into tihe Habsburg dominions, Slavonia and southern Hungary,
in order to escape the fury of the Turks; Flemish and French
Protestants fled in thousands to the British Islands; and the
Electors of Brandenburg peopled their wast* spaces with Hugue-
not refugees from France and Protestant refugees from southern
Germany. In the industrial age the migrations took another
form. German industrial expansion demanded a vast supply of
cheap labour, and this was provided by a mass immigration of
Sla^s, which created misgiving even when the German Empire
was supremely powerful. 1 Little misgiving -was created, on the
other hand, by the still vaster immigration of all the less devel-
oped -nationalities of Europe into the United States and, later,
into 'the British Dominions. The process, indeed, was in itself
unobjectionable so long as the migrating masses carried with
them no conscious sentiment of nationality in a political sense,
and no claim to assert themselves as separate entities, i.e, so
long as allegiance was conceived as due not to the nationality
but to the state. It is quite another thing when, under the
principle of self-determination, the balance of nationalities in
any given state becomes a matter of vital importance to the
state itself. The Emperor Leopold I. would hardly have given
special privileges to the Slavs who sought refuge in his domin-
ions had he foreseen that this migration would lead, some 200
years later, to the downfall of the Habsburg Empire and dynasty.
The damger of similar consequences is increased when the con-
stitution -of the state itself is made dependent upon a popular
vote, and all the signs point to the fact that self-contained
nations will no longer permit promiscuous immigration the
United States has set the example by " tightening up " its
immigration laws and will be increasingly intolerant of national
divergencies within their own borders. The effect of the principle
of self-determination, logically applied, would therefore be to
establish the nationalities as jealously segregated nations, prob-
ably surrounded by tariff walls, certainly defended against dan-
gerous infiltration of alien elements from without by rigid rules
as to naturalization, and earnestly bent on reducing all within
their borders to the same national model. The danger to peace
of attempting to confine the expansive forces of nationalism
within such artificial limits is obvious, and the danger will not
be avoided by the creation of an international force, such as the
League of Nations, charged with the duty of preserving the
status quo or of readjusting it according to the ebb and flow of
the national life of the several communities; for the pressure of
the forces of expansion of vigorous nationalities, artificially
restrained, would blow the League to pieces.
It may be that the economic development of the world, by
increasingly demonstrating the interdependence of nations, will
reduce the sentiment of nationality to the position it occupied
during the long ages when it was not the basis of the state, still
less an intolerant crusading power. But the World War at least
proved that the international movement associated with labour,
disfigured as it was by its insistence on the necessity of a new
form of war that of class against class was powerless against
the passion of nationality. The true hope of peace for the future
lies in the recovery by the world of the idea of the state, what-
ever form it may take, as a thing apart from and above the idea
of nationality and infinitely tolerant of national divergencies.
It is the ideal towards which the British Empire has been con-
sistently tending. The ideal League of Nations will be some
such loose confederation, embracing all the world, of which each
constituent state, while guarding its own interests, will realize
that these interests are bound up with those of the totality of
1 See a remarkable series in the Frankfurter Zcitung in 1911.
states. For such a universal union, however, the world is not
ripe; for there are peoples who are not yet capable of self-
government, and will only become so, if ever, by a long process
of education. To talk of self-determination for such peoples is
a mockery. It is also a wrong; for, as Senator Elihu Root
wisely said with reference to the Philippines, " the right to gov-
ernment is prior to the right to self-government."
See W. Alison Phillips, " Europe and the Problem of Nationality,"
Edinburgh Rev. for Jan. 1915, of which parts are incorporated in the
above article ;J.W. Headlam-Morley, " Plebiscites," Quarterly Rev.
for July 1921 (No. 468); Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Pleb-
iscites, with a collection of Official Documents (1921); Plebiscites,
vol. xxv. of the Peace Handbooks issued by the Historical Section
of the Foreign Office (1920); A History of the Peace Conference of
Paris, edited by H. W. V. Temperley (3 vols., 1920). Among more
modern foreign works on the subject are Schallmeyer, Vererbung
und Auslese im Lebenslaufe der Volker (1903) ; Kirchhoff, Zur
Verstdndigung ilber die Begriffe " Nation " und " Nationalitdt "
(1905) ; Otto Bauer, Nationalitdtenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie
(1907). (W. A. P.)
