William Howard Taft. Four years later he was renominated,
but he died at Utica, Oct. 30 1912, shortly before the elections.
SHEVKET, MAHMUD (1858-1913), Turkish pasha, was born
at Bagdad in 1858, and from early youth showed marked quali-
ties of intellect and personality. He received his military train-
ing at the military college in Constantinople, 1875-80, and after
a very brief period of service with the troops was given an ap-
pointment on the general staff. Von der Goltz, who at that time
was reorganizing the Turkish army, thought very highly of the
young Shevket, and it was through his agency that the latter
was sent to Germany to manage the reequipment of the Turkish
army. As a result he remained from 1884 to 1894 in the small
arms factory of Mauser Bros., at Oberndorf on the Neckar. He
also studied armament problems in France for a short time, and
in 1894, as the reward of his labours, was made inspector of
military arsenals in Constantinople. From 1901 to 1903 he was
military governor of the Hejaz, in Arabia, then in what amounted
to a state of war. He next went in a like capacity to Kossovo
(Uskub), and there came in contact with the Young Turk
movement, which had its headquarters in Salonika. In 1908
Abdul Hamid averted the break-up of the old regime by summon-
ing a National Assembly. This state of things, however, did not
last long. In the spring of 1909 the Old and Young Turks were
struggling for supremacy. A powerful Old Turk counter-revolu-
tion was prepared, but, in mid-April, the III. Army Corps, under
Hussein Husni Pasha, marched from Salonika against Constanti-
nople. At San Stefano Mahmud Shevket took over the command,
and, after heavy fighting, forced his way on April 4 into Constan-
tinople. Impressed by his victory the National Assembly no
longer dared to oppose the will of the Young Turks, and on
April 26 voted the deposition of Abdul Hamid. Mahmud Shev-
ket was the hero of the day. But he did not care for politics,
which he considered had been the ruin of the Turkish corps of
officers, and preferred to confine his activities to purely military
matters. The next few years afforded him plenty of opportuni-
ties. In 1910 and 1911 he put down a revolt of the Malissors
with great energy, and in 1912 fought against the rebels in Al-
bania. In the summer of 1912 he became Minister of War, and
in Jan. 1913 succeeded Kiamil as Grand Vizier. He took a very
426
SHIP AND SHIPBUILDING
active part in army reforms, but he came into conflict with the
Union Liberale, which took its orders from Sherif Pasha in Paris,
and he was murdered by one of its members on June n 1913.
SHIP AND SHIPBUILDING (see 24.867). The period from
1910-21 was marked by great progress in shipbuilding; that
progress was in some ways interrupted, in others stimulated, by
the World War, which overshadowed every phase of develop-
ment both in commercial and naval enterprise. The naval
strengths during ten years after 1921 of the chief nations were
restricted as a result of the decisions summarized in the article
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.
The great object of the Allied belligerents during the war
being to obtain the maximum output both of war material and
of merchant ships on which their supplies depended, those respon-
sible for the building of all types of ships naturally turned their
attention to standardization. This had the effect of retarding
the adoption of new inventions on the one hand; but on the
other the novel circumstances and continued development of
material by Germany during the war, and the ruthless use made
of that war material, continually called for novel devices and
new types of ships to meet and defeat the continually changing
and ever-increasing intensity of the campaign. This, whilst it
produced many new types of warships and countless devices for
their improvement in offence and defence, in the case of many
classes of warships, but more particularly in the design of mer-
chant ships, had the effect of developing standardized types,
both in Great Britain and later in America, in order to increase
the numbers of ships for transport purposes of all kinds and so
counter the enormous losses due to the German submarine cam-
paign. After the Armistice, although at first there was an enor-
mous demand for ships of all classes, the slump in trade in 1920-1
and the very high prices of ships had the effect of reducing the
demand. In Great Britain many of the warships building after
the Armistice were broken up and no new ships had in 1921 been
started. The output of merchant ships was in 1921 steadily de-
clining, so that it could not be said that shipbuilding had yet re-
sumed that steady advance which was being made before the war.
The outstanding features which have affected the design of all
classes of ships specially are the gradual adoption of oil in lieu of
coal as a fuel, the further development of the steam turbine, and,
for certain classes of vessels, the progress made with internal-
combustion engines (see INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES).
