policy." The adoption of republicanism in the Nationalist
.platform was strongly resented in the Union and on the motion
of Mr. Merriman who voiced very accurately the feelings of
most of the Cape province Dutchmen a motion condemning
republican propaganda was carried (June 18 1917) by 72 votes
to 21. The propaganda, however, grew in virulence. There was,
said Gen. Botha in 1918, an agitation on foot to establish a re-
public by violent means.

It will be seen that throughout the World War S.A. had been
divided by bitter racial strife. It was not, however, the traditional
clash betweed Briton and Boer, but a combination of Boer and
Briton against a section of the Boer community, and this marked
an advance on old conditions. Nor were all those who gave
Hertzog their votes really prepared to follow him to all lengths.
But the defeat of Germany brought no respite in the Nationalist
agitation it rather increased, nor did it require much astuteness
for Hertzog to fix upon President Wilson's declarations in favour
of self-determination as a weapon. The last half of 1918 was,
however, noteworthy in S.A. for other than political happenings.
In the influenza epidemic which swept over the world S.A.
suffered very severely. Influenza attacked both the white and
coloured population and was most severe in the Cape peninsula.
A total of 54,899 deaths were registered in Aug.-Dec. 1918. Of
these, 11,510 were among whites and of these 6,094 occurred in
the Cape province. (There was a recurrence of the epidemic in
1919, but in a milder form.)

As soon as the World War ended Gen. Botha was summoned
to London 2 where he joined Gen. Smuts. They represented S.A.
throughout the peace negotiations and both were
signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, under which S. Natloaal-
A. and the other British Dominions became original sj//-d"<er-
members of the League of Nations. The counter- mlnatloa.
measures of the Nationalists failed. No sooner had
hostilities ceased than the central committee of their organization
sent a note to President Wilson expressing their desire to lay
before him their aspiration that the principle of self-determina-
tion should be applied as much to the S.A. people as to " other
small nations." Mr. Wilson declined to interfere. General
Hertzog was at heart most concerned to regain independence
for the ex-Dutch republics. Thus in a debate initiated by Sir
Thomas Smartt on the republican propaganda in the House of
Assembly in Feb. 1919 he maintained the right of the Free State
to break away from the Union. At the opening of the session
in Jan. one of his henchmen, Mr. Tielman Roos, in the debate on
the resolution congratulating King George on the victory of the
Allies, had moved an amendment declaring that peace could
only be maintained by the " complete application " of the prin-
ciple of self-determination enunciated by the Allied and Associated
Powers. This amendment had been defeated by 73 votes to 20.

Hoping to get some advantage out of the struggle going on
around the Peace Conference table in Paris Gen. Hertzog and
certain of his colleagues determined to visit Europe. Hertzog
held that the question of the Union as a whole becoming a re-
public was a matter in which Great Britain had no voice, but
meanwhile Great Britain might " redress the wrong done to the
ex-Dutch republics by restoring to them their freedom." He
and his colleagues would lay their case before the Prime Minister,
Mr. Lloyd George. When it was announced that a Nationalist
di-putation would leave for England, trouble arose. The crews
of the mail steamers intimated that they would not put to sea
if Gen. Hertzog and his colleagues were passengers. This difficulty
was met by the offer to bring them over to England in a British

2 In Botha's absence Mr. F. S. Malan was acting Prime Minister. -



544



SOUTH AFRICA



man-of-war. Hertzog, however, realized that that would render
him ridiculous; eventually he and his friends sailed in a Dutch
vessel to New York, whence they took passage to Europe. They
saw Mr. Lloyd George, they visited Paris, and they returned to
S.A. unsatisfied. Mr. Lloyd George pointed out to them, among
other things, that the restoration of the Dutch republics was not
a matter to bring before the Imperial Government; the Union
of S.A. was a self-governing state and could speak only through
its own constitutionally chosen Ministry.

