The tax levy of 1918 produced $12,142,121 for the use of counties,
$22,580,567 for cities, towns and villages, and $16,444,671 were ,
school and school district rates. The state income taxes of 1916, '
paid in 1917, amounted to $9,482,595, of which $603,762 went to
the state and the rest to localities in lieu of the general property tax. i

Education. In 1915 a State Board of Education was provided to
correlate the educational undertakings of the state. The most
important new departure was with reference to vocational edu- !
cation, for which a Board was provided in 1915. A law of 1917
increased the effectiveness of compulsory education for those
between 9 and 14; in 1915 aid in transportation was provided for
those attending school at a distance from home; 32 cities in 1920 !
maintained continuation schools. In 1920 the total educational
expense by the state and localities was $25,901,282; $2,779,072 for
the university, $1,427,959 for normal schools, $10,024,095 for city
schools, and $11,361,692 for town and country schools, toward
which a great effort at improvement was being made.

History. Gov. McGovern, elected in IQII, continued the
progressive policy inaugurated by Gov. La Follette. The activi-
ties of the state Government were increased, their administration
being given to commissions composed in part at least of recognized
experts, and similar commissions were given power of super-
vision and control over private activities. The extension of this
policy led to a reaction in 1914 and Emanuel Phillip was elected
governor on a somewhat reactionary programme. The break,
however, proved to be less violent than many expected, and the
main features of the legislation of the preceding 10 years were
continued. The outbreak of the World War divided sentiment
in the state perhaps more than elsewhere in the country. In the
'fifties some German leaders had hoped to make the state essen-
tially German and a centre in America for the development of
German culture, as New England was for English Puritanism,
but turned to liberalism. This project had failed, but a large
element in the state was German-born or of German parentage,
and many communities retained German habits and language,
and educated their children in Catholic or Lutheran schools
conducted in German. While this element was by no means solid
in sentiment, the majority sympathized with Germany as opposed I j
to Great Britain and her Allies. When the question arose of the j
entrance of the United States into the war, this element was II
opposed to it, and was reenforced by a powerful sentiment in 1 1
favour of peace. The national representation of the state was
divided. Senator La Follette voiced the peace sentiments, and
was one of those characterized by President Wilson as " a little
group of wilful men." Senator Husting, a Democrat, supported
the Wilson administration. The death of Senator Husting
necessitated a senatorial election in the spring of 1918, which
attracted wide attention as a test of public opinion in the state
which was thought least likely to support the war. An active
campaign of education was conducted, by means of pamphlets,
speeches and organization. The result was the choice in the
Republican primaries of Irvine L. Lenroot, who was pledged to
support the Administration in its war policy, and who defeated



WISE WOEVRE, BATTLES IN THE



1031



the Democratic candidate in the election which followed. Later
Senator Lenroot broke with President Wilson on his peace policy,
taking a stand for moderate reservations in the plan for a League

Nations. This stand was endorsed by his reelection for the
regular senatorial term in 1920, when the state gave a large
majority also to Harding. In the gubernatorial election of that
year, the successful candidate, Mr. Elaine, represented in general
the La Follette views, maintaining that the stand taken by that
senator was not disloyal, but legitimate opposition. Although
many regretted the necessity of fighting Germany, the number
who failed to support the United States was negligible.

Gov. Phillip proved an efficient war administrator, working
in harmony with the national officials and organizing extremely
effective state and local machinery to handle the problems that
constantly arose. The state met and exceeded every demand
made upon it, for men and for money; the draft was put into
operation with success; the administrative effectiveness which
had been developed in the preceding 10 years was everywhere in
evidence. Wisconsin troops repeated the record they had made
in the Civil War. A war history commission planned to put the
war record in substantial shape for the future. The Wisconsin
National Guard served on the Mexican frontier, 1916-7, and was
called into national service for the World War in 1917; its aggre-
gate strength, Aug. 4 1917 was 15,266. The losses of troops from
Wisconsin in France were given as 5,735; 71,790 were accepted
at camp under the draft laws. To the five Liberty loans $471,-
194,250 was subscribed. The United War Work Campaign of
1918 produced $4,546,706. Besides this a million had been
raised for the Y.M.C.A., nine millions and a quarter for the Red
Cross; 8,503 French orphans were adopted, and generous con-
tributions made to all causes of war aid and relief.

