to blame for their exaggerated estimates of themselves.
In the middle of May the plenipotentiaries of the Govern-
ment of Northern Caucasia addressed a note to all the Powers,
announcing the formation of an independent state, separated
from Russia. Transcaucasia, however, remained in a com-
plete state of confusion, though the proclamation of the inde-
pendence of the country by the assembly which met early in
June at Baku was plainly directed against Turkey. What
exactly was meant by Transcaucasia, however, must have been,
obscure even to the assembly, for a few days earlier there had
been set up under Turkish auspices three independent states,
known as the Georgian, Tartar (Azerbaijan) and Armenian
Republics. Necessity had compelled all three to conclude
treaties of perpetual amity and alliance with Turkey, who had
every intention of annexing these weak states at the earliest
possible moment.
Enver did everything to strengthen his political army in the
Caucasus. Accelerated promotion and doubled pay were prom-
ised to the officers serving with it, with the result that many
officers, who were urgently required in Palestine, got away from
that theatre, where they received no pay at all.
In the summer the Caucasus Army was increased to six
complete divisions, which were stronger than they had been
at any time since 1914, numbering 9,000 men each. The trans-
port of these troops, and their reserves, material and supplies
absorbed all the fuel available, so that no trains could be sent to
the Palestine Army, on whose fighting force the ultimate decision
of the war depended. The Pan-Islamic idea, which had been
propagated since the beginning of the war, had produced a com-
plete confusion of mind and robbed Enver and his entourage of
the last vestige of that strategic sobriety which alone could no^
save Turkey from ruin. Every week 14 coal trains were sen
from Germany to Constantinople; of these seven far more thai
were necessary were kept for the use of the capital itself
2,500 tons were shipped by way of the Black Sea to the E
Caucasian Army, and the rest was absorbed by the Anatoliai
railway or in other words the war profiteers, who filled who!
trains with their goods and paid out untold sums in bribes ti
the railway officials to give them priority of passage.
The E. Caucasian Army extended itself in Transcaucasi;
and N. Persia, from Lake Urmia to Arax, during the course o
the summer, without troubling themselves in the least about thi
dangerous English offensive against Mosul, where 4,000-5, oo<
Turkish soldiers were posted in conditions of the utmost misery
The few events that followed in Transcaucasia were of little
military interest, and consisted mainly of a few petty scuffle;
without influence on the general situation, and unsuitable foi
inclusion in a strategic narrative. Even the despatch of a German
division to Georgia in the summer of 1918 had no other objecj
than the furtherance of those plans, on the futility of which we
have already insisted.
Nuri Pasha, with Bolshevik help, certainly succeeded in
expelling from Baku a small British force which had crossed tha
Caspian and occupied the town on Aug. 12. This incident
however, had no effect on the strategic position. In Persia Nun
pushed forward to Tabriz.
The final conclusions as to the Transcaucasian operations
may be summed up as follows. The position of Turkey and of tha
Central Powers in 1918 was such that a military victory was out
of the question. This fact, however, was recognized neither by
Ludendorff, who wasted the defensive strength of the German
army in a purposeless spring offensive, nor by Enver, who was
obsessed by his vast schemes for annexation of territory. The
despatch of a strong German division to the Caucasus, and the
operations of large German forces in the Ukraine in the summer
of 1918, when the war was being lost in France, show the kind of
strategic conception then prevalent. In the case of Turkey the
theatres of war which had to be supplied with men and material
were too numerous for the resources available. When the Rus-
sians collapsed in 1918 a wise strategy would have considered
the elimination of one theatre of operations as a relief to be)
accepted with gratitude, and would have, as a natural conse-
quence, transferred all the forces thus liberated to the Palestine
front. Such a course would of itself have relieved the pressure on
the Mesopotamian front, which could no longer be saved by di-
rect means. The underlying idea ought to have been that a I
tenable military position in Palestine would have been more
favourable, in the event of negotiations for peace, than any
conquests in the Caucasus, which would have to be given up
again in case of military defeat. Enver, and with him a whole
series of Turkish and German military men, had never had that
conception of the limits of the possible which is the prime
characteristic of every great strategist. They mistook the elabo-
ration of immense and impracticable schemes for genius, whereas
true genius consists of getting the best possible results from the
material available. The events on the E. Anatolian front also
'serve to prove very clearly that strategy is an art not to be mas-
tered, even with the best will in the world, by a layman such as
Enver, and that it is governed almost entirely by the geograph-
ical conditions of the theatre of operations. This should have
been recognized by the office strategists of Constantinople, who
had no clear grasp of the geographical conditions of the coun-
try in general or in detail, and failed to realize that strategical
manoeuvres which seem highly promising on the map may be
impossible of execution in practice. In the German schools of
strategy, and also in Turkey, so-called military geography was
before the war treated with complete contempt, as it was be-
lieved that it tended to limit freedom of strategic conception.
