head cattle receipts, 1,500,000. The foreign trade of St. Louis was
$100,000,000 in 1920, an increase of 825,000,000 over 1919. The
total tonnage shipped out of St. Louis in 1920, domestic and export,
was 29,036,405 (by rail) and 166,140 (by water); tonnage received
in the same year was 43,104,519 (by rail) and 177,925 (by water).
The more important new buildings of the period 1910-20 with
the amounts they cost were: the Statler hotel, $3,000,000; the War-
wick hotel, 8400,000; the cathedral of St. Louis, $2,000,000; the
Missouri athletic club, $500,000; the Railway Exchange, $3,000,000,
18 storeys, covering an entire city block; the University club, $600,-
ooo; the Young Women's Christian Association, $500,000; the
Boatmen's bank, $750,000; the Arcade, $1,250,000; the Post-Des-
patch building, $500,000; the Bevo Manufacturing Company,
$1,000,000. The cost of new buildings in 1919 was $20,538,450.
The St. Louis Republic, a morning newspaper founded in 1808,
was purchased in 1919 by the St. Louis Globe-Democrat (a Republi-
can paper), and discontinued. This left two morning newspapers,
the Globe-Democrat, and the Westliche Post (German). There was a
marked increase in the circulation of the evening papers.
When the Armistice was signed Nov. n 1918 one in 13 of the
city's pop. 56,944 was in the army, navy or marine corps.
The total casualties were 2,511, of which 1,384 were killed in
battle. Of the three Liberty Loans, St. Louis took the equivalent
of 25% of the assessed value of the city's realty and personalty.
On the third, fourth and fifth calls for loans the St. Louis Federal
Reserve district was the first to subscribe its quota. On the
third loan the city subscribed $65 for every man, woman and
child, nearly three times the quota. (W. B. ST.)
ST. MIHIEL, BATTLE OF: see WOEVRE, BATTLES IN THE,
section 2.
ST. PIERRE and MIQUELON (see 24.41). During the early
years of the decade 1910-20 this little French colony suffered se-
verely as a result of unprofitable fisheries, and large nun.bers of
its people emigrated to Nova Scotia and Quebec. After the World
War began in 1914 the French draft law called all the malt inhabi-
tants of conscript age to France where they took part in various
services. As their withdrawal crippled the fisheries, which could
not be prosecuted by the older people and the women and children,
the survivors were returned as speedily as possible and ordinary
operations were resumed. But during the decade, also, the use of
the steam trawlers in the fisheries was on the increase, displacing
the wooden sailing vessels previously employed, and this also les-
sened the number of those finding steady employment. However,
during the later years of the war, with fish increasing in value, the
colony became very prosperous, and after the Armistice the French
Government decided to build a large refrigerating plant, costing
about 1,000,000 at St. Pierre for the treatment of cod and other
fishes. The financial success of this project was doubted by many,
but this deep-sea fishery was being supported by France as a
training school of men for its navy, and for the same reason
generous bounties are given on all the fish caught. The pop. was
in 1920 about 4,500, but the prosperity of the little community
was impaired by the difficulties of exchange.
SAINT-SAfiNS, CHARLES CAMILLE (1835-1921), French
musical composer (see 24.44), died at Algiers Dec. 16 1921.
SAINTSBURY, GEORGE EDWARD BATEMAN (1845- ),
English man of letters (see 24.45), published subsequently to 1910
a History of English Prose Rhythm (1912); The English Novel
(1913) ; A First Book oj English Literature (1914) ; The Peace of the
Augustans (1916); A History of the French Novel (2 vols., 1917-9)
and Notes on a Cellarbook (1920).
SAIONJI, KIMMOCHI, PRINCE (1839- ), Japanese states-
man, was born in Kyoto, in 1839. When less than 20 years of age,
he took part in the councils which led to the Restoration and at
19 was commander-in-chief of an imperial army. He studied in
France from 1869 to 1880, and returned home imbued with dem-
ocratic ideas. In 1881 he commenced his official career and in
the following year accompanied Mr. (afterwards Prince) Ito to
Europe and the United States to investigate the parliamentary
system. In 1885 he was appointed minister to Austria; in 1888
he occupied a similar post in Berlin and in 1891 was appointed
president of the Board of Decoration. In 1893, he became vice-
SAKHALIN SALONIKA CAMPAIGNS
345
president of the House of Peers and was raised to the Privy Coun-
cil in 1894. In the same year he received the portfolio of educa-
tion in the second Ito Cabinet, temporarily acting as Minister of
Foreign Affairs during the illness of the late Count Mutsu. He
was again Minister for Education in the third Ito Cabinet from
Jan. to June 1898, and was nominated president of the Privy
Council on the death of Count Kuroda, three times acting as
prime minister during the interval between the resignation of one
Cabinet and the formation of the succeeding one. In July 1903,
he became the leader of the Seiyu-Kai and in 1905 formed his
first Cabinet as prime minister; he was again premier in 1911 to
1012. In 1919 he represented Japan as chief envoy at the Peace
Conference and was invested with the Grand Order of Merit. He
was made a prince in 1920 in recognition of his services in connex-
ion with the World War and the Peace Conference.
