By the middle of July, with the increasing number of American
divisions, which had gained and were gaining battle experience,
that difficulty disappeared. On July n Petain, on Pershing's
insistence, again urged this plan upon Marshal Foch, purposing
now to make it immediately after the long-awaited German
Marne attack. Foch gave it his approval, not indeed with any
hope of gaining thereby any decisive advantage, but rather
regarding it as a desirable counter-stroke to the German assault.
The striking success of this counter-attack, which in two days
gained and held control of the German communications in the
Marne salient, and thereby compelled its evacuation, brought
to the Allied leaders, as it did to many in Germany, the discovery
that the tide of victory had already turned. On July 24 Foch
arranged a meeting of the commanders-in-chief at Bombon, to
discuss the means of following up this success and of preserving
to the Allies the initiative thus unexpectedly gained.
The chief misgiving of the French , Government at this time,
now that Paris had been rendered secure through the driving
of the Germans back from the Marne, was the lingering appre-
hension that the enemy might still drive a wedge between the
French and the British armies at Amiens. It was therefore
particularly welcome that Field-Marshal Haig should propose
an attack on the Amiens salient to be made by the newly formed
Australian corps, now in. that sector and desirous of making
the attack, together with the Canadian corps, which had not yet
been engaged in the year's battles. At this meeting also it was
decided to assign to the American army the reduction of the
St. Mihiel salient as its first distinctive operation, but meanwhile
to employ this new army in completing the reduction of the
Marne salient. All the commanders-in-chief at this meeting
expressed themselves as favouring a continuation of offensive
action, yet still with the idea of keeping the German army busy,
of wearing it down, of seizing favourable occasions and localities
for attacks to gain prisoners and material and reconquer useful
bits of territory, rather than with any thought of a systematic
plan for ending the war by victory before winter.
During the two weeks following this conference the German
army was forced back slowly from the Marne salient, now become
WESTERN FRONT CAMPAIGNS
1003
a mere pocket, which was, however, held stubbornly because
in this area there had been captured from the French, in May,
vast quantities of munitions and military supplies of all kinds
and of materials which were urgently needed in Germany, but
which there had not been time or facilities for removing. In
addition a vast amount of German material had been brought
up for the maintenance of the army on the Marne front, and
for the July 15 attack. Much of this was irreplaceable, and the
German army had to fight to gain time to remove as much of
it as possible.
Ludendorff, who had been present with his army during the
Champagne-Marne drive, was not especially disheartened' at
its result and had gone to Flanders hoping to recoup his
failure in Champagne by hastening the preparations for his
offensive next in contemplation in the Lys salient. It was there
that he received news of the Soissons reverse. He immediately
realized the threatening consequences to his armies of this
Allied counter-thrust, and returned to Avesnes to arrange the
necessary withdrawal from the salient.
Materially this retrograde movement did not seriously com-
promise the German army, since, except during the penetra-
tion by the three assault divisions (two American and one
Moroccan) S. of Soissons on July 18 and 19, the withdrawal was
made slowly and in good order, inflicting as heavy losses on the
attackers as the Germans themselves suffered. But Ludendorff
soon recognized that the Lys offensive would have to be indefi-
nitely postponed and the troops destined for it used in easing
the situation in the Marne salient, where the Allied forces
French, British, American and Italian troops were now pressing
vigorously from all points. What Ludendorff apparently failed
to gauge correctly at this time was the resultant damage to the
moral of the German army; neither did he yet, seemingly, share
the conviction, which had now been brought home to the
German people and to Germany's allies, that all hope of ending
the war by a German victory was gone, and that the only
question left impending was whether it would end by a com-
promise or by the utter defeat of the Central Powers. Had the
German High Command faced at this time the logic of the
situation and made a decision to do, after the " Second Marne,"
what most German officers have since agreed should have been
done after the first battle of the Marne, namely, to retire to the
line of the Meuse and re-form, subsequent history might have
differed materially from the actual events.