The campaigns in the East proved that freedom of strategic
conception, unless based on accurate geographical knowledge,
is not only profitless but a fruitful cause of defeat. Finally, the
war in Eastern Anatolia may teach us one valuable psychological
TURKISH CAMPAIGNS
809
lesson, which was insufficiently appreciated by the Turkish
Supreme Command. The form of a strategic movement has of
itself BO driving force; the vital factor, in strategic force too, is
the troops. Now the spirit of the troops depends mainly on their
physical condition. An army called on, when insufficiently clad
and underfed, to face the snows of winter soon loses its fighting
value. If strategy depends on the efficiency of the troops, this
in its turn depends on the efficiency of the supply and trans-
port services, and the administration of the army in general.
Only when this organization is in good order and working well
, can the leading strategic conception be, in the true sense of the
word, free. On this simple truth the strategy of the Turks dur-
ing the World War always suffered shipwreck, even when they
had better leaders than those who appeared during the war in
Armenia. (F. C. E.)
(II.) MESOPOTAMIAN OPERATIONS
The Anglo-Indian operations of 1914-8 in Mesopotamia, which
ended in the military occupation of almost the whole of that
i extensive region, were in their initial stages conceived on com-
paratively modest lines. They were at the outset undertaken
merely with the object of (i) protecting the Anglo- Persian oil
installations of the Qarun; (2) occupying the greater part of the
Basra vilayet, so as to secure possession of the Shatt al "Arab and
to maintain control of the districts immediately round the head
of the Persian Gulf; and (3) impressing the Arabs and others in
this and neighbouring regions and influencing thereby the in-
habitants of the territories intervening between the Ottoman
i Empire and India. It was foreseen in London and at Simla that
the Ottoman Government would be likely, under instigation
i from Berlin, to send troops in this direction, for the purpose of
harassing the Indian executive by stirring up trouble in Persia
and Afghanistan; and steps had been taken to deal with the
contingency before relations between the Entente Powers and
the Porte were actually broken off. The Poona Bde. of the 6th
Indian Div. had been dispatched to an island near the head of
;the Persian Gulf in the middle of Oct., and on Nov. 7, two days
'after the British Government declared war on Turkey, these
advanced troops appeared in their transports at the mouth of
the Shatt al 'Arab.
The fort guarding the entrance to the estuary was taken after
j brief bombardment, and the brigade then disembarked and
Encamped some miles up-stream on the right bank. On learning
:;his the Turks hurried all available forces down from Basra to
oar the way to the invader; but, the rest of the 6th Div. under
iSir A. Barrett having arrived, they were attacked on the iyth and
effectually overthrown. Basra fell on the 2ist. The vanquished
Dsmanlis for the most part retired to Qurna, at the junction of
|:he Euphrates with the Tigris, the point where the water-way
rcases to be navigable for ocean-going vessels proceeding up-
itream; but Barrett promptly pushed troops to a point higher
!ip, and the place surrendered on Dec. 9. Considerable Ottoman
; 'enforcements had, however, been on the way from Bagdad
t:owards Basra since the arrival of the Anglo-Indian expeditionary
orce in the Shatt al 'Arab, and these now began concentrating,
>artly in the direction of Ahwaz and menacing the oil-fields, and
>artly about Nasiriya on the Euphrates. Threatened in a meas-
Mre on either flank, and necessarily dispersed owing to having
nany posts to hold, the 6th Div. was not comfortably situated;
>ut, as the Turkish fighting forces which had come down from
he N. were not as yet organized for active operations nor in an
iggressive mood, the invaders were enabled to consolidate their
>osition, and they were little interfered with during the first
hree months of 1915.
