Austrian troops to fight on French soil against the French ; and the
non-German nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, sup-
ported by the Social Democrats, were strongly opposed to taking
part in the war in the west. The German Supreme Command,
on being informed of this, sent Gen. von Cramon, their repre-
sentative with the Austro-Hungarian army in the beginning of
1918, " a definite order to insist upon a binding declaration."
Arz replied that no Austro-Hungarian divisions would be available
until peace had been concluded with Russia and Rumania, but
that artillery could be sent, though it would be deficient in muni-
tions. This offer was accepted. 1 General von Cramon succeeded
in persuading Hindenburg and Ludendorff, in spite of the doubts
which these proceedings had aroused in them, to make another
request for the cooperation of Austro-Hungarian divisions in the
western theatre of war. But Cramon's intervention with General
von Arz in the meantime did not succeed. General von Arz
explained to him in the end in strict confidence that it would not
be agreeable to those in high places if infantry were sent to the
west. As a last resource now the German Supreme Command
tried to stir up its ally to an attack in Italy. On March 15

l Von Cramon, Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Verbundeter,
p. 6. The number of heavy batteries sent was 46.



992



WESTERN FRONT CAMPAIGNS



Hindenburg implored General von Arz to arrange for an im-
mediate offensive by the Austro-Hungarian armies in Italy, to
relieve the German army in its difficult decisive battle. After
some hesitation Arz replied on March 27 that he would rally all
the means at his disposal and deliver a blow against Italy at the
end of May which should completely break her.

Germany was thus left to carry out the decisive battle on
French soil on her own resources. There were three enemies to
be reckoned with: England, France and America. The British
had borne the chief burden of the fighting during the latter half
of 1917, when the great battle in Flanders had towered over all
other events in significance. In spite of the lost ground in the
Ypres sector, and the unavoidably heavy loss in fighting power, it
could in the end be registered as a German victory in so far as
the English had failed to achieve their strategic aim, the destruc-
tion of the German submarine base in Flanders. For the estima-
tion of future prospects, at least as important as this happy issue
was the apparent failure of the British attack system with its
unreserved employment of masses in a battle of materiel, and its
methodical conduct of the offensive as a series of thoroughly
prepared attacks with objectives limited in space and, once
chosen, rigidly adhered to. It was believed that this system
revealed a lack of capacity for operative manoeuvring inherent
in British leadership and in the British army. The tank battle
at Cambrai in Nov. was looked upon as a further proof of this.
Should the Germans succeed in bringing about a war of movement
again in the west, their conviction was that they would prove
themselves superior to the British.

Contrasted with the powerful effort that the British had put
forth to gain the victory in Flanders, the ends for which their
French allies were striving in the second half of 1917, after the
failure of the great Aisne offensive, were apparently more modest.
The local attacks to which they confined themselves at Verdun
and later in the Laffaux corner turned out favourably for them,
it is true, and inflicted considerable losses on the Germans. But
on the whole their cautious strategy led to the deduction that the
moral depression of the French nation and the army, which had
set in after the battle of the Aisne, and was not hidden from the
Germans, had not been overcome. Not that the German Com-
mand was likely to regard the spirit of France as permanently
paralysed; on the contrary it was considered certain that the
French army, in the following spring, would enter the struggle
for final victory completely refreshed and stronger than before.
In comparison with England she was the militarily stronger op-
ponent, more skilled in strategy and tactics, and more dangerous.