SAKHALIN (see 24.54). The Japanese portion of the island
of Sakhalin, to the S. of the parallel of 50 N. lat., known
officially as Karafuto, was ceded to Japan under the treaty of
peace with Russia in Oct. 1905. The area is about 13,148 sq. m.
and the pop. in 1920 was 105,765. The taxes and other sources
of revenue from the island, with the addition of a grant of about
700,000 yen from the national treasury, are sufficient to cover the
administration, the budget balancing at about 10,000,000 yen.
The chief industry of the island, and one of the oldest, is that of
the fisheries, and these are being successfully developed. The most
important is the herring fishery, followed by trout and salmon,
these all being relegated to specially controlled areas; cod and
crab are also plentiful, the latter being canned and exported chiefly
to America.
About 17,000 ac. of land were under cultivation in 1918, the chief
crops raised being oats, barley, potatoes, peas and buckwheat.
More than 900,000 ac., suitable for cultivation and pasturage, are
still available and many settlers are engaged in agriculture, the cli-
mate and soil rendering this a profitable undertaking. There are
over 8,000,000 ac. of practically untouched forest, chiefly conifer,
on the island, providing in the future an almost inexhaustible sup-
ply for the manufacture of pulp for paper-making. In consequence,
five pulp manufactories have already been established, each pro-
ducing over 10,000 tons per annum, and five more are projected.
There are three important coal-fields in the island, producing
about 136,000 tons annually. Alluvial gold is found in the river
beds, iron pyrites exist in large quantities in the Notoro peninsula,
and in 1907 and 1913 oil-bearing strata were discovered on the W.
coast in large areas at Anshi and Notasamu. (H. SA.)
SALANDRA, ANTONIO (1853- ), Italian statesman, was
born at Troia in 1853. He first entered parliament as member
for Lucera and from the beginning of his political career he sym-
pathized with the views of Baron Sonnino. When the latter be-
came Treasury Minister in the Crispi Cabinet of 1893, Salandra
was chosen under-secretary in that department. He was Minister
of Finance in the first Sonnino Cabinet of 1906 and Treasury
Minister in the second (1909-10). When in March 1914 Sig.
Giolitti resigned, Sig. Salandra was called upon to form the new
Cabinet, and he was Premier when the World War broke out in
Aug. following. On the death of the Marquis di San Giuliano in
Oct. he offered the Foreign Office to his former chief, Baron Son-
nino, who accepted it. It was the Salandra Cabinet which took
the momentous decision of bringing Italy into the World War on
the side of the Allies, and it conducted the Government of the
country during the first months of the campaign more success-
fully than any of the succeeding war Cabinets. On resigning
office in June 1916, he continued to support both the Boselli and
the Orlando Cabinets. As professor of Constitutional Law in the
university of Naples he published several important works on
legal subjects, and translated Spencer's Principles of Sociology.
SALISBURY, JAMES EDWARD HUBERT GASCOYNE-CECIL,
4TH MARQUESS OF (1861- ), English politician, eldest son of
the 3rd marquess (see 24.76), was educated at Eton and University
College, Oxford, where he took a second-class in History in 1884.
The next year he entered Parliament as member for Darwen. He
was defeated in 1892, but he returned as member for Rochester in
1893 and remained in the House of Commons till he succeeded his
father in 1903. He fought in the S. African War with the 4th
battalion of the Bedfordshire regiment, and was mentioned in
despatches. On his return in 1900 he became Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, a post which on succeeding to the peerage he
quitted for that of Privy Seal in the Cabinet of his cousin, Mr.