SELOUS, FREDERICK COURTNEY (1851-1917), English ex-
plorer (see 24. 614), in 1909 organized Mr. Roosevelt's hunting ex-
pedition in East Africa, and in 1910 represented Britain at the
Congress of Field Sports held at Vienna. In Aug. 1914 he offered hii
services to the War Office, but they were declined on account of
his age (he was over 62). Persistence, however, gained him a sub-
altern's commission (Feb. 1915) in the Legion of Frontiersmen
(25th Fusiliers) and he reached Mombasa in May following. Se-
lous took part in many engagements in the East African campaign,
was promoted captain and (Sept. 1916) given the D.S.O. He
was killed in action at Beho Beho on Jan. 4 1917 (a year after his
eldest son had been killed on the western front). His private col-
lection of trophies was given by his widow (Mary Maddy, whom
he married in 1894) to the Natural History Museum, London,
where in June 1920 a national memorial to him was unveiled a
bronze half-figure by W. R. Colton a Selous scholarship being
also founded at his old school, Rugby.
See J. G. Millar's Life of Frederick Courtney Selous (London 1918),
and Geog. Jnl., vol. xlix. (1917).
SENUSSI AND SENUSSITES (see 24.649) .The military activity
of the Senussi from 1900 to 1910 had been directed against the
advance of the French in the regions bordering the Sahara be-
tween Lake Chad and the Nile basin. There was evidence of an
BtXr-*-*-*- ^L
.< M.'mm.d..lHo mr . *
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,-f** \ i \ A.
THE SENUSSI COUNTRY
increase of adherents to the sect in Egypt and in Arabia; in N.W.
Africa and in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Senussiism made prac-
tically nt> headway.
396
SENUSSI AND SENUSSITES
Activity in Cyrenaica. While continuing hostilities against
the French, the Senussi sheikh Sayed (Sidi) Ahmad esh Sherif
in 191 1 aided the Turks in Cyrenaica, then commanded by Enver
Bey (later Pasha) in the campaign against Italy. The traditional
policy of the Senussites was one of suspicion in regard to the
Turks but they had been won over by Pan-Islamic propaganda.
By the Treaty of Lausanne, Oct. 1912, the Turks agreed to
evacuate Tripoli and Cyrenaica. At that time the Italians held
only the chief seaports of Cyrenaica, the rest of the country being
in the military occupation of the Senussites and their allies.
Sidi Ahmad continued the war with Italy, aided by a body of
Turkish troops, which, contrary to treaty engagements, remained
in Cyrenaica. The Italians devoted their attention to the occu-
pation of the hinterland of Tripoli (including Fezzan), a process
completed in Aug. 1914. In Cyrenaica they remained mainly on
the defensive. General Ameglio, appointed governor of Cyre-
naica towards the end of 1913, had however begun a vigorous
campaign against the Senussites, when in Feb. 1914, in conse-
quence of the threatening situation in the Balkans, orders were
issued from Rome to suspend operations.
' When the World War began, and while Italy still remained
neutral, Turkish agents, with German support, sought to make
Cyrenaica and Tripoli bases of action against the French and
British. To the tribes which rose in revolt in Tripoli and its
hinterland the Senussites gave some support, but Sidi Ahmad,
through the intermediary of chiefs friendly to Italy, was con-
ducting unofficial negotiations, and had the Italians been willing
to acknowledge his independence an accommodation with them
might have been reached. He refused however to accept the
position of "a protected Bey." By the spring of 1915 he was
again attacking Italian posts. Strong efforts had been made for
some time by the Turks and their German advisers to induce
the Senussites to invade western Egypt; a special Turkish mis-
sion now visited Sidi Ahmad and endeavoured to get him to
proclaim a jihad. The Senussi sheikh was disinclined to take the
advice offered him. The Senussites had always maintained good
relations with Egypt for much of their trade they were depen-
dent upon the good-will of the Egyptian authorities. It was the
demonstration that the Turco-Germans could give him sub-
stantial military and financial aid which finally changed Sidi
Ahmad's views. A large number of Turkish officers and some
Arabic-speaking German officers from the German garrison at
Constantinople were smuggled into Cyrenaica, a matter of little
difficulty. Among the arrivals was Nuri Bey, a half brother of
Enver Pasha who exercised much influence. Nuri was joined in
April 1915 by Ga'far Pasha, an Europeanized Arab of consider-
able ability, and with and after Ga'far came arms, ammunition
and other stores, including wireless and telephonic apparatus. 1
By Aug. 1915 the Germans were using the landing places be-
tween Sollum and Tobruk as submarine bases. The time for
putting the Turco-German plans into operation was approach-
ing. These plans were, mainly through Senussite instrumentality,
to threaten at once French north and central Africa, Nigeria,
Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. It was also designed
to penetrate to Cameroon and establish land communication
between the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. The Ger-
man Emperor, as " Islam's Protector," exhorted Sidi Ahmad
to "expel infidels from territory which belonged to true be-
lievers." But besides the Senussi sheikh the only important chief
won over to the cause was 'All Dinar, Sultan of Darfur, a trib-
utary state of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the plan failed.
