occasion offered.
" It was," he said, " a melancholy result of the cen-
turies of disunion. There were traitors in the country ;
they did not hide themselves ; they carried their heads
erect ; they found public defenders even in the walls of
Parliament." Then he continued : " Everywhere where
corruption is found there a form of life begins which no
one can touch with clean kid gloves. In view of these
facts you speak to me of espionage. In my nature I am
not born to be a spy, but I believe we deserve your
thanks if we condescend to follow malignant reptiles
into their cave to observe their actions."
This is the origin of the expression " the reptile
Press,'' for the name was given by the people not to
those against whom the efforts of the Government
were directed, but to the paid organs to which, if
report is true, so large a portion of the Guelph fund
was given.
But we must pass on to the events by which the
work of 1866 was to be completed.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH FRANCE.
1 867- 1 870.
EVER since the conclusion of peace, the danger
of a conflict between France and Germany
had been apparent. It was not only the grow-
ing discontent and suspicion of the French nation and
the French army, who truly felt that the suprem-
acy of France had been shaken by the growth of
this new power ; it was not only that the deep-rooted
hatred of France which prevailed in Germany had
been stirred by Napoleon's action, and that the Ger-
mans had received confidence from the consciousness
of their own strength. Had there been nothing more
than this, year after year might have gone by and, as
has happened since and had happened before, a war
always anticipated might have been always deferred.
We may be sure that Bismarck would not have gone
to war unless he believed it to be necessary and de-
sirable, and he would not have thought this unless
there was something to be gained. He has often
shewn, before and since, that he was quite as well
able to use his powers in the maintenance of peace
315
J
1 6 Bismarck. [1867-
as in creating causes for war. There was, however,
one reason which made war ahuost inevitable. The
unity of Germany was only half completed ; the
Southern States still existed in a curious state of
V semi-isolation. This could not long continue; their
position must be regulated. War arises from that
state of uncertainty which is always present when a
political community has not found a stable and per-
manent constitution. In Germany men were look-
ing forward to the time when the southern States
should join the north. The work was progressing;
the treaties of offensive and defensive alliance had
been followed by the creation of a new Customs'
Union, and it was a further step when at Bismarck's
proposal a Parliament consisting of members elected
throughout the whole of Germany was summoned at
Berlin for the management of matters connected with
the tariff. Further than this, however, he was not
able to go ; the new Constitution was working well ;
they could risk welcoming the States of the south
into it ; but this could not be done without a war
with France. Bismarck had rejected the French
proposal for an alliance. He knew, and everyone else
knew, that France would oppose by the sword any
attempt to complete the unity of Germany ; and,
Avhich was more serious, unless great caution was
used, that she would be supported by Austria and
perhaps by the anti-Prussian party in Bavaria. There
were some who wished to press it forward at once.
Bismarck was very strongly pressed by the National
Liberals to hasten the union with the south ; at the
beginning of 1870 the Grand Duke of Baden, him-
1870] OzLtbreak of War with France. 317
self a son-in-law of the King of Prussia and always
the chief supporter of Prussian influence in the south,
formally applied to be admitted into the Federation.
The request had to be refused, but Bismarck' had
some dif^culty in defending his position against his
enthusiastic friends. He had to warn them not to
hurry ; they must not press the development too
quickly. If they did so, they would stir the resent-
ment of the anti-Prussian party ; they would play
into the hands of Napoleon and Austria. But if
there was danger in haste, there was equal danger in
delay ; the prestige of Prussia would suffer.
It is clear that there was one way in which the
union might be brought about almost without re-
sistance, and that was, if France were to make an
unprovoked attack upon Germany, an attack so com-
pletely without reason and excuse that the strong
national passion it provoked might in the enthusiasm
of war sweep away all minor differences and party
feelings.
There was another element which we must not
omit. These years witnessed the growth in deter-
mination and in power of the Ultramontane party.
We can find their influence in every country in
Europe ; their chief aim was the preservation of the
temporal power of the Pope and the destruction of
the newly created Kingdom of Italy. They were also
opposed to the unity of Germany under Prussia.