Arthur Balfour; and he held, for some months in 1905, the office
of President of the Board of Trade. Lord Salisbury never loomed
large in the House of Commons, though he was for some years
chairman of the Church Parliamentary Committee, and dis-
charged competently his duties as Foreign Under-Secretary. But
he gradually came to occupy a position of increased authority in
the Upper House. He threw in his lot in 1911 with the "Die-
hards," and spoke in favour of defeating the Parliament bill and
daring the Government to create sufficient peers to carry it. Dur-
ing the early years of the war he was energetic in the discharge of
his military duties as lieutenant-colonel of his yeomanry regiment.
He did not join either Coalition Government, but was critical of
both, taking an independent line. As the war drew to a dose he
gradually came to assume the informal leadership of a Conserva-
tive and Unionist Opposition in his House, showing himself par-
ticularly sensitive to departures from the old poh'cy of his party
on Irish and ecclesiastical questions. He married in 1887 Lady
Cicely Alice Gore, daughter of the 5th Earl of Arran, and had
two sons and two daughters. He was created K.G. in 1917.
SALONIKA CAMPAIGNS, 1915-1918. Under the heading of
SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS the conquest of Serbia in 1915 by Austro-
Hungarian forces is narrated. The idea of reinforcing the
Serbian front with Allied forces had been contemplated both in
England and in France some time before it was carried out.
British and French guns, in charge of naval missions, had taken
some part in the campaign of 1914, and stores had been sent up
from Salonika at intervals. In the winter of 1914-5 Lord
Kitchener several times considered the advisability of sending
a number of the British Army Divisions into Serbia via Salonika.
On the part of the French, M. Briand, it is said, proposed later
in 1914 to make a serious military effort in the Balkans. But
the Dardanelles campaign diverted attention from this project,
and it was not till in August 1915, when the failure of the Dar-
danelles offensive was evident, that the creation of an Anglo-
French army on the Balkan front was seriously undertaken.
General Sarrail, whose military reputation stood very high in
France, had been suddenly deprived of his command of the III.
Army by Joffre, ostensibly owing to an unsuccessful combat
at Boureuilles in Argonne, but really as the result of long-con-
tinued friction between the two. Sarrail, however, stood in
close relations with the political leaders of the Left, and the
autocratic methods of Joffre's G.Q.G. had already raised con-
siderable opposition in the Government and the Chamber;
it suited the Government, therefore, to satisfy the Left, to snub
the G.Q.G., and to remove to a distance a forceful and ambitious
personality, by sending Sarrail to the Mediterranean as com-
mander of an army yet to be created.
Appointed on Aug. 5, Sarrail was ordered to study the military
situation and submit proposals. In his written projects he came
to the conclusion that it was impossible to abandon ground in
the Gallipoli peninsula, and had asked for both his own and the
British contingents to be made up entirely from forces in France
or in England. An inter-Allied conference, held at Calais early
in September, had agreed to this, but with the reservation that
no forces were to go till after the forthcoming Champagne and
Artois offensives had taken place. But the news of the Bul-
garian mobilization drove home at last the urgency of the crisis.
Orders went to the Dardanelles on Sept. 26 for two British
Divisions in the sequel one to go thence to Salonika; the
French " Expeditionary Corps " was likewise to send a Division,
and the Greek authorities had agreed to permit the landing.
Sarrail himself was to bring a mixed brigade from France, as
an earnest of the forces promised later.
On Oct. 3 advanced parties of the French landed at Salonika
without difficulty, only a formal protest being made by the
authorities on the spot. Next day M. Venizelos in a speech
at Athens declared that Greece would come to the aid of her
ally Serbia against any attack by Bulgaria, and at once a crisis
arose at Athens. On the sth King Constantine informed
Venizelos that the policy indicated had not his support, and the
Government fell, to give place to the neutralist Zaimis cabinet.
346
SALONIKA CAMPAIGNS
During the first few days instructions from Paris to Bailloud
(commanding on the spot pending Sarrail's arrival) varied
several times, apparently in accordance with political nuances.
At first (Oct. 3) the word was to concentrate at Nish, in the
heart of Serbia; next, the Greek frontier was not to be crossed
(Oct. 10); and then again (Oct. 12) authority was given to take
over protection of the railway between Demir Kapu defile and
the Greek frontier against possible attack from Strumitsa in
Bulgaria, thereby releasing a small Serbian force to rejoin its
own army. Meantime the Serbians demanded more direct
assistance, but Sarrail (who arrived on the I2th), taking into
account the size of his force only 1 5 divisions plus the British
roth Div. which was not under his orders and the fact that it
could only disembark and push on by driblets, determined to
limit his advance to the near side of Demir Kapu. On Oct. 14
the leading French troops arrived at Strumitsa station (in Serbia)
in time to aid the Serbian railway guards in repelling an inroad
from Strumitsa.
