inople-Adrianople area, thousands of miles from the theatres of
perations, in Mesopotamia and eastern Anatolia.



The loss of Trebizond finally aroused Enver Pasha to a realiza-
tion of the full extent of the strategic danger in the E., and in
March the II. Army was directed to the E. Anatolian front. It
was to deploy on the line Lake Van-Mush-Kigi, and advance
against the Russian flank and rear in the general direction of
Erzerum; it was to be brought up to a strength of 10 divisions
by the addition of the forces already in the area of operations,
and to be reorganized in four corps. The commander, Ahmad
'Izzet Pasha, had been promoted commander-in-chief of the
Turkish army after the Dec. armistice in the Balkan War.

The strategic plan adopted by the Turkish Supreme Command
for the II. Army was as usual excellent in theory but impossible
of execution. The idea of throwing a whole army on the flank
and rear of the Russians must certainly have seemed seductive
to anyone sitting over a map in Constantinople; for it seemed to
promise a strategic encirclement, it followed famous precedents,
and there was plenty of room for the manoeuvre. In practice,
however, the plan paid no attention to the actual conditions of
time and space. The II. Army was despatched in the spring by
rail from Constantinople to Ulu Kyshla; the line, which was a
single one, with enormous intervals between stations, was already
serving as the line of communication for the Palestine and
Mesopotamia armies, so that any rapid transport of the II. Army
was out of the question. The Turkish Supreme Command made
a grave miscalculation in assuming that the army would be
assembled and ready for the advance in 40 days; the distance
from the railhead -at Ulu Kyshla to the area of concentration
(some 400 m.), which had to be covered on foot, would itself have
taken up all that time. The amateur strategists at Turkish H.Q.
took no account of these matters, and were mightily surprised
when the event disappointed their expectations. As a matter of
fact by July 8 the leading troops of the II. Army (III. Corps 7th
and nth Div.) had barely passed Malatia, and the rest of the
army was still on the railway in August.

Meanwhile the situation on the III. Army front was going
from bad to worse. At the end of May it had carried out a few
successful minor operations; Mamakhatun and Surmene (E. of
Trebizond) had been occupied, and the army command, which
was now at Gumuskhane, misconceiving the general situation,
proposed to carry out a powerful offensive S. of Trebizond early
in July. For this purpose it suggested that the units of the II.
Army already available should push forward without delay to
the area S. of Erzerum an advance which, with the weak forces
which 'Izzet Pasha had at his disposal, could only have been
effective as a demonstration or a piece of bluff. But even this
could hardly have succeeded, in view of the excellent intelligence
as to the Turkish movements which the Russians were known to
have, and 'Izzet Pasha rightly declined to fall in with the scheme.
As a matter of fact the Russians had full information as to these
happenings, and especially the progress of the transport of the
II. Army, and seized their chance to attack the III. Army in
July, before the II. Army's menace to their flank could become
effective. This was the best solution of their problem of opera-
tions on the inner line, and it met with complete success. On July
7 the Turkish III. Army was driven from Erzinjan and Baiburt
with heavy losses in men, guns and material, and was able to
make another stand only on the line Kemach (on the Euphrates
30 m. W. of Erzinjan) -Chadali Pass-Tireboli on the Black Sea.
The most serious result of this defeat was the complete de-
moralization of the defeated troops; thousands of deserters,
plundering and robbing, flooded all the country as far back as
Sivas; columns and transport melted away in panic on the
appearance of the Russian cavalry, who had broken through
the Turkish line at two points and suddenly appeared in its rear.
The III. Army reported in Aug. that 13,000 deserters had re-
joined their units, but the governor of Sivas estimated that some
30,000 were still at large in his area. The fact that the Mahom-
medan population in the area evacuated by the Turkish army
fled in terror before the advance of the Russians added to the
indescribable confusion.

When 'Izzet Pasha with the III. Corps advanced at the end
of July into the zone of assembly allotted to the II. Army the



8o6



TURKISH CAMPAIGNS



situation was as follows. In the hilly country S. of Bitlis was the
5th Div., which had been driven from that town by the Russians,
and the 8th Div. was in the hilly country S. of Mush. "Izzet
formed them into the XVI. Corps. N.W. of them were only
a few small detachments, holding the main roads as far as the
Elmali valley, in which stood the nth Cav. Bde. as the extreme
right wing of the III. Army.

