territory, pledges which Rumania at least did not regard as
invalidated by her subsequent Treaty (of Bucharest, May 1918)
with the Central Powers. In Feb. 1917 all three had agreed
with Japan to uphold her claims on Shantung. Finally there
were agreements of a less definite character with Serbia and with
Greece. It remained to be seen how far these compacts could
be reconciled with each other and with the views of the United
States, who had not endorsed any of them and was officially
unaware of them up to the opening of the Conference. There
remained the pre-Armistice terms which were binding on all the
parties to the Conference, and which indisputably must prevail
wherever they came into conflict with treaties of prior date.
Drafted at Washington, on the basis of a separate correspondence
between Mr. Wilson and the German Government, they had
nevertheless been considered and adopted (with certain amend-
ments) by the Supreme War Council of the Allies as the founda-
tion of the future peace. This meant that (with the exceptions
which they or Mr. Wilson had specified in Oct. and Nov. 1918)
the Allies were bound to impose no terms which clashed with
'For the preliminaries leading to the Armistice of Nov. n 1918,
see under WORLD WAR. See also, for points unsettled at the Peace
Conference, SILESIA and other appropriate headings.
Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points (of Jan. 8 1918), his Four Prin-
ciples (of Feb. n), his Four Ends (of July 4) and his Five
Particulars (of Sept. 27).
This peculiar obligation was the outcome of an offer, made
by Germany on Oct. 4 1918, " to accept the programme set
forth by the President of the United States in his message to
Congress of Jan. 8 1918, and his later pronouncements, especially
his speech of Sept. 27," as a basis for peace negotiations. A
similar offer was made by the Austro-Hungarian Government
on Oct. 7. From Germany the President required, as a condi-
tion precedent to negotiations, that " the military masters
and monarchical autocrats of Germany " should be irrevocably
deposed. To Austria-Hungary he intimated that in one par-
ticular he could no longer stand by the Fourteen Points. It
was no longer sufficient that the Czechoslovaks and the Yugo-
slavs should be guaranteed autonomy within the Austro-
Hungarian state. These peoples must now decide what action
on the part of Austria-Hungary would satisfy their aspirations.
A republican Germany and a partition of Austria-Hungary
were thus indicated as fundamental conditions of the peace.
The Central Empires accepted the fiat; and the European Allies
then agreed to make peace with Germany " on the terms of peace
laid down in the President's Address to Congress and the
principles enunciated in his subsequent addresses," with two
qualifications. They reserved judgment on the second of the
Fourteen Points " relating to what is commonly known as the
freedom of the seas." They pointed out that, in their opinion,
the President's demand for the " restoration " of territories
invaded by Germany should be understood to include " com-
pensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the
Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land,
by sea and from the air." The President accepted explicitly this
meaning of " restoration," and accepted ex silentio the de-
murrer as to the " freedom of the seas." After the Conference
had begun, he stated to some American journalists (Feb. 14 1919)
that the freedom of the seas was no longer needed, as in future
(with a League of Nations in existence) there would be no
neutrals. It will be noted that the reply of the Allies to the
President only committed them with regard to the German
treaty. The armistices signed by Austria (Nov. 3 1918) and
Hungary (Nov. 13) were unconditional, and the Italian Govern-
ment afterwards held that neither of these countries was en-
titled to the benefit of the Wilsonian terms. But the legal
point was not pressed by the Allies in general, even against
Bulgaria and Turkey with whom Mr. Wilson had not negotiated
at all. The general view was that Germany had negotiated on
behalf of both herself and her Allies; and indeed the Wilsonian
terms which Germany accepted made explicit references both
to Austria-Hungary and to Turkey.
