among the other prominent members were Mr. Barnes (Great
Britain) and M. Vandervelde (Belgium). It contained no
elected representatives of labour, but conferred with a number
of labour leaders who were specially invited to Paris for the
purpose. Its work proceeded smoothly and swiftly. The Con-
vention enumerates nine fundamental principles, for drafting
which Mr. Gompers was responsible; but otherwise it refrains
from any attempt at remedial legislation. It is mainly con-
cerned with outlining the organization, powers and procedure
of a Labour Conference (an international labour parliament)
and a Labour Office (a bureau of experts). The Convention
links up the Labour Conference with the League of Nations,
and provides that the original members of the League shall also
be the original members of the Conference. The German delegates
proposed (in May 1919) that the Convention should be revised
by a conference of trade unions, in the light of the German
Labour charter and of the Berne resolutions. This proposal was
however rejected; the Convention in its final form owes nothing
to German amendments. It forms section 13 of the Treaty of
Versailles, and appears in all the other treaties with enemy
powers. The Labour Conference met for the first time at Wash-
ington in the autumn of 1919, but was attended by no American
delegates, owing to the fact that the U.S. Senate had not yet
ratified the Treaty of Versailles. (See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR.)
The Labour Convention was not presented to the Conference
until April i, and for some weeks after the third plenary session
(Feb. 14) it seemed as though the Ten and their satellitic com-
missions were making little progress. This impression was
strengthened by the temporary absence of Mr. Lloyd George
(Feb. 7-March 5) and of Mr. Wilson (Feb. i4-March 14), who
departed on urgent business of different kinds to London and to
Washington respectively. For a time the Supreme Council
was also robbed of M. Clemenceau; he was wounded on Feb. 19
by a French anarchist and was not seen again in public until
March 10. But in any case the Supreme Council was at this
stage burdened with a mass of formal duties which could not
be avoided or postponed. It was necessary, under the rules of
procedure, to hear the views of the " members with special
interests." Late in Jan. audiences were given to the claimants
for the German colonies, among whom the British Dominions
were conspicuous. Then came the turn of the minor Powers
and the oppressed nationalities: Rumania, Greece, Czecho-
slovakia, the Hejaz, Belgium, the Syrians, the Druses, the
Zionists, the Yugoslavs, Denmark, the Albanians, the Arme-
nians and the Montenegrins. The ceremonial interviews rarely
added anything to the case which had been already presented in
writing; and all the claims, except those involving considerations
of high policy, were referred, as the interviews concluded, to
the five territorial commissions, and to a central commission
which was appointed (Feb. 27) to coordinate the conclusions
of the territorial experts. On a few questions there was sub-
stantial progress. A provisional agreement was reached as to
the future of the German colonies. A Financial Drafting
Commission defined the questions of finance and reparation
which must be settled by the experts. Between Feb. 12 and
March 3 the Military and Naval Drafting Committee prepared
the first draft of the naval and military terms, and early in
March Mr. Lloyd George persuaded the Supreme Council to
accept the principle that all the enemy Powers should be obliged
to abolish compulsory military service. By March 10 the
naval, military and air terms were practically complete and on
March 17, when Mr. Lloyd George was contemplating another
visit to London, Mr. Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Sig. Orlando
sent him a joint letter, begging that he would remain in Paris
for the fortnight which, in their opinion, was the time required
for completing the German treaty. Mr. Lloyd George agreed,
but on condition that a more expeditious and more secret
procedure than that of the Ten was adopted. He carried his
point; on March 25 an official notice was issued that informal
discussions by the delegates of the principal Powers would be
substituted for the methods hitherto adopted. With this
announcement began the period of the Council of Four. The
Marquis Saonji, who might have claimed a seat in this conclave,
abstained from doing so, except when Japanese interests were
involved, on the ground of his ignorance of European languages.