The Treaty of Versailles having been signed (June 28 1919)
Gens. Botha and Smuts returned to S. Africa. A few weeks
later Gen. Botha, whose health had been indifferent
Botha's for some time, died (Aug. 27) after a very brief illness.
Death: j n jjj m g.A. lost one of her greatest sons, and the
Prime Empire a man who, whether as friend or foe, had
Minister, been large minded, sincere and whole-hearted. With
regard to Botha's successor Lord Buxton, the gover-
nor-general, had no hesitation. Gen. Smuts was the inevitable
choice. In Sept. at a special session of Parliament, the peace
treaty with Germany was debated, and a resolution passed ask-
ing King George to ratify it on behalf of the Union. In this de-
bate and on many other occasions Gen. Smuts dwelt on the en-
hanced position S.A. had acquired as a result of the World War;
she had not only become an equal member of the British Com-
monwealth, with a voice in the direction of its foreign affairs, but
a separate entity in the comity of nations. Greater freedom it
could not possess; it was mistress of its own destinies, but, so he
argued, it was not open to the Union to break away from the
British connexion.

The war had ended, economically S.A. had suffered from it
less than might have been anticipated, and a period of trade
expansion had set in. Smuts, both in generalship and in diplo-
macy, had been the greatest figure which the British Dominions
had thrown up during the conflict. He was presently called
upon to get the verdict of his own people on his policy and actions,
for by the constitution, another general election was due. It
was held in March 1920 in circumstances somewhat unfavourable
for the Ministry. Though on imperial questions the Unionist
party and the S.A. party held the same views, there were many
points on purely domestic issues on which they did not agree and
they opposed one another at the polls, often too when a National-
ist was contesting the same seat. There were several triangular
and even some quadrilateral contests caused by Labour candi-
datures. And the election showed that the Nationalists, deter-
minedly narrow in their outlook for many back-veld Boers the
world outside S.A. counted as nothing had gained strength.
There were 134 seats to be filled as against 130 in 1915. The
Nationalists came out the strongest single party with 4$ seats;
the S.A. party held 40, the Unionists 25, while Labour gained
the remarkable number of 21 seats. Three Independents com-
pleted the list. The Nationalists were jubilant and with the
help of the Labour members hoped for great things. Gen.
Smuts was in a difficult position but he resolved to meet Parlia-
ment and carry on the Government. This could only be done
with the help of the Unionists and that help was given to
Smuts as freely as it had been given to Botha. Even so, the
margin of votes was exceedingly small and would have disap-
peared had not several of the Labour members on the main
issues also supported the Ministry. As it was Smuts went
through the session with remarkable skill and succeeded in
passing more than one important measure among others the
Native Administration Act (see above).

The evidence that the election had afforded of the strength
of the Nationalists could not however be ignored, nor was it
possible that in the existing state of parties Parliament
JogEfforis. cou ld continue to do its work efficiently or the country
be at peace. Some way out must be found. Consider-
ing his race, it is not a matter for wonder that Smuts tried first
to see if an accommodation could be reached with the National-
ists. A reunited party which would have the support of the
whole Dutch community was a tempting prospect. Negotiations
went on for some time; finally in Sept. 1920 a hereeniging (re-



union) conference was held at Bloemfontein. It failed, and its
failure might have been foreseen. On various points the Nation-
alists or the S.A. party were prepared for compromise, but when
the test came it was seen that there was no bridging the gulf
which separated them on essentials. Gen. Smuts and his party
held firm to the principles of the unity of the Union and the
preservation of the ties which linked the Union to the Empire.
The Nationalists, on their side, refused to abandon the republican
plank in their platform.

Gen. Smuts consequently turned for support elsewhere. In a
manifesto issued on Sept. 29 and addressed to " all right minded
S. Africans, irrespective of race or party " he asked them " to
join a new party which shall be strong enough to safeguard the
permanent interests of the Union against the disruptive and
destructive policy of the Nationalists." This was an open bid
to the Unionists, nor were they indisposed to respond. Their
fundamental principles were those of Gen. Smuts and his follow-
ers. But when at the conference of the S.A. party, held on Oct.
27, a resolution was adopted directing the head committee of
the organization to take the necessary steps not for the creation
of a new party, but for " an expansion of the S.A. party,"
some difficulty was created. The Unionists, who represented
the bulk of the British section of the community,
had, though with natural regret, been prepared to
make a new combination, but they disliked the
idea of simple absorption into a predominantly Dutch organ-
ization. These feelings were expressed at the Unionist party
conference at Bloemfontein early in November. Counsels of
patriotism prevailed and at a meeting between the Unionist
executive and Gen. Smuts at Johannesburg on Nov. 27, a com-
plete agreement was reached. The Unionists joined the S.A.
party, which retained its name. Nor was it an unfitting title,
though it would become meaningless if the fusion of the two
races came about, and the old distinction between Boer and
Briton obliterated. This possibility was precisely what the
Nationalists (and also a few British extremists) most dreaded
while it was the goal to which Smuts looked forward. Speaking in
London on May 22 1917, he had declared " we want to create
a blend out of various nationalities. We want to create a new
nation and that is the South African nation. ... I am hopeful
that ... we shall in the end succeed and create under our
South African sun a new type in the world."