In Sarrail's opinion the only service he could render was to
concentrate on the routes to Strumitsa, and, by an offensive into
Bulgarian territory, to draw off as many Bulgarian forces as
possible from the main attack further north. General Mahon,
commanding the British loth Div., took the same view, 1 and
formed a mixed force which began to move up to Doiran, on the
right rear of the French group in the Rabrovo region. On the
1 7th, however, in answer to a request from the Serbian com-
mander at Uskub, Sarrail began to push a brigade beyond the
Demir Kapu defile to Krivolak, but he refused to advance it to
Veles, though again pressed to do so by the Serbs, and in fact
a sharp attack developed from Strumitsa on Rabrovo on the
zist and 22nd, which, till it was repulsed, threatened to isolate
all French detachments N. of Strumitsa station. Meanwhile,
Paris sent further instructions to the effect that all possible
help should be afforded to the Serbs, subject to the limitation
that the French communications with Salonika were in no case
to be compromised. In reality, the French and British Govern-
ments were very uneasy about the attitude of the Greek Army,
a considerable force of which lay in the region N.E. of Salonika.
The fall of Venizelos had put an end to the prospect of Greek
cooperation, and under the new regime the local military and
civil authorities began to oppose every move of the Allies,
which was not entirely covered by Serbia's treaty rights, to the
use of Salonika and the railway. Thus, when Mahon's force
moved forward the use of the Salonika- Kilkish (Kukush)-Doir-
an line was refused, and it had to use the main line, detrain
in the midst of the French, and work thence outwards towards
its post at Doiran.
On Nov. i the i22nd French Div. began to arrive from France,
and Sarrail had already prepared to attack from Rabrovo
towards Strumitsa with Bailloud's is6th Div., with Mahon in
echelon behind his right, while his forces about Krivolak and
Kavadar (sist Div.) made ready to attack in flank any Bul-
garian force which should advance up the Cerna (Tserna) in
pursuit of the Serbians. On Nov. 3 an attack was accordingly
delivered northward from a front E. of Rabrovo; weather and
the difficulty of the country brought it, however, to a standstill
on the 6th, though local advances were made later. At this
moment (Nov. 4) GaUieni, having become War Minister in the
new French cabinet, telegraphed orders for the French Army
to operate towards Veles, adding that four more British divisions
were to be sent, which on arrival would take over the front
leftwards from Doiran. The British 22nd Div. was in fact
already close to Salonika, with another under orders to follow.
But Sarrail judged that it was impossible to wait for these rein-
forcements. Todorov's Bulgarian Army had already thrust
itself between the Serbian Main Army and Krivolak, and the
1 According to Sarrail, the British Government instructed Mahon
that his troops were to remain at Salonika, and it was on his own
initiative that the British general formed a mobile force. Further
instructions authorized Mahon to move forward but forbade him
to cross the Greek frontier, until on Oct. 27 a final telegram removed
this restriction.
urgent thing was to relieve pressure on that part of the Serbian
forces which was retiring by the Babuna pass on Prilep, while
reserving the possibility of action towards Veles if the Serbian
Main Army should after ah 1 seek to break through towards its
Allies. Orders were therefore given to the Krivolak-Kavadar
force (57th Div. to be reinforced by the i22nd Div.) to take the
offensive westward over the Cerna, so.as to strike the pursuers in
flank or rear. On the 6th~9th accordingly the 57th Div. crossed
the Cerna and pushed an advance into the mountains towards
the Babuna, still held by the Serbs. But the Bulgarians were
in force, and the French retired to their Cerna bridgeheads,
which the Bulgarians attacked without success on the I2th,
i3th, i4th and i5th.
During these and the following days instructions came re-
peatedly from Paris to modify the French commander's views
and dispositions, now laying emphasis upon cooperation with the
Serbs, now upon dangers from the Greek Army in rear. Finally
on Nov. 21 Sarrail was given a free hand to decide what aid he
could give to the Serbians and at what moment he should
retire on Salonika. He adopted at first a middle course. He
wished neither to attack at the risk of involving two-thirds of
his forces in the Serbian dtbdcle (the Babuna had been turned
by the N. on Nov. 14), nor to fall back to Salonika, where
prestige counted for so much, but to hold on in the entrenched
camp of Kavadar in the hope of " something turning up."