Council of Four, March zy-May 7. The Four worked at
high pressure to complete the German treaty. They met two
or three times a day; they confined their discussions to matters
of principle and high policy; they left questions of detail and
all technical subjects to the experts. But there were delicate
and urgent problems, not all vitally connected with the treaty,
which came up at many sessions, and some of these were never
finally settled at Paris. The Four could never concentrate on
one subject, to the exclusion of all others, until a definite agree-
ment was reached; for each stage in a particular discussion
involved a further, reference to the experts, and a longer or
shorter delay until the experts were ready with their report.
Hence a chronological record of their debates, if such were
available, would be a bewildering document. But it is known
what were the more contentious topics debated in these six
weeks, and what were the main issues in each case.
(a) The guarantees for Germany's compliance with the treaty
were a special anxiety to France. She asked that there should
be a prolonged occupation of the left bank of the Rhine by
French, British and American forces; that the Rhine bridge-
heads (Cologne, Coblenz and Mainz) should be included in the
zone of occupation; that the left bank should be permanently
detached from Germany to form a neutral and autonomous
state (" Rhineland Republic "). Great Britain and America
had offered France defensive treaties (the " Three Power
Treaty ") in lieu of these cumbrous precautions (March 14).
M. Clemenceau accepted the treaties, but also pressed for the
adoption of the French scheme. His colleagues would not hear
of a Rhineland Republic; but they agreed that the left bank,
and a deep belt on the right bank, should be denuded of fortifica-
tions (Art. 180) ; and, more reluctantly, that there should be
joint occupation for 15 years. Still another concession was
extracted from them the last clause of Art. 429, which provides
that, even at the end of 15 years, the occupation may be con-
tinued if in the opinion of the Allies France is insufficiently
guaranteed against an unprovoked attack. This clause was in-
tended to provide for the contingency of the British or the
American defensive treaty being still unratified at that date.
(b) The Saar valley was claimed by France in compensation
for her ruined mines. At first she had asked for complete political
sovereignty on historical grounds; but this solution, which in-
volved the subjection of 650,000 Germans to French rule,
was rejected by her Allies, who would not even restore the
French frontier of 1814 in this region. But they conceded to
her the Saar coal-mines in full ownership, and, not without some
4 o
PEACE CONFERENCE
hesitation, agreed that for 15 years the Saar valley should be
withdrawn from the control of Germany and placed under the
League of Nations. At the end of that time the inhabitants were
to decide between three alternatives the status quo, union with
France, union with Germany. If they voted for Germany,
then France was to receive the price of the mines from Germany
or from the Reparations Commission.
(c) The Reparations Clauses were also of special interest to
France. Her representatives insisted passionately on " integral
reparation," the assessment of the damage actually done by
Germany and by her allies, and the exaction of the utmost
farthing. How otherwise, they asked, could France escape
bankruptcy? Many English and American experts were im-
pressed by the exhaustion of Germany, the danger of driving
her to desperation, the unwisdom of leaving her liability inde-
terminate for the many months which would pass before a com-
plete bill for damages could be presented; and they pressed
for taking in final quittance whatever sum (20 or 40 milliards
of marks at most) Germany could be compelled to pay at once.
The French view prevailed, but there was another battle over
the categories of damage, and Mr. Wilson was persuaded only
with great difficulty to admit that pensions and allowances to
combatants and to their families came within the terms of his
pre-Annistice conditions. There were further debates on the
capacity of Germany to pay and on the sum for which she might
conceivably be liable. In the end the extent both of her legal
liability and of the sum to be actually paid wai left for future
definition. Germany was to pay 20 milliards of gold marks in
cash and kind by May i 1921; and out of this sum the Allies
would pay for any foodstuffs or raw materials which they
considered indispensable to Germany. Two further sums,
each of 40 milliards, were to be exacted later, bringing the total
to 100 milliards; but this, in the words of the treaty, was only
" a first instalment." The final account would be presented by
the Reparations Commission before May i 1921, and would be
paid off by degrees over a period of 30 years, with interest at
5 per cent. On Sept. 5 1919 the French Minister of Finance
encouraged the Chamber to expect that 300 milliards might be
extracted from Germany. In Jan. 1921 the European Allies
agreed to exact one-third of this sum, payable with interest over
40 years, and supplemented by a tax of 12 per cent ad valorem
on German exports. This was rejected by Germany, but at the
end of April the Allies presented an ultimatum which was
accepted.