As proposed by Haig on July 24, the Australian and Canadian
corps on Aug. 8 attacked side by side the German salient fac-
ing Amiens, supported by a French corps on their right and a
British corps on the left. This attack was one of the most
brilliant and tactically interesting episodes of the war, and
showed Ludendorff again that the much disparaged tanks
were, on ground suitable for their employment, a potent factor
in a surprise attack. Although the sector against which the
assault was launched was held by first-class troops, the German
divisions were overrun and virtually annihilated as organized
units. This attack dealt a stunning blow to the pride of the
German High Command, a deadly one to the weak moral of the
troops, and produced a corresponding exhilaration in the British
army, all ranks of which could now clearly see that a complete
and final inversion of roles had taken place.
The shock was felt throughout Germany and reacted strongly
upon the Government. The unsuccessful Marne attack, with
the subsequent withdrawal from the Marne salient, although
manifestly a lost battle, had, nevertheless, been one initiated
by the German High Command on a battle-field of its own
choice. The battle of Amiens could not be so interpreted. The
Allies had here initiated the attack and it had been completely
successful. Ludendorff correctly names Aug. 8 as the " Black
Day " of the German army in the war. So grave was the crisis
felt to be that a conference of army leaders and members of the
German Cabinet was called to meet at Spa on Aug. 13. It was
there agreed that further prosecution of Germany's war aims
was hopeless, and that a peace would have to be negotiated at
the first favourable opportunity, that is, at the first turn in the
military situation even temporarily favourable to Germany.
That looked-for turn never came. Under the persistent Allied
attacks the German army reserves steadily dwindled, munitions
and supplies lessened, and moral evaporated.
The day following the Amiens success Foch decided not to
put the American army which now had some 1,250,000 men
in France in on the Vesle, where the situation was virtually
stabilized, but to assign it at once the task of reducing the
St. Mihiel salient (see WOEVRE, BATTLES IN).
The battle of Amiens was followed up by a French attack
between the Oise and the Aisne on Aug. 20, which forced the
German line back on Chauny. Still more serious for the enemy
was the attack by the British III. Army, on Aug. 21, N. of the
Somme, on the line Bapaume-Peronne, which brought another
crisis. By the end of Aug. the military situation had become
sufficiently defined to enable the Allied leaders to look beyond
a mere driving of the German army back to its strongly fortified
lines of the previous winter, popularly known as the Hindenburg
line, and to make plans for its rupture in a way to reap the
largest strategical as well as tactical fruits of victory.
For this the British army, now fully restored in man-power
and in high moral, and the American army, untouched by war
weariness or reverses, inspired by an almost religious fervour
of belief in the righteousness of the cause in which it was fighting,
were of necessity regarded as the chief Allied weapons. The
French army was tactically a trained and skilled army, but
could no longer count on any large reserves of man-power
to replace losses, and the general feeling among the French
that their country had already been " bled white " in the war
led to the not unreasonable contention by Government and
people that, while France must still do her share to the end, her
army must from now on be spared as much as possible, since in
any event French losses in man-power would far exceed that of
any other nation in the war.
Foch, therefore, determined on two main offensives: the
British, supported on their right by the French, were to break
the Hindenburg line in the direction of Cambrai-St. Quentin;
the Americans, after completing the reduction of the St. Mihiel
salient, which had been assigned as their first task, were to
break through the German lines of defence N. of Verdun, sup-
ported on their left by French armies, and to advance in the
direction of Mezieres. In other words, the German line in
northern France, constituting as it did a huge salient, was to be
attacked in the simple orthodox manner by pinching in the two
flanks. Of these two the Americans had possibly the harder
task, for the Verdun front was well adapted to and thoroughly
organized for stubborn defence, and, inasmuch as the railway
communications through Sedan-Mezieres were essential to the
German army so long as its front lay W. of the Meuse river,
the Verdun front, only 50 m. in front of this railway line, was
bound to be defended with all the vigour and skill still remaining
in the German army. Connecting these two attacks, the French
army was to continue its operations to throw back the Germans
beyond the Aisne and the Ailette. Such was the Allied plan
formulated in Foch's directives of Sept. 3.
By the end of Aug. the German High Command ordered the
evacuation of the Lys salient, and it was completed Sept. 6.
On Sept. 2 the attack of the British III. Army N. of the Somme
was extended northward, E. of Arras, to include the I. Army
reinforced by the Canadian corps; and as a result the whole
German army fell back to the so-called Hindenburg line, which
the Germans themselves designated the Siegfried Stellung.
There they hoped to gain time to reorganize the depleted units.