In the British navy, and to a great extent in other navies,
during this period, oil most completely superseded coal for steam-
raising. At first destroyers were the only type of vessel, apart
from submarines, in which coal was altogether abolished as a
fuel in the British navy. Then in 1912 light cruisers of the " Are-
thusa " class had oil only. A little later in that year, in the
" Queen Elizabeth " class of battleships oil was decided upon as
the only fuel for the first time in a capital ship. Subsequently to
that, no British warship proper, with the exception of the " Ra-
leigh " class of io,ooo-ton light cruisers, which were destined for
world-wide work, had anything but oil as a fuel, and in the
" Raleighs " seven-eighths of the power was derived from oil.
This change was a very momentous one to make, especially
when it is considered that in Welsh coal Great Britain possessed
the finest and then the cheapest steam coal in the world. In
spite of this, however, the advantages of oil were so great that,
when in use it had been found satisfactory, coal was relegated to
be the fuel of none but special or auxiliary ships in the navy.
The advantages of oil may be summarized shortly as follows:
For the same weight it has 50% more thermal value than coal.
It occupies less space and can be stowed in spaces inconvenient
for coal and other stores. Boilers with oil remain much cleaner
for a long period, so that full power can be kept up indefinitely
as long as the fuel lasts. Oil can be easily taken on board at any
time, thus not calling upon the crew for the great exertion in-
volved in coaling ship hurriedly, perhaps just before their ener-
gies are required for fighting an action. The exertion of stoking
is entirely done away with and far fewer men are required in the
stokehold, which is always clean and comfortable. With oil also
much larger boilers can be used, which saves space in the boiler-
rooms. Though there are other contingent advantages, those
named are enough to show that the British Admiralty took a
wise course in adopting oil for all fighting ships, and this was
amply proved during the war.
Subsequently, owing to the very high price of coal and of
wages for firemen, many of the advantages enumerated above
induced merchant shipowners to adopt oil in place of coal for
high-powered passenger vessels. In low-speed cargo-boats the
great economy of internal-combustion engines as compared with
steam-engines, makes the advantage of the adoption of oil still
more paramount, and the number of these vessels has been
largely increased. The comparatively low powers, however,
which can be got with internal-combustion engines prevented
their being adopted up to 1921 for fast merchant ships or for any
warships, except submarines, which generally have compara-
tively low power and moderate speed. In submarines a much
lighter internal-combustion engine than that used for cargo
vessels has been developed, with a high number of revolutions.
Another very important advance in marine engines has been
gained by the used of toothed gearing. This gear enabling the
high number of revolutions in turbines to be reduced, so that
large slow-running propellers can be used in conjunction with
very quick-running efficient turbines, a much higher efficiency
has been secured and increased speed of ship and economy of
working has resulted. In its present form this gearing was first
introduced in 1910 by Sir Charles Parsons in connexion with the
turbine engines of a merchant vessel named the " Vespasian."
The success of the trials of this ship led to the further adoption
of gearing, and for the British navy it was first tried in destroyers,
then in some light cruisers, and was in 1921 gradually coming
into use for most war ships and many mercantile ships. The
largest ship in which it had been adopted was H.M.S. " Hood."
I. BRITISH WARSHIPS
Taking the first most important type of British warship, namely
capital ships, the naval actions in the Russo-Japanese war of
1904-5 had demonstrated the capital importance of the heavy
long-range gun, while the turbine system of propulsion had been
sufficiently tested in high-speed passenger vessels and small
warships to justify its adoption, at any rate experimentally, in
warships of a larger size. These changes were, no doubt, bold
ones, both as regards guns and machinery; but the wisdom of
their selection for the design of the first " Dreadnought," in 1905,
was sufficiently vindicated by subsequent experience, and by the
general acceptance of these two features by other naval Powers.
Laid down in Oct. 1905, the original " Dreadnought " proved
so successful that from 1907 onwards the designs of British capi-
tal ships moved on progressive lines without departing from the
essential principle of the " Dreadnought " type, viz. a ship
carrying an all-big-gun armament, adequately protected for
taking her place in the line of battle, and of a speed at least equal
to that of any foreign ship of similar rank.
