ordinarily hearty welcome ; we may perhaps suspect
with the King that they had allowed their report to
receive too rosy a colour ; no doubt, however, they
were acting in accordance with what they knew were
the wishes of the man who had sent them out. In
the beginning of June the decision was made ; Prince
Leopold wrote to the King that he accepted the
crown which had been ofTered to him, since he thereby
hoped to do a great service to his Fatherland. King
William immediately answered that he approved of
the decision.

Bismarck then at last was successful. A few days
later Don Salazar again travelled to Germany ; this



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 327

time he brought a formal offer, which was formally-
accepted. The Cortes were then in session ; it was
arranged that they should remain at Madrid till his
return ; the election would then be at once completed,
for a majority was assured. The secrecy had been
strictly maintained ; there were rumours indeed, but
no one knew of all the secret interviews ; men might
suspect, but they could not prove that it was an in-
trigue of Bismarck. If the election had once been
made the solemn act of the whole nation, Napoleon
would have been confronted with a fait accompli.
To have objected would have been most injurious;
he would have had to do, not with Prussia, which ap-
parently was not concerned, but with the Spanish
nation. The feeling of France would not allow him
to acquiesce in the election, but it would have deeply
offended the dignity and pride of Spain had he
claimed that the King who had been formally ac-
cepted should, at his demand, be rejected. He could
scarcely have done so without bringing about a war;
a war with Spain would have crippled French re-
sources and diverted their attention from Prussia ;
even if a war did not ensue, permanent ill feeling
would be created. It is not difificult to understand
the motives by which Bismarck had been influenced.
At the last moment the plan failed. A cipher
telegram from Berlin was misinterpreted in Madrid ;
and in consequence the Cortes, instead of remaining
in session, were prorogued till the autumn. All had
depended on the election being carried out before
the secret was disclosed ; a delay of some weeks
must take place, and some indiscreet words of Salazar



328 Bismarck. [1867-

disclosed the truth. General Prim had no course
left him but to send to the French Ambassador, to
give him official information as to what had been
done and try to calm his uneasiness.

What were Bismarck's motives in this affair ? It
is improbable that he intended to use it as a means
of bringing about a war with France. He could not
possibly have foreseen the very remarkable series of
events which were to follow, and but for them a war
arising out of this would have been very unwise, for
German public opinion and the sympathy of all the
neutral Powers would have been opposed to Prussia,
had it appeared that the Government was disturbing
the peace of Europe simply in order to put a Prus-
sian prince on the throne of Spain contrary to the
wishes of France. He could not ignore German
public opinion now as he had done in old days ; he
did not want to conquer South Germany, he wished
to attract it. It seems much more probable that he
had no very clear conception of the results which
would follow ; he did not wish to lose what might
be the means of gaining an ally to Germany and
weakening France. It would be quite invaluable if,
supposing there were to be war (arising from this or
other causes), Spain could be persuaded to join in
the attack on France and act the part which Italy
had played in 1866. What he probably hoped for
more than anything else was that France would de-
clare war against Spain ; then Napoleon would waste
his strength in a new Mexico ; he would no longer
be a danger to Germany, and whether Germany
joined in the war or not, she would gain a free hand



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 329

by the preoccupation of France. If none of these
events happened, it would be an advantage that
some commercial gain might be secured for Ger-
many.

On the whole, the affair is not one which shews his
strongest points as a diplomatist ; it was too subtle
and too hazardous.

The news aroused the sleeping jealousy of Prussia
among the French people ; the suspicion and irrita-
tion of the Government was extreme, and this feel-
ing was not ill-founded. They assumed that the
whole matter was an intrigue of Bismarck's, though,
owing to the caution with which the negotiations
had been conducted, they had no proofs. They
might argue that a Prussian prince could not accept
such an offer without the permission of his sovereign,
and they had a great cause of complaint that this
permission had been given without any communica-
tion with Napoleon, whom the matter so nearly con-
cerned. The arrangement itself was not alone the
cause of alarm. The secrecy with which it had
been surrounded was interpreted as a sign of ma-
levolence.