(d) The delimitation of the western frontier of Poland was
not effected without serious debates. France desired to treat
Poland liberally. Great Britain was impressed with the risk
of creating a new Germania irredenta to trouble the peace of
eastern Europe. The experts were anxious that due weight
should be given to Mr. Wilson's Thirteenth Point, which
stipulated that Poland should have a free and secure access to
the sea. Poland (supported by France) asked for full sovereignty
over Danzig and the approaches to that city. But the popula-
tion of Danzig was almost wholly German, and the frontier
demanded by Poland would have left 2,000,000 Germans under
Polish rule a solution which Mr. Lloyd George considered
inadmissible. Thanks to Mr. Lloyd George a compromise was
at last arranged which left Danzig a free city under the protection
of the League of Nations with a very exiguous degree of freedom.
The Polish frontier, in this compromise, was still drawn with
more regard to the economic interests of Poland than to the rights
of nationalities. But, before the German treaty was signed,
the frontier was again modified, and other changes were intro-
duced, in deference to the expostulations of the German dele-
gates; in particular it was determined that in Upper Silesia a
plebiscite should be held.
(e) Shantung was demanded by the Japanese plenipoten-
tiaries under the treaties which China had concluded with
Japan in 1915, but which, according to the Chinese plenipoten-
tiaries, had been extorted by force majeure; also under a secret
agreement of 1917 with the European Allies, to which the
United States had never adhered. For a long time Mr. Wilson
resisted the Japanese claim, but he finally accepted (April 30
1919) a compromise which the Chinese regarded with so much
disfavour that they declined to sign the German treaty. The
Japanese were allowed to keep the town of Kiaochow with the
adjacent district, and the right of exploiting the mines and the
railways in the Shantung peninsula; but they gave an oral under-
standing that they would restore the sovereignty of the penin-
sula to China " as soon as possible." Mr. Wilson subsequently
(Aug. 19) told a committee of the American Senate that he
would have preferred a different solution. But the Japanese
claim was pressed at a time when Italy seemed on the point of
seceding from the Conference; and a second secession would
have made it difficult to conclude any treaty with the Germans.
(/) The Italian claims to Austro-Hungarian territories were
continually under discussion during April. They were primarily
founded on the Treaty of London; but Sig. Orlando claimed
Fiume also, taking his stand in this case on the right of self-
determination which he otherwise repudiated. Mr. Wilson
at first argued that the Treaty of London was incompatible
with the principle, enunciated in the Fourteen Points, that
" a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected
along clearly recognizable lines of nationality " (Point Nine).
But Sig. Orlando objected that Italy was not bound by this
principle, against which he himself had twice protested in the
Supreme War Council, when the terms of the German Armistice
were under discussion. His protests had been overruled at that
time, on the ground that they were irrelevant to the discus-
sions with Germany; but he had reserved the right to dispute
Point Nine, and he asserted this right to the fullest extent in
April. On April 14 Mr. Wilson gave way to the extent of in-
timating that he would accept the northern (Brenner) frontier
assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London, and would admit
Italy's claim (based on the same treaty) to Lissa and Valona;
but he required that Fiume, as the natural outlet for the trade
of Yugoslavia and Austria, should be made a free city within the
Yugoslav customs area, and he held that, as regarded Dalmatia,
Italy ought to be content with guarantees for the rights of the
Italian minorities living in that province. Subsequently he
rejected a proposal, made by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd
George, that Italy should be awarded Fiume in exchange for
a renunciation of her treaty claims upon Dalmatia; on April
20 he declined to discuss the Adriatic problem any further; and
on the 23rd he created a sensation by publishing a statement of
the grounds on which he resisted the Italian pretensions. Next
day Sig. Orlando left the Conference, and Baron Sonnino fol-
lowed him within 24 hours. On April 29 the Italian Chamber,
after hearing Orlando's account of the negotiations, reaffirmed
his definition of the Italian claims by an overwhelming majority.