Purport of the Wilsonian Terms. The general principles
contained in Mr. Wilson's manifestoes were not all of the kind
that a Peace Conference could enforce or promote. Some were
principles of international morality; others could hardly be
realized in a world which was still convulsed by national and
racial animosities, by the sense of intolerable wrongs and of
crushing disillusionments. The time was not yet ripe for in-
sisting that the victors, equally with the vanquished, should
abstain from " private international understandings of any
kind," should throw down all " economic barriers " and should
guarantee " equality of trade conditions " (most favoured
nation treatment) to their former enemies. Still less could the
Allies agree at that date to give " adequate guarantees " that
their armaments should be " reduced to the lowest point con-
sistent with domestic safety " within any definite period of
time. It was easier for the Allies to accept some other prin-
ciples which made a strong appeal to the moral sense of man-
kind: as, for instance, that nations ought to be governed in their
foreign policy by the rules of private honour and by respect
for the common law of civilized society; that " every part of
the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of
that particular case, and upon such adjustments as are most
likely to bring a peace that will be permanent"; and that "no
PEACE CONFERENCE
37
special or separate interest of any single nation, or any group
of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement
which is not consistent with the common interest of all." These,
and other similar rules, were valuable as a statement of the spirit
in which the wiser heads of the Conference would approach their
work. But the Conference could hardly do more for the propa-
gation of Mr. Wilson's ideals than it did in approving the
Anglo-American scheme of a League of Nations " formed under
specific covenants " to ensure that " the combined power of
free nations will check every invasion of right." When it pro-
vided that the Covenant of the League should form an integral
part of each of the new treaties, and when it made the League
responsible for supervising and revising many parts of the peace
settlement, the Conference loyally accepted the conception of
the League which Mr. Wilson had explained in his address of
Sept. 27 and in several speeches of his European tour (Dec.
igiS-Jan. 1919). The League was planned to be, as he had
said at the Guildhall in London on Dec. 28, a permanent con-
cert of Powers for the maintenance of the peace terms. It is
easy now to blame the Allies for assuming that the Covenant,
drafted by Lord Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts in consultation
with Mr. Wilson and Col. House, would be accepted without
demur by the U.S. Senate. But their attitude towards the proj-
ect of the League, when it was under discussion at the Con-
ference, at least proves them honestly desirous of realizing Mr.
Wilson's aspirations.
The territorial terms which Mr. Wilson had formulated
were comparatively simple, though not always easy to reconcile
with his principle of self-determination, which required that
" every question whether of territory or of sovereignty, of
economic arrangement or of political relationship " should be
settled on the basis of " the free acceptance of that settlement
by the people immediately concerned." Mr. Wilson himself
subsequently confessed that, when he put self-determination
on his programme (in spite of Mr. Lansing's fruitless objections,
since revealed), he did so in ignorance of the very existence of
some of the nationalities which afterwards invoked his aid.
Literally and unconditionally applied, the principle of self-
determination would have reduced eastern Europe to a chaos
of privileged enclaves and economically helpless states; nor
was it easy to see how it could be applied with any useful
results to the German colonies or to the non-Turkish portions
of the Ottoman Empire. The first of these two difficult cases
was hardly met by Mr. Wilson's demand (in the Fourteen
Points) that colonial questions should be settled with equal
regard to the interests of the populations concerned and to
the equitable claims of the Government whose title was to be
determined. The solution eventually applied to both cases
was that of mandates, a device first suggested by Gen. Smuts
in Dec. 1918, and readily endorsed by Mr. Wilson when it was
brought to his notice. As for the minor European nationalities,
Mr. Wilson himself had already, before the Conference, in-
dicated that their aspirations could not in every case be satisfied
" without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of dis-
cord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the
peace of Europe and consequently of the world." This at
least made it clear that a plebiscite would not be assumed to
be in every case the one unfailing criterion of the justice of
national claims.
The following is a brief summary of the territorial terms to
which the Allied and Associated Powers were committed by
the pre-Armistice negotiations: (i) Germany was to evacuate
all Russian territory, and (2) to recognize the independence of
all territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations.