French determination to secure their position in the central
Sudan contributed largely to the localization of the conflict. In
1909-10 the French had conquered Wadai (see 28.225), which
adjoins Darfur, thereby withdrawing from the Senussite sphere
a country in which they had been all powerful. In 1913, push-
ing N. from Kanem into the Saharan borderland, Colonel Largeau
conquered Borku, capturing 'Ain Galakka, the Senussite south-
l The German political agent was a certain Mannismann, who
after the defeat of Sidi Ahmad endeavoured to persuade the Senus-
sites to continue the war. He was attacked and killed in the desert
by tribesmen hostile to Ahmad.
ern base, in November, of that year. In the middle of 1914
Bardai, the chief settlement in the Tibesti highlands, was occu-
pied. 2 These newly conquered regions on the southern fringe of
the Libyan Desert were placed under the control of Lt.-Col. J.
Tilho. Though risings against their authority by chiefs acting
on Senussite instructions, and raids by nomads continued up to
the early months of 1917, the French posts formed an effective
barrier against any Senussite advance into central Africa.
Campaign in Western Egypt. Since May 1915 the danger of
a Senussite invasion of western Egypt had existed. It was due
to the great tact with which Lt.-Col. C. L. Snow, 3 who com-
manded the small force stationed in western Egypt, handled a
very delicate situation that the rupture with the Senussites was
delayed till Nov. 1915. At the last moment, early in November, a
final effort was made to avoid a break, Sidi Mohammed el
Idris, Senussite envoy in Egypt, being sent to Cyrenaica to
arrange for the Senussi sheikh " to get rid of his Turkish advisers
in return for a sum of money." It was too late; Sidi Ahmad was
already well supplied with German gold as well as arms.
The enemy plan of campaign was to advance in parallel lines
with two forces, one across the Libyan plateau, a great lime-
stone tableland the other farther S. along the string of oases
leading from Siwa to the Nile. Simultaneously the Sultan of
Darfur was to rise in revolt, invade Kordofan and advance
on Khartum. The plan was boldly conceived, but the danger
to Egypt and the Sudan was not chiefly in the military force
at the command of the Senussi sheikh and his allies. That
danger lay in the spiritual authority exercised by Sidi Ahmad
and the high prestige he enjoyed in Egypt. Many if not most
of the 200,000 Bedouins of western Egypt were adherents of
the Senussi sect and should the Senussi forces gain any strik-
ing success it "might lead to serious religious and internal dis-
orders." So wrote Gen. Sir John Maxwell, then commanding
the forces in Egypt, who added that the Senussi peril was his
principal source of anxiety not the Turkish attack on the
Suez Canal.
The opening of the campaign was accompanied by great ac-
tivity by German submarines off the Cyrenaican coast and in
the Gulf of Sollum; among the boats sunk were the British aux-
iliary cruiser " Tara " and the horse transport " Moorina." Sur-
vivors of the crews were handed over to the Senussi and suffered
great privations (Cyrenaica is a very desolate country and the
Senussites themselves were often short of food). Land hostilities
began on Nov. 15 but in view of the isolation and smallness of
the Egyptian garrisons at Sollum and other advanced posts
they were withdrawn, and a stretch of country 200 m. or more
in length was at once overrun by the Senussites. They advanced
as far as Dabya (90 m. W. of Alexandria and the terminus of
the railway along the coast), sweeping past, but not attacking
Mersa Matruh, the chief port of western Egypt and reached by
boat from Alexandria in 1 2 hours. This port was made the base
for the British operations.
General Maxwell's endeavour, in view of the internal situation,
was to avoid anything in the nature of a reverse, to keep the
enemy as far as possible from the Nile valley, and, as soon as
possible, to strike a decisive blow at the Senussi and by his defeat
to diminish his influence as a spiritual potentate. These aims
were achieved, but at the outset the difficulty was to get together
a force strong enough to undertake operation. In Aug. 1915,
when the situation on the western Egyptian frontier became
critical, the Gallipoli campaign was being vigorously prosecuted,
while the Turks had again advanced towards the Suez Canal.