The Indian Government was, however, anxious to obtain a
tronger hold upon the district already occupied, and so in
! Vlarch it was decided to raise the expeditionary force to the
'trength of an army corps. Early in April Sir J. Nixon took
'ver command from Gen. Barrett, who with limited means had
onducted the campaign with signal skill and judgment, and
Jen. Townshend at the same time assumed charge of the 6th
|)ivision. The last units of the new division (the i2th) had
rrived by the middle of the month. These changes, as it turned
out, synchronized with a marked increase of activity on the part
of the Turks; for they appeared in some force near Qurna and
also seriously threatened Ahwaz; they were, however, driven off
with no great difficulty at both points. Encouraged by these
successes, Nixon decid'ed to assume the offensive and to occupy
'Amara, a town of some importance 60 m. N. of Qurna on the
Tigris, but considerably farther if following the sinuosities of
the stream. This task was entrusted to Townshend, who carried
it out by making free use of water-transport of all kinds for
moving his troops. Aided by a naval flotilla, on May 31, he
signally defeated a hostile force which tried to bar the way; and
then, as the result of a bold stroke, on June 3 made himself
master of 'Amara, capturing 17 guns and 1,800 prisoners. This
operation accomplished, Nixon resolved on a blow against
Nasiriya. The heat was now intense; but, in spite of this, por-
tions of the 1 2th Div., relying for mobility largely upon water
transport, took possession of the town after some hard fighting
on July 25, another 17 guns with 1,000 prisoners being the prize
of victory. The Anglo-Indian army which had descended upon
this corner of the Ottoman Empire could then fairly claim that
it had achieved the object for which the campaign had been
originally undertaken.
Its triumph had been all the more creditable seeing how
seriously it had suffered from want of transport, and taking the
inadequacy of its administrative branches into consideration.
It must be remembered that the Indian Government had
accepted heavy commitments in other fields of military action.
Two divisions had been dispatched to the western front. Large
forces had been furnished for the protection of Egypt. The E.
African campaign also at that stage was an Indian undertaking.
The military organization of the great British Asiatic dependency
had not in pre-war days been framed with the idea of prosecuting
martial operations on an ambitious scale overseas. Large re-
serves of trained men did not exist to fill those gaps in the ranks
that contests with well armed antagonists bring about in the
present day. The available departmental services notably the
medical service had been starved. The troops now operating
at the head of the Persian Gulf were, moreover, faced by quite
exceptional difficulties, owing to the insufficiency of that shallow-
draught water transport upon which their efforts and their main-
tenance virtually hinged.
Unfortunately, the success which had hitherto attended the
combinations of Generals Barrett and Nixon inspired the civil
and military authorities at Simla with the desire for a more
ambitious programme in Mesopotamia than that which had
been contemplated in Oct. 1914, and they readily fell in with
Nixon's proposal that an advance up the Tigris to Kut should
be undertaken. The Home Government agreed. This meant an
advance of some 180 m. up-river into the heart of the enemy's
country by troops who had already undergone much hardship,
the maintenance of the force depending upon a flotilla that was
barely adequate for the purpose and that would become entirely
inadequate were the strength of the force to be increased above
that of the division and the cavalry brigade already told off for
the undertaking. News had come that a Turkish force was
assembling at Kut under Nur ed Din Bey. Although Nixon
made strong representations with regard to his lack of water
transport, he perhaps hardly made the danger of advancing
beyond 'Amara unless this were substantially increased suffi-
ciently clear to authorities far away from the scene of action.
Nor, perhaps, was the virtual impossibility of rapidly aug-
menting it realized. Townshend was charged with carrying out
the proposed advance and early in Aug. his 6th Div. began
gradually to push forward up the Tigris. On Sept. 14 he con-
centrated his force at Sheikh Sa'd.