When it had to be decided upon which of the two the German
blow was next to fall, a success over the British therefore sug-
gested itself as being more easily and certainly obtainable. Added
to this there was the consideration decisive from a political
standpoint that the principal enemy, England, would probably
be more inclined for peace when she herself had suffered a crush-
ing defeat. In this respect the estimated value of the respective
opponents had altered considerably from that made by Falken-
hayn, which had passed muster two years earlier. The war in
which England was fighting with her own forces on the European
continent was, since the battle of the Somme, no longer a " side
show." She was, on the contrary, now conducting it with all her
available forces, with the utmost tenacity and with her own wea-
pons. For the rest it might be assumed that when the German
" hammer blow " fell on the one enemy, the other would not
stand idly looking on, but would either directly assist his ally or
proceed to a relief offensive. One hammer blow would not suffice.
A general battle was therefore launched. Ludendorff dwelt on
this in making his report to the Kaiser on Feb. 13 1918 at Schloss
Homburg, when he said:

" The battle in the west which the year 1918 will bring presents
the biggest military problem ever set before an army. France and
England have grappled with it in vain fora years. . . . It must not
be imagined that we are going to have another such offensive as in
Galicia or Italy. It will be a stupendous struggle, beginning in one
place and continuing in another, and will take up a long time."

As regards the relative strengths of the two sides, the German
High Command cherished no illusions as to any marked numerical



superiority for their own forces. The strength of the German
army in the west was brought up to 194 divisions by the addition
of divisions brought up from the eastern and Italian theatres.
The Entente forces in France in Feb. 1918 were estimated at
167 divisions. If the n French-English divisions in Italy, which
were easily available, were added to these, there remained only a
slight superiority in the number of divisions on the German side.
In artillery the German western army was not even quite as
strong as its opponents. Ludendorff based his decision on the
theory that the totals of the two fighting forces would balance
each other. A factor which counted for much with the Germans
was the physical condition of the army. An offensive attack best
suited the character of the nation and the tradition and training
of the troops. It was the more powerful form of warfare. Ger-
many owed to it all her previous tangible successes. The ordinary
citizen could see, through all his heartfelt longing for peace, that
his efforts could only be rewarded when Germany had overthrown
her enemies. Here and there, it is true, the same disintegrating
influences which were undermining the war spirit at home could
be seen at work in the army. But the influence of the good ele-
ments, which far outweighed the rest, stamped the whole as an
excellent body of men. Their " will to win " was not indeed
inspired purely by victory for its own sake. The attack was
longed for also as a deliverance from the terrible battering which
they had endured for years with resignation and with courage.

It now became supremely important to find out the precise
moment at which the American forces would actively intervene.
In a review of the situation drawn up by the German Supreme
Command in the winter of 1917-81! was stated:

" The United States are forming an army of about 50 divisions,
of which three only have as yet landed in France. One of tin
at the front to be trained. The two others are in need of more training
behind the front. By the spring of 1918 the American forces in
France may reach a strength of about 15 divisions. The mass of the
divisions will only be suitable for use on quiet fronts. Only the 3
divisions now in France may be expected to take part in a spring
offensive. The corps of officers is not yet trained for war on a large
scale. On these grounds the independent use of large American units
in difficult positions will be out of the question at present. The
drafting of reserves and the arming and equipment of the American
troops are good. Training is still inadequate. But the first regiment
put in at the front fought well during a German attack, and it is
therefore to be expected that the American soldier, after more
training and experience, will prove himself a worthy opponent."

In another calculation, made in Dec. 1917, the Supreme
Command estimated the whole of the American forces that had
been landed in France up to the spring at 450,000 men at most.
A larger number was not to be expected on account of the lack of
shipping for transport. The mass of this army could not be ready
for an attack by the spring of 1918. The value of the Americans
at first would therefore lie in their power to set free English-
French divisions on quiet fronts. As a matter of fact this calcula-
tion of the American strength was too generous. The total
number of Americans landed in France up to the end of March
1918 has been stated by the American Secretary of War at just
under 370,000. Of these only 144,000 were included in the 5
fighting divisions. The fact that the Germans did not at once
realize the full extent of the increase in American transports, from
April onward, in response to the urgent demands of England and
France, does not actually affect their review of the situation at
the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. When Hindenburg
and Ludendorff resolved on the decisive attack they were entitled
to hope for so crushing a victory over the English and the French
by beginning operations early that the palm of victory could not
be snatched from them again even by very considerable masses of
American troops, whose intervention would only become effective
in the later war of movement. Supposing as a basis for the
actual starting-point of the offensive the Germans to be in
possession of the line Doullens-Amiens by the beginning of April,
which was within the realm of possibility, the annihilation of
the British army might be completed within that month.
Meanwhile the battle against the French would have broken out
in full force. During the months of May and June a decisive
defeat had to be inflicted on them also. If that succeeded, the