The governors of Wisconsin after 1911 were: F. C. McGovern,
Republican, 1911-5; Emanuel Phillip, Republican, 1915-21;
John J. Elaine, Republican, 1921- .

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Recent works on Wisconsin are: H. C. Camp-
bell, etc., Wisconsin in Three Centuries (4 vols., 1905); E. B. Usher,
Wisconsin, Its Story and Biography (8 vols., 1914); F. C. Howe,
Wisconsin, an Experiment in Democracy (1912); C. McCarthy, The
Wisconsin Idea (1912); J. B. Winslow, The Story of a Great Court
(1912); F. Merk, Economic History of Wisconsin in the Civil War
Decade (1916). (C. R. F.)

WISE, BERNHARD RINGROSE (1858-1916), Australian law-
yer, was born at Sydney Feb. 10 1858, the second son of Edward
Wise, Judge of the Supreme Court of N.S.W. He was educated
in England at Rugby and Queen's College, Oxford, where he
won the Cobden prize and was proxime for the Lothian Historial
Essay, finally graduating ist-class in law. He was also a promi-
nent athlete, and represented Oxford in the mile race against
Cambridge. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple
(1883), then returned to Australia, was elected to the N.S.W.
legislature and became Attorney-General of N.S.W. 1887-8,
and Q.C. in 1898, being again Attorney-General from 1899 to
1904 and, in addition, Minister of Justice 1901-4. For part of
1903-4 he was Acting-Premier of N.S.W. He did distinguished
service to the cause of Federation but was defeated in the elec-
tions for the first Commonwealth Parliament, and his abilities
therefore were never called upon for Federal service. From 1915
until his death, Sept. 19 1916, he was acting as Agent-General
for N.S.W. in London.

WISTER, OWEN (1860- ), American writer, was born in
Philadelphia July 14 1860. He was a grandson of Frances
Anne Kemble (see 15.724). On graduating from Harvard in 1882
he intended to devote himself to music. He went abroad for
study; but ill-health forced him to return to America, and he
spent several years in Arizona and New Mexico. He then en-
tered the Hazard law school, graduating in 1888, was admitted
to the bar in 1889 and for two years practised law in Philadelphia.
Thereafter he gave his time to literary work. As an under-
graduate he had contributed a poem, Beethoven, to the Atlantic
Monthly in 1882. His subsequent publications include the
Modern Swiss Family Robinson (1883); The Dragon of Wantley:
His Tail (1892); Lin Mclxan (1898); The Virginian: a Horse-
man of the Plains (1902); Philosophy 4: a Story of Harvard



University (1903); Lady Baltimore (1906); The Seven Ages of
Washington: a Biography (1907); Members of the Family (1911);
The Pentecost of Calamity (1915, a condemnation of Germany for
the World War), and A Straight Deal: or the Ancient Grudge
(1920). His novels, The Virginian and Lady Baltimore in particu-
lar, established his position as one of the foremost of contem-
porary American writers. He became a member of the National
Institute of Arts and Letters and of the Societe des Gens de
Lettres de France, and in 1912 was elected a member of the
Board of Overseers of Harvard.

WITTE, SERGE JULIEVICH, COUNT (1840-1915), Russian
statesman (see 28.762), died in Petrograd March 12 1915. His
diaries were posthumously published by the Soviet in Pravda in
1918, and a study of his career as Minister of Finance during
1892-1903, by D. A. Lutokhin, appeared in 1915. The Memoirs
of Count Witte, translated from the original Russian MS. and
edited by Abraham Garmolinsky, were also published in New
York and in London in 1921.

WOfiVRE, BATTLES IN THE, 1914-8. The military impor-
tance of the great plain which separates the Metz ridges from the
line of heights along the Meuse was evident as soon as the fron-
tier of 1871 was drawn. On its N. side, a strip of bold undulating
country, the axis of which may be taken as Montm6dy-Thionville,
skirts the Belgian and Luxemburg border, while at the S. it
narrows, as the Meuse and Moselle converge toward Toul, to a
blunted end facing the Haye Plateau and Toul. Along the
Meuse (Verdun-Toul) and along the Moselle (Thionville-Metz)
both sides gradually crowned the heights with permanent fortifi-
cations. The plain itself, through which the frontier ran along no
very well defined line, was not fortified, each side treating it as a
sort of foreground or glacis. Generally speaking, this frontier
line left the plain to France, but the French ground immediately
adjacent to the frontier was practically under the fire of the
Metz guns. Hence the war outpost line, which was to protect the
concentration of the French main armies, was drawn well back
almost to the verge of the Meuse heights and no attempt was
made to hold the frontier region itself.