On the following day he drove an advanced Turkish force in
disarray out of a fortified position at Abu Rumman on the
right bank of the Tigris, about 15 m. from Kut, and he then
lalted for some days to admit of supplies coming up and of
reconnoitring the lines which the enemy had established on both
)anks of the river about Es Sinn. On the 28th he attacked Nur
ed Din in his entrenched position and completely defeated him,
8 io
TURKISH CAMPAIGNS
taking 1,650 prisoners, 13 guns and much war material, and the
cavalry pursued the fleeing Osmanlis as far as 'Aziziya, halfway
from Kut to Bagdad. The enterprise had in fact been carried
out with a success equal to its audacity.
Kut was a locality of some strategical significance. Issuing
here from the Tigris, the Shatt al 'Arab creates a link with the
Euphrates at Nasiriya. The natural route for troops from
Bagdad proceeding to the lowest reaches of the Euphrates
immediately above Qurna would be by way of the Tigris and
the Shatt al Hai. Therefore, installed in his new position at
Kut, Townshend in a measure blocked both the routes from
Upper Mesopotamia to Basra that following the Tigris right
down to Qurna, and that turning off by the Shatt al Hai. Kut
was furthermore the most important place between "Amara or
Nasiriya and Bagdad, and its capture was calculated to exert a
considerable moral influence over the Arabs who dwelt in this
region and who were disposed to be troublesome. But almost
the whole of the Anglo-Indian troops in the theatre of war, apart
from detachments required for garrison duty nearer the Persian
Gulf, had now been projected into an isolated situation far within
the enemy's territory; they were, moreover, depending upon a
long line of water communication, not easy to protect against
marauding attacks and served by only a restricted number of
steamers and smaller craft. But for the severe defeat suffered
by the Turks at Es Sinn, the disposition of the invading forces
at the beginning of Oct. would have justified some anxiety.
But the idea of pushing on to Bagdad had already taken
shape even before the occupation of Kut. The Aug. discomfiture
in the Gallipoli Peninsula (see DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN), coupled
with a belated realization that the Dardanelles venture would
not succeed, had rendered the Home Government eager for some
dramatic achievement in Mesopotamia. The Indian Viceroy had
advocated an advance to Bagdad when the start up the Tigris
from 'Amara was materializing. Townshend's gratifying triumph
acted as a stimulus to these aspirations, and during the month of
Oct. there was much inter-communication between London,
Simla and army headquarters in Mesopotamia on the subject of
a further advance. Nixon intimated early in the month that he
was strong enough to open a road to Bagdad under the circum-
stances then existing, but he did not consider himself able to
hold the city if taken. The question of even reaching the place,
however, depended in reality upon whether the advance were to
take place before the enemy was reinforced. The military
authorities who were consulted at home, while admitting the
possibility of capture, regarded permanent retention as out of
the question with the limited forces available; they declared that,
if Bagdad was to be held, the army in Mesopotamia must be
reinforced by two divisions. Influenced by political considera-
tions, however, the Home Government became more and more
insistent. The dispatch of the two Indian divisions that were
on the western front at the time to the Persian Gulf was under
consideration, but it could not be promised at the moment.
Although no reinforcements could be sent him, and although had
they been sent him they could not have taken part in the opera-
tion owing to the time that must elapse in getting them to the
theatre of war and owing to the absence of water transport to
move them and to feed them when they got there, Nixon was on
the 3ist informed that he might advance on the city.
Townshend had pushed large parts of his force from Kut on
to 'Aziziya while the discussion was proceeding. He found that
the Turks were less demorah'zed by the reverses' they had met
with than had at first been supposed, and they had been given
time to rally and to reorganize. His own troops had been severely
tried, and all his units were short of establishment. He enter-
tained serious misgivings as to progressing farther, in view of the
isolation of his force, of the length of his communications, and
of the manifest insufficiency of that water transport which was
the governing factor in any operations that he might have to
undertake. Even after receiving his orders to advance, he was
unable to move for a fortnight owing to time lost in getting up
supplies to 'Aziziya and in organizing for the hazardous effort.
On Nov. ii, however, the advance began, and on the 2ist the
Turks were dislodged from a fortified position at Laj. It was
known that the enemy was in strong force at Ctesiphon and had
constructed elaborate entrenchments at that point; news had
also come that hostile reinforcements were expected. A night
march was therefore carried out, and at dawn Townshend at-,
tacked. The assault was most successful in the first instance.