WESTERN FRONT CAMPAIGNS



lericans whose troops were for the most part not yet suffi-
:ntly trained for a war of movement would merely be swept
ito the general debacle. Entirely inexperienced in the leading
of great masses, they would hardly change the decrees of fate.
The Germans had of course to take into account the fact that

-even a complete military victory by the Central Powers in 1918
the continent would not end the war, so long as the will of
lyd George in. England was- unbroken. Again, should the
tente by a great effort succeed in readjusting the situation on
continent, the war of starvation could be carried on with
ater effect in proportion as the submarine menace diminished.
ie question was therefore whether the Central Powers, after
subduing their enemies on the continent of Europe, could still
hold out economically. The opening of the Ukraine had come so
late that it was extremely doubtful whether its resources would be
available in time to stave off the threatened economic collapse of
the nations of the Quadruple Alliance. Ludendorff had no illu-
sions upon this point, being convinced that it was absolutely

I essential to have his military offensive in the west accompanied
and supported simultaneously by a political offensive on a
large scale on the English home front. This would be directed
toward bringing about the fall of Lloyd George and persuading
the English nation to accept rather Lord Lansdowne's efforts in
the direction of peace. It was for the political leaders to call into
being and carry out a propaganda offensive of this nature. The
commander-in-chief could only demand it and this he did.

As early as the middle of Jan. 1918, Ludendorff had handed in
to the Imperial Chancellor, with a strong personal recommenda-
tion, a memorandum for a German political offensive drawn up
by Colonel von Haeften. But this urgent warning to the political
leaders of the State met with no response. The politicians were
unmoved. Once more, on June 3 1918, Ludendorff made another
passionate appeal to the Chancellor to undertake a political
offensive against the English home front, again sending a memo-
randum by Colonel vori Haeften, which this time included a
detailed plan of campaign. But it was unavailing.

The question arises here whether the German Supreme Com-
mand would not have done better, at a moment when they were
militarily strong, to attempt their utmost to induce the political
heads of State to prepare the way for peace. Ludendorff 's pub-
lished memoirs show that it was never opposed to efforts aiming
at an honourable peace that would safeguard the existence of the
German Empire. But all the attempts in this direction made by
the political leaders found the Allied Governments unresponsive,
and were regarded merely as signs of internal weakening in the
Central Powers. Ludendorff was to see for himself, shortly
before the beginning of the great spring offensive, how little the
attitude of the Entente statesmen had changed and how hopeless
and damaging the renewal of any such attempt would prove.
According to a credible report from a neutral country, Washing-
ton's readiness to enter into official peace negotiations depended
upon the following preliminary conditions: the unconditional
evacuation of northern France and Belgium; the payment of
reconstruction expenses; Alsace and Lorraine to be made inde-
pendent; the annulling of the treaty of Brest Litovsk, just

1 concluded in the east; reference of all eastern questions to a peace
conference to be summoned by the Entente; and a complete
change of the Government system in Germany on lines to be laid

. down and enforced by President Wilson later. A commander-
in-chief who, in the spring of 1918, should have pressed the politi-
cal leaders to pave the way for peace negotiations under such
conditions, without having tried for a decision on the field, would
have been cursed by his fatherland.