This proved, in the sequel, to be of enormous importance.
For, from about the end of the igth century, vast mineral
resources had been discovered in the Briey basin or Eastern
Woe'vre; this lay on both sides of the frontier, and was at the
outbreak of war being developed by a Franco-German syndicate^
From the military point of view a short, purely military war
being in prospect no great importance was attached by the
French to the evacuation of an untenable stretch of country, but
when the war became a prolonged, and largely an economic,
struggle, the German occupation and exploitation of the Briey
area became a most important asset to the Central Powers.

Nevertheless, after the battle of the Marne and its concomitant
fighting on the Meuse died away in Sept 1914, no major offensive
took place in this area until the American attack of Sept. 1918.
The reasons for this quiescence on the French side were not
allowed to appear during the war, and are still rather obscure.

In the following article are described (i) the bitter trench-
warfare fighting which without ever becoming a major offensive
went on continually in 1914-5, around the salient of St.
Mihiel the base of which was the Woe'vre plain and (2) the
American operations, which, carried out on a large scale and
without reserve, reduced the salient in two days in 1918.

(C.F.A.)

(I.) HAUTS DE MEUSE AND WOE'VRE, 1914-6

On Sept. 19 1914 the right wing of the French III. Army was
carrying out an offensive advance from the Hauls de Meuse in
the direction of Mars-la-Tour when the VIII. Corps encountered
at Woe'l an advanced guard of the German army which was being
led toward the Hauts de Meuse by Gen. von Strautz. Before the
engagement at Woe'l had assumed any great importance it was
suspended by the arrival of an order from Gen. Joffre to the
effect that the VIII. Corps was to proceed immediately to Ste.
Menehould, where it was to remain in general reserve. Conse-
quently the Germans found themselves confronted only by re-



1032



WOEVRE, BATTLES IN THE



serve troops, not yet inured to war, and dispersed over a wide
fjront, when they launched their attacks against the Meuse
heights on the 2oth and following days.

At Vigneulles Gen. Grand d'Esnon of the 7Sth Res. Div. was
killed and the enemy surmounted the Hauts de Meuse. Before
long the German heavy artillery was bombarding the forts of
Lionville and Geronville toward the S. and Camp des Remains
in front. On Sept. 24 St. Mihiel was in the hands of the Ger-
mans, who tried to gain ground W. of the Meuse but could not
get beyond Chauvoncourt. In the N. von Strautz's army was
held by Gen. Pol Durand's group of reserve division's which had
come to the assistance of the VI. Corps. Toward the S. it was
attacked by the XVI. Army Corps at St. Baussant and by the
VII. Cav. Div.

The region of. Leronville-Marbotte was without defenders, but
the Germans did not advance in the direction of Commercy, as
their aim was to encircle Verdun. To this end the German
Crown Prince attacked to the S. of Varennes and in Argonne
simultaneously and the French III. Army thus found itself
threatened both to the N. W. and to the S. of Verdun.

The isth Div. of the VIII. Corps was brought back to Chau-
mont-sur-Aire to the III. Army Reserve, ready to hasten either
to the aid of the V. Corps in the Argonne or toward Chauvon-
court to help the 75th Res. Div.

The i6th Div. was transported by train from St. Menchould
to Leronville-Sampigny and placed under the orders of the I.
Army headquarters, for the purpose of covering Commercy, and
was reinforced on Sept. 28 by the Bclfort Brigade. From this mo-
ment von Strautz's army, which was composed of Bavarians, had
its III. Army Corps bottled up at St. Mihiel and so the " Hernia,"
called also the " Wedge," came into being. From Les Epargcs to
the Meuse S. of St. Mihiel, the III. Army put in line the VI.
Corps and part of Gen. Pol Durand's group. The Bislee penin-
sula and the front Koeur-la-Grande-Brasseitte-St. Agnant were
held by the VIII. Corps with the i6th Inf. Div. and the Belfort
Bde. To the E., in the region of the Bouconville pondsin Woevre,
was the 7th Cav. Div. Still farther eastward the XVI. Corps was
attacking fiercely at St. Baussant, urged on by the determined
commander of the I. Army.