The next 10 years therefore saw a succession of post- " Dread-
nought " battleships in which the primary armament passed from
the ten iz-in. guns of the " Dreadnought " through the ten 13-5-
in. guns of the " Orion " (all on the centre line of the ship) to the
eight is-in. guns of the " Queen Elizabeth," an increase, within
that brief period, of over 126% in the heavy projectile weight
of discharge. There was no secondary battery, properly speak-
ing. The " Dreadnought " carried 24 i2-pdrs. for repelling
T.B.D. attack, but this armament was soon recognized as being
too light for the ever-increasing size and power of destroyers,
and in subsequent ships up to the " King George V." class
(inclusive) batteries of 12 to 16 4-in. guns were mounted as high
up as possible to repel the attack of destroyers. In the " Iron
Duke " and " Queen Elizabeth " classes 6-in. Q.F. guns were
substituted for the 4-in., as the latter weapon was then thought
to be insufficient against destroyers and light cruisers.
The speed of these battleships was kept at the uniform level of
21 knots up to and including the " Iron Duke " class. The type
of turbine machinery on four shafts, which had proved so satis-
factory in the original " Dreadnought," became the standard,
SHIP AND SHIPBUILDING
427
but the growth in displacement necessitated a corresponding
increase in power to attain the requisite speed. The use of oil fuel
in association with coal was maintained until the " Queen Eliza-
beth " class was reached, when the greater advantages of oil fuel
and the improved methods of its combustion finally caused the
abandonment of coal as fuel. A noteworthy feature of these
remarkable vessels was the advance in speed to 25 knots, necessi-
tating, on a slightly larger displacement than that of their pred-
ecessors, an increase of about 150% in the power.
Concurrently with the development of the battleship proper,
that of the British battle cruiser may be followed with advantage.
Up to the inception of the " Dreadnought " design nothing more
ambitious than an armament consisting of g-2-in. guns associated
with 7'5-in. guns ("Warrior" and "Minotaur," 1903-4) had
been attempted in armoured cruisers. But the same reasons
which caused the evolution of the all-big-gun battleships from
the mixed armament of the " King Edward VII." and " Lord
Nelson " classes now called for a similar simplification in the
armoured cruiser designs. The outcome of this policy was the
production of the " Invincible " class of " cruiser battleships,"
now generally known as " battle cruisers."
In these vessels the additional power necessary for their 4 to 5
knots superiority of speed over the " Dreadnought " was obtained
at the sacrifice of two i2-ih. guns and some loss of armour pro-
tection. The value of speed, which in battleships had always
been a debatable point, was, of course, incontestable for the
battle cruisers, and the development of the type has, both before
and since the outbreak of the war, kept pace with the insistent
demands of the strategist for the highest speed obtainable. With-
in the lo-year period referred to above, the increase in speed and
power from the "Invincible" (25 knots for 41,000 H.P.) to the
"Renown" (32 knots for 120,000 H.P.) required an increase in
displacement from 17,250 tons to 26,500 tons, the relative
increase in power being over 190 per cent. Finally in the " Hood "
a speed of 32 knots with 144,000 H.P. on a displacement of 41,200
tons, an increase of 235% in power was involved.
The wisdom of the policy which initiated this new era in naval
construction, relegating temporarily into the background the
former British supremacy in capital ships, was naturally the sub-
ject of much criticism. But evolution in warship construction is
not the property of any one navy, and there is little doubt that,
at the conclusion of the Japanese war, the world stood on the
threshold of a new era in naval architecture. If British naval
supremacy was to be maintained it had to be done by leading
the world along the new path of warship design, without waiting
for others to utilize the advantages that had been rendered
possible by progress in armour, guns and machinery. How great
an advance the " Dreadnought " represented on previous ships
may be gauged from the particulars given in Table I.
TABLE I. Comparison between " Dreadnought " and the Best
Previous Skips.
" Dread-
nought "
(as de-
signed)
Best Pre-
vious
Ship
Number of 12-in. guns carried.
10
4
Length of line of battle for equal num-
ber of 12-in. guns on the broadside
Ratio
I tO 2
Total muzzle energy per broadside of
,
,
12-in. guns
Length of line of battle for equal 12-in.