Of course they must interfere to prevent the elec-
tion being completed. Where, however, were they
to address themselves ? With a just instinct they
directed their remonstrance, not to Madrid, but to
Berlin; they would thereby appear not to be inter-
fering with the independence of the Spaniards, but
to be acting in self-defence against the insidious
advance of German power.

They could not, however, approach Bismarck ; he



2,3*^ Bismarck. [1867-

had retired to Varzin, to recruit his health ; the
other Ministers also were absent ; the King was at
Ems. It was convenient that at this sudden crisis
they should be away, for it was imperative that the
Prussian Government should deny all complicity.
Bismarck must not let it appear that he had any
interest in, or knowledge of, the matter ; he therefore
remained in the seclusion of Pomerania.

Benedetti also was absent in the Black Forest. On
the 4th of July, therefore, the French Charge d' Af-
faires, M. de Sourds, called at the Foreign Office and
saw Herr von Thiele. " Visibly embarrassed," he
writes, " he told me that the Prussian Government
was absolutely ignorant of the matter and that it
did not exist for them." This was the only answer
to be got; in a despatch sent on the nth to the
Prussian agents in Germany, Bismarck repeated the
assertion. " The matter has nothing to do with Prus-
sia. The Prussian Government has always considered
and treated this affair as one in which Spain and the
selected candidate are alone concerned." This was
literally true, for it had never been brought before
the Prussian Ministry, and no doubt the records of
the office would contain no allusion to it ; the
majority of the Ministers were absolutely ignorant
of it.

Of course M. de Sourds did not believe Herr von
Thiele's statement, and his Government was not satis-
fied with the explanation ; the excitement in Paris
was increasing; it was fomented by the agents of the
Ministry, and in answer to an interpolation in the
Chamber, the Due de Grammont on the 6th de-



1870] Outbreak of War- with France. 331

clared that the election of the Prince was inadmissi-
ble ; he trusted to the wisdom of the Prussian and the
friendship of the Spanish people not to proceed in
it, but if his hope were frustrated they would know
how to do their duty. They were not obliged to
endure that a foreign Power by setting one of its
Princes on the throne of Charles V. should destroy
the balance of power and endanger the interests and
honour of France. He hoped this would not happen ;
they relied on the wisdom of the German and the
friendship of the Spanish people to avoid it ; but if
it were necessary, then, strong in the support of the
nation and the Chamber, they knew how to fulfil their
duty without hesitation or weakness.

The French Ministry hereby publicly declared that
they held the Prussian Government responsible for
the election, and they persisted in demanding the
withdrawal, not from Spain, but from Prussia ; Prim
had suggested that as the Foreign Office refused to
discuss the matter, Grammont should approach the
King personally. Benedetti received instructions to
go to the King at Ems and request him to order or
advise the Prince to withdraw. At first Grammont
wished him also to see the Prince himself ; on se-
cond thoughts he forbade this, for, as he said, it was
of the first importance that the messages should be
conveyed by the King ; he was determined to use
the opportunity for the humiliation of Germany.

If it was the desire of the French in this way to
establish the complicity of Prussia, it was impera-
tive that the Prussian Government should not allow
them to do so. They were indeed in a disagreeable



T);^2 Bismarck. [1867-

situation ; they could not take up the French chal-
lenge and allow war to break out ; not only would
the feeling of the neutral Powers, of England and of
Russia, be against them, but that of Germany itself
would be divided. With what force would the anti-
Prussian party in Bavaria and Wiirtemberg be able
to oppose a war undertaken apparently for the dynas-
tic interests of the Hohenzollern ! If, however, the
Prince now withdrew, the French would be able to
proclaim that he had done so in consequence of the
open threats of France ; supposing they were able to
connect the King in any way with him, then they
might assert that they had checked the ambition of
Prussia ; Prussian prestige would be seriously injured
at home, and distrust of Prussian good faith would
be aroused abroad.