Two lines were carried and many prisoners were captured. But
strong Ottoman reinforcements arrived on the battlefield while
the fight was still in progress, and these recovered much of the
ground that had been lost earlier in the day. For three days the
two armies remained facing each other at Ctesiphon, the Turks
being much superior in numbers and their array gradually
swelling as fresh troops arrived from Bagdad. Townshend was
in the meantime making all preparations for a retreat and was
getting his wounded away a service of no small difficulty owing
to the insufficiency of transport. Then on the night of the 25th
he moved off.
His losses since quitting 'Aziziya amounted to 3,500 nearly
one-third of his strength. Except in respect to cavalry, the enemy
enjoyed a great advantage in numbers, and as soon as the re-;
treat began the Arabs started harrying the retiring force. Still,
thanks to Townshend's skilful dispositions and to the resolute
marching of his weary troops, no great difficulty was experienced
in evading grave molestation during the first four days of the
backward march. But, owing to the flotilla of supply transports,
barges and fighting craft being delayed by the shoals, and to :
some of the craft getting aground, a halt had to be called on the
2Qth. This enabled the pursuing Ottoman columns to come up,
and on Dec. i they delivered a resolute attack upon the Anglo-
Indian force, but the assailants were beaten off after a sharp
encounter and the retreat was then resumed. It had been neces-
sary to abandon three steamers, but so great was the effect of the
stalwart resistance offered by Townshend's sorely tried little
army that it was little interfered with during its last three days
of retreat. It assembled at Kut on Dec. 3, having suffered another
i,ooo casualties since quitting Ctesiphon, but bringing in the
i, 600 prisoners taken on Nov. 22.
So for the moment ended the Bagdad adventure. On
Dec. 3 the first of the reinforcements spoken of six weeks before
(when London and Simla were pressing for an advance) had only
started a few days on their four weeks' voyage from France
to the Shatt al "Arab. Military authorities had admitted the
possibility of a successful dash on the city, but had denied the
possibility of so small a force holding the city unless reinforced;
and even had additional troops been available in the country,
the water transport to get them up the river was lacking.
When Townshend moved forward the best to be hoped for was
that he might reach his goal and might then escape if he
straightway hurried down the Tigris again. Seldom in the his-
tory of war has a military force been committed to an undertak-
ing so unwarrantable.
But worse, from the British point of view, was to follow. For,
with the approval of the Home and Indian Governments, Nixon
decided that Townshend should stop where he was, although
if he did so he was bound to be invested. They assumed too
readily that he would be relieved ere his supplies ran out. So his
sick and wounded, his cavalry, most of the flotilla and a propor-
tion of his animals were sent off down Tigris, although the civil-
ian population was unfortunately allowed to remain; prepara-
tions for a siege were put in hand ; and on the 8th Kut was hemmed
in on all sides. Its situation in a deep loop on the left bank of
the river rendered the place readily defensible against attack,
and the German Field-Marshal von der Goltz, who had just
taken supreme command of the Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia,
perceived that unless it fell to an early assault the main task of
his advanced troops would be to guard against a relief. Nur cd
Din had four divisions at his disposal, and on the icth, nth and
24th he delivered unavailing onsets upon the narrow front that
was not covered by the river. Then the siege became a blockade,
part of the Turkish army moved down the Tigris to Sheikh Sa'd
and 'All Gharbi, and the work of constructing formidable lines
at Es Sinn on the right bank of the river, and athwart a defile on
TURKISH CAMPAIGNS
(MESOPOTAMIA)
PLATE II.
TURKISH CAMPAIGNS
811
the left bank between the channel and the Suwaikiya marshes,
was taken in hand. About the end of the year Khalil Pasha
assumed command.
Meanwhile the 7th and 3rd Indian Divs. had begun to arrive
in the Shatt al 'Arab in the middle of Dec., and Gen. Aylmer
took charge of the troops who were to undertake the relief of Kut.
Units as they disembarked were pushed on to 'Amara and pro-
ceeded thence up the Tigris. The urgency of joining hands with
Townshend forbade delay. There was no time to organize the
force properly, it lacked powerful artillery for dealing with
entrenchments, and the shortage of river transport multiplied
its difficulties. The Turks were nevertheless driven out of "All
Gharbi and were on Jan. 6 1916 defeated with heavy loss at