They were very active and powerful in South Ger-
many, and at the elections in 1869 had gained a
majority. Their real object must be to win over
the Emperor of the French to a complete agreement
3i8 Bismarck. [1867-
with themselves, to persuade him to forsake his
earlier policy and to destroy what he had done so
much to create. They had a strong support in the
person of the Empress, and they joined with the
injured vanity of the French to press the Emperor
towards war.
In 1867, war had almost broken out on the ques-
tion of Luxemburg. Napoleon had attempted to get
at least this small extension of territory ; relying on
the support of Prussia he entered into negotiations
with the King of Holland ; the King agreed to sur-
render the Grand Duchy to France, making, however,
a condition that Napoleon should secure the assent
of Prussia to this arrangement. At the very last mo-
ment, when the treaty was almost signed, Bismarck
made it clear that the national feeling in Germany
was so strong that if the transaction took place he
would have to declare war against France. At the
same time, he published the secret treaties with the
southern States. These events destroyed the last
hope of maintaining the old friendly relations with
Napoleon ; " I have been duped," said the Emperor,
who at once began reorganising and rearming his
forces. For some weeks there was great danger of
war concerning the right of garrisoning Luxemburg ;
this had hitherto belonged to Prussia, but of course
with the dissolution of the German Confederation
the right had lapsed. The German nation, which was
much excited and thought little of the precise terms
of treaties, wished to defend the right ; Bismarck
knew that in this matter the Prussian claim could
not be supported ; moreover, even if he had wished
1870] Outbi^eak of War with France. 319
to go to Avar with France he was not ready ; for some
time must elapse before the army of the North Ger-
man Confederation could be reorganised on the
Prussian model. He therefore preserved the peace
and the matter was settled by a European Congress.
In the summer of 1867, he visited Paris with the
King ; externally the good relations between the two
States were restored, but it was in reality only an
armed peace.
It is difficult to decipher Napoleon's wishes ; he
seems to have believed that war was inevitable ;
there is no proof that he desired it. He made
preparations ; the army was reorganised, the num-
bers increased, and a new weapon introduced. At
the same time he looked about for allies. Negotia-
tions were carried on with Austria ; in 1868 a meet-
ing was ari'anged between the two Emperors ; Beust,
who was now Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, was
anxious to make an attempt to overthrow the power
of Prussia in Germany. In 1 870, negotiations were
entered into for a military alliance ; a special envoy,
General Lebrun, was sent to Vienna to discuss the
military arrangements in case of war. No treaty
was signed, but it was an almost understood thing
that sooner or later an" alliance between the two Em-
perors should be formed against Prussia.
It will be seen then that at the beginning of 1 870
everything was tending towards war, and that under
certain circumstances war was desirable, both for
France and for Germany ; much seemed to depend
on the occasion of the outbreak. If Prussia took
the offensive, if she attempted by force to win the
320 Bismarck. [1867-
southern States, she would be faced by a coalition of
France and Austria, supported only too probably
by Bavaria, and this was a coalition which would
find much sympathy among the discontented in
North Germany. On the other hand, it was for the
advantage of Prussia not to delay the conflict : the
King was growing old ; Bismarck could never be sure
how long he would remain in office ; moreover, the
whole forces of North Germany had now been com-
pletely reorganised and were ready for war, but with
the year 1871 it was to be foreseen that a fresh at-
tempt would be made to reduce their numbers ; it
was desirable to avoid a fresh conflict on the military
budget ; everything shews that 1870 was the year in
which it would be most convenient for Prussia to
fight.
Prussia, at this time, had no active allies on whom
she could depend ; Bismarck indeed had secured the
neutrality of Russia, but he did not know that the
Czar would come actively to his help ; we may feel
sure that he would prefer not to have to call upon
Russia for assistance, for, as we have seen in older
days, a war between France and Russia, in which
Germany joined, would be very harmful to Germany.