Having drawn together the supporters of "national unity of
the European races and the economic development of S.A. along
peaceful lines " Gen. Smuts made a new appeal to the country,
backed by the whole strength of what had been the Unionist
party. Smuts fought the election on the republican issue. With
the alternative thus nakedly put the Nationalists took alarm.
They knew that success for them on such an issue was impossible
and therefore they tried to confuse the people, and snatch a vic-
tory on other grounds. Severance from the British Empire, the
turning of the Union into a republic, was not, they declared,
their immediate object, rather was it an ideal which they hoped
to attain in a remote future. This manoeuvre deceived no one.
Even if the Nationalists did not ardently desire a complete
rupture with Great Britain they did want to secure at once com-
plete ascendency in the ex-Boer Republics. During the election
campaign Hertzog was induced to put the case baldly. Heckled
at a meeting at Roodebank in the Standerton district he said
that " even today (1921) he would accept a republic in the
Transvaal and Free State and those Englishmen who objected
might retain their British citizenship. If they had any grievances
they would be represented by a British diplomatic agent."
He admitted that if his wish were granted and difficulties arose
the country would be in exactly the same position as before the
Boer War.

The election was held in Feb. 1921 and resulted in a notable
triumph for Gen. Smuts and the enlarged S.A. party. But it was
significant that the Nationalist vote increased and that on balance
of losses and gains they held two more seats in the new than they
had held in the old Parliament. The distribution of parties was
as follows: South African 76, Nationalist 47, Labour 10, In-



SOUTH AFRICA



545



dependent i. 1 The 76 seats held by the S.A. party compared
with 40 in the old S.A. party and 25 in the old Unionist party.
The gains of the enlarged party had been at the expense of the
Labour candidates. But an analysis of the poll showed that
Smuts had rallied to his side many doubtful voters besides those
transferred from Labour. Nor could the Nationalists claim that
those who voted for Labour candidates favoured their propa-
ganda; there were in the Transvaal bitter contests between
Nationalist and Labour candidates. In considering the figures
of the votes cast it should be remembered that nine S.A. party
candidates were returned unopposed, whereas only one National-
ist (Gen. Hertzog himself) was not opposed. It is also note-
worthy that the Nationalists' successes we're almost entirely
in rural and remote constituencies, decisive evidence that their
strength lay in the back- veld Boers. The figures were: S.A.
party 138,942 (an increase of 19,455 compared with 1920),
Nationalists 104,692 (an increase of over 8,000 ), Labour 28,983
(a decrease of over 12,000).

Following upon the election there was a reorganization of the
Cabinet in which Sir Thos. Smartt became Minister for Agricul-
ture, Mr. Patrick Buncan Minister for the Interior, and Mr. J. W.
Jagger Minister for Railways and Harbours. Another leader of
the late Unionist party, Sir Edgar Walton, was appointed High
Commissioner in London. In June 1921 Gen. Smuts, Sir T.
Smartt and Col. H. Mentz (Minister of Defence) came to London
to attend the Imperial Conference. In regard to matters affect-
ing the internal affairs of S.A. the most delicate question dis-
cussed by the conference was the status of British Indians (see
above). While the ministers were still in London the question
of the future of Rhodesia advanced a stage. A deputation had
been invited to discuss with the Colonial Office a plan for as-
certaining whether Rhodesia was prepared to take a referendum
upon a definite scheme of self-government (see RHODESIA).
Largely however as the result of the general election in the
Union in Feb. 1921 the party in Rhodesia which preferred to
join the Union had again grown in strength. The Rhodesian
deputation saw Gen. Smuts early in Sept., immediately after
his return to Cape Town, when it was made clear that though
the admission of Rhodesia as a province of the Union would be
welcomed, it was a matter for the Rhodcsians to decide.