The King therefore had a difficult task when
Benedetti asked for an interview. He had been
brought into this situation against his own will, and
his former scruples seemed fully justified. He com-
plained of the violence of the French Press and the
Ministry ; he repeated the assertion that the Prus-
sian Government had been unconnected with the
negotiations and had been ignorant of them ; he had
avoided associating himself with them, and had only
given an opinion when Prince Leopold, having de-
cided to accept, asked his consent. He had then
acted, not in his sovereign capacity as King of Prus-
sia, but as head of the family. He had neither col-
lected nor summoned his council of Ministers, though
he had informed Count Bismarck privately. He
refused to use his authority to order the Prince to



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 333

withdraw, and said that he would leave him full
freedom as he had done before.

These statements were of course verbally true ;
probably the King did not know to what extent
Bismarck was responsible for the acceptance by
the Prince. They did not make the confidence of
the French any greater ; it was now apparent that the
King had been asked, and had given his consent
without considering the effect on France ; they could
not acquiesce in this distinction between his acts as
sovereign and his acts as head of the family, for, as
Benedetti pointed out, he was only head of the family
because he was sovereign.

All this time Bismarck was still at Varzin ; while
Paris was full of excitement, while there were hour-
ly conferences of the Ministers and the city was
already talking of war, the Prussian Ministers osten-
tatiously continued to enjoy their holidays. There
was no danger in doing so ; the army was so well
prepared that they could afford quietly to await what
the French would do. What Bismarck's plans and
hopes were we do not know; during these days he
preserved silence ; the violence of the French gave
him a further reason for refusing to enter into any
discussion. When, however, he heard of Benedetti's
visit to Ems he became uneasy ; he feared that the
King would compromise himself; he feared that the
French would succeed in their endeavour to inflict
a diplomatic defeat on Prussia. He proposed to go
to Ems to support the King, and on the 12th left
Varzin ; that night he arrived in Berlin. There
he received the news that the Prince of Hohen-



334 Bismarck. [1867-

zollern, on behalf of his son, had announced his
withdrawal.

The retirement was probably the spontaneous act
of the Prince and his father ; the decisive influence
was the fear lest the enmity of Napoleon might
endanger the position of the Prince of Roumania.
Everyone was delighted ; the cloud of war was dis-
pelled ; two men only were dissatisfied — Bismarck
and Grammont. It was the severest check which Bis-
marck's policy had yet received ; he had persuaded
the Prince to accept against his will ; he had per-
suaded the King reluctantly to keep the negotia-
tions secret from Napoleon ; however others might
disguise the truth, he knew that they had had to
retreat from an untenable position, and retreat before
the noisy insults of the French Press and the open
menace of the French Government ; his anger was
increased by the fact that neither the King nor the
Prince had in this crisis acted as he would have
wished.

We have no authoritative statement as to the
course he himself would have pursued ; he had, ac-
cording to his own statement, advised the King not
to receive the French Ambassador ; probably he
wished that the Prince should declare that as the
Spaniards had offered him the crown and he had
accepted it, he could not now withdraw unless he
were asked to do so by Spain ; the attempt of Gram-
mont to fasten a quarrel on Prussia would have been
deprived of any responsible pretext ; he would have
been compelled to bring pressure to bear on the Span-
iards, with all the dangers that that course would



1870] Outbj^eak of War with Finance. 335

involve. We may suspect that he had advised this
course and that his advice had been rejected. How-
ever this may be, Bismarck felt the reverse so keenly
that it seemed to him impossible he could any longer
remain Minister, unless he could obtain redress for
the insults and menaces of France. What prospect
was there now of this ? It was no use now going on
to Ems; he proposed to return next day to Varzin,
and he expected that when he did so he would be
once more a private man.

He was to be saved by the folly of the French.
Grammont, vain, careless, and inaccurate, carried
away by his hatred of Prussia, hot-headed and blus-
tering, did not even see how great an advantage he
had gained. When Guizot, now a very old man, living
in retirement, heard that the Prince had withdrawn,
he exclaimed : " What good fortune these people
have! This is the finest diplomatic victory which
has been won in my lifetime." This is indeed the
truth ; how easy it would have been to declare that
France had spoken and her wishes had been fulfilled !
the Government need have said no more, but every
Frenchman would have always told the story how
Bismarck had tried to put a Hohenzollern on the
throne of Spain, had been foiled by the word of the
Emperor, and had been driven from office. Gram-
mont prepared to complete the humiliation of Prussia,
and in doing so he lost all and more than all he had
won.