This withdrawal, and the accumulating evidences of increasing
demoralization in the German army, made it evident to Allied
military leaders that offensive operations on a still larger scale
could be safely initiated; and Marshal Foch, in a conference with
the British and Belgian commanders-in-chief at Cassel Sept. 9,
arranged for a fourth offensive, on the extreme northern part of
the western front, to force the Germans back towards Ghent.
On Sept. 12 the American I. Army, as previously agreed upon,
attacked and captured the St. Mihiel salient.
1004
WESTERN FRONT CAMPAIGNS
During the latter part of Sept. German H.Q., harassed and
preoccupied by the crucial events which were taking place in
other theatres, either gave insufficient heed to the precariousness
and difficulties of the German military situation on the western
front or were too stunned by their sudden and general reversal
of fortune everywhere to be able to grasp and cope with them.
Ludendorff, it is true, had two lines in rear reconnoitred: one
from the Dutch frontier-Bruges-Valenciennes; the other Ant-
werp-Brussels-Namur-the line of the Meuse; but neither 'line
solved the problem, nor could it be held in the face of a vic-
torious pursuing enemy. The desideratum was to find a secure
position for the army's winter respite from active operations,
and time for the resting, reorganization and recruitment of the
armies. It was possible to accomplish this only by a timely
withdrawal, to the line of the Meuse at least, if not to the
frontier. But Ludendorff still clung to the idea of holding
every foot of French territory until the last possible moment.
On Sept. 26 the final Allied offensive, prepared by the directives
of Foch, began. The American army under Pershing and the
French IV. Army under Gouraud attacked on the Verdun and
Champagne fronts (see MEDSE-ARGONNE, BATTLE OF). On
Sept. 28 the Belgians, supported by a French army under
Degoutte and the British II. Army under Plumer, attacked the
line from the coast southward beyond Ypres (see YPRES AND
THE YSER, BATTLES OF, Part iv.). On Sept. 27 the British III.
and I. Armies, including the Canadian corps, had attacked on a
front of 13 m. in the direction of Cambrai, and on the 29th
the British IV. Army under Gen. Rawlinson, after a heavy bom-
bardment lasting two days, attacked the St. Qucntin sector.
( The American and Belgian attacks had the advantage of
coming as a complete strategic surprise; but, in the case of the
Meuse-Argonne front, the depth of the fortified zone behind the
front lines enabled the German reserves to be brought up and
increasingly strong resistance to be made. Both British attacks
were made against strongly organized positions held by the
best troops the Germans still had; but on the front of the
British I., III. and IV. Armies the enemy was already virtually
on his rearmost prepared line, the attack was not unexpected, and
both opposing armies appreciated thoroughly the consequences
of victory and defeat. If driven from the Hindcnburg line the
weakened German army must thereafter fight in the open. The
contest was therefore bitter to the point of desperation, but,
even with the aid of the elaborate system for defence afforded
by the long-prepared Hindenburg line, the struggle proved
unequal, and the German army was forced back with heavy
losses, to begin its retreat through the open country.'
The German High Command had not appreciated the risk
of accepting battle on the Hindenburg line, or else had over-
estimated either the strength of the position or the remaining
fighting capacity of the troops. Once the line was broken,
however, they awoke to the situation. On Sept. 28 Ludendorff
and Hindenburg agreed that the end had come; on the 29th the
Foreign Minister was informed of the army's desperate plight;
on Oct. i Hindenburg and the Kaiser went together to Berlin,
and on Oct. 4 the first peace offer was sent to President Wilson.
On the battle-front the Allies were not permitting events to
lag, and this same day renewed efforts were made on all fronts.
The French V. Army under Berthelot had advanced from the
Aisne and on Oct. 6 reached the Suippe. On Oct. 7 Foch ordered
the attack on the right flank, extended to include the heights
E. of the Meuse. On Oct. 8 the British I. and III. Armies re-
newed their attacks, and in three days drove the Germans back
beyond the line of the Selle river-Le Cateau.
Between the two sectors of the Allied main right and left
flank offensives -lay the strong defensive German positions W.
and S. of Laon. On Oct. 9 these positions were abandoned by
the enemy, and the whole German line between the Scheldt
and the Aisne began its retreat. By Oct. 10 the American I.