In the 1921 election campaign the Nationalists sought to evade
the main issue partly by assailing the policy of the Government
on native affairs. That policy has already been out-
lined; by Nationalist orators addressing the back-veld
Boer the conciliatory measures adopted were de-
nounced as "cooperating with niggers"; by Nationalist orators
addressing audiences in the Cape province where the native
had the vote the segregation clauses of the Act of 1920 were
denounced as evidence of the bias of the Government against
the Kaffirs. This method of electioneering had elements of danger,
for discontent among considerable sections of the natives was
pronounced. The chief ground of complaint was in regard to
their economic position. The natives had been quick to learn
the lesson of the strikes of white labour on the Rand and in 1917
and subsequent years there had been strikes and native dis-
turbances at Johannesburg and other cities. There were also
many evidences of political and religious ferment. Serious
disturbances at the Lovedale missionary institute in April i92o, 2
were followed on Oct. 23 of the same year by a disastrous collision
at Port Elizabeth. In the last-named case the native labourers
had struck for higher wages and their leader, Masabalala,
president of the Native Workers Union, had been arrested and
refused bail. An angry crowd gathered before the court house
and fire was opened upon it by the Europeans who feared an

'These figures include the results of recounts and of two by-
elections in the Transvaal, necessitated by ties in the voting at the
general election. At two by-elections for Cape Town constituencies
in Sept. 1921 Labour candidates won, bringing the Labour members
of Parliament to 12 and reducing the S.A. Party to 74.

* The students attempted to burn down the college buildings
and murder the professors. The rioting began with complaints as
to the quality of the bread served, which was the same for whites
and blacks.

xxxn. 18



Native
Unrest.



attack. Rioting and incendiarism ensued and for a time it looked
as if Port Elizabeth would be at the mercy of the natives. In all
over 20 persons (including one European) were killed and 40
injured. The action of the natives was condemned by many of
their leaders, such as Dr. Rubusana, an ex-member of the Cape
provincial council and by Mr. Jabavu, 3 a graduate of London
University, who, while calling for the remedy of grievances,
denounced the " Bolshevist propaganda " permeating the native
mind. An investigation made by a commission appointed by the
Government tended to show that the authorities at Port Eliza-
beth had mishandled the affair, and that bloodshed might have
been avoided had Masabalala been granted bail. It was a cause
for angry recriminations later when Nationalist candidates for
Parliament appeared on the same platform as Masabalala.

A greater tragedy followed at Bulhoek, near Queenstown on
May 24 1921. For months several hundreds of natives known
as Israelites, proselytes of one Enoch Ngijima, who gave himself
out as the prophet Enoch, had been allowed to remain at Bulhoek
and they had become a menace to the community. Whether or
not earlier action might have averted the calamity is not certain;
in this case the Government acted with great forbearance. But
at length it became imperative that the Israelites should be
compelled to return to their homes, and forces were moved to
Bulhoek to be in readiness for eventualities. Enoch proved
intractable and his followers proved themselves possessed of all
the fanaticism of dervishes. On May 24, when preparations
were being made for their removal, large numbers of them, though
destitute of firearms, charged the troops, and some 400 were killed
or wounded before their ranks wavered and broke. On this
occasion the soldiers had no option but to fire; the Israelites,
though their reckless charge exhibited only fanaticism, had also
shown military skill and had dug trenches and prepared am-
bushes for the troops. Their dispersal was a necessity. Neither
did fesponsible native leaders approve Enoch's teachings.

The Bulhoek tragedy was, however, regarded by the leaders
of the natives as the outcome of unjust economic laws. The
case against the Government was put by Mr. Selby Maimang,
the president of the Industrial Commercial Workers Union a
union which embraced nearly all the native and coloured trade
organizations in South Africa at its meeting at Cape Town in
July 1921. Mr. Maimang said that the land laws of the country
were to blame for the catastrophe. Enoch's following had fallen
victims to bad influences brought about by bad administration.
Coloured workers were smarting under irritating disabilities in
every walk of life. Mr. Maimang, a representative of moderate
opinion among the natives, reprobated the useless stirring up
of passions, declaring it to be the duty of the Union to educate
all non-European workers to guard their own interests. Organ-
ization was essential; they could only ward themselves against
exploitation by a distinct band of comradeship. As to that many
European employers were already convinced that combination
among the natives engaged in industries was a factor which they
could not ignore.