On April 30 the German delegates arrived at Versailles and the
Council of Four (now reduced to three) had to face the possibil-
ity that Italy would not sign the treaty; at this time was drafted
the ratification clause which stipulates that the treaty shall come
into force as soon as ratified by Germany and any three of the
principal Powers. But on May 4 Orlando relented. He and
his colleagues reached Paris on May 7, a day too late for the
sixth plenary session which approved the draft treaty, but a few
hours before the draft was handed to the Germans at Versailles.
The Council had not surrendered to Italy on the Adriatic ques-
tion, but it was left open for future discussion.
The Draft Treaty and the German Delegates. Two considerable
sections of the treaty, the Covenant of the League and the
Labour Convention, had been finally approved on April 28 by
the fifth plenary session without much debate; the chief feature
of the proceedings was that Baron Makino and M. Bourgeois
expressed regret that the commission had not seen fit to accept
the Japanese and French amendments. The sixth plenary ses-
sion (May 6), which was held in secret to approve the treaty as
a whole, revealed more serious differences. The Chinese pro-
tested against the Shantung clauses, the Portuguese against the
African settlement, and Marshal Foch argued that the military
guarantees for the submission of Germany were inadequate.
His objection was met, to a certain extent, by the announcement,
PEACE CONFERENCE
on May 7, that the United States and Great Britain were pre-
pared to sign treaties with France, guaranteeing her against
German aggression. But the session of May 6 was remarkable
for the strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction among the minor
Powers "with special interests" (including the British Domin-
ions) who felt that their views had not been sufficiently con-
sidered. On May 7 at the Trianon the Conference saw the draft
treaty handed to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the principal
German delegate, and heard him deliver, without rising from
his chair, a sharp attack upon their dilatory methods. He
stated that, in the past six months, the blockade had been
responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in Germany.
" Think of that when you speak of guilt and punishment." He
and his countrymen accepted the liabilities to which they were
committed by the Armistice and Mr. Wilson's terms. They
were prepared to play their part in restoring Belgium and the
devastated areas of France. But he intimated that Germany
did not hope for a just peace. " We are under no illusions as to
the extent of our defeat and the degree of our helplessness; .
we know the power of the hatred that we encounter here."
Fifteen days were allowed the Germans for preparing their
reply, but the term of grace was eventually extended to May 29.
The German delegates, to expedite the negotiations, trans-
mitted their criticisms by instalments, each dealing with one
topic (League of Nations, Labour Charter, Saar Valley, etc.);
in some cases they tendered several notes successively on the
same subject. The Supreme Council had arranged that these
notes should be considered by 13 committees, each of which was
specially responsible for one section of the treaty, and interim
replies were returned to the Germans very promptly. Conse-
quently much of the disputed ground had been covered in pre-
liminary correspondence before the German counter-proposals
were presented as a whole; and M. Clemenceau was able to
dispatch the reply of the Allies on June 16. Both documents
were polemical in character. The Germans, besides criticising
many particular articles of the draft treaty, argued that its
general tenor was inconsistent with the terms of the pre-Armis-
tice agreement; and the Allies repudiated this imputation with
some heat. The main criticisms of the Germans are noted
below. Their counter-proposals were numerous, and only the
more striking can be given here: (a) Reparation. They offered
to pay a sum not exceeding 100 milliards of gold marks, partly
in gold but mainly in commodities and services; but they
claimed the right of appeal from the assessment of the Repara-
tions Committee to a neutral arbitrator. They would pay the
first 20 milliards by May i 1926; but they claimed credit for all
war material surrendered under the Armistice conditions, for
state railways and state property ceded along with Alsace-
Lorraine and the colonies, and for the share of the German
public debts which, as they maintained, these territories ought
to bear. No definite period was fixed for the payment of the
remaining 80 milliards, though it was stated that Germany would
allocate to this purpose annually a sum equal to the average
net peace budget of the empire before the war and it was stip-
ulated that no interest should be paid, (b) Territorial. They
demanded a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine which should give
the inhabitants an option between union with France, union
with Germany and complete independence. In lieu of the Saar
valley they offered to France fixed annual supplies of coal,
pending the reconstruction of the French mines. In lieu of ceding
West Poland, Danzig and Memel they offered to make Danzig,
Konigsberg and Memel free ports (under German sovereignty).