It was in these circumstances that an opportunity
shewed itself of gaining another ally who would be
more subservient than Russia. One of the many
revolutions which had harassed Spain during this
century had broken out. Queen Isabella had lost
the throne, and General Prim found himself obliged
to look about for a new sovereign. He applied in
vain to all the Catholic Courts ; nobody was anxious
1870] Outbreak of War with France. 321
to accept an honour coupled with such danger as
ruHng over the Spanish people. Among others he
applied to Leopold, hereditary Prince of Hohen-
zoUern, eldest son of that Prince of Hohenzollern
who a few years before had been President of the
Prussian Ministry. The choice seemed a good one :
the Prince was an amiable, courageous man ; he was
a Catholic ; he was, moreover, connected with the
Napoleonic family. His brother had, three years
before, been appointed King of Roumania with
Napoleon's good-will.
The proposal was probably made in all good faith ;
under ordinary circumstances, the Prince, had he
been willing to accept, would have been a very proper
candidate. It was, however, known from the first
that Napoleon would not give his consent, and, ac-
cording to the comity of Europe, he had a right to
be consulted. Nor can we say that Napoleon was
not justified in opposing the appointment. It has
indeed been said that the Prince was not a member
of the Prussian Royal House and that his connection
with Napoleon was really closer than that with the
King of Prussia. This is true, but to lay stress on it
is to ignore the very remarkable voluntary connec-
tion which united the two branches of the House of
Hohenzollern. The Prince's father had done what
no sovereign prince in Germany has ever done before
or since : out of loyalty to Prussia he had surren-
dered his position as sovereign ruler and presented
his dominions to the King of Prussia ; he had on
this occasion been adopted into the Royal Family ;
he had formally recognised the King as Head of
32 2 Bismarck. [1867-
the House, and subjected himself to his authority.
More than this, he had even condescended to accept
the position of Prussian Minister. Was not Napoleon
justified if he feared that the son of a man who had
shewn so great an affection to Prussia would not be
an agreeable neighbour on the throne of Spain?
It was in the early spring of 1869 that the first
proposals were made to the Prince ; our information
as to this is very defective, but it seems that they
were at once rejected. Benedetti's suspicions were,
however, aroused. He heard that a Spanish diplo-
matist, who had formerly been Ambassador at Berlin,
had again visited the city and had had two interviews
with Bismarck. He feared that perhaps he had
some mission with regard to the Hohenzollern candi-
dature, and, in accordance with instructions from his
Government, enquired first of Thiele and, after a visit
to Paris, saw Bismarck himself. The Count was
quite ready to discuss the matter ; with great frank-
ness he explained all the reasons why, if the throne
were offered to the Prince, the King would doubtless
advise him not to accept it. Benedetti was still sus-
picious, but for the time the matter dropped. From
what happened later, though we have no proof, we
must, I think, share his suspicion that Bismarck was
already considering the proposal and was prepared
to lend it his support.
In September of the same year, the affair began
to advance. Prim sent Salazar, a Spanish gentleman,
to Germany with a semi-ofificial commission to invite
the Prince to become a candidate, and gave him a
letter to a German acquaintance who would procure
1870] Otitbi^eak of War with France. 323
him an introduction to the Prince. This German
acquaintance was no other than Herr von Werther,
Prussian Ambassador at Vienna. If we remember
the very strict discipline which Bismarck maintained
in the Diplomatic Service we must feel convinced
that Werther was acting according to instructions."^
He brought the envoy to the Prince of Hohenzol-
lern ; the very greatest caution was taken to pre-
serve secrecy ; the Spaniard did not go directly to
the castle of Weinburg, but left the train at another
station, waited in the town till it was dark, and only
approached the castle when hidden from observa-
tion by night and a thick mist. He first of all asked
Prince Charles himself to accept the throne, and
when he refused, offered it to Prince Leopold, who
also, though he did not refuse point-blank, left no
doubt that he was disinclined to the proposal ; he
could only accept, he said, if the Spanish Govern-
ment procured the assent of the Emperor Napoleon
and the King of Prussia. Notwithstanding the re-
luctance of the family to take the proffered dignity,
Herr von Werther (and we must look on him as
Bismarck's agent *) a fortnight later travelled from
Munich in order to press on the Prince of Roumania
that he should use his influence not to allow the
House of Hohenzollern to refuse the throne. For
the time, however, the subject seems to have dropped.