Army had penetrated to the last line of German defences on its
front, the Kriemhilde Stellung, and cleared the Argonne forest,
while on its left the French IV. Army reached the Aisne.
On Oct. 10 a new directive of Foch gave more distant objec-
tives to the armies; the Northern Flanders Group was to ad-
vance toward Belgium; the British armies, debouching from the
front Solesne-Vassigny, were to push both in the direction of
Mons and toward Avesnes; on their right the French I. Army
was to push up the Oise; while the French and American armies
between the Aisne and the Meuse were to continue their north-
ward movement. The Marshal defined the purposes of these
converging attacks to be to force the Germans back on the
rough Ardenne forest, where communications were lacking and
a modern army would have difficulty in maintaining itself.
On Oct. 12 the French X. Army of Mangin, on the left of the
V.,- reinforced by an Italian corps, passed the Aisne and occupied
the Chemin des Dames. On Oct. 14 the army group under King
Albert renewed its attack on the front from the Lys to Dixmude.
The Germans were unable to hold; Lille had to be abandoned,
and, under the combined pressure of this and the British attack,
the whole German line N. of Cambrai rolled backward in disor-
der, toward the Scheldt, closely pursued. The Americans also
attacked on the I4th, with important gains W. of the Meuse.
On Oct. 17 the British IV. Army and the French I. Army
attacked the hastily improvised German line between Le Cateau
and the Oise. On the 2oth the III. Army attacked the line of
the Selle, supported by the I. Army astride the Scheldt. Both
attacks succeeded.
The conditions of the fighting are best understood by referring
to the German reserves. From 69 divisions in reserve when the
attack of Sept. 26 was begun the German army had been reduced
by Oct. 15 to 26 divisions in reserve, of which only 9 were
rested. Of the divisions in line many were unfit for combat, but
could not be replaced.
Toward the end of Oct. the dissatisfaction in Berlin and
elsewhere with the Government had become intense. The people
felt that the war had been mismanaged and that they had been
deceived. In an attempt to appease them Ludendorff was
dismissed on Oct. 25, and his place as quartermaster-general
was taken by Gen. Groener. But it was too late to save either
the Cabinet or the Monarchy, for with the disaster to the army
from the vigorous Allied attacks of Nov. i and following days
the Kaiser was forced to abdicate on Nov. 9.
On Nov. i the Allied armies began their final drive. On the
right the American I. Army on the Mcuse-Argonne front effected
a clean break through the German lines, and began an active
pursuit which was only stopped by the Armistice on Nov. n.
On the left of the American armies the French IV. Army was
equally successful. Farther N. the British I. Army attacked the
line of the Rh6nelle river and completed the evacuation of
Valenciennes. This attack was followed on Nov. 4 by a general
attack by the British I., III. and IV. Armies, on a 3O-m. front,
from Valenciennes to the Sambre, N. of Oisy. In spite of serious
natural obstacles, having to force the crossings of the Sambre
on the right and to penetrate the forest of Mormal in the centre,
the line was advanced 5 m. on Nov. 4. This battle finally broke
the German power of resistance, and the German army began
a retreat along the entire northern front, though it still offered
stiff resistance to the British I. Army on Nov. 5 and 6.
On Nov. 9 the important railway centre and fortress of
Maubeuge was taken and the II. Army crossed the Scheldt on
its entire front. On Nov. n the Canadian 3rd Div. captured
Mons. Farther N. the Belgian army stood before Ghent.
On Nov. 9 Foch had telegraphed all commanders-in-chicf:
" The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, yields on
the entire front. I appeal to the energy and initiative of the
commanders-in-chief and of their armies to render decisive the
results gained." On the same day the German delegates pre-
sented themselves at Rethondes to ask terms for an armistice,
which were accepted on Nov. n.
During the last week's fighting the outbreak of the revolution
in Germany, interrupting as it did the service of communication
and the forwarding of supplies, had combined, with the pressure
on the front, the depleted and disorganized condition of the
troops, and the absence of any available reserves to replace
broken and worn combat units, to render further resistance on
WESTER WMYSS WEST INDIES, BRITISH
the part of the Germans an impossibility. Had the Armistice
not been concluded a great debdcle would have been the result.