The decline in trade which became noticeable in the middle of
1920, and was acute in the first half of 1921, added to the dif-
ficulties of the industrial problem. It affected both white and
coloured labour severely and caused renewed agitation on the
Rand, while diamond mining came almost to a standstill.

Lord Buxton's tenure of the office of governor-general and
high commissioner came to an end in 1920. In very difficult cir-
cumstances he had carried out his duties with firmness and in a
manner which won the esteem of all classes, including the Nation-
alists. He identified himself with the interests of S. Africa. On
giving up office he was granted an earldom (Oct. 21 1920), and
on his return home served as chairman of the committee ap-
pointed to inquire into the future government of Rhodesia. Prince
Arthur of Connaught was chosen as the new governor-general
and high commissioner. He reached the Cape on Nov. 17 ten
years after his father, the Duke of Connaught, had opened the
first session of the Union Parliament.

8 Son of Tengo Jabavu (d. 1921), editor of Imvo (zi Bantu), an
influential native newspaper, which he had founded in 1884.



546



SOUTH AFRICA



AUTHORITIES: (a) Official. The Official Year Book of the Union,
prepared by the Union census and statistics department is a valuable
record and contains sections relating to state archives and official
publications and a classified bibliography. The Colonial Office,
London, publishes annual reports on the native protectorates, and
the Colonial Office List (yearly) gives lists of all parliamentary papers.
The Government of India issues reports concerning Indians in S.A.
(see especially Statement made by Sir B. Robertson before the Asiatic
Enquiry Commission (1921), a survey of the whole question).

(6) Geography, Natural History, etc.. Sir C. P. Lucas, Historical
Geography; South Africa (Part II., revised by A. B. Keith, 1915) ; R.
Marlot Flora of South Africa (4 yols. 1913-5); F. W. Fitzsimmons,
The Natural History of South Africa (1919) ; J. D. F. Gilchrist, South
African Zoology (1911);}. W. Bews, Grasses and Grasslands of South
Africa (1918); E. H. L. Schwartz, The Kalahari, or Thirstland Re-
demption (1920).

(c) Philology, Native questions, etc.. Sir H. H. Johnston, A Com-
parative Study of the Bantu and Semi-Bantu Languages (1919);
Alice Werner, Introductory Sketch of the Bantu Languages (1919);
W. A. Crabtree, "Bantu Speech," Jnl. African Soc. (1918-9);
C. Pettman, Africanderisms (1913); S. T. Plaatje, Native Life in
South Africa (1916); Jabavu, The Black Problem (1920); L. Perin-
guey, Stone Age of South Africa (1911) ; Sir H. Sloley, " Recent De-
velopments in Basutqland," Jnl. African Soc. (Jan. 1917).

(d) Political, Descriptive and Social. Violet Markham, The South
African Scene (1913); M. Nathan, The South African Common-
wealth (1919, with useful bibliography); O. Letcher, The Bonds of
Africa (1914); A. J. Macdonald, Trade, Politics and Christianity in
Africa and the East (1916); F. C. Cornell, The Glamour of Prospect-
ing (1920) ; Lady Duff Gordon, Letters from the Cape (ed. by J. Purvis,
1921), the first separate, publication of these striking letters, written
in 1861.)

() History. G. McCall Theal, History and Ethnography of South
Africa[to 1884] (final ed. xi vols. 1919) ;G. E.Cory, Rise of South Af-
rica [to 1857] (iii. vols. 1910-9) ; W. C. Scully, A History of South
Africa to the Union (1915); Sir E. Walton, Inner History of the
National Convention (1912); A. B. Worsfold, The Union of South
Africa (1912); The Times History of the War, Vol. iii, chap. 64,
the South African Rebellion (1915); Report on the outbreak of the
Rebellion (an official publication, 1915); and the Report of the
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the Rebellion (1916).

See also The South and East African Year Book and Guide, edited
annually by A. S. and G. G. Brown, an increasingly useful work;
The South African Journal of Science; the Trans. Geological Soc.
South Africa; and the Jnl. African Society of London. For economics
see the lists given in the Official Year Book. (F. R. C.)

DEFENCE AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

The establishment of union in S. Africa in the year 1910 in-
volved a fusion of the different military systems then obtaining
in the four colonies which became original Constituent Provinces
in the new amalgamation. These systems were as follows.