Plan for a Break-through at St. Quentin. Suggestions for
an offensive had been made by the higher command of Prince
Rupprecht of Bavaria's army group after the English offensive
in Flanders had died down in the beginning of Nov. 1917. The
suggestions culminated in the proposal to launch the main attack
from the Armentieres-La Bassee front in the direction of
Hazebrouck against the right flank and rear of the British, on the
assumption that they would certainly concentrate their forces
in Flanders in the coming spring for a renewed break-through
xxxii. 32



993

operation in the direction of the German submarine base. The
Allies would then obviously be in a difficult operative position.
The mass of their fighting forces would be crowded up on the
extreme N. wing of the whole western front. To bring up strate-
gic reserves would take time. On their left flank and rear lay the
sea. For the British in particular, strategically less trained as
they were, it would not be easy to deploy their closely packed
masses in the direction of the right flank and to cover their
threatened communications, all the more so as a large part of
their non-mobile righting material was rigidly fixed. Tactically
the prospect of breaking through the front was a good one, since
the attackers would be faced by few positions technically very
strong. It was, however, recognized that the country would be a
difficult one in which to follow up the attack, which would be
hemmed in between two commanding ranges of hills, and still
further confined to the left by the La Bassee canal. It would
therefore have to advance mainly in the wet Lys depression, and
the ascent to the Bailleul and Hazebrouck heights would have to
be carried by fighting. On account of the wet ground the opera-
tion would probably have to wait until the middle of April.
General Ludendorff fully acknowledged the advantages of the
proposed operation, but laid stress on the serious difficulties
presented by the ground, and above all on the point that the
attack, being dependent on the weather, could not be made early
enough. He considered that an attack in the region of St.
Quentin offered better prospects. When the line of the Somme-
Peronne-Ham had been captured, the attack could proceed in
a N.W. direction, resting its flank on the Somme, and might
succeed in rolling up the British front. The higher command of
Crown Prince Rupprecht's army group held to its own point of
view, however, that the attack on the line Armentieres-La Bas-
see in the direction of Hazebrouck code name "St. George"
was to be preferred on tactical and strategical grounds to any
other offensive setting in farther to the south. Their reasons were
thus stated in a memorandum of Nov. 20:

" In consideration of the general political situation and the appear-
ance on the scene of the Americans, the attack should clearly be
made as soon as possible. On the other hand a decisive effect can
only be attained if the objective, i.e. the mass of the British army, is
securely united in massed groups in Flanders. This condition of
security can only exist when the British in Flanders are preparing to
attack. Our offensive can only set in when this has become a cer-
tainty. The British must .attack in Flanders again in the coming
year. They are forced to do so by our submarine base. We may
therefore count on it with certainty and make a strategic use of the
situation. Side by side with these considerations arises that of the
difficult nature of the ground in the Lys depression, which makes it
imperative not to attack too early. From previous experience and
observation it would appear that considerable difficulty may be
expected with the ground and the water up to about the middle of
April. . . . The British in Flanders have similar ground conditions
to consider. If they proceed to the offensive, our attack at Armen-
tieres Estaires would presumably be possible also. We should do
best therefore both as regards the operative effect and the state
of the ground to wait until the British attack in Flanders. It will
then be necessary at first for us to give way before the enemy offen-
sive in Flanders and so far as possible on the French front also.
If we accept the defensive battle, we shall have to tie up such strong
forces in the process that we shall not be powerful enough for an
attack. We can without hesitation afford to retire as far as the line
Vladsloe-W. of Roselare Werwicq, as the submarine base will
still be covered."

Opposition was also raised in some quarters to an attack from
the La Bassee canal front to the corner of Bullecourt, on the
ground that it would come up against a strongly fortified system,
and that no rapid result at the start could be expected. The
enemy would, it might be assumed, gain time for bringing up his
reserves from the north and the south. " Unless the circum-
stances change considerably in our favour there is a danger of the
operations resulting in a pocket being formed in the front and not
in a decision in the war of movement."