'Izzet Pasha's intention was to assemble the main body of his
II. Army at Diarbekr and the smaller part at Kharput, and only
then to advance in the direction of Erzerum and the country to
the E. of it. He knew that in front of him the reinforced IV.
Caucasian Corps had taken over the task of guarding the flank of
the Russian main army.

This plan, however, was hot carried out. The Turkish Supreme
Command, in view of the disaster to the III. Army and the
reports of constantly arriving Russian reinforcements, urged
'Izzet to attack before the assembly of his forces had been finished.
'Izzet had no option but to obey, though he was under no illusion
as to the result. He wished at least to concentrate all his few
available forces on the left wing of his area of deployment and to
make a push into the district W. of Erzerum, in order to relieve
the pressure on the III. Army. But this also proved beyond his
powers. The ist, i4th and 53rd Divs., which had arrived at the
end of July and the beginning of Aug., were pushed forward
against the Russians, who were still being reinforced on the front
opposite the II. Army; a few local successes were achieved, and
'Izzet Pasha on Aug. 10 decided to renounce a general offensive
and to hold and fortify the line Kigi-Ognot heights S. of Mush.

Thus ended the geometrical strategy of the Turkish Supreme
Command, which had from the first been based only on wishes
and hopes rather than on definite realities. The administrative
deficiencies in the II. Army had been, as usual in Turkey, so
great as alone to ruin all hope of success. The army was sent
forward into wild and mountainous country, in which only
mountain artillery and columns of pack-animals could be moved,
and it was supplied with only 18 mountain guns and with
ox-wagons for transport and far from enough even of these.
Figures as to the number of cattle in the deployment area were
accepted without verification, and proved to be exaggerated
some five fold. Those responsible for the supply services were,
as ever in Turkish wars, quite incompetent to make the best of
what turned up, and very disposed to steal the little that was
available. Under such conditions the best plans are of no avail,
for they can never be translated into actual practice.

Meanwhile Wahib Pasha was displaying praiseworthy energy
in reorganizing the III. Turkish Army, of which the head-
quarters were at Andria. Divisions were formed out of the old
corps, regiments out of divisions, battalions out of regiments.
The army was divided into two " Caucasian Corps," the I. and
II., the former comprising the 5th, nth and 37th Caucasian
Divisions. But even these combined divisions were very weak.
The volunteer formations and other irregular bands proved
wholly useless, and were soon broken up. German motor trans-
port columns, established in the winter of 1916-7 on the line of
communications of the III. Army between Ulu Kyshla and
Sivas, prevented a threatened catastrophe due to starvation.
All Wahib Pasha's efforts, however, could not restore the spirit
of the III. Army and give back to it that confidence which was
essential to the prosecution of a successful offensive.

The II. Army, when its concentration was completed, was
composed of the XVI., II., IV. and III. Corps. Mustafa Kemal
(later to become famous as leader of the Nationalist army) was
the army commander. 'Izzet Pasha was entrusted with the gen-
eral direction of the II. and III. Armies operating on the Ar-
menian front, and moved his H.Q. to Kharput.

The II. Army, which had its H.Q. at Diarbekr, was experienc-
ing even greater difficulties in the matter of its communications
than was the III. In the winter, however, the strain was eased
by both sides going into winter quarters, as in the old days. Only
in the passes small observation detachments stood facing each
other. In Nov. most of the troops were moved back into more
sheltered districts, so that the Turkish and Russian winter



quarters were some 30 to 40 m. apart, about the equivalent o
five days' march in this difficult country. The Turks, howevei
were still short of food. As early as Nov. the men were get tin
only one-third of their regular rations, the pack-animals ha<
themselves to find what meagre pasturage they could, and t.
find any was soon impossible on account of the deep snow
the cavalry horses were getting only i| kilogrammes of oats
Hundreds of animals died every day. Again and again outposts
patrols and whole detachments of men were found starved o
frozen to death in the holes of the rocks. In the terrible cold
which when snowstorms ragsd might well chill to the bone evei
the warmest clad men, the majority of the troops had only thei
summer clothing. The percentage of sick grew higher day by day
The sanitary arrangements were in the highest degree defective
so that these miserable beings lived and died in boundlesl
wretchedness. In the hospital at Kharput alone the averag.
deaths in the winter of 1916-7 amounted to 900 per month
Medical requisites were insufficient, and there were no means ol
combating the plague lice and the epidemic of typhus whicq
followed it. Of the III. Army 60,000 men perished between JuW
1916 and the spring of 1917, and in the autumn of the latter yea;
barely 20,000 men remained at the front.