When the Senussi invasion occurred the decision to evacuate
Gallipoli had not yet been taken, while the British Government
had just committed itself to the Salonika campaign. In these
circumstances Sir John Maxwell had to content himself with
collecting a " scratch " force to oppose the Senussi. The strength
2 Turkish troops had occupied Tibesti in 1910 and Borku in 1911.
They were recalled at the outbreak of the war with Italy.
3 Col. Snow was killed in the first action (Dec. II 1915) by an
Arab whom he was endeavouring to persuade to surrender. He had
served over 20 years in the Egyptian coastguard and was intimately
acquainted with the desert tribes.
SENUSSI AND SENUSSITES
397
of the Senussi is conjectural. The Turkish troops with them
may have numbered 1,000; the Muhafizia or Senussite regulars
were perhaps 5,000 strong. In addition there was an irregular
body of tribesmen, Arabs and Arabized Berbers, probably
numbering 20,000, all well armed and accustomed to desert
warfare, but undisciplined and untrustworthy. The Senussites
were well supplied with rifles and small-arms munitions; they
had field guns and machine-guns; they had an ample camel
transport and many of their troops were well mounted. With
them were about 100 Europeans; Ga'far Pasha was commander-
in-chief, and was accompanied by Sidi Ahmad and Nuri Bey.
Through bad leadership, or from other causes not explained,
the Senussi offensive was not carried out as planned. When the
advance across the Libyan plateau was made, Siwa oasis was also
occupied; but no further progress towards the Nile by that route
was then attempted. Moreover, 'Ali Dinar of Darfur, who had
formally renounced his allegiance to the Sudan Government in
April 1915, while preaching a jihad and indulging in abusive
letter writing, 1 did not carry out his threat of invasion. Thus at
the outset the British had to deal only with the enemy advance
along the Mediterranean coast.
Orders for the formation of a Western Frontier Force were
issued on Nov. 20. Maj.-Gen. A. Wallace, who was given the
command, took up his headquarters at Matruh on Dec. 7. His
troops consisted of Yeomanry, Territorials, Australians, New
Zealanders, Indians and Egyptians, with a squadron of armoured
cars and a squadron of aeroplanes. The striking force was a
composite mounted brigade under Brig.-Gen. J. D. T. Tyndale
Biscoe and a composite infantry brigade under Brig.-Gen. the
Earl of Lucan. " Regiments and staff had been collected," wrote
Sir John Maxwell, " somewhat hastily. . . . The composite
yeomanry brigade contained men from 20 or more different
regiments. . . . It was not until the middle of Feb. (1916) that
the condition of the Western Frontier Force could be considered
really satisfactory."
The Senussites were engaged on Dec. u and 13 in the neigh-
bourhood of Matruh with indecisive result. Having received
reinforcements, General Wallace again engaged the enemy, on
Christmas Day, at Gebel Medwa, a few miles from the coast.
The Senussites, severely handled, retreated to Halazin (officially
misspelt Hazalin), 25 m. S.W. of Matruh. Torrential rains now
interrupted operations; in any case General Wallace was too
weak to resume the offensive until further reinforced. The first of
these new reinforcements consisted of the 2nd Regt. of the ist
South African Infantry Brigade, which disembarked at Matruh
on Jan. 20 and 21 1916. They were the first S. Africans from
the Union to take part in the war outside the limits of S. Africa. 2
On. Jan. 23 the Senussites were attacked at Halazin and after
an eight-hours' stubborn engagement were defeated and fled.
The country had been turned by the rains into a quagmire and
mud played an important and unfortunate part throughout.
General Wallace's successes now induced many of the Egyp-
tian Bedouin (mostly the Walad 'Ali tribesmen) to desert the
Senussi cause. Wallace had been tied to his base at Matruh by
lack of sufficient camel transport, but by February this difficulty
was overcome and the force had been further strengthened,
partly by more South African infantry. The time for a real
offensive had come. At this period General Wallace resigned and
was succeeded by Maj.-Gen. W. E. Peyton (Feb. 9 1916).
On Feb. 20 General Peyton sent forward a force under Brig.-
Gen. H. T. Lukin (commander of the ist S. African Inf. Brig.)
with orders to take Barrini, 50 m. E. of Sollum. On the 26th
an engagement was fought at Agagia, in which Ga'far Pasha
attempted to carry out his favourite manoeuvre an enveloping
movement. This movement was checked, the infantry pressed
forward and after a two-hours' struggle the Senussites were
compelled to evacuate their position. The yeomanry were then
sent in pursuit, and the Dorset Regiment (under Col. H. M.