\ft.-tonsj
J I45,OOO
\ft.-tons
' broadside gun power ....
Ratio
I to 2-6
Tons displacement per 12-in. gun .
1,785
3-750
First cost per 12-in. gun in line of battle.
175,000
280,000
Annual upkeep of ship per 12-in. gun car-
ried. 1
34,800
62,300
Speed (knots)
21
19
Endurance :
At economical speed (nautical m.)
5,800
5,790
At 16 knots (nautical m.)
4,000
3,000
Other navies were not slow to follow the lead given by Great
1 This includes pay, victualling, repairs, coal, stores, etc., together
with an addition of 15% per annum of first cost, for interest and
depreciation, etc
Britain. The veil of secrecy in which the new types were closely
shrouded whetted the emulation as well as the curiosity of other
nations. Germany, ever ready to reap where others have
sown, set about preparing for the change, and two years later
produced the "Nassau" class, with 12 n-in. guns as main
armament and 12 6-in. guns as anti-destroyer armament. At
the rate of three a year She continued to lay down ships of this
type improved in armament as time progressed each batch
being accompanied by a battle cruiser of corresponding power
and speed. Other nations fell into step, and, during the five or
six years preceding the outbreak of war, produced, with variants
appropriate to their several necessities, all-big-gun ships carrying
a main armament of 10 or 12 primary weapons grouped in turrets
shielding two, three, or even four guns each.
While the German output of capital ships had, once it got
under way, continued with methodical regularity, British naval
construction had suffered from the vagaries inseparable from
divergent political views and aspirations.
Under the " Cawdor Memorandum " of Nov. 30 1905 it had
been laid down that the minimum British requirements would be
four large armoured ships a year, and the " Dreadnought " with
the three " Invincibles " fulfilled this condition, but in each of
the two following years only three battleships (and no battle
cruisers) were laid down, while the 1908-9 programme only pro-
vided for one battleship (" Neptune ") and one armoured cruiser
(" Indefatigable "). Efforts had been made to induce Germany
to curtail her naval expansion " a year's holiday in naval con-
struction " being suggested but such hopes as were based on
this contingency gradually faded before the inexorable German
determination to challenge British sea supremacy. In the 1909-
10 estimates provision was therefore made for laying down four
capital ships, two in July 1009 (" Colossus " and " Hercules ")
and two in Nov. (" Orion " and " Lion "), while four " contin-
gent " ships (" Monarch," " Thunderer," " Conqueror " and
" Princess Royal ") were to be laid down in April 1910, if the
German menace showed no signs of abating. So far from this
latter being the case, there was an acceleration in the dates of
laying down the .German ships, and the programme outlined above
was therefore punctually carried out. The 1909-10 programme,
it will be seen, was a memorable one in the history of British
naval construction, and its adoption enabled Great Britain to
maintain her naval supremacy, which otherwise would have
been jeopardized.
Notwithstanding the atmosphere of uncertainty created by
the delays due to hopes of a reduction of armaments, the rate of
progress on warships under construction was well maintained,
and, with a few exceptions, Great Britain was able to complete
the largest battleships within 24 to 30 months of laying down,
a performance which compared favourably with the best achieve-
ments abroad, and which not even Germany with her methodical
preparations was able to equal.
The disposition of the heavy guns in both battleships and battle
cruisers had, during the first five years of this period, undergone
several important modifications. In the " Dreadnought," " Bellero-
phon " and " St. Vincent " classes the five two-gun turrets were
placed as in the diagram : A being on the forecastle deck, the re-
maining turrets on the upper deck, giving eight guns on each broad-
side, six ahead and six astern.
The " Invincibles," which carried one turret (X) less, had the two
middle turrets P and Q disposed en echelon, and the superstructure
amidships was so arranged as to enable all eight guns to fire on
either broadside. The middle turrets were, however, placed so near
to one another that serious trouble was experienced from gun blast
when firing across the deck. In the battle cruisers of the " Indefatig-
able " class, and the battleships of the " Neptune " and " Colossus "
classes, therefore, where a similar arrangement was adopted, the
centre pair of turrets were spaced wider apart. A further change in
the arrangement of turrets was adopted for the first time in these
428
SHIP AND SHIPBUILDING
battleships, where the after-pair were disposed at different deck
levels to enable X turret to fire over Y. This arrangement, which
now became the standard practice, while it introduced some diffi-
culty in providing for stability, was economical of space, and simpli-
fied many of the gunnery problems connected with the ship; it
gave, moreover, a higher gun platform for some of the armament.