They demanded that Germany's claim to keep her colonies should
be referred to arbitration, (c) Commercial. They offered to
the Allies " most favoured nation " treatment in German
markets for a restricted number of years, upon condition of
complete reciprocity; and " national " treatment to Allied goods
passing over German railways (without a time limit) on the
same condition, (d) League of Nations. They offered to nego-
tiate on this subject, taking the Allies' draft covenant as a basis.
But, as conditions precedent to negotiation, they demanded
that Germany should be admitted immediately to the League;
that members of the League should be pledged to abstain from
waging economic war; that the Allied Powers should, within
two years, abolish compulsory military service and themselves
disarm, (e) Occupied Territory. They proposed that the armies
of occupation should be withdrawn within six months after
the signing of the treaty.
These proposals constituted a manifesto addressed to the
public outside the Conference; but in some particulars they
agreed with proposals which had been forcibly argued in the in-
most circles of the plenipotentiaries. M. Tardieu and Mr.
Wilson Harris have both stated, apparently on good authority,
that the idea of mitigating the treaty in essential details was be-
fore the Supreme Council at various dates from May 23 to
June 13, and that one reason for these discussions was a doubt
whether the treaty, as it stood, could be enforced on a recal-
citrant Germany. Mr. Lloyd George was now the spokesman
of the critics; among these were counted the leading members
of his Ministry, who, together with Dominion representatives,
had been summoned to a special meeting at Paris on June r.
He protested against the idea of maintaining a large army of
occupation for a considerable time. He was now (for a short
while at least) in favour of a fixed indemnity; he advocated re-
vision of the Polish frontier and the early admission of Germany
to the League of Nations. But it was hardly possible to rewrite
the treaty at this stage; the dangers of further delay were too
serious to be lightly accepted. On June 13 the movement for
revision came to an end. Its only consequences were some con-
cessions on secondary points. On Reparation and Military-
Occupation the Allies stood by their original draft. They con-
ceded some slight changes in the Polish frontier with the object
of bringing it " into closer harmony with the ethnographic
division." They agreed to a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. They
intimated that they were opening negotiations at once for an
eventual reduction of their own armaments. They withdrew a
provision for internationalizing the Kiel canal. They promised
that Germany, if she complied with the terms of the treaty,
should be admitted to the League of Nations " in the early
future." They invited Germany to offer, within four months
of the signing of the treaty, a lump sum in settlement of the whole
bill for reparation, but this suggestion was not accepted.
Signing of the Treaties of Versailles, June 28. All arrange-
ments had been made for a general advance of the Armies of
Occupation in case the German Government refused to sign the
treaty, and there were a few days of suspense while Count
Brockdorff-Rantzau was conferring with his colleagues at
Weimar. On June 20 the Scheidemann Cabinet resigned,
ostensibly because it would not consent to sign, but actually
from a well-founded consciousness that it no longer com-
manded the confidence of the German Labour party. On June
21 a new Premier, Herr Bauer, offered to sign on conditions:
he stated that the articles requiring the surrender of war crim-
inals and those declaring Germany to be the sole author of the
war must be omitted. He was told that conditions could not be
accepted, and on June 22 obtained the leave of the Weimar
National Assembly to sign unconditionally. Formal assurances
to this effect were given on June 23 at Versailles, through Herr
Haimhausen who, on the previous day, had succeeded Brock-
dorff-Rantzau as head of the German delegation. During the
last days of suspense the German warships interned at Scapa
Flow were sunk by their commanders, acting, it was stated, on
orders from the German Admiralty (June 21).
The new German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Hermann
Mtiller, and his colleague Dr. Bell signed the treaty on June 28
in the Salle des Glaces at Versailles in the presence of all the
plenipotentiaries, except those of China, who absented them-
selves to emphasize their protest of May 6 against the Shantung
articles. Before and after this ceremony several subsidiary
treaties were signed: (a) Defensive treaties with France, by
Great Britain and the United States, undertaking to defend