The strategic position in Armenia at the beginning of 1917 wa;
extremely unfavourable to the Turks. The Russians, who ha<
obtained undisputed control of the Black Sea, had massed surf
strong forces in front of the II. and III. Armies that there coulc
be no idea of a Turkish offensive. At the same time railways wera
being built from Sarikamish by Hasan Kala to Erzerum and fronj
Trebizond and Gumuschane, on the completion of which tha
Russians in their turn would be in a position to resume th<|
offensive without being hampered by transport difficulties. This
offensive might be directed either against the front of one of th<
two Turkish armies, or from Lake Urmia along the soutlurr
shore of Lake Van against the almost unprotected flank of th
III. Army. In view of the fact that a new English advance
against Bagdad was in preparation, this latter seemed very
probable, and Liman von Sanders did rightly in asking the
Turkish Supreme Command, in the late autumn of 1916, to hold
another army ready at Mosul. The proposal, however, was re-
jected by Enver. It would also have been sound policy to have
placed the II., III. and VI. Armies (the latter being at Bagdad)!
under one command; for the transference of forces betweert
Armenian and Bagdad fronts could not be carried out quickly
enough from Constantinople, and a junction of the Russian and
British fronts by an extension of the former by Urmia and the
western frontier of Persia was shortly to bi expected. A Russian
offensive from Persia against Mosul would certainly place both
the III. and the VI. Turkish Army in a perilous position. The
completion of the railway from Igdir by Bayazid to Kara Kilissa
and its continuance by Tutak and Melassgirt seemed to indicatei
the probability of a Russian offensive against the right of the II.
Turkish Army. The offensive against Mosul did not in fact take
place; but this omission was a serious error on the part of the
Russians and a piece of good fortune for the Turks, on which they
had no right to count. However, Liman von Sanders' request
for the establishment of a single command was rejected by the
Turkish Supreme Command. The relations between Enver and|
Liman had in fact gradually become so strained, that Enver
made a point of refusing anything that Liman wanted.

The Grand Duke Nicholas had, for his part, been making
energetic preparations during the winter of 1916-7 for a
powerful new offensive. The III. Turkish Army was opposed by
the V. Caucasian, II. Turkestan, and I. Caucasian Corps; the
II. Turkish Army by the VI. and IV. Caucasian Corps as far as
Van. Thence to the W. of Lake Urmia came the II. Caucasian
Cav. Corps and a number of detachments (fortress regiments
from Kars, frontier guard units, Armenian and Assyrian irregu-
lars). The VII. and I. Caucasian Cav. Corps prolonged the
front from Sauj Bulak along the Persian frontier to W. of
Kermanshah.

But the Grand Duke's plans, which in view of the wretched
condition of the Turkish armies must have led to a complete



TURKISH CAMPAIGNS



807



victory and perhaps driven Turkey out of the war in the summer
of 1917, were never carried out. This was in part due to the fact
that all available Russian forces were being concentrated for
Brussilov's great offensive in Volhynia, but mainly to the out-
break of the Russian revolution, which checked all large operations
in Asia. When the revolution broke out in April the advance had
not begun. In the course of the winter there had been nothing
but local skirmishes for the possession of a hill or pass, which,
whether they turned out to the advantage of Turks or Russians
had no influence on the general strategic situation.