(3) Belgium and the occupied territories of France, Rumania,
Serbia and Montenegro were to be evacuated. (4) Belgium was
to be left in the position of a sovereign state. (5) Alsace and
Lorraine were to be returned to France. (6) Poland and Serbia
were to be given free and secure access to the sea. (7) The in-
dependence and territorial integrity of Poland and the Balkan
states were to be assured by international guarantees. (8) The
Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire were to be allowed
to form a sovereign state; but the Straits were to be placed
under international control, and the non-Turkish nationalities
were to be allowed " an absolutely unmolested opportunity of
autonomous development." (9) The Czechoslovaks and the
Yugoslavs within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were to deter-
mine their own political destiny. We may further mention Mr.
Wilson's Ninth Point, demanding a readjustment of the fron-
tiers of Italy along " clearly recognizable lines of nationality."
To this limitation of Italy's ambitions Sig. Orlando had
never agreed. But his protest was not, unluckily, made public
till May 1919.
Opening of the Conference. The invitations to the Conference
were issued by the five principal and associated Powers, whose
chief plenipotentiaries held consultations in Dec. and the early
days of Jan. 1919, before they formally assembled at Paris.
Mr. Wilson was in Paris from Dec. 13 to Dec. 25, in England
from Dec. 26 to Dec. 31, in Italy from Jan. 3 to Jan. 6. M.
Clemenceau, Sig. Orlando and Baron Sonnino visited London
early in December. Finally, on Jan. 12, there took place at the
Qua! d'Orsai a meeting of the Supreme War Council (a body
constituted in Nov. 1917) which was attended by Mr. Wilson
and Mr. Lansing, M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, Mr. Lloyd
George and Mr. Balfour, Sig. Orlando and Baron Sonnino.
On this occasion it was decided that only the representatives of
the five chief Allied and Associated Powers (the fifth being
Japan) should be entitled to attend all meetings of the Con-
ference, and that other members should be summoned only
when their special interests were involved in the discussion.
The decision was taken without the other Allied and Associated
Powers being consulted, but was in harmony with the practice
of the Congress of Vienna (1815), and was defended on the
ground that the five were "Powers with general interests."
Membership of the Conference was accorded to 32 Powers in
all. Enemy Powers were not admitted, and neutral Powers
were only to attend, when specially summoned by the five, at
sessions specially appropriated to the discussion of their claims.
But all belligerents, and all Powers who had severed diplomatic
relations with Germany, were entitled to. appear at every
plenary session. It had been originally proposed to put all
" new states in process of formation " on the same footing as
the neutrals with special interests. But the right of Poland and of
Czechoslovakia to be represented in the Conference was con-
ceded before the rst plenary session. Croatians and Slovenians
were in fact represented by the Serbians, but the enlarged
kingdom of Serbia, owing to the opposition of Italy, was not
officially recognized until the end of May. The five principal
Powers settled the number of plenipotentiaries by whom each
state might be represented, with special regard to the military
importance of each Power and to the part which it had played
in the war. The number of plenipotentiaries was a question of
sentiment only, since no Power exercised more than one vote;
but the question was not settled without some bickering.
Finally five plenipotentiaries were assigned to each of the
principal Powers; three apiece to Belgium, Brazil and Serbia;
two apiece to Canada, Australia, South Africa, India, China,
Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania,
Siam; one apiece to New Zealand, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Uruguay. All the Powers were allowed to make use of