On the 2ist-22nd, however, the retirement of the i22nd Div.
over the Cerna under some pressure, together with the general
military situation and a definitive refusal of reinforcements from
France, 2 decided him in favour of falling back to Salonika, a
decision approved by Gallieni. Four days later Sarrail was
officially informed that the Serbians were retreating in the Adri-
atic direction. The preparations for the Vardar retirement had
already begun on the 24th with the seizure of a position on the
E. bank, to prevent interference with the retreat of the Krivolak-
Kavadar force on Demir Kapu. On Dec. i only rear-guards
remained at Krivolak. By the night of the 3rd-4th all troops
were inside Demir Kapu, and on the 6th this position also was
given up. On the 8th the Bulgarians, who had from time to
time attacked the rear-guards on the Vardar and the positions
near Kosturino on the Strumitsa route, delivered a more con-
certed attack on the front Ormanli (now held by the British)-
Kosturino-Gradets on the E. and Mirovcha Petrovo on the W.
of the Vardar. Their evident intention was envelopment, and
on the pth, judging the centre of his line to be too pronounced
a salient, Sarrail took up a position along the Petrovska stream,
W. of the Vardar and the heights of Dedeli E. of it, the village
of Dedeli being held by Mahon's forces, which from that point
were echeloned back to Lake Doiran. From this position also
the Allies retired under threat of envelopment during the night
11-12, after holding their ground against attacks on the nth.
Lastly, the French i22nd and 57th Divs., at Gyevgyeli (Gevgeli)
and near Doiran, covered the evacuation of part of Mahon's force
on to the Salonika railway and the reconstitution of the is6th
French Div., which had been considerably split up.
Thus the drive into Serbia came to an end, with little material
loss, but a sad diminution of prestige, and the forces fell back
to the following positions about Salonika: advanced guards of
I2oth French Div. Karasuli with a detachment at Gumenye, and
of 57th French Div. with cavalry, Kilkish, with a detachment
at Kilindir; main body (i 22nd, is6th, 57th) in position on the line
Doganyi-Daudli. British loth and 22nd Divs. Salonika, with
other British forces arriving. Important points on the railway
had been destroyed during the retreat. Meanwhile, on Dec. 4,
1 At that moment, according to Falkenhayn, the combatant
strength of the Allies in France was to that of the Germans in the
ratio of rather more than 3 to 2. Sarrail says that in his interview
with Lord Kitchener on Nov. 17, the latter informed him that
Joffre had declared that he would not give him (Sarrail) another
man, and that the British would furnish five divisions instead. In
accordance with this promise, besides the loth and 22nd Divs., the
27th and 28th Divs. from France landed at Salonika in the last days
of Nov. and first days of Dec., and the 26th Div. also from France,
early in Jan. 1916.
SALONIKA CAMPAIGNS
347
the Serbs had evacuated Monastir in their now frankly' west-
ward retirement.
The reassembly- of the Allied Salonika forces around their
port of origin naturally raised the question were they to
remain there? Their locus standi had been the fact that they
were Allies of Serbia using a line of communications to which
Serbia was by treaty entitled. This part of the case no longer
existed, Serbia being wholly in the hands of the enemy, and
could only be revived if and when the Serbian Army were trans-
ferred from the Adriatic ports on which it had retreated to
Salonika. Another part of the justification for the Allies'
presence was the admitted fact that they had come at the re-
quest of Venizelos, and for the purposes of common action with
the Greeks, but since Venizelos's fall even the Zaimis cabinet,
representing " benevolent " neutrality, had given way to a
cabinet representing at least strict neutrality, 1 which gave the
Germanophil element at Salonika all the official justification
it needed to pursue the policy of obstruction that it had already
initiated in the Zaimis period. On the other hand the factor of
prestige was one of great weight, especially in view of the pend-
ing abandonment of the Dardanelles compaign, and although
Sarrail suggested that evacuation followed by a dramatic
offensive at some other point would more than restore the
lost prestige, it was decided that Salonika should be held.
Beyond that decision, however, no clear military or political
intention was at that time formed. The policies of the British,
French and Russian Governments were in unison as to the
problem of Greece, and it seems to have been thought that,
by remaining, the Salonika force would confront the enemy
with as difficult a diplomatic problem as its own. This was,
indeed, the case. The policy to be followed by the Central
Powers, both towards Greece and in occupied Serbia and Albania,
was wholly unsettled. " While the troops of the two Imperial
Armies were hastening from victory to victory," says General