The outbreak of the revolution was taken by many of the
Russian troops as a signal that the war was at an end, though
there were formations which still maintained their cohesion and
discipline. The Turks, however, were prevented partly by the
general military situation of Turkey and partly by the peculiar
difficulties of the II. and JII. Armies, from seizing and exploiting
their advantage as they might have been expected to do. The
rapid progress of the English towards Bagdad had necessitated
the despatch of reinforcements to that theatre, and the main-
tenance of the Palestine front also absorbed large forces, so that
ihcre were neither men nor material left over for the Caucasian
front. The two armies, barely 40,000 strong in the spring of
1917, were now formed into the " Caucasian Army Group " under
'Izzet Pasha, whose H.Q. were still at Kharput, and who had now
been provided with a German chief of staff, Maj. von Falken-
hausen. All this, however, did not in any way make it possible
to resume operations. Typhus was still raging; in Feb. the II.
Army lost 42 of its few doctors from this cause. There was so
little wood that the delousing stations could not be heated. The
deportation of the Armenian population had left the fields
antilled, and the villages deserted and in ruins. Of the craftsmen
,vho exhibit a multitudinous activity behind the armies on the
European fronts there was not a sign, and even the workshops
vhich had been busy in peace-time were deserted. The supply
)ften broke down entirely. A shameless traffic in waggons went
l>n on the single railway from Haidar Pasha to Ulu Kyshla,
vhich served the Palestine, Mesopotamian and Caucasian fronts.
These waggons, which should have been used for military purposes,
I vere privately hired out by officers and officials to contractors
nd war profiteers at high prices, and on this railway an illicit
:arrying trade was developed on a gigantic scale. The higher
.uthorities, who also took their quota of profit, were not inclined
o interfere. So for the sake of these brutes thousands of brave
Anatolian soldiers perished of cold and starvation without even
.nowing the true cause of their miserable death.

The reports of the hopeless military position in 1917, which
rere sent to Berlin by the Turkish Supreme Command, were
rom first to last lies, and served only to increase the exaggerated
stimate of themselves which obsessed the minds of the German
Supreme Command as well and caused the loss of every oppor-
. unity of arriving at peace of understanding.

When Bagdad fell to the English on the night of March 10-11,
he chance offered itself of a successful Russian offensive on
rlosul either westward from Lake Urmia or from the region of
.ake Van southwards. Had it been carried out even by one good
orps it could not have failed to be successful. During the whole
,f 1917 some 15 infantry and 2j cavalry divisions remained on
he Russian front facing the Turks, but nothing important was
ndertaken. The front from Trebizond to the Diala near Bagdad,
i /here it connected with the English line in Mesopotamia,
leasured over 600 m. from flank to flank, and afforded far
reater scope for free strategic manoeuvres than the narrow
onts in France, which were actually filled with guns and men.
Warlike activity was only resumed in E. Anatolia, however,
'hen Russia at the end of 1917 entered into negotiations with
le Central Powers. The political event which decided the re-
Jtnption of the offensive by the Turks, which took place early in
918, was the notification by the Turkish plenipotentiaries at
rest Litovsk on Jan. 17 that a Russian retirement from all the
rea occupied by them in Asia Minor was an essential pre-
minary to the conclusion of peace. At the same time the
'krainian delegates were asked by the Turkish delegates how



far they were interested in the retention of the Caucasus by
Russia. On their replying that they had no interests in the
Caucasus, the Turks resolved to conquer it, and obtained Ger-
many's consent to their doing so, though at the time they did
not disclose to her all their ulterior designs.

The Russians retired at the end of Jan. 1917, and in Feb. the
Turks advanced across the line Van-Erzerum-Trebizond. The
Turkish armies, which together could muster only the strength
of a weak army corps, were in such poor condition that even the
small, unorganized Armenian bands, who opposed them, were able
to give them greater trouble. Their communiques at this time
were full of stories of great victories which never took place.

The forward march was carried out in two columns. The
northern one, feeling its way very cautiously along the coast
of the Black Sea, reentered Trebizond on Feb. 24; the other
reached Erzinjan on the i4th, and moved thence by Mamakha-
tun on Erzerum. Nothing was seen of the Russians, who, as a
matter of fact, had long since recrossed the frontier; only a
few desperate Armenians endeavoured to dispute the reoccu-
pation of their country by their hereditary tormentors. The
Turks were held up for some time by these bands in front of
Erzerum, which they only "recaptured" on March n, and
revenged themselves by the usual revolting barbarities on the
unhappy Christian population.