The idea of an attack delivered from the II. Army's front
code name " Michael " was criticized as follows by the higher
command of Prince Rupprecht's army group:

" Decisive operations by the II. Army can only aim at a break-
through of the enemy front and the attainment of the best possible
results in the war of movement against the enemy's reserves. The



994



WESTERN FRONT CAMPAIGNS



Somme an unusually powerful obstacle will serve as a support
for the left flank. The main idea of an operation on the II. Army
front must therefore be to break through the enemy front in the
first place, in order to protect the left flank against the French anc
roll up the enemy front toward the north. The operation would
then be continued in the area between the Somme and the Pas de
Calais against the enemy forces there, as a war of movement with a
N.VV. direction. The enemy would have his back to the sea. There
would be a prospect of a decisive victory if the operation were
pushed far enough forward. The progress of the operation in detail
after the successful break-through would depend upon the measures
taken by the enemy, and cannot be foreseen. Operations of this
order presuppose strong forces, considerably stronger than would
be necessary for the " St. George " scheme. The advantages of this
scheme are that in the II. Army area operations are possible at all
seasons; that the enemy positions excepting those S. of St. Quentin
are not strongly built up and are but thinly occupied at the mo-
ment ; that the question of strong enemy reserves need hardly be
considered, as the British will make their attack in Flanders, and
the French are not likely to make theirs against the II. Army. If
the French should prepare an attack at St. Quentin, the German
attack would have to set in farther to the north. The disadvantages
are that the operations would lead through the ruined tract of coun-
try 'Alberich,' 1 and would involve crossing the wide area of the
Somme battle, strewn with positions and craters; that the II. Army
front runs from N.W. to S.E., while the direction desired for the
main operation is N.W. It therefore becomes considerably more
difficult to roll up the enemy front towards the N.W. after the suc-
cessful break-through.

" The attack would first have to be made in a W. direction as far as
the Somme, and could only later develop toward the N.W. A certain
amount of time would necessarily be wasted before the operation of
movement came into swing. This would give the enemy an oppor-
tunity of bringing up his reserves, the network of railways being
favourable for the purpose."

Although General Ludendorff and the chief of the general
staff of Rupprecht's group of armies, General von Kuhl, were
agreed on the main point that the offensive should be directed
against the British, the chief of the general staff of the German
Crown Prince's army group, Count von der Schulenburg, held
at first a directly opposite view, considering an attack on the
French to be the better policy. " England, with her dogged
self-confidence," h'e said, " is not k'kely to end the war on account
of a partial defeat of her army. She will be more inclined for
peace when the power of the French is broken by a heavy defeat."
Count Schulenburg's proposal was " to attack in the Argonne
and to the E. of it, and simultaneously to carry out a strong
attack from the St. Mihiel region in a W. direction. The objec-
tive of the attack would be Verdun, and, if possible, the de-
struction of the portion of the French army enveloped by the
attack. The wooded, indistinct character of the deployment area
would make it easier to hide the preparations for attack. The
attacks would have a good chance of success if managed as a
surprise. The French would never get over the loss of Verdun.
If the seizure of the fortress were combined with a decisive
victory over a portion of the French army, which would mean
depriving the French of the possibility of a really promising
offensive in 1918, the French nation and its army would be
swept by a great wave of depression:

" The British are certain to attack in Flanders if we attack the
French at Verdun. A French offensive may be predicted with equal
certainty if the British are attacked. If the Supreme Command is
not in a position to execute a big attack, and at the same moment
fight a defensive battle in another place, there remains the possibility
of evading the enemy attack on the threatened front by retreating.
This could be carried out by the VII., Land III. Armies, and also to
a limited extent in Flanders presumably, but not E. of the Argonne
or on the V. Army's front."

The armistice concluded with Russia on Dec. 15 made a
considerable difference in the general situation. Russia no longer
counted as a military factor, and the balance of power in the
western theatre of war had now readjusted itself in favour of the
Germans in consequence. All the reports received pointed to the
conclusion that the Entente Powers would for the present