He had at first declared that the withdrawal of
the Prince was worthless when it was officially com-
municated to him by Prussia ; now he extended his



^T,6 Bismarck. [i867~

demands. He suggested to the Prussian Ambassador
at Paris that the King should write to the Emperor
a letter, in which he should express his regret for
what had happened and his assurance that he
had had no intention of injuring France. To Ben-
edetti he telegraphed imperative orders that he was
to request from the King a guarantee for the future,
and a promise that he would never again allow the
Prince to return to the candidature. It was to give
himself over to an implacable foe. As soon as Bis-
marck heard from Werther of the first suggestion, he
telegraphed to him a stern reprimand for having
listened to demands so prejudicial to the honour of
his master, and ordered him, under the pretext of ill
health, to depart from Paris and leave a post for
which he had shewn himself so ill-suited.

That same morning he saw Lord Augustus Loftus,
and he explained that the incident was not yet
closed ; Germany, he said, did not wish for war, but
they did not fear it. They were not called on to
endure humiliations from France ; after what had
happened they must have some security for the
future ; the Due de Grammont must recall or ex-
plain the language he had used ; France had begun
to prepare for war and that would not be allowed.

" It is clear," writes the English Ambassador, " that
Count Bismarck and the Prussian Ministry regret the
attitude which the King has shewn to Count Benedetti,
and feel, in regard to public opinion, the necessity of
guarding the honour of the nation."

To the Crown Prince, who had come to Berlin,



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 2iZl

Bismarck was more open ; he declared that war was
necessary.

This very day there were taking place at Ems
events which were to give him the opportunity for
which he longed. On Benedetti had fallen the task
of presenting the new demands to the King ; it was
one of the most ungrateful of the many unpleasant
duties which had been entrusted to him during the
last few years. In the early morning, he went out in
the hope that he might see someone of the Court ;
he met the King, himself who was taking the waters.
The King at once beckoned to him, entered into
conversation, and shewed him a copy of the Cologne
Gazette containing the statement of the Prince's
withdrawal. Benedetti then, as in duty bound,
asked permission to inform his Government that the
King would undertake that the candidature should
not be resumed at any time. The King, of course,
refused, and, when Benedetti pressed the request,
repeated the refusal with some emphasis, and then,
beckoning to his adjutant, who had withdrawn a few
paces, broke off the conversation. When a few
hours later the King received a letter from the
Prince of Hohenzollern confirming the public state-
ment, he sent a message to Benedetti by his aide-de-
camp. Count Radziwill, and added to it that there
would now be nothing further to say, as the incident
was closed. Benedetti twice asked for another in-
terview, but it was refused.

He had done his duty, he had made his request,
as he expected, in vain, but between him and the
King there had been no departure by word or gest-



338 Bismarck. [i867-

ure from the ordinary courtesy which we should ex-
pect from these two accomplished gentlemen. All
the proceedings indeed had been unusual, for it was
not the habit of the King, as it was of Napoleon, to
receive foreign envoys except on the advice of his
Ministers, and the last conversation had taken place
on the public promenade of the fashionable water-
ing-place ; but the exception had been explained
and justified by the theory that the King's interest in
the affair was domestic and not political. Both were
anxious to avoid war, and the King to the last
treated Benedetti with marked graciousness ; he had
while at Ems invited him to the royal table, and
even now, the next morning before leaving Ems,
granted him an audience at the station to take leave.
Nevertheless, he had been seriously annoyed by this
fresh demand ; he was pained and surprised by the
continuance of the French menaces ; he could not
but fear that there was a deliberate intention to force
a quarrel on him. He determined, therefore, to re-
turn to Berlin, and ordered Abeken, Secretary to
the Foreign Office, who was with him, to telegraph
to Bismarck an account of what had taken place, with
a suggestion that the facts should be published.