While the offensive qualities of the battleships had continued to
increase in successive types, the need for improved defence, particu-
larly against mine and torpedo attack, had not been overlooked.
The adoption of protective bulkheads against under-water attack
as carried out in the " Dreadnought " and subsequent capital ships
was the outcome of the naval engagements of the Russo-Japanese
war. The Russian battleship " Tsareyitch," in particular, had been
fitted with a protective deck which, instead of being continued to
the side of the ship, was turned down in wake of the magazines,
forming a heavy longitudinal bulkhead situated some distance from
the ship's side. This protection had enabled her to resist success-
fully the explosion of several torpedoes. It was decided to incor-
porate in the " Dreadnought " design some under r water protection
to the vitals. Within the limits of displacement available it was not
possible to do' more than protect the magazines and shell-rooms.
These were given 2-in. protective bulkhead plating at the three
centre-line turrets, and 4-in. protective bulkhead plating outside
the two beam turrets, as the latter, being situated nearer the sides
of the vessel, were consequently much more vulnerable.
In the subsequent " Bellerophqn " and " St. Vincent " classes
this side protection was developed in the form of a continuous longi-
tudinal protective bulkhead terminated by protective transverse
bulkheads completely boxing in the magazines and shell-rooms of
the five turrets and the main machinery spaces enclosed between
them. The thickness varies frorn ij in. to 3 in. according to the
distance of the bulkhead from the outer shell of the ship. In a verti-
cal direction the bulkhead ran from the outer bottom to just above
the lower edge of the side armour. In the " Hercules " and " Orion "
classes there was a reversion to the original " Dreadnought " sys-
tem of isolated protection to the various compartments immediately
below each of the three groups of turrets, the remainder of the
ship's hull below water-line being unprotected. In the " King
George V." and " Iron Duke " classes the under-water protection
was extended by joining up the portions between the two foremost
turrets to those below the centre turret, so that only the ends of the
ship and something less than the middle third remained unpro-
tected. Concurrently with the battleships this form of protection
was also fitted in the battle cruisers, but limited to the magazines
and shell-rooms.
Finally, in the " Queen Elizabeth " (the torpedo menace having
increased) the continuous longitudinal protective bulkheads were
once more incorporated, and with the transverse protective bulk-
heads at each end, girdling the ship throughout nearly her entire
length, so that not only shell-rooms and magazines, but engine-
ana boiler-rooms had the protection of a bulkhead 2 in. thick some
10 ft. from the ship's side, with the addition of another longitudinal
bulkhead of 17 Ibs. plating placed (at a distance of 7 ft. amidships
and at varying distances at the ends) on the inner side of the pro-
tective bulkhead, further minimizing the risk of damage to the
vitals of the ship from the effects of an explosion.
The arrangement of the protective bulkheads in the " Royal
Sovereign " class generally followed that of " Queen Elizabeth,"
but their thickness was l^ inches.
The efficiency of this system of protection, which a series of experi-
ments had established, was demonstrated at Jutland, and it was
further improved upon by the later forms of bulge protection.
The construction of British battle cruisers had proceeded con-
currently with that of the battleships, although in smaller num-
bers. The demands made upon the engineering staff to provide
for the large increases of power already referred to involved
many difficult problems, but the " Indefatigable " was neverthe-
less completed (in 1911) within two years of laying down, and
the later ships, "Lion," "Princess Royal," " Queen Mary," and
" Tiger," followed on in succeeding years, each marking some
advance in power and speed. Two other battle cruisers of the
" Indefatigable " type, viz. " New Zealand " and " Australia,"
built for the Dominions from whence they took their names, had
also been completed and were available for reinforcing the battle
cruiser squadrons.
When the World War broke out in Aug. 1914 there were, more-
over, four capital ships building in England for foreign Powers
two for Turkey and two for the Chilean Government. The two