1 He addressed one letter to " The Governor of Hell in Kordofan
and the Inspector of Flames in Nahud."
1 A volunteer force raised in Rhodesia (the 2nd Rhodesian Regt.)
had gone to E. Africa in 1915.
Souter) in a fine charge broke into the enemy lines and captured
Ga'far Pasha. 3 Nuri Bey took over the command of the Senussi
forces, which offered little further resistance. Two British col-
umns advanced on Sollum, which was reoccupied on March 14.
Sollum is close to the Cyrenaican frontier and into Cyrenaica,
that is into Italian territory, Nuri Bey and his forces retreated
after blowing up their main ammunition dump. General Peyton
did not further pursue Nuri, but on March 17 a squadron
of armoured cars, under Major the Duke of Westminster,
raced 120 m. across the desert and rescued the survivors some
90 in number of the " Tara " and " Moorina." Shortly after-
wards General Peyton's force was reduced, the S. Africans leaving
in April for France.
Sidi Ahmad had been with Ga'far Pasha until the end of
Jan. 1916. He then went to Siwa and began the advance along
the oases that lead to the Nile. The advance came too late to
be effective, but on Feb. 1 1 Senussites occupied Baharia oasis,
some 100 m. from the fertile and densely peopled districts of
Fayum and Minia. Before the end of February the Senussites
had also occupied the more southerly oases of Farafra and Dakh-
la. Thereupon the Egyptian officials were withdrawn from
Kharga (the Great Oasis), which is connected by railway with
the Nile valley, and the Senussites proceeded to occupy it. The
strategical importance of the oases is great, but having no troops
available for an offensive in S.W. Egypt, General Maxwell took
defensive measures only. A command under Maj.-Gen. J.
Adye patrolled the region from the Fayum to Assiut and Esna.
The oases were kept under constant observation by aeroplanes,
and the Senussites did not emerge from them. After the complete
defeat of their northern force they abandoned Kharga, which
was reoccupied by the British on April 15 1916. Gen. Sir Archi-
bald Murray had meanwhile (March 19) succeeded General Max-
well in the Egyptian command.
Darfur Campaign. At this period, in the Sudan, the Sirdar,
Gen. Sir Reginald Wingate, was dealing with 'Ali Dinar of Dar-
fur. For over a year the Sultan had been openly defiant and
since Dec. 1915 had been making arrangements to invade Kor-
dofan. As the Sudan Government had not in 1915 any force
available for action in Darfur, negotiations were entered into
with him, but without result, and the belief grew in the Sudan
that the Government was too weak to deal with so powerful a
sultan ('Ali Dinar had a regular "slave" army some 10,000 in
number, for the most part well armed). Early in 1916 it had
become imperative to clear up the situation if the general peace
of the Sudan was to be preserved. Though it was the worst
season of the year for military operations the Sirdar determined
to anticipate 'Ali Dinar's offensive. An expeditionary force,
3,000 strong, was organized under command of Maj. (tempor-
ary Lt.-Col.) P. V. Kelly. Except for a detachment of the R.F.C.
the troops consisted entirely of units of the Egyptian army
this being the first time since the Mahdia that Egyptian troops
had fought Sudanese Arabs. The expedition was highly success-
ful. It was remarkable for the manner in which transport diffi-
culties were overcome. Khartum, the base, is 500 m. by rail
from the nearest seaport: El Obeid, railhead, is 428 m. from
Khartum; and from El Obeid the force had to advance nearly
400 m. across a desolate roadless country. It then had to engage
a numerically superior enemy of indomitable valour. Battle
was given by the Darfurians on May 22 (1916) at Beringa, near
El Fasher, 'Ali Dinar's capital. A body of 2,000 riflemen, sup-
ported by a large mounted force, attacked the Egyptians with
all the accustomed bravery of the Dervish warrior. They were
beaten back, counter-charged and completely defeated, losing
3 Like many other Arab officers and men in the Turkish army who
fell into the hands of the British, Ga'far Pasha joined the Arab forces
under the Emir Faisal and took part in the Syrian campaign against
the Turks. After his capture at Agagia he had been confined in the
citadel at Cairo. He tried to escape by means of a rope. Ga'far
being a very heavy man, the rope broke ; he fell, injured himself, and
was removed to hospital. While there, he learned of the Sherif of
Mecca's revolt and resolved to join his forces. In 1920 he became
Minister of Defence in the Provisional Arab Government of Meso-
potamia. He was a delegate at the Near East Conference held in
Cairo in March 1921.
398
SERBIA
over 50% of their number in killed alone. 'Ali Dinar and a con-