It happened that Bismarck, when the telegram
arrived, was dining with Roon and Moltke, who had
both been summoned to Berlin. The three men
were gloomy and depressed ; they felt that their
country had been humiliated, and they saw no pros-
pect of revenge. This feeling was increased when
Bismarck read aloud the telegram to his two col-
leagues. These repeated and impatient demands,



1870] Oiitbreak of War with France. 339

this intrusion on the King's privacy, this ungenerous
playing with his kindly and pacific disposition, stirred
their deepest indignation ; to them it seemed that
Benedetti had been treated with a consideration he
did not deserve ; the man who came with these pro-
posals should have been repulsed with more marked
indignation. But in the suggestion that the facts
should be published, Bismarck saw the opportunity
he had wished. He went into the next room and
drafted a statement ; he kept to the very words of
the original telegram, but he left out much, and ar-
ranged it so that it should convey to the reader the
impression, not of what had really occurred, but of
what he would have wished should happen. With
this he returned, and as he read it to them, Roon
and Moltke brightened ; here at last was an answer
to the French insults ; before, it sounded like a
" Chamade " (a retreat), now it is a " Fanfare,"
said Moltke. " That is better," said Roon. Bis-
marck asked a few questions about the army. Roon
assured him that all was prepared ; Moltke, that,
though no one could ever foretell with certainty the
result of a great war, he looked to it with confidence ;
they all knew that with the publication of this state-
ment the last prospect of peace would be gone. It
was published late that night in a special edition of
the North German Gazette, and at the same time a
copy was sent from the Foreign Office to all German
embassies and legations.

It is not altogether correct to call this (as has often
been done) a falsification of the telegram. Under
no circumstances could Bismarck have published in



340 Bismarck. [1867-

its original form the confidential nnessage to him from
his sovereign ; all he had to do was to communi-
cate to the newspapers the facts of which he had
been informed, or so much of the facts as it seemed
to him desirable that the public should know. He,
of course, made the selection in such a form as to
produce upon public opinion the particular effect
which for the purposes of his policy he wished.
What to some extent justifies the charge is that the
altered version was published under the heading,
" Ems." The official statement was supplemented
by another notice in the NortJi German Gazette, which
was printed in large type, and stated that Benedetti
had so far forgotten all diplomatic etiquette that he
had allowed himself to disturb the King in his holi-
days, to intercept him on the promenade, and to at-
tempt to force demands upon him. This was untrue,
but on this point the telegram to Bismarck had been
itself incorrect. Besides this, Bismarck doubtless saw
to it that the right instructions should be given to
the writers for the Press.

But, indeed, this was hardly necessary ; the state-
ment itself was a call to arms. During all these days
the German people had been left almost Avithout in-
struction or guidance from the Government ; they
had heard with astonishment the sudden outbreak
of Gallic wrath ; they were told, and were inclined to
believe it, that the Prussian Government was inno-
cent of the hostile designs attributed to it ; and the
calm of the Government had communicated itself to
them. They remained quiet, but they were still un-
easy, they knew not what to think ; now all doubt



1870] Outbreak of War with France. 341

was removed. It was then true that with unexam-
pled eagerness the French had fastened an alien
quarrel upon them, had without excuse or justifica-
tion advanced from insult to insult and menace to
menace ; and now, to crown their unparalleled acts,
they had sent this foreigner to intrude on the reserve
of the aged King, and to insult him publicly in his
own country. Then false reports came from Ems ;
it was said that the King had publicly turned his
back on Benedetti on the promenade, that the Am-
bassador had followed the King to his house, and
had at last been shewn the door, but that even
then he had not scrupled again to intrude on the
King at the railway station.* From one end of Ger-
many to another a storm of indignation arose ; they
had had enough of this French annoyance ; if the
French wished for war then war should they have ;
now there could no longer be talk of Prussian ambi-
tion ; all differences of North and South were swept
away ; wherever the German tongue was spoken men
felt that they had been insulted in the person of the
King, that it was theirs to protect his honour, and
from that day he reigned in their hearts as uncrowned
Emperor.

The telegram was as successful in France as in
Germany. There the question of peace and war
was still in debate ; there was a majority for peace,