A few months later, for the third time, the offer was
repeated, and now Bismarck uses the whole of his
influence in its favour. At the end of February,
Salazar came on an of^cial mission to Berlin ; he
* Sybel states that this was not the case.
324 Bismarck. [1867-
had three letters, one to the King, one to Bismarck,
one to the Prince. The King refused to receive
him ; Prince Leopold did not waver in his refusal
and was supported by his father ; their attitude was
that they should not consider the matter seriously
unless higher reasons of State required it. With
Prince Bismarck, however, the envoy was more suc-
cessful ; he had several interviews with the Minister,
and then left the city in order that suspicions might
not be aroused or the attention of the French Gov-
ernment directed to the negotiations. Bismarck
pleaded with great warmth for the acceptance of the
offer; in a memoir to the King, he dwelt on the great
importance which the summons of a Hohenzollern
prince to the Spanish throne would have for Ger-
many ; it would be politically invaluable to have a
friendly land in the rear of France ; it would be of
the greatest economic advantage for Germany and
Spain if this thoroughly monarchical country de-
veloped its resources under a king of German
descent. In consequence of this, a conference was
held at Berlin, at which there were present, besides
the King, the Crown Prince, Prince Carl Anton, and
Prince Leopold, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Schlei-
nitz, Thiele, and Delbriick. By summoning the
advice of these men, the matter was taken out of
the range of a private and family matter ; it is true
that it was not ofificially brought before the Prussian
Ministry, but those consulted were the men by whom
the policy of the State was directed. The unani-
mous decision of the councillors was for acceptance
on the ground that it was the fulfilment of a patri-
1870] Outbreak of War with France. 325
otic duty to Prussia. The Crown Prince saw great
difficulties in the way, and warned his cousin, if he
accepted, not to rely on Prussian help in the future,
even if, for the attainment of a definite end, the
Prussian Government furthered the project for the
moment. The King did not agree with his Minis-
ters ; he had many serious objections, and refused to
give any definite order to the Prince that he should
accept the offer; he left the final decision to him.
He eventually refused.
Bismarck, however, was not to be beaten ; he in-
sisted that the Hohenzollerns should not let the mat-
ter drop ; and, as he could not persuade the King to
use his authority, acted directly upon the family with
such success that Prince Carl Anton telegraphed to
his third son, Frederick, to ask if he would not ac-
cept instead of his brother. Bismarck had now de-
clared that the acceptance by one of the Princes was
a political necessity ; this he said repeatedly and
with the greatest emphasis. At the same time, he
despatched a Prussian officer of the general staff and
his private secretary, Lothar Bucher, to Spain in or-
der that they might study the situation. It was
important that as far as possible the official repre-
sentative of Prussia should have no share in the
arrangement of this matter.
Prince Frederick came to Berlin, but, like his
brother, he refused, unless the King gave a command.
At the end of April, the negotiations seemed again
to have broken down. Bismarck, who was in ill
health, left Berlin for Varzin, where he remained for
six weeks.
326 Bismarck. [1867-
We are, however, not surprised, since we know that
Bismarck's interest was so strongly engaged, that he
was able after all to carry the matter through. He
seems to have persuaded Prince Carl Anton ; he then
wrote to Prim telling him not to despair; the can-
didature was an excellent thing which was not to be
lost sight of ; he must, however, negotiate not with
the Prussian Government, but with the Prince him-
self. When he wrote this he knew that he had at
last succeeded in breaking down the reluctance of
the Prince, and that the King, though he still was
unwilling to undertake any responsibility, would not
refuse his consent if the Prince voluntarily accepted.
Prince Leopold was influenced not only by his inter-
est in the Spanish race, but also by a letter from Bis-
marck, in which he said that he ought to put aside all
scruples and accept in the interests of Prussia. The
envoys had also returned from Spain and brought
back a favourable report ; they received an extra-