Preparations had been made to extend the attack on Nov. 14
to include the Lorraine front E. of Metz, an attack which the
German army was as little prepared to meet as it was to resist
the advance of the whole Allied line to the north. But this proved
unnecessary to secure the Allied war aims. (A. L. C.)
WESTER WEMYSS, ROSSLYN ERSKINE WEMYSS, IST BARON
(1864- ), British admiral, was born in London April 12
1864, the 3rd and posthumous son of James Hay Erskine Wem-
yss of Wemyss Castle, Fife. He entered the navy in 1877, was
promoted lieutenant 1887, commander 1898, captain 1901,
rear-admiral of 2nd Battle Squadron 1912-3, and of the 3rd
fleet 1914, vice-admiral 1916 and admiral of the fleet 1919.
He commanded a squadron during the landing of the British
troops in Gallipoli (1913), was commander-in-chief in the East
Indies and Egypt (1916-7), Second, and shortly afterward First
Sea Lord of the Admiralty (1917-9), and member of the War
Cabinet (1918). He was created K.C.B. (1916), G.C.B. (1918),
and raised to the peerage (1919).
WEST INDIES, BRITISH (see 4.607* and separate articles on the
various islands). For administrative purposes, British Guiana
and British Honduras are usually regarded as an integral part
of the British West Indies, with which they have much in com-
mon. These two colonies are, therefore, included here. The
area of the group remained unchanged in 1921, no new posses-
sions having been acquired by Great Britain in the Caribbean
and no territory alienated. The total pop., according to the
latest estimates available in 1921, was: Bahamas, 59,049;
Barbados, 200,368; Jamaica, 891,040; Turks and Caicos Is.,
5,615; Cayman Is., 5,564; Antigua, 32,865; St. Kitts, 22,415;
Nevis, 11,596; Anguilla, 4,230; Dominica, 40,315; Montserrat,
10,182; Virgin Is., 5,557; Trinidad and Tobago, 386,707; Gre-
nada, 74,490; St. Vincent, 53,210; St. Lucia, 51,505; British
Guiana, 305,991; British Honduras, 43,586.
The Supply of Labour .Though Barbados has a redundant
population, the labour supply in the rest of the West Indies
was insufficient for agricultural requirements, and the position
had been aggravated by the emigration of British West Indians
to Cuba, to which island they were tempted by the promise of
higher wages, which did not, however, always materialize.
Toward the end of 1919 this form of emigration began to as-
sume serious proportions, no fewer than 21,573 labourers leav-
ing Jamaica for Cuba, whilst only 6,457 returned. Recruiting
for Cuba was also actively carried on in Barbados. With the
slump in prices in 1921, however, the tide set in to some extent
in the opposite direction, many labourers returning to their
homes. In the British West Indies it was beginning to be real-
ized that it is only by the payment of suitable wages, improved
housing conditions and the offer of other amenities, that labour-
ers can be induced to remain in their island homes. In British
Guiana the shortage of labour was particularly acute, and with
a population averaging only 3-3 to the square mile, no develop-
ment of the hinterland on a large scale was possible.
In 1913, Mr. James McNeil and Mr. Chimman Lall visited
the British West Indies to report on the system of indentured
immigration prevailing in British Guiana, Jamaica and Trinidad,
and though their report was favourable, Lord Hardinge, the
then Viceroy of India, announced in the Indian Legislative
Council in April 1916 the determination of the Government to
abolish the indenture system. It was at first proposed to termi-
nate the system gradually in order that the colonies might have
time to adjust themselves to the change; but in practice emi-
gration from India was completely suspended in the same year.
In 1919, the need for labour having become acute in British
Guiana, a deputation comprising representatives of all classes
of the agricultural and commercial communities visited England
to urge upon the India Office and leaders of Indian public
orjjnion, who were then in London, the desirability of the re-
sumption of Indian immigration on a free colonization basis.
Representatives of the deputation and of the West India Com-
mittee subsequently visited India, where they interviewed prom-
1005
inent leaders and the members of the Government, who agreed
to send a commission to British Guiana to report on the suita-
bility of that country for receiving immigrants. The appoint-
ment of this commission was, however, delayed, it being felt
desirable to await the views of the public in India regarding the
proposals for dealing with the Indian question in Kenya Colony
before proceeding further with the matter. In July 1921 an
offer of the Indian Government to send a deputation to British