the panel system in choosing their plenipotentiaries, and the
representatives of the British Dominions did important work on
more than one occasion by virtue of their position on the panel
of the British Empire. These arrangements were complete
before the first plenary session (Jan. 18), which was merely
asked to transact some formal business, on lines settled in ad-
vance by the Five. It elected M. Clemenceau as president of
the Conference; it sanctioned the appointment of a secretariat,
and also of a drafting committee on which the Five alone were
represented. At the second plenary session (Jan. 25) certain
of the minor Powers, Belgium and Canada amongst them, pro-
tested against the degree of control which the Five had assumed
over the proceedings of the Conference. These protests were
PEACE CONFERENCE
bluntly answered by M. Clemenceau; but they could not be
altogether ignored. The smaller Allies were by degrees allowed
a larger representation on some of the commissions and com-
mittees; and in this way a use was found for the abilities and
experience of some highly distinguished statesmen, such as
M. Venizelos.
Organization and Procedure. The original rules of procedure,
drafted by M. Berthelot, do not throw much light on the
methods of transacting business which were actually employed,
and in some points they were quickly modified. 1 The conduct
of affairs, until March 25, was in the hands of the Council of
Ten, a body composed of two plenipotentiaries for each of the
five Powers; it was simply the Supreme War Council adapted to
new purposes. The plenipotentiaries were allowed to bring their
expert advisers with them, and made free use of this permis-
sion; but the Council from the first availed itself of the power,
accorded under rule 13, to refer technical questions to com-
mittees of experts. The proceedings of the Ten were secret;
rule 8 provided for the publication of official communiques,
but these were usually so worded as to convey the minimum
of information. Owing to the large numbers present at each
session, the secrecy of the proceedings was seldom respected;
and, while the unofficial reports published in the French press
were severely censored, the correspondents of English and
(more particularly) American papers were often successful in
acquiring and transmitting important information. On Jan. 17
the Ten promised, in answering a protest from the correspond-
ents, that the plenary sessions should be open to them, except
in special cases. But these sessions were infrequent and, when
they were open to the press, only transacted formal business.
Those of May 6 and May 31, at which important differences of
opinion became manifest, were held behind closed doors. The
secrecy of the deliberations grew more complete after March 25,
when the Council of Ten was superseded by the Council of
Four (Mr. Wilson, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Sig.
Orlando). Thenceforward experts were merely summoned to
answer questions; for over three weeks the only official con-
tinuously present was the interpreter (M. Mantoux) ; but in
April Sir Maurice Hankey was admitted as secretary. The
Four delegated certain questions to a council of five foreign
ministers (Mr. Lansing, M. Pichon, Mr. Balfour, Baron Sonnino,
Baron Makino), but this body did not become prominent until
the end of June wh -n the Four dispersed and left all current
business to be transacted by the Five.
Each of the principal Powers, except France, provided its
plenipotentiaries with a large staff of officials and other experts.
These " delegations " served as panels from which was drawn
the personnel of the innumerable commissions and committees
appointed from time to time by the plenary sessions or by the
Supreme Council. 2 Most of the earlier commissions were
large and imposing bodies; each of the principal Powers con-
tributed two or three representatives to each commission,
while the other Powers were allowed to send, between them,
five or ten. This was the constitution of the commissions on
Reparations, on the Responsibility for the War, on the League
of Nations, on International Labour Legislation, on Ports,
Waterways and Railways, all of which were sanctioned by the
second plenary conference (Jan 25). In Feb. and March five
territorial commissions were constituted. On these only the
principal Powers were represented. The subjects referred to them
were the territorial claims of: (i) the Czechoslovaks, (2) the
Poles, (3) Rumania and the Yugoslavs, (4) Greece and Albania,
'English was recognized at the Conference as of full equality with
French as the official language, so that all the proceedings were
bilingual. The British Dominions were recognized not only as an
integral part of the British Empire delegation (being, for instance,
part of the panel from which British representations on the Supreme
Council were chosen), but also as states on an equality with other
small independent states. Thus Gen. Botha and Gen. Smuts
sometimes sat in the Supreme Council in one capacity and some-
times in the other.
2 " Supreme Council " was the generic name applied to whatever
body the Ten, the Four or the Five happened to be in control of
the proceedings.
(5) Belgium and Denmark. On Jan. 27 the Supreme Council
appointed a large economic commission to draft the articles of
the German treaty which related to such subjects as commercial
relations, shipping, industrial property, pre-war contracts, and
the liquidation of enemy debts. On Feb. 12 a naval and military
committee, under Marshal Foch, was created to draft the terms
relating to disarmament and the surrender of naval and military
material. The Council of Four, like the Council of Ten, con-
stantly employed expert committees, but showed a preference
for comparatively small bodies which could be trusted to work
with expedition.