The zone S. of the St. Mihiel wedge and Woevre and N. of
Toul was assigned to the I. Army. The point of liaison between
the I. and III. Armies was on the Meuse below Bisl6e. Before
long the III. Army was put under the command of the I. Army
and it was therefore Gen. Dubail who was matched against Gen.
von Strautz.

At first the Germans tried to debouch from Chauvoncourt,
but without success. Elsewhere, both in the S. and the N., they
made every effort to enlarge the wedge while the French attacks
were directed toward diminishing it. Hence there resulted
partial engagements at Chauvoncourt, in front of Les Parodies,
at Les Eparges near the Hauts de Meuse, in the Bois d'Ailly,
in the Bois Brule, near Aprcmont, and at St. Baussant.

For the beginning of April 1915, Gen. Dubail ordered an
attack on a large scale from the N. and the S. to be delivered by
several army corps. A force designated the army detachment
Q6rard, including the I. and II. Army Corps, the Verdun
Provisional Div., and the I. Cav. Corps, opened the attack on
April 5 and took possession of Fromezey, Gussaniville and
1'Hopital farm (in the region of Etain), but broke down before
the intact German wire for in the marshy ground the artillery
projectiles buried themselves deeply.

In conjunction with the attack by Gerard's force an attack was
launched by the XII. Corps and VIII. Corps which, however, had
no particular results. The fighting lasted from the sth to the
22nd without achieving anything but the exhaustion of both
attackers and defenders.

: From that time forward the struggle resolved itself into a
series of partial combats. The names Les Eparges, the Tranchee
de Calonne, Chauvoncourt, Bois d'Ailly, Bois Brule, Seicheprey,
Bois le Pretre recur day by day in the communiques of 1915.

On May 5 1915 the VIII. Corps lost in one morning all the
ground which it had taken several months to gain in the Ailly



wood. There was even a moment when a gap in the line seemed to
be broken through and the way opened to Commercy; but the
counter-attacks came in time to regain part of the Bois d'Ailly,
and restore the situation. In the course of one of these counter-
attacks in the woods, a company of the 17 2nd, led by Com-
mandant d'Andre, crossed five lines of German trenches in
succession and came within sight of St. Mihiel. But here they
were confronted by German reserves and surrounded. For three
days these heroes resisted all attacks, having nothing but their
rifles and the German grenades picked up in the fifth line of
trenches. They finally succumbed to hunger and thirst. Justly
indeed was this trench named " the thirst trench." When Gen.
von Strautz saw Commandant d'Andre on the day after the
fighting was over, he said, " Vous avez el6 deux fois blessi, vous
ttiez au Bois d'Ailly, vous ties un brave."

At Bois le Pretre, near the Moselle, the fighting was incessant
and for the most part to the advantage of the French.

At Les Eparges it was mine warfare. In this the Germans had
generally the upper hand, but, as at the Bois d'Ailly and the
Bois le Pretre, the upper hand did not imply the gain of ground
desired. In mine warfare the Germans had a very considerable
advantage over their opponents in the matter of equipment and
especially of boring tools. At the outset the galleries they made
in the Crete des Eparges and the colossal dimensions of their
mine chambers astonished even the men of the II. Corps, re-
cruited though many of them were from the mining country of
the Nord. But, though astonished, they were not dismayed, and
feeble as their implements were, they often took their revenge
for the mine attacks to which they were subjected.

The characteristic of the army of 1915 was the poverty of its
material in comparison to that at the disposal of the enemy. In '
it was learned the lesson that a nation poor in coal and iron must
shed much blood to save itself from slavery.

When in Sept. 1915 the Champagne offensive was launched,
quiet set in on the front Les Eparges-Chauvoncourt-Bois d'Ailly-
Bois le Pretre. On both sides, the forces on this front were milked
to obtain quality and quantity on the field of the great battle.
When it died down, the battered formations came back to rest
and recruit and also to fight, for activity began again in Nov.
and Dec. 1915.

In Feb. 1916 the storm burst at Verdun, and in July the other
storm on the Somme. Then the front with which we are con-
cerned became so calm that the commander of the VIII. Corps
called the Wedge of St. Mihiel a convalescent home.

Here and there, now and then there was a coup de main, but
the only result was to show both sides the necessity of not relaxing
vigilance. The year 1917 came and went without changing cither
the positions or the attitude of the two parties. The great Bri tish
offensive of Arras, the great French offensive on the Aisnc, the
Franco-British battles of Ypres absorbed all the offensive power
of the adversaries on the western front. Not till 1918 did the
sector Les Eparges-Chauvoncourt-Bois d'Ailly-Bois le Pretre
become again the scene of victory.