While Erzerum was being taken, the left Turkish column
advancing from Trebizond was approaching the frontier be-
tween Chopa and Magriali, and the political problem of the
provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, the occupation of which
had been the motive of the advance, became acute. Their
interest in these provinces caused the Turks to commit their
last and decisive strategic blunder, the greatest of which they
had been guilty since 1914. The Turkish Government consid-
ered these operations in the Caucasus to be of the first impor-
tance, although the true decisive theatre for Turkey in 1918 was
Palestine. Instead of concentrating in Palestine the few troops
it had available, the Supreme Command withdrew troops and
war material from that front and despatched them to the
" East Caucasian Group." Even the small German contingent,
which formed the backbone of the Palestine army, was also
sent to the Caucasus. Liman von Sanders' words to Count
Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Constantinople, written
in June 1918, were fully justified by events: " The Turks are
sacrificing all Arabia, Palestine and Syria to these boundless
undertakings of theirs in Trans-Caucasia. Germany will some
day be burdened with the responsibility for this."

Enver and the German High Command had, however, suc-
ceeded in completely deceiving the German ambassador as to
the Turkish objective, for the latter, in reply to Liman von
Sanders, wrote on June 21 that the German Jager battalion was
being transferred from Palestine to Georgia, " not in response to
. Turkish wishes, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of restoring
order in the Caucasus, so as to allow of the whole Turkish army
being transferred thence to Mesopotamia by way of Urmia and
Tabriz." This, of course, could have been done more quickly
and easily if the Turkish army had never advanced from Arme-
nia into the Caucasus. The motive of the Caucasus adventure
lay deeper. Enver's idea of attacking India, childish as it was,
had yet proved enticing to the German High Command, and
the strategic base for an invasion of India by way of Persia
was actually established in the Caucasus in the summer of 1918.
And this at a time when the decision of the World War was
ripening on the front in France!

Considerations of an economic nature, it is true, carried great
weight in the minds of the German Supreme Command at this
time. The output of the Rumanian oil wells was insufficient;
and it was therefore thought necessary to occupy Baku, and to
despatch petroleum thence to the Black Sea by the Tiflis rail-
way. It has been necessary to mention these considerations in
order to make clear the motives of the Turkish operations in 1918.

After the occupation of Erzerum the southern Turkish column
reached Olti, the first objective of the Turks in the winter of
1914-5, on March 26. Meanwhile the coast column was moving



8o8



TURKISH CAMPAIGNS



on Batum. The Georgians, however, who, naturally enough,
had little sympathy with the Turkish " restorers of order,"
banded themselves together to oppose their further advance.
The latter were not even able to keep a firm hand on insurgent
Armenia. Behind their backs Armenian bands even succeeded
in occupying Erzerum for a time and thereby interrupting all
movement on the Turkish line of communications. Meanwhile
Georgian bands had occupied Batum. The Turks attacked the
town and stormed the advanced positions on April 9; one fort
fell on the loth, two others on the nth, and on the I4th the
town surrendered. The Turkish Supreme Command seized the
opportunity to telegraph to the world at large the most incredi-
ble stories of victory.

Early in April Nuri Pasha, who was now in command of the
" East Caucasus " Army, pushed a strong column from Lake
Van in the direction of Rare. Vostan, at the S.E. corner, and
Amis, at the N.E. corner of the lake, were occupied after violent
conflicts with Armenian bands, who fought with the utmost
fierceness. Van fell on April 7.

While this column was advancing on Kars by way of Kara Ki-
lissa, the Erzerum column, which had been brought to a halt
after the above-mentioned capture of Erzerum by Armenian
bands, pushed forward by Sarikamish, and the two columns
thus converged on Kars. As there was no strategically effective
enemy to overcome, the operation was successful, despite the
late arrival of the Van force. The Erzerum column approached
Kars on April 5, after driving off some Armenian irregulars near
Sarikamish; the Van column made slow progress through the
revolted province of Bagasia, arriving at Kara Kilissa April 18.

On the z6th the Turkish communiqui reported 'the " storm-
ing " of the fortress of Kars (which was apparently undefended)
with the capture of 860 guns. This number was considerably
in excess of the truth. There is no doubt, however, that the
provisions secured in the fortress considerably facilitated the
further prosecution of the operations. The column advancing
along the coast had meantime pushed on from Batum to Kobu-
leti and Ozurgeti on the edge of the Caucasus mountains.

The Turks now felt themselves to be masters of the situation,
and their pretensions became so outrageous as to lead to serious
controversies with the German Government, which, for the
first time in the war, was compelled to protest energetically
against their exorbitant claims. It had, however, only itself