For business not immediately connected with the making
of treaties the Supreme Council made considerable use of the
Armistice Commission at Spa, of the military staff of the old
Supreme War Council at Versailles, and of the Supreme Econom-
ic Council at Paris. The last named of these bodies was in-
stituted, at the instance of Mr. Wilson (Feb. 8) to advise the
Conference on any economic measures of a temporary character
which might be necessary to ensure: (a) that the devastated
areas were duly supplied with the raw materials and other
commodities required for purposes of reconstruction; (b) that
the economic life of other countries which had suffered from the
war was promptly revived; (c) that the pressing wants of
neutral and ex-enemy countries were satisfied without detriment
to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Supreme Economic
Council absorbed many of the functions of those inter-Allied
councils which, during the later stages of the war, had been
charged with special problems of food supply and relief work,
finance, shipping and blockade. It also formed special sub-sec-
tions to advise on the reorganizing of inland communications
by rail and water, and on the control of the raw materials
required for reconstruction. Lord Robert Cecil, representing
Great Britain, usually presided at meetings of the Supreme
Economic Council. Mr. Hoover, who was one of the American
representatives, made himself responsible for the Food and
Relief section, which had to deal with the most urgent of all
the duties referred to the Council. From Feb. 17 to the end of
June the activity of the Supreme Council was unremitting. It
was expected to see to the revictualling of Germany under the
terms of the Armistice Convention. It organized relief work
among the starving populations of eastern Europe. It reor-
ganized the derelict transport systems of Austria-Hungary and
Poland. Its German duties involved negotiations with a German
finance commission, and the arranging of the Brussels agree-
ment (March 14) under which Germany was supplied with
foodstuffs up to the end of Aug. 1919. It was by successive
recommendations of this council that the commercial blockade
of Germany was partially relaxed in Feb., March and April;
the most striking of these recommendations was that subjects
of Allied countries should be free to trade with Germany,
subject to any restrictions which their respective Govern-
ments might desire to maintain (April 24). In April the Council
undertook to supervise the economic life of the left bank of the
Rhine, during the period of occupation. After the German
treaty had been signed the Supreme Economic Council was
still utilized by the European Allies as an agent for the pur-
chasing of foodstuffs in America and supplying Austria with
coal. The last meeting was at Rome in Nov. 1919.
The Council of Ten, Jan. i8-March 25 1919. The first
section of the German treaty to be drafted in something like
its final form was the Covenant of the League of Nations, which
Mr. Wilson consistently regarded as " in a sense the most
essential part of the peace settlement." By the end of Jan.
the American and British delegates had agreed upon a draft.
This was carefully discussed in the first fortnight of Feb. by
the League of Nations Commission, on which were represented
not only the five Great Powers, but also Belgium, Brazil, China,
Portugal, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The most prominent personages who served on the commis-
sion, after Mr. Wilson who was its president, were Col. House
(U.S.A.), Lord Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts (British Empire),
M. Bourgeois (France), Sig. Orlando (Italy) and M. Venizelos
PEACE CONFERENCE
39
(Greece) . The Covenant passed its first reading at the third plen-
ary session (Feb. 14), but was amended in details before it was
finally approved by the fifth plenary session (April 28). The
amendments were chiefly inspired by the wish to meet American
criticism. One provided that members of the League might
withdraw on giving two years' notice; another expressly guarded
the Monroe Doctrine from attack. Among amendments which
were considered but rejected it is enough to mention: (a) a
Japanese proposal that there should be a clause declaring all
members of the League, without respect of race or colour, to
be equal; (b) an American proposal to forbid any discrimina-
tion " in fiscal and economic regulations " between one nation
and another (which would have put an end to Zollvereins and
to imperial preference) ; (c) a French proposal to endow the
League with a general staff and with powers to supervise the
process of disarmament. (See LEAGUE OF NATIONS.)
To the same period belongs the main work of the Labour
Commission, which began to draft the Labour Convention on
Feb. i. The Convention was intended to convince the world
that the interests of labour would be better served by supporting
the Allies at Paris than by helping German Socialists to draft
their Labour charter in the International Conference which sat
at Berne in Jan. and February. The Commission, first proposed
by M. Clemenceau, had an American chairman (Mr. Gompers);