In concluding this survey of operations on the front between
Les Eparges and the Moselle, it is necessary to underline again
the poverty of material and munitions under which the French
army laboured. Not only did it possess little heavy artillery, but
even the 75*5, excellent for barrages, diminished daily and were
replaced by B.L. guns of 90 and 95 mm., obsolete since 1900.
Track for light railways could not be had. Boring tools were so
short that mine warfare in the Forest of Apremont had to be
waged with pick, chisel and crowbar. Ammunition was served
out by spoonfuls, and at one moment the commander of the
eastern group of armies had only 350 rounds per gun for his
75's half an hour's battle allowance.

These conditions were, of course, not peculiar to the front
under consideration, and are introduced here to enable the reader
to see how the Higher Command was obliged to apply the great
Napoleonic principle of economy of force; to show how it was
possible for the Crown Prince to break in the Verdun front or, for
that matter, the whole front from the Meuse to Switzerland, for
the defenders were few, their guns few, and their shell very few.



.
t




WOEVRE, BATTLES IN THE



1033



But it may be seen, too, how a German success was bound always
to remain without a sequel, for it was through this conception
of the economy of forces that Joffre was able always to keep in
hand strong, rested reserves, free guns and unallotted ammuni-
tion. (V.L.E.C.)

(II.) BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL (SEPT. IZ.'TO 14 1918)

For four years the St. Mihiel salient had projected 28 km.
deep into the French line, constituting alike a menace and an
invitation to attack. Its original purpose, to serve as one of
the jaws of a nutcracker attack on Verdun, having failed, it was
used in 1916 as the anvil against which von Falkenhayn sought
in vain to drive home his hammer-blows against Verdun from
the north. In 1918 Ludendorff again hoped through its posses-
sion to gain Verdun and much more by the wider encircling
attack in Champagne of July 15, but again the attack failed.
During all these years also it had remained not only a threat of
further German aggression but a serious interruption of French
railway communication with Verdun and also with the Lorraine
front. In 1915 the French army had twice attacked to compel
evacuation of the salient but both attacks had failed, the first,
made in April at Les Eparges, with serious losses.

Tactically, the salient afforded a strong defensive position.
The Cote de Meuse, a range of hills rising abruptly 500 metres
above the Meuse valley on the W. and the Woevre plain on the
E., afforded strong supporting points on the western face of the
salient, while Mont Sec and the lower-lying hills S. of the Rupt
de Mad were well adapted to a strong defensive organization.

To the general staff of the American Expeditionary Forces
the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient had appealed strongly as
a favourable initial or try-out operation for the American army
as soon as sufficient forces should have arrived to undertake it.
The reason for this selection was not so much the material gain
to be reaped from it as the consideration that the fresh and
eventually preponderant American force should preferably be
employed against a part of the line where it could strike a vital
"blow to the Germans. Metz, the centre of important railway
communications and surrounded by coal and iron fields, obvious-
ly presented itself as such a region, and, in addition, while the
American forces were being gathered for the later major opera-
tions, the same installations and lines of communication needed
for them could be utilized by the earlier arriving troops to gain
an initial success on a smaller scale, mainly for moral effect
though also as a factor in troop training.

General Pershing had discussed this view with General
Petain in June 1917, and, after further study of the front, port
facilities and railway lines, this had been adopted as the work-
ing plan. However, the slowness of the transportation of troops
to France during the first year of American participation in the
war, and the exigencies caused by the success of the German
offensive operations in the spring of 1918, caused the plan to be
temporarily laid aside, and, during both spring and summer of
that year, American troops in France and arriving were scat-
tered along the western front to meet needs of the moment.

By the end of July the situation had stabilized sufficiently in
favour of the Allies to enable the question of reuniting the
troops of the American army to be taken up. On July 24 Marshal
Foch confirmed the understanding arrived at the previous year,
that the first American operation should be the reduction of the
St. Mihiel salient, and, a few weeks later, he authorized the
transfer to the I. American Army of that sector of the Allied
front facing the salient. This transfer occurred on Aug. 30.

By this time the American army consisted of forces far be-
yond the number requisite for the mere reduction of the salient
and the question of their subsequent employment arose. Gen-
eral Pershing desired to exploit the St. Mihiel attack to the ut-
most; Foch